1 Introduction
1.5 IR Theory and Espionage
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9 The underlying reason for Taiwan academic’s reluctance to speak about PRC espionage appears to be a concern for potential retribution from the PRC. According to a former Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) official, many Taiwanese scholars fear that they will be denied access to the PRC if they criticize, or comment on, PRC espionage. Many social science scholars rely on entry to the PRC, and access to PRC academics, in order to undertake their research. If a Taiwanese scholar is found to be “too unfriendly” to the Mainland, then they could be denied entry to the PRC or shunned by Mainland scholars.11 Without access to Mainland China, many scholars would be deprived of an important research market that is vital for their careers and success. According to this individual, China also routinely hacks into the e-mail accounts of Taiwanese academics who deal with politics and cross-strait issues. It is assumed that they keep tabs on what these scholars are saying and who they associate with.
The fact that many Taiwanese scholars refuse to openly, or even privately, discuss
matters relating to PRC espionage against Taiwan should be a cause for concern. It demonstrates that the PRC has already been successful in curtailing criticism over some of its threatening actions towards Taiwan. As a maturing democracy, Taiwan’s academic community must naturally take a part in raising security awareness, educating the populace of Taiwan, and advising ROC military and government bodies on issues related to Taiwan’s security (contrast with American academics who advise congress on PRC espionage threats). If Taiwan’s academic community remains silent on this issue, the security challenge of PRC espionage may not receive enough attention and emphasis. Taiwan’s security scholars have the challenging task of
fostering better relations with the PRC, while maintaining vigilance and raising awareness against enduring security threats.
1.5 IR Theory and Espionage
Espionage has been a feature of international relations since antiquity. Most nations, especially great powers, are active practitioners. Simply stated, espionage is the effort to discover by concealed methods the guarded secrets of other nations.12 The practice of espionage in
international relations can best be understood by examining espionage from the perspective of
11 Appendix 1, Interview 9.
12 Louis Farago, War of Wits, The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1954).
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10 political realism. One of the central propositions of the Realist Theory holds that international relations are conducted in an anarchic environment. Espionage helps states reduce this anarchy by revealing the motives, plans and intentions of other nations. States have a natural need and motivation to collect as much information as they can about other nations. States and national leaders feel more secure when they understand the intentions and disposition of other nations.
Information, especially information gleaned from espionage, reduces strategic ambiguity and therefore allows national leaders to make decisions with greater confidence and effectiveness.
The intelligence organizations of most major powers garner significant attention from national leaders and play an important role in national decision making. The president of the United States receives an intelligence briefing from the CIA every morning on world events and issues of concern. Civilian and military leaders are very reliant upon and demanding of their
intelligence organizations.
The second principle of Political Realism holds that states are interested and driven to maximize their power.13 Political scientists often speak of a nation’s power in terms of economic, military and diplomatic capability. However, knowledge and information concerning one’s friends and enemies is also a form of power. This is especially true in the information age where acquiring sensitive information often provides an advantage for whoever can attain it first.
Information superiority can enhance the effects of a nation’s economic, diplomatic and military initiatives. Likewise, a deficiency of information reduces the effectiveness of a nation’s tools of influence. It is thus in the interest of all nations to acquire sensitive information about the business of other nations.
The relationship between espionage and military objectives is especially strong. Since ancient times, military strategists such as Sunzi have recognized and stressed the value of attaining the secrets of the enemy. In contemporary military thinking, good intelligence is often considered to be a “force multiplier.” Attaining, and acting on accurate information about one’s enemy increases the chance of successful military endeavors. Having good intelligence can save lives; failure to collect accurate intelligence can result in tragedy and loss of life.
13 Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973).
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11 Given that states are motivated to acquire the secrets of other nations, the perceived benefits of espionage generally outweigh the costs. While the rewards can be substantial, states are seldom severely punished for their espionage activities.14 Most countries use official
diplomatic cover to conduct their espionage activities. Therefore, they have a certain measure of protection if they are caught. Espionage is often hard to detect. When it is detected, it is usually difficult to acquire hard proof of an enemy agent’s activity. It is often easier to catch one’s own citizen in the act than it is catch both the citizen and the foreign agent conspiring together.
Moreover, because foreign agents often have official diplomatic cover, it makes retribution against the offending nation even more difficult. Hence, while the payoffs of espionage can be substantial, the ultimate risk for the spying nation is often fairly low.
Despite the cooperation that often exists among friendly nations, extensive espionage operations sometimes do still occur. The relationship between friendly states can simultaneously show strains of Complex Interdependence and of Political Realism. The US relationship with Israel and the ROC provides a case in point. The state of Israel is closes American allay yet intensive espionage operations continue to occur, especially on the part of Israel. Several recent, high profile cases attest to this fact. The US relationship with the ROC has also experienced several high profile espionage cases. In 1987 the CIA procured information from an ROC military officer on Taiwan’s nuclear weapons program. The United States successfully used this information to pressuring the ROC government into terminating its nuclear weapons
development program. More recently, a high level US DOD official was fired and punished for spying on behalf of Taiwan. He was recruited by a young female NSB agent who provided him with romantic affections.15
In spite of the mutual practice of espionage, most countries continue to maintain strong relations with each other and they rarely face substantial diplomatic repercussions for their actions. In many cases, the victim nation is unwilling to undertake serious retribution against the offending nation. The effort to punish the offending nation may simply not be worth the effort.
This is often the case for smaller nations who are espionage targets of larger nations. In some cases, a “tit for tat” situation occurs in which countries each country expels a number of
14 Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, (Arlington: Newcomb Publishers, 1998).
15 “Error of Judgment” Time Magazine, 20 September 2004. Online at:
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,699471,00.html accessed March 5, 2010.
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12 diplomats. However, most countries seek to avoid this development because it causes undue problems for both sides. Taiwan was unwilling to punish the US for the CIA’s discovery of its nuclear program. Similarly, some Taiwanese politicians are unwilling to take tough measures against PRC espionage for fear of harming relations.16
States that discover espionage activities in their borders may be unwilling to punish transgressor nations because the victim states are also engaged in espionage against the same states which target them. If a state undertakes retribution against another nation, its own
diplomats and espionage agents may face similar scrutiny and reprisal. The punishing state may loss current sources of intelligence information as well as losing future espionage sources. For this reason, states may conclude that they stand to lose more than they gain by punishing the other nation.