1 Introduction
1.2 Motivation and Purpose
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3 leadership, military structure and capability, science and technology, economic conditions and social conditions. These six categories generally correspond and reflect the espionage targets of other major countries.
In some cases, the boundary between espionage and other forms of intellectual exchange can become blurry. International academic and scientific exchange is one such area. While most of this activity is professional and legitimate, it can sometimes cross the line into espionage.
Visiting scientists and academics are sometimes used by intelligence organizations to pressure or elicit sensitive or classified information from their counterparts in the host country. This can be a very grey area because scientists and academics naturally seek as much knowledge in their area of interest as they can obtain. In these instances, the judgment as to whether espionage has occurred must be considered on a case-by-case basis.
1.2 Motivation and Purpose
Despite its persistence and frequency in international affairs, espionage is rarely studied by the scholarly community. Part of this reason has to do with the fact that many espionage activities are kept secret and government organizations control most of the information relating to espionage activities. Despite the government’s control over the most sensitive details of espionage, an increasing amount of information is now available to the public. Many scholars may consider espionage to be a subject unworthy of serious study. This is a grave mistake.
Although its influence is often subtle, espionage and the discipline of intelligence have played an important role in international events. Many military engagements have been fundamentally altered by the presence or absence of intelligence information, often times, this critical
information is derived by means of HUMINT. Peacetime diplomacy can also be undermined by espionage activities. In 2002 ROC President Chen Shui-bian was forced to cancel a stopover at a European country on his way to visit diplomatic allies in Africa. The Chinese government discovered Chen’s itinerary and subsequently pressured the host country into revoking President Chen’s invitation. Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials strongly suspected that the PRC had surreptitiously acquired this information and pressured the host country into canceling the visit.4
4 “PRC bugging is a serious problem” The China Post, November 1, 2002
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4 An important aim of this study is to help increase awareness of the danger of PRC
espionage activity in Taiwan. Pushing the subject of espionage into the academic community may motivate other scholars to examine this important security issue. Unlike many academic topics, the subject of espionage can be fairly controversial, especially in Taiwan. This study does not seek to avoid controversy, raising provocative questions is an important means to challenge our assumptions and deepen our understanding of important issues. Presenting controversial positions, provided they are accurate and defensible, will spur other scholars to conduct research into this neglected facet of Taiwan’s security.
The subject of PRC espionage against Taiwan is both timely, and taboo. Under the Ma Administration, the ROC has considerably increased its interaction with the PRC in the space of only a few years. Most of this contact has been beneficial for both sides and many international observers have hailed this increase in cross-strait interaction as a major step for peace between the two sides. Unfortunately, as this thesis will argue, and as others have observed, cross-strait spying, especially from the PRC side, has continued on a massive scale.5
This study has several main objectives and goals. First, it seeks to determine how PRC HUMINT operations against Taiwan have evolved as China and Taiwan have opened up to each other following the Cold War.6 Secondly, this study will identify probable weaknesses in the ROC’s security apperatus which pertain to, and make it more vulnerable to PRC HUMINT operations.
The third major aim of this study will be to challenge assumptions, and draw possible lessons for the study of PRC HUMINT operations in other countries, particularly the United
5 In January of 2009, Lin Yu-fang, the head of the Foreign and National Defense Committee in the Legislative Yuan, claimed that both China and Taiwan were still actively spying on each other despite warmer cross-strait relations ( Ko Shu-ling and Flora Wang “Two detained in espionage case” Taipei Times, January 16, 2009)
6 The end of the Cold War is pertinent for several reasons. At this time, major ideological changes occurred in both the ROC and PRC. In Taiwan, the end of martial law marked the beginning of Taiwan’s move from authoritarianism to democracy. This in turn led to important political changes, particularly the rise of the DPP, and social
developments such as the desire for independence among some citizens. In the Mainland, the CCP retained its authoritarian rule while discarding communist ideology and moving towards market reforms. These simultaneous developments changed the way in which the two sides viewed each other and allowed for increased human interaction between the two sides.
The rise of democracy and freedom of the press in Taiwan enabled the media to better examine security problems such as espionage. During the Cold War, and especially the White Terror, the issue of espionage was inextricably intertwined with political infighting and intrigue. For this reason, an accurate study of PRC espionage against Taiwan in this period is beyond the scope of this study.
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5 States. Analyzing PRC HUMINT activity in Taiwan could provide a more comprehensive
picture of the PRC’s overal HUMINT operations and capability. This in turn could provide Western security scholars with additional insight with which to analyze the PRC espionage threat in other countries.
Two views on PRC HUMINT operations have emerged among U.S. security scholars and proffesionals. The first view holds that the dominant Chinese method of espionage is the mosiac approach, or “thousand grains of sand” method. In this approach, a large number of individuals are tasked to each collect a small amount of information. The collected information is later analyzed and peiced together to form meaningful data. This view of PRC HUMINT was offered by retired FBI counter-intelligence agent Dr. Paul Moore in 1999.7 This position was also
reiterated by Sratfor analyst Sean Noonan in 2012 who suggested that the PRC still prefers to use the high-quantity, low-quality mosaic method.8
The second view of PRC HUMINT operations among U.S. security scholars is that China strongly prefers to use ethnic Chinese as intelligence assets. Paul Moore argued that Chinese intelligence agents feel most comfortable interacting and appealing to individuals with a common background. He described the Chinese approach to spy recruitment as a “soft
recruitment.”9 In this approach, a long-term relationship is developed and the targeted individual is made to feel as though they are more Chinese than American. Rather than blatently harming American interests, the targeted individual is persuaded that he is simply helping China to catch up, and improve its position in the world.
Due to the sensitivity surrounding the subject of PRC espionage, there is a void of
scholarly work on one of the ROC’s most serious and pressing security concerns. It is hoped that this study may help fill that void, and raise awareness and concern for PRC espionage activities.
Raising awareness of PRC espionage activity in Taiwan may also help garner support for increased security measures on the part of ROC government organizations as well as Taiwanese
7 Paul D. Moore “China’s Subtle Spying” New York Times, September 2, 1999
8 Sean Noonan “Chinese Industrial Espionage makes Inroads in the US and Europe” Straftor, January 24, 2012 Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110119-chinese-espionage-and-french-trade-secrets
9 Paul D. Moore “How China Plays the Ethnic Card” Los Angeles Times, June 24, 1999
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6 businesses and individuals who operate in Mainland China. Threat awareness is one of the key factors in defending against espionage.
Finally, this study seeks to examine PRC espionage in order to better understand the consequences and implications of this activity. In the most extreme cases, espionage has resulted in the death of agents who were working on behalf of Taiwan. In other areas, espionage weakens Taiwan’s military defenses and it strains Taiwan’s ability to achieve diplomatic goals. Espionage seriously undermines military advantage and this can mean more lives lost during a conflict. It also adversely affects U.S. interests as the United States is now the sole foreign supplier of military equipment to the ROC. Many of the weapon systems sold to Taiwan contain sensitive military technology which could, if acquired by China, help the PRC further erode the balance of military power in the strait. In the unlikely event of a conflict, the PRC could exploit discovered weaknesses in US systems and increase its fighting effectiveness against ROC and US forces which may be called upon to defend the island.