The following appendix contains a list of sources who were interviewed on the subject of PRC espionage against Taiwan. Unless otherwise noted, these interviews were face-to-face interviews held in Taipei, Taiwan. In some instances, subjects were interviewed on multiple occasions. Due to the sensitivity of the subject, most interview subjects asked that their name not be used. The interviews listed below represent roughly half of the total number of interviews conducted by this author. However, additional interviews are not listed because the subjects failed to provide useful information.
- Remarked that Taiwan was a very open society and that it was hard to keep secrets in Taiwan
- Described an incident from an academic conference at Jiaotong University in Mainland China. Several PRC scholars approached their Taiwanese academic counterparts and asked them to confirm details about President Ma Ying-Jeo’s advisors and their meeting times.
Interview 2
- PRC spies very active and aggressive in general
- Individuals from the PRC have been known to establish simple business near ROC military bases where they then observe activity levels and seek to befriend military personnel.
- Counter-intelligence does not seem to be well respected in Taiwan’s government.
- Ma Administration cut MIB budget by about 50%, has reduced HUMINT collection in the PRC and is relying more on open source information
- PRC appears to collect information on Taiwanese scientists.
- Former employees of Taiwan’s Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) are often approached by PRC officials who offer them employment in China.
- Some former employees at the CSIST feel as though Taiwan’s government does not value them.
- Some Taiwanese scientists have gone to work in Mainland China and Korea after downsizing in Taiwan.
Interview 4
(Name withheld – asked not want to be cited by name) Current ROC Naval officer, previously worked at the General Political Warfare Bureau
February 2010
- Morale is low in many areas of the ROC military, particularly among young recruits who don’t see the PRC as a big threat.
- ROC military has an internal publication which warns of security threats, including espionage. However, Many officers and soldiers do not pay much attention to this publication.
- In 2008, an NCO in the ROC Navy, stationed at Tso-Ying Naval base, was punished for having a relationship with a female prostitute from Mainland China. (Source said that the navy NCO may have provided the
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prostitute with information on ROC navy but was not sure about the details of the case) This incident was not reported in Taiwan’s news agencies.Interview 5
(Name withheld – asked not want to be cited by name) Retired US Navy officer, author of several books on PRC and ROC navy
E-mail correspondence on 20 June 2010
- Remarked that there is a very strong PRC espionage threat against Taiwan’s military, remarks were made based on conversations with ROC and American military officers.
- Taiwan is not included in the American intelligence sharing relationship which includes NATO, as well as Japan and Australia.
- There is indeed concern in the US defense establishment over PRC HUMINT operations against Taiwan.
Interview 6
(Name withheld – asked not want to be cited by name) Retired US Air Force officer, currently a researcher at a US think tank focusing on Asia
E-mail correspondence on 10 July 2010
- In terms of military technology, the PRC could also obtain information about U.S. weapons used by Taiwan from other sources. China would not have to rely solely on direct espionage against Taiwan to collect
information on U.S. military hardware sold to Taiwan.
- Due to its status within the US export control system (roughly three tiers down, behind NATO and a second category for non-NATO allies), Taiwan would not have detailed tech data on the most sophisticated assemblies, and would not even have access to them. These would be enclosed and tamper-proofed. For repairs, sometimes entire missiles have to be shipped back to the original manufacturer in the US. There is usually no transfer of software "source' code either. MND is usually given relatively general performance data, which is sensitive but not the crown jewels. This issue of US restrictions is a sore point within MND. It's not just Taiwan - all countries in this category are treated pretty much the same with some exceptions.
- I would imagine that China's priorities are Taiwan's indigenous programs within CSIST, Taiwan's defense plans, bio data on key personnel, order of battle info, what problems Taiwan may be having in terms of readiness, when/if maintenance problems arise on US procured systems, delivery dates, specs of Taiwan's requirements, what US visitors are doing in Taiwan, AIT activities, Taiwanese delegations visiting the US, and so on.
Interview 7
(Name withheld – asked not want to be cited by name) Former member of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) 2000 – 2004, currently a professor at a national university in Taiwan 16 May 2011
- During the Cold War and White Terror, Chiang Kai-Shek purged the ROC government of suspected spies and communists. It was more difficult for spies to operate (in Taiwan) at this time.
- In general, Taiwan is not able to safeguard secrets from the PRC very well.
- Loyalty to Taiwan is a big problem in the government
-- Taiwan’s society is split, some deep-blue individuals feel closer to Mainland China.
-- Loyalty problems in Taiwan’s government unlikely to go away
- PRC cyber-espionage is very active, most of the important academics in Taiwan have had their e-mail compromised and monitored by the PRC.
- With regard to espionage, most scholars in Taiwan are afraid of upsetting the PRC and fear that China would attempt to punish them if they criticize the PRC too strongly.
Interview 8
(Name withheld – asked not
- While serving as an ROC marine, subject had a secondary responsibility for internal security (including counter-intelligence) in his unit. In
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general, security, including counter-intelligence, was not strong.
- Subject has received expense-paid trips to PRC think tanks on several occasions. During these visits, PRC researchers asked questions regarding Taiwan’s domestic politics and relations with the United States. This Taiwanese scholar does not have access to confidential ROC government information.
Interview 9
(Name withheld – asked not want to be cited by name)
- Stated that he encountered a taxi driver in Taipei City, near the Ministry of National Defense who claimed we was from the PRC. The taxi driver stated that he was conducting surveillance in Taiwan for the PRC, incident occurred in the late 1990s.
Interview 10
(Question: with regard to the 楊芷宜 case, how is it possible that she could have worked as an assistant in the LY? Were any changes made to LY security protocol following this incident?)
- There are no background checks for legislative assistants, LY did not make any changes following this incident.
- Legislators can hire whoever they wish, LY members typically have about 5 or 6 assistants, sometimes as many as 10.
- Security at the LY is generally not very good. Some legislative members will make sensitive remarks to the media following defense committee meetings.
(Question: Do any of Taiwan’s security organizations provide security training to LY staff or legislators?)
- No security training in LY.
- Many legislators have business relations with the PRC and they spend a great deal of time in Mainland China. Some legislators provide sensitive information to contacts in Mainland China is order to win business deals or improve their connections.