4 Developments in PRC HUMINT Operations
4.7 Targeting of Taiwanese in the PRC
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56 acquired US citizenship. The PRC’s preference to recruit ethnic Chinese spies is also used in other countries like Japan which harbors a large Chinese immigrant population.124
This new development in Chinese recruitment strategy appears to have been at least partly brought about by the PRC’s high emphasis on ROC-related issues. The PRC had already begun attempting to recruit non-ethnic Chinese to spy against the US as early as 2004. However, the PRC’s first successful efforts to target non-ethnic Chinese sources, Fondren and Bergersen, were both US government employees who were working on Taiwan related issues.
4.7 Targeting of Taiwanese in the PRC
One of the most advantageous new recruiting grounds for PRC espionage against Taiwan is the Mainland itself. Since the late 1980s, Taiwanese citizens have been traveling to, and taking up residence, in the Mainland in ever greater numbers. There are now more than half a million Taiwanese who reside in the PRC permanently or for long periods of time. This group provides PRC intelligence agencies with a potentially large pool of educated, and often
well-connected, Taiwanese individuals to recruit from.
The fact that the PRC is operating on its home turf provides several critical advantages.
First, PRC intelligence agents are operating in a friendly environment where they have the full support of local governments. The PRC has a massive internal security and police force with several specialized organizations which maintain security and collect information on individuals of interest. In addition to local police forces, the PRC also relies upon the People’s Armed Police (PAP), and the Ministry of Public Security to maintain order.
Secondly, MSS and PSB agents are under little, if any, real risk of surveillance or opposition by foreign governments. Whereas operations in Taiwan and the West are potentially dangerous due to local security and law enforcement agencies, no such opposition group is present in the PRC. It is simply impossible for foreign security organizations to conduct meaningful surveillance and counter-espionage operations in the PRC.
Finally, PRC intelligence officers can use a wide variety of incentives and threats against Taiwanese businessmen whom they seek to attract. Financial incentives are common but the
124 Jane’s, pg.113
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57 PRC has also been known to use entrapment and coercive methods against Taiwanese in the PRC. In 2012, a Taiwanese businessman in Mainland China was pressured to spy for the PRC by officials who threatened to close his business if he did not agree to spy for China. PRC officials were interested in this individual, surnamed Zhen, because he had a friend who worked at the ROC’s MIB. These officials attempted to use Zhen to persuade his friend to spy for the PRC.125
PRC espionage against ROC citizens in the Mainland generally targets two groups;
businessmen and retired ROC military officers and government officials. Since 1994 there have been at least five known cases of Taiwanese businessmen being recruited to spy against Taiwan while living in the PRC.126 An additional case involved a Taiwanese antique dealer who lived in the Mainland and served as a courier of secrets for a retired ROC officer.127
Retired and visiting ROC military and government officials in the PRC are a lucrative target for PRC intelligence and the most serious security risk for Taiwan. The information and experience which these individuals retain makes them much more valuable than ordinary
businessmen. Retired ROC military officers are visiting and relocating to the Mainland in greater numbers. According to ROC defense officials, in 2002 there were roughly 3,000 former ROC military officers doing business in the PRC.128 Furthermore, the waiting period which these officers are required to observe before they can travel to the Mainland has been reduced to just one year. In many cases, retired ROC military and intelligence officers have flouted this rule and illegally traveled to the Mainland immediately after retirement. In 2001, a Control Yuan report found that half of the 414 military and intelligence officers who retired between 1999 and 2001 had traveled to Hong Kong. Of these, eleven were confirmed to have entered Mainland China.
Most of these individuals were senior officials who had access to national secrets.129
So far, PRC intelligence officials have recruited three former ROC intelligence officials while they were residing in the PRC. Chen Chir-gao (陳志高 ), a retired MJIB agent, was caught spying for the PRC in 2007. In 2008, Wang Hui-hsien (王惠賢 ), a retired colonel in the MIB, was also
125 See appendix 2, case 2012-3
126 See appendix 2, cases: 2012-3, 2012-2, 2011-2, 2008-1, 1996-2
127 See appendix 2, case 2010-1
128 Lawrence Eyton, “Taiwan: Island of insecurity” Asia Times Online, June 18, 2002 Available at:
http://www.atimes.com/china/df18ad01.html
129 “Editorial: Identity crisis threatens security” Taipei Times, December 27, 2001
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58 arrested for espionage. In 2012, Dong Jian-nan(董建南), a retired MJIB agent, was arrested for luring other retired colleagues to China for recruitment.
These cases are particularly serious because the two individuals had decades of
experience in ROC military and security organizations. The situation was particularly serious in Wang’s case because he compromised the identities of several MIB agents who were active in China. More importantly, recruiting retired ROC officials allows the PRC to take advantage of their professional networks and potentially gain more spies. Chen was able to recruit his longtime friend, Lin Yu-nung (林羽農), who was currently employed at the MJIB. Wang was also attempting to recruit two other MIB agents.
The fact that Wang was able to provide PRC intelligence with the names of active MIB agents in the Mainland should question the effectiveness of ROC security policies and screening practices. In cases such as this, requiring retired officials to wait for only one year before
traveling to the PRC is not sufficient to guard against catastrophic intelligence losses.
It is important to consider that PRC spies in these two examples were caught only because they attempted to recruit their associates in Taiwan. It is very likely that many other cases of espionage have gone undetected. In such cases, PRC intelligence officials may simply elect to debrief willing ROC retires who settle in the PRC. Interviewing and debriefing émigrés is a standard practice in intelligence collection. In these cases, detection of espionage would be virtually impossible.
Other groups of Taiwanese may also be vulnerable to potential PRC solicitations for secrets. The many former high-ranking ROC soldiers who now travel to for conciliatory exchanges and cross-strait cooperation activities could also be targeted. According to one participant, a former ROC Military officer, it appears that some retired ROC military officers have a very conciliatory attitude towards the Mainland and no longer view the PRC as a realistic military threat. These retired officers are often very excited and nostalgic about the opportunity to visit the Mainland and they sometimes lack caution when dealing with PRC counterparts. One former ROC military officer who participated in these events observed that other ROC
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59 participants did not exercise caution in their statements and exercised very poor judgment in their choice of words.130
Some observers may conclude, as one Taiwanese military expert did, that retired ROC military officers who travel or visit China are not potential espionage threats because they do not have current information on military matters in Taiwan. This is an extremely erroneous
assumption. Retired military officers are essentially experts in what is known as “military software” issues. Major software issues include such areas as: military strategy & tactics, troop morale, training and overall fighting ability, leadership issues, future planning and budget issues.
Having a good understanding of these issues is an absolute must in determining the overall capability of a nation’s military. Thus, for PRC intelligence agencies, retired military officers constitute a potentially rich target.
Observing and apprehending individuals who reveal sensitive details about ROC military software issues is harder than catching spies who deal with technical and physical material. Most software issues are based on informed opinion and therefore do not necessarily require the handling and transportation of physical material or technical specifications. Any retired ROC military officers who lives in, or travels to, Mainland China could easily compromise sensitive details about software issues in the ROC Military. Given that retired ROC military officers often let their guard down while visiting the PRC, it would be entirely possible for their PRC
counterparts to elicit sensitive bits of information in the course of what appears to be a relatively harmless conversation. PRC intelligence agents are known to be highly adept at using alcohol consumption and social-pressure tactics to pressure their targets into revealing more than they intended.
Chinese intelligence agencies aggressively target Taiwanese businessmen in the PRC. In 2006 a former member of the PRC Ministry of Public Security revealed that over 2,000
130 “Based on what I have seen, some of these officials appear to let their guard down when they go to these events.
This, combined with China’s deliberately elaborate receptions, makes some of the military officials so excited that they sometimes forget to use good judgment. They then do and say things without thinking, apparently clueless that their actions not only hurt themselves, but also their nation”130 Li Hua-chiu “Military must reign in retired generals”
Taipei Times, June 14, 2011
Li Hua-chiu (李華球) is a researcher with the National Policy Foundation
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60 Taiwanese businessmen in China were forced to spy against Taiwan.131 As early as 1999, the MJIB confirmed that over 34,000 Taiwanese businesmen had come in contact with PRC
intelligence agents.132 Much of this contact probably included assement or recruitment attempts.
In that year, the chairman of the Taiwan Capital Business Association in Fuzhou suggested that many important Taiwanese businessmen in China are subject to wiretaps.133
The first known case of PRC intelligence agents successfully recruiting a Taiwanese businessman occurred in 1994. In that year, PRC intelligence agents befriended Zhang Ming-Ho, a 37 year old Taiwanese man who ran a wedding photo business in Fuzhou.134 Zhang claimed that he had initially cultivated ties with government officials in order to expand his business.
After befriending Zhang, PRC intelligence agents asked him to collect unclassified information from Taiwan. Eventually, agents asked him to obtain ROC defense and foreign affairs budget proposals from an acquaintance who worked for a New Party legislature in the Legislative Yuan.
Fortunately, Zhang was unable to obtain the budget proposals and he even turned himself in to Taiwanese authorities in 1996 once he realized the seriousness of his actions.
PRC intelligence agencies have a range of carrot and stick tactics which they can use to enlist the services of Taiwanese living in the Mainland. PRC officials have been known to employ various forms of blackmail against Taiwanese targets as well as very generous incentives for more important targets.
China is well known to use sexual entrapment against foreign targets and it sometimes uses this tactic against Taiwanese.135 In 2009 PRC intelligence officers attempted to blackmail four Taiwanese officials from the Ministry of Justice.136 During their official stay in China, the four individuals made visits to karaoke parlors and hostess lounges where they were secretly filmed engaging in inappropriate activities with female hosts. Chinese intelligence agents attempted to use the videotaped activity to coerce them into spying for China.
131Hurley, B. “Taiwanese Businessman Blackmailed into spying for China” The Epoch Times, January 2, 2006
132 “ROC fears of PRC spying stirred by report” The China Post, August 17, 1999
133 “Government bolsters spy controls” Taiwan News August 17, 1999
134 Appendix 2, Case 1996-2
135Nicholas Eftimiades , Chinese Intelligence Operations, (Arlington: Newcomb Publishers, 1998)
136 Appendix 2, Case 2009-4
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61 In this particular case, the blackmail attempt was unsuccessful. This aggressive form of blackmail can often be a double edged sword for intelligence agencies. In some cases, the attempt may backfire and the potential source can be lost if they confess their activities to their own security forces. In 2004 a Japanese Foreign Service officer committed suicide in Shanghai after having been blackmailed by a Chinese intelligence agent for his relationship with a bargirl.137
PRC intelligence agents also appear to be increasingly aggressive against targets in the Taiwanese business community. Several Taiwanese businessmen were pressured to spy for the PRC on the threat that their businesses would be closed down.138 In 2011, a retired Taiwanese intelligence agent, traveling with his wife in Mainland China, was abducted by PRC security officers and held for 82 days before being released. According to the retired Taiwanese
intelligence officer, he had traveled to the PRC on several previous occasions without having any problems.139
The aggressive way in which the PRC has recruited, and utilized Taiwanese, to spy against their government raises several questions about PRC strategy and operating methods towards recruitment and handling of Taiwanese assets. The PRC may view Taiwanese in China as readily available, but expendable, assets. In several cases, Taiwanese businessmen were directed to return to Taiwan and solicit their fellow ROC citizens for sensitive military or recruit them to spy for the PRC.140 This type of activity is very risky because, as indeed happened, most ROC military officers are likely to report the incident to security officials. Secondly, these Taiwanese businessmen are not professional agents, and they likely receive very little training from the PRC, so their asset recruitment abilities are likely limited. Thirdly, recruiting a spy through coercion is less likely to produce reliable assets. Coerced individuals sometimes do inform their government of the situation.141 Given the risky nature, and potentially high rate of failure, for this approach, the PRC may simply be trying to recruit larger numbers of spies in the
137 Justin McCurry “Japan says diplomat’s suicide followed blackmail by China” The Guardian December 29, 2005
138 See appendix 2, case 2010-2
139Zhao-long Wu, “Retired Taiwanese intelligence agent held for 82 days in China” Want China Times, August 22, 2011.http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclasscnt.aspx?cid=1501&MainCatID=15&id=20110822000024
140 Appendix 2, Cases 2011-2, 2012-3
141 This is precisely what happened in 1996 when Zhang Ming-ho, decided to turn himself in to ROC authorities Case 1996-2
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62 hopes that a few achieve true success. Given that the number of Taiwanese businessmen in China will only increase, the PRC may feel that is has little to lose and enough to gain by using these spies in high risk operations.
While PRC asset recruitment has often been aggressive, it is not limited to this approach.
Chinese intelligence agents often use much softer, and subtler, forms of blackmail against Taiwanese businessmen in the Mainland. Former Chinese intelligence agent Hao Feng-jun, who defected to Australia in 2005, discussed one of these tactics which he used against Taiwanese businessmen in China.142 In the course of running a business and living in China, some
Taiwanese businessmen invariably run into legal problems. They then come in contact with local government and law enforcement officials. When this happens, Taiwanese businessmen are sometimes lured into a trap set by Chinese intelligence agents who play on their fears of being punished. Intelligence agents like Hao Feng-jun often pose as city councilman or government officials and offer to help Taiwanese businessmen who stumble into legal problems. They then offer to overlook crimes such as tax evasion and prostitution if the individual agrees to collect information on China’s behalf. As these businessmen are fearful of losing their investment or families, they often agree to the requests of Chinese intelligence agents.
China can use more subtle forms of elicitation when blackmail is too risky or deemed to be ineffective. Chinese officials often treat foreign visitors to extravagant meals where alcohol consumption is strongly encouraged. The hosts will often attempt to flatter the guest by praising their scholarly achievements if they are a scientists or academics. The foreign guest will then be invited to offer their opinion on an important subject, usually something technical or political in nature. Foreign guests in such situations will often feel compelled to speak and sometimes inadvertently let their guard down and reveal sensitive information.143 Chinese military or intelligence professionals could easily tailor this tactic to target retired Taiwanese military officers who visit or retire in Mainland China. A Taiwanese visitor may accidently reveal a few sensitive bits of information or opinions during a long night of drinking and exchanging “war stories.” When this tactic is used, PRC agents usually attempt to acquire only a limited amount of
142Hurley, B. “Taiwanese Businessman Blackmailed into spying for China” The Epoch Times, January 2, 2006
143 Eftimiades
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63 information. This may appear insignificant; however, when pieced together, this information can reveal useful intelligence on Taiwan’s military or other targets.
On the other end of the spectrum, PRC intelligence agencies have also been known to use generous incentives to win over potential sources of information. The most common approach is to offer lucrative job offers to retired ROC military officials. In addition to providing the PRC with more potential sources of information, retired military officers would bring a wealth of technical and leadership experience to the PRC’s rapidly developing industrial sector. China also actively courts Taiwanese scientists who have worked at places such as the Zhongshan Institute of Science and Technology and Hsinchu Science Park.144
It appears that the Taiwan Affairs offices in the PRC are likely taking a central role in the spotting, assessing and recruiting process of spies from among the expat Taiwanese population in the PRC. In 2011, Lai Kun-jie, a Taiwanese software engineer working in Beijing, was found guilty of spying for the PRC. He was befriended by Li Xu, the deputy director of the Beijing Taiwan Affairs Office who recruited him to spy against Taiwan. According to Lai, Li pressured him to spy for the PRC by threatening to expel him from China.145
The use of local Taiwan Affairs Offices to recruit spies from among the Taiwanese expat population makes perfect sense. Every major city in the PRC with a significant Taiwanese population has a Taiwan Affairs Office. The Taiwan Affairs Offices are the chief points of contact for Taiwanese businessmen and other expats in the Mainland. Taiwan Affairs Offices undertake official and social interaction with Taiwanese. As such, officials at these offices undoubtedly maintain a great degree of knowledge on important Taiwanese individuals in their area of responsibility. They are in the best position to determine who might have potentially valuable information.
The Lai Kun-jie spy case strongly suggests that professional intelligence agents are being assigned to at least some of the locale Taiwan Affairs Offices. The process of spotting, assessing and recruiting a potential spy is a complex task which is undertaken by trained professionals. It is likely that MSS personnel are staffing, and taking the lead in recruiting spies from the local
144 Interview 3
145 Appendix 2, Case 2011-2
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64 Taiwanese population. The MSS is one of the PRC’s leading organizations in charge of
HUMINT operations. The Third Bureau of the MSS has traditionally had responsibility for Taiwan and it could have expanded its mission to include the targeting of Taiwanese in the PRC.
HUMINT operations. The Third Bureau of the MSS has traditionally had responsibility for Taiwan and it could have expanded its mission to include the targeting of Taiwanese in the PRC.