論中共對台的間諜活動 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. sit. Nat. 論中共對台的間諜活動. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 碩士論文政治大立 Master’s Thesis. n. al. er. io. The PRC Espionage Threat to Taiwan’s Security. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Student: Aaron Jensen Advisor: Dr. Liu Fu-Kuo. 中華民國 101 年 6 月 June, 2012 I.

(2) The PRC Espionage Threat to Taiwan’s Security. Aaron Jensen Advisor: Dr. Liu Fu-Kuo. 立. 治政國立政治大學大碩士論文. 學. ‧ 國. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧ y. sit. Nat. A Thesis. er. io. Submitted to International Master’s Program in China Studies. n. a l Chengchi University National iv. n U i e h Requirement n gofc the In partial fulfillment. Ch. For Master’s Degree in Asia-Pacific Studies. 中華民國 101 年 6 月 June, 2012 II.

(3) The PRC Espionage Threat to Taiwan’s Security. A Master’s Thesis National Chengchi University. 立. 政治大. er. io. sit. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. In Partial Fulfillment. n. Of the aRequirements for the Degree of. iv l C n Master h e n gofcArt hi U. By Aaron Jensen June, 2012 III.

(4) Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Dr. Liu Fu-Kuo for his role as advisor and for his insights on this unique subject. I am also grateful to Dr. Lin and Dr. Chang for their help and direction. Their rich experience and suggestions enabled me to look at this challenging subject from different perspectives. Many thanks also to Wendell Minnick for providing me access to his archived reports of Taiwan security-related material. I would also like to thank Charles for his help and opinions. Finally, I would also like to thank my interview subjects, many of whom wish to remain anonymous, for agreeing to offer their experiences and insight.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. IV.

(5) Abstract This thesis examines how the People’s Republic of China uses Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to collect sensitive information about the Republic of China, or Taiwan. It examines the development and changes in PRC HUMINT activity which has taken place in the post-Cold War Era. This study finds that two major developments have led to a situation where PRC HUMINT activity is now a serious threat to Taiwan’s security. The first development, a dramatic increase in cross-strait human interaction, has enabled the PRC to open up HUMINT. 政治大 allegiance problems on the 立 part of some ROC officials, has lowered Taiwan’s. operations against the ROC on a wider front. The second development, loyalty and. ‧ 國. 學. internal resistance to PRC HUMINT operations. These twin developments have enabled the PRC to threaten the security of the ROC’s military and security. ‧. organizations, as well as its government and society.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. V.

(6) Table of Contents. 1 Introduction............................................................................................................................1 1.1 Intelligence and Espionage………………………………………………….….………2 1.2 Motivation and Purpose……………………………………………………….…….….3 1.3 Literature Review and Research………………………………………………..………6 1.4 Research Challenges…………………………………………………………...….……8 1.5 IR Theory and Espionage…………………………………………………..…….……..9. 政治大. 1.6 German Cold War Espionage…………………………………………………….……12. 立. 2 PRC Policy Towards the ROC and Major Drivers of Espionage…………………..…..15. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1 ROC Military……………………………………………………………….………….18 2.2 ROC HUMINT Networks in the PRC…………………………………………..……..22. ‧. 2.3 ROC Government………………………………………………………………...……24. sit. y. Nat. 2.4 Taiwan Society………………………………………………………………….……..26. al. er. io. 2.5 Taiwan Economy and Technology Sector……………………………………………..27. iv n C 3.1 China’s HUMINT Organizations………………………………………………….……36 hengchi U n. 3 Overview of PRC Intelligence Organizations…………………………………………….30. 4 Developments in PRC HUMINT Operations…………………………………….………38. 4.1 Agent Infiltration: Late 1980s to mid 1990s……………………………………..……..40 4.2 PRC Agents in Taiwan: Late 1990s to Present………………………………….……..42 4.3 Short-Term HUMINT Assets……………………………………………………….…46 4.4 Targeting of ROC Interests in Third Countries………………………………………..50 4.5 Expansion and Targeting of ROC Interests in the US…………………………..……..53 4.6 Increased Recruitment of Non-Ethnic Chinese……………………………….…..……55 4.7 Targeting of Taiwanese in the PRC…………………………………………….……...56 VI.

(7) 5 Internal Factors in ROC Security……………………………………………………...…..65 5.1 Comparison to Loyalty Problems in Cold War Germany…………………………….....72 5.2 Contributing Factors to Internal Security Weakness: Morale and Corruption……….…74 5.3 Taiwan’s Lack of Security Consciousness………………………………………….…...75 6 Developments During the Ma Administration and Conclusion…………………………..82 6.1 Implications and Outlook………………………………………………………….…….84 6.2 Recommendations and Conclusion…………………………………………….….…..…89 Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………...…..93. 政治大. Appendix 1 Interview Subjects………………………………………………………………100. 立. Appendix 2 PRC Espionage Cases Against or Involving Taiwan…………………………104. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. VII.

(8) Chapter 1 Introduction. The strategic balance between Taiwan and China is one of the most important subjects in military and security studies circles today. Scholars and military experts from numerous countries examine the situation from various angles and arguments. However, one important security subject has, to this point, been largely left off the scholarly agenda. PRC espionage against Taiwan has received scarcely any attention from Taiwan’s academic community. While Chinese espionage has recently been given greater attention in places like the United States and Europe, it has so far received very little scrutiny in Taiwanese security studies circles. This study. 政治大. examines major changes and developments in PRC espionage from the end of the Cold War to the present.. 立. This essay exams the nature and scope of PRC espionage against Taiwan. Although. ‧ 國. 學. espionage is a security problem for all nations, Taiwan faces a uniquely difficult challenge against PRC espionage operations. This study will argue that the PRC has capitalized on two. ‧. major developments within the last two decades to deepen and expand its human intelligence. y. espionage activity against the ROC.. io. sit. Nat. operations against the ROC. Specifically, this study will focus on the PRC’s post-Cold War. al. er. Since 2008, the first major development between China and Taiwan has been the. n. iv n C h eornfamily have relocated to the Mainland for business i U PRC citizens have also migrated g c hreasons. explosion of human interaction between the two sides. Hundreds of thousands of ROC citizens. to Taiwan, in lesser numbers, and they have begun traveling to the island in significant numbers as well. This development has presented Chinese intelligence organizations with a goldmine of espionage recruitment and intelligence collections opportunities. The second major development which has affected the balance of cross-strait security is the problem of divided allegiance in ROC military and security organizations. As a result of both domestic, and cross-strait, changes, some ROC government officials have lost their allegiance to the ROC. This situation has led a number of high-ranking ROC officials to commit espionage against the ROC, and in some cases defect to the Mainland.. 1.

(9) The subject of this study will be limited to the human side of espionage, known as HUMINT.1 Only cases which involve information acquired via human means will be included. Broadly speaking, espionage can include technical means such as electronic eavesdropping, reconnaissance and surveillance and computer hacking. This study will confine itself to human espionage; discussion of technical espionage will be included only when it is used as an accessory for the human agent.. 1.1 Intelligence and Espionage Before pursuing this study, it is necessary to define what HUMINT is, and to distinguish it from related activities. HUMINT is a part of the larger activity of intelligence collection.. 政治大 These collection methods include using reconnaissance aircraft or spy satellites to photograph 立 targets of interest, known as Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), by intercepting foreign Intelligence agencies typically collect sensitive and secret information in a variety of ways.. ‧ 國. 學. communication signals (SIGINT), by collecting foreign media and academic material, called Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and by using human agents to collect intelligence (HUMINT).. ‧. The discipline of HUMINT is further subdivided into overt and covert collection. Overt. y. Nat. collection is done in the open and is accomplished through legal means. An example of overt. io. sit. collectors would be military attaches that are stationed overseas and collect information on host. n. al. er. country military matters. The use of military attaches to collect information is an accepted. i n U. v. practice in international relations. Thus, it is not considered to be espionage.. Ch. engchi. Covert intelligence collection is undertaken surreptitiously by human agents.2 The targeted information is usually considered secret or classified by the host nation. Louis Farago, the author of an early work on espionage and intelligence, defines espionage as, “the effort to discover by concealed methods the guarded secrets of others.”3 The targets of espionage activity usually include major national interests such as military capability, internal politics and foreign relations as well as technology. In his study of PRC intelligence agencies, Nicholas Eftimiades identifies six major targets of Chinese espionage activity: A nation’s political situation, its. 1. HUMINT: stands for human Intelligence For the sake of convenience, this proposal uses the common term “espionage” in place of “covert HUMINT” 3 Louis Farago, War of Wits, The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1954). 2. 2.

(10) leadership, military structure and capability, science and technology, economic conditions and social conditions. These six categories generally correspond and reflect the espionage targets of other major countries. In some cases, the boundary between espionage and other forms of intellectual exchange can become blurry. International academic and scientific exchange is one such area. While most of this activity is professional and legitimate, it can sometimes cross the line into espionage. Visiting scientists and academics are sometimes used by intelligence organizations to pressure or elicit sensitive or classified information from their counterparts in the host country. This can be a very grey area because scientists and academics naturally seek as much knowledge in their area. 政治大. of interest as they can obtain. In these instances, the judgment as to whether espionage has occurred must be considered on a case-by-case basis.. 立. 1.2 Motivation and Purpose. ‧ 國. 學. Despite its persistence and frequency in international affairs, espionage is rarely studied by the scholarly community. Part of this reason has to do with the fact that many espionage. ‧. activities are kept secret and government organizations control most of the information relating. y. Nat. to espionage activities. Despite the government’s control over the most sensitive details of. io. sit. espionage, an increasing amount of information is now available to the public. Many scholars. al. er. may consider espionage to be a subject unworthy of serious study. This is a grave mistake.. n. iv n C important role in international events. Many h emilitary h i U have been fundamentally n g cengagements. Although its influence is often subtle, espionage and the discipline of intelligence have played an. altered by the presence or absence of intelligence information, often times, this critical. information is derived by means of HUMINT. Peacetime diplomacy can also be undermined by espionage activities. In 2002 ROC President Chen Shui-bian was forced to cancel a stopover at a European country on his way to visit diplomatic allies in Africa. The Chinese government discovered Chen’s itinerary and subsequently pressured the host country into revoking President Chen’s invitation. Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials strongly suspected that the PRC had surreptitiously acquired this information and pressured the host country into canceling the visit.4. 4. “PRC bugging is a serious problem” The China Post, November 1, 2002. 3.

(11) An important aim of this study is to help increase awareness of the danger of PRC espionage activity in Taiwan. Pushing the subject of espionage into the academic community may motivate other scholars to examine this important security issue. Unlike many academic topics, the subject of espionage can be fairly controversial, especially in Taiwan. This study does not seek to avoid controversy, raising provocative questions is an important means to challenge our assumptions and deepen our understanding of important issues. Presenting controversial positions, provided they are accurate and defensible, will spur other scholars to conduct research into this neglected facet of Taiwan’s security. The subject of PRC espionage against Taiwan is both timely, and taboo. Under the Ma. 政治大. Administration, the ROC has considerably increased its interaction with the PRC in the space of only a few years. Most of this contact has been beneficial for both sides and many international. 立. observers have hailed this increase in cross-strait interaction as a major step for peace between. ‧ 國. 學. the two sides. Unfortunately, as this thesis will argue, and as others have observed, cross-strait spying, especially from the PRC side, has continued on a massive scale.5. ‧. This study has several main objectives and goals. First, it seeks to determine how PRC HUMINT operations against Taiwan have evolved as China and Taiwan have opened up to each. y. Nat. sit. other following the Cold War.6 Secondly, this study will identify probable weaknesses in the. al. er. operations.. io. ROC’s security apperatus which pertain to, and make it more vulnerable to PRC HUMINT. n. iv n C The third major aim of this studyhwill e nbe gto challenge c h i Uassumptions, and draw possible. lessons for the study of PRC HUMINT operations in other countries, particularly the United 5. In January of 2009, Lin Yu-fang, the head of the Foreign and National Defense Committee in the Legislative Yuan, claimed that both China and Taiwan were still actively spying on each other despite warmer cross-strait relations ( Ko Shu-ling and Flora Wang “Two detained in espionage case” Taipei Times, January 16, 2009) 6 The end of the Cold War is pertinent for several reasons. At this time, major ideological changes occurred in both the ROC and PRC. In Taiwan, the end of martial law marked the beginning of Taiwan’s move from authoritarianism to democracy. This in turn led to important political changes, particularly the rise of the DPP, and social developments such as the desire for independence among some citizens. In the Mainland, the CCP retained its authoritarian rule while discarding communist ideology and moving towards market reforms. These simultaneous developments changed the way in which the two sides viewed each other and allowed for increased human interaction between the two sides. The rise of democracy and freedom of the press in Taiwan enabled the media to better examine security problems such as espionage. During the Cold War, and especially the White Terror, the issue of espionage was inextricably intertwined with political infighting and intrigue. For this reason, an accurate study of PRC espionage against Taiwan in this period is beyond the scope of this study.. 4.

(12) States. Analyzing PRC HUMINT activity in Taiwan could provide a more comprehensive picture of the PRC’s overal HUMINT operations and capability. This in turn could provide Western security scholars with additional insight with which to analyze the PRC espionage threat in other countries. Two views on PRC HUMINT operations have emerged among U.S. security scholars and proffesionals. The first view holds that the dominant Chinese method of espionage is the mosiac approach, or “thousand grains of sand” method. In this approach, a large number of individuals are tasked to each collect a small amount of information. The collected information is later analyzed and peiced together to form meaningful data. This view of PRC HUMINT was offered. 政治大. by retired FBI counter-intelligence agent Dr. Paul Moore in 1999.7 This position was also reiterated by Sratfor analyst Sean Noonan in 2012 who suggested that the PRC still prefers to use. 立. the high-quantity, low-quality mosaic method.8. ‧ 國. 學. The second view of PRC HUMINT operations among U.S. security scholars is that China strongly prefers to use ethnic Chinese as intelligence assets. Paul Moore argued that Chinese. ‧. intelligence agents feel most comfortable interacting and appealing to individuals with a common background. He described the Chinese approach to spy recruitment as a “soft. y. Nat. sit. recruitment.”9 In this approach, a long-term relationship is developed and the targeted individual. al. er. io. is made to feel as though they are more Chinese than American. Rather than blatently harming. n. American interests, the targeted individual is persuaded that he is simply helping China to catch. Ch. up, and improve its position in the world.. engchi. i n U. v. Due to the sensitivity surrounding the subject of PRC espionage, there is a void of scholarly work on one of the ROC’s most serious and pressing security concerns. It is hoped that this study may help fill that void, and raise awareness and concern for PRC espionage activities. Raising awareness of PRC espionage activity in Taiwan may also help garner support for increased security measures on the part of ROC government organizations as well as Taiwanese. 7. Paul D. Moore “China’s Subtle Spying” New York Times, September 2, 1999 Sean Noonan “Chinese Industrial Espionage makes Inroads in the US and Europe” Straftor, January 24, 2012 Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110119-chinese-espionage-and-french-trade-secrets 8. 9. Paul D. Moore “How China Plays the Ethnic Card” Los Angeles Times, June 24, 1999. 5.

(13) businesses and individuals who operate in Mainland China. Threat awareness is one of the key factors in defending against espionage. Finally, this study seeks to examine PRC espionage in order to better understand the consequences and implications of this activity. In the most extreme cases, espionage has resulted in the death of agents who were working on behalf of Taiwan. In other areas, espionage weakens Taiwan’s military defenses and it strains Taiwan’s ability to achieve diplomatic goals. Espionage seriously undermines military advantage and this can mean more lives lost during a conflict. It also adversely affects U.S. interests as the United States is now the sole foreign supplier of military equipment to the ROC. Many of the weapon systems sold to Taiwan contain sensitive. 政治大. military technology which could, if acquired by China, help the PRC further erode the balance of military power in the strait. In the unlikely event of a conflict, the PRC could exploit discovered. 立. weaknesses in US systems and increase its fighting effectiveness against ROC and US forces. ‧ 國. 學. which may be called upon to defend the island.. 1.3 Literature Review and Research. ‧. The topic of PRC espionage operations against Taiwan is a relatively untouched academic. y. Nat. subject; hence no English language books or journal articles address the issue directly. Despite. io. sit. the lack of direct subject material on this issue, there is a significant amount of literature which. al. er. deals with the subject of espionage in general. Studies of espionage provide a basis and a starting. n. iv n C Louis Farago’s 1954 study, “War of Wits.” h eFarago h i Ua broad introduction to the basic n g cprovides. point for more specialized studies such as this one. One of the earliest studies on espionage is. principles and workings of HUMINT operations and the intelligence business. Even more. relevant to this study is Harry Positzke’s 1977 study on CIA operations. The CIA is America’s primary collector of HUMINT, as such, studying the CIA’s collections methods helps provide solid examples of how intelligence operations have been undertaken in the field. According to one intelligence expert, the methods and tactics of espionage change very little over time and place.10 Studying past intelligence operations can provide a rough blueprint for how another country could conduct espionage in another locale. Positzke’s discussion of how the U.S. used tourists to collect information on the Soviet Union has direct relevance for how the PRC may be. 10. Nicholas Eftimiades , Chinese Intelligence Operations, (Arlington: Newcomb Publishers, 1998). 6.

(14) using tourists to gather information in Taiwan. It provides a rare example of how tourists were used, and what they were able to collect. Several existing studies on Chinese intelligence agencies help construct a broad picture of the structure and operations of PRC intelligence agencies. One of the paramount works on this subject is Jane’s 1999 study titled, Chinese Intelligence and Security Agencies. This technical report provides a comprehensive overview of the structure and missions of the offices and bureaus in China’s intelligence pantheon. It contributes to this study by identifying the separate and specialized offices which are responsible for collecting Taiwan related intelligence. While broad in scope, the major shortcoming of this report is its lack of analysis on PRC intelligence. 政治大. collection strategy and methods. Nicholas Eftimiades’ 1998 study, Chinese Intelligence Operations, helps fill this analytical gap by providing insight into how Chinese HUMINT. 立. collection evolved in the 1990s. Whereas the Jane’s study focuses on structure, Eftimiades looks. ‧ 國. 學. at how Chinese intelligence agencies and their agents operate to collect intelligence. Drawing from examples in North American and Taiwan, he argues that PRC intelligence agencies are. ‧. developing in terms of overall sophistication and capability.. Insight into the motivation and psychological factors of espionage was greatly aided by. y. Nat. sit. several articles from the Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) which is an. al. er. io. office in the U.S. Department of Defense. The mission and goal of PERSEREC is to conduct. n. behavioral science research and analysis to support improved policy procedures in personnel. Ch. i n U. v. security. As one of the few entities specifically designed to research and publish articles on this. engchi. topic, the insights into the motivations for espionage were invaluable to this study. Veteran intelligence analyst Richards J. Heuer’s essay, “The Insider Espionage Threat,” discusses the general motivations and preconditions for espionage. Heuer’s analysis of espionage focuses more on individual factors which underlie the motivations for espionage. Katherine Herbig’s study, “Allegiance in a Time of Globalization” examines changing patterns of espionage under conditions of globalization in the United States. Drawing on a rich variety of social and psychological literature, Herbig first explores the psychological and social factors which compel a person to develop a sense of loyalty to a nation. She concludes that people develop a sense of loyalty to their nation at a young age due to the need for self-protection and self-transcendence. Simply put, people need to belong to a group, and develop group identification, in order to feel 7.

(15) secure. Although this study was focused on American society and the challenges faced by the U.S. government, it does provide an important framework for understanding the loyalty challenges in Taiwan. Specifically, Herbig argues that three main factors help to bind an individual to their nation: 1, a sense of emotional attachment 2, a motivation to help the country and 3, a sense of pride towards the nation. As will be discussed later, these three factors have sometimes become very strained in contemporary Taiwanese society. This has in turn contributed to Heuer’s basic conditions for espionage. The majority of information on particular cases of PRC espionage against Taiwan was derived from Taiwan’s own English language news publications. The China Post and the Taipei. 政治大. Times provided the bulk of raw material for this study. The China Post has been in circulation for decades and it was particularly useful for researching espionage cases before 2000. The. 立. Taipei Times was founded in 1999 and since then, has aggressively reported on issues relating to. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan’s defense and security. In some cases, Chinese language publications such as United Daily News, China Times, Liberty Times and Apple Daily were also utilized when they provided. ‧. additional information.. y. Nat. 1.4 Research Challenges. io. sit. A large portion of the material and opinions used in this study was derived from interviews with. al. er. Taiwanese and American security experts and scholars. A significant challenge in conducting. n. iv n C the majority of Taiwanese scholars approached were very averse and reluctant to h e norginterviewed chi U. these interviews was getting Taiwanese scholars to discuss or comment on the subject. In general,. talk about PRC espionage against Taiwan. A few experienced professors suggested that the topic was untenable due to the supposed lack of information. Several Taiwanese scholars, including noted military experts, claimed that they were unfamiliar with PRC espionage activity. A former MND official and current scholar agreed only to confirm a single story which had appeared in the Taiwanese media. One scholar, and former ROC Navy captain, even claimed that current and retired ROC military personnel would not spy for the PRC because they would risk losing their military pension. Ironically, this interview took place just a few months after the largest ROC Military spy scandal in decades; the case of brigadier general Luo, who earned hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars spying for the Mainland.. 8.

(16) The underlying reason for Taiwan academic’s reluctance to speak about PRC espionage appears to be a concern for potential retribution from the PRC. According to a former Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) official, many Taiwanese scholars fear that they will be denied access to the PRC if they criticize, or comment on, PRC espionage. Many social science scholars rely on entry to the PRC, and access to PRC academics, in order to undertake their research. If a Taiwanese scholar is found to be “too unfriendly” to the Mainland, then they could be denied entry to the PRC or shunned by Mainland scholars.11 Without access to Mainland China, many scholars would be deprived of an important research market that is vital for their careers and success. According to this individual, China also routinely hacks into the e-mail accounts of Taiwanese academics who deal with politics and cross-strait issues. It is assumed that they keep. 政治大. tabs on what these scholars are saying and who they associate with.. 立. The fact that many Taiwanese scholars refuse to openly, or even privately, discuss. ‧ 國. 學. matters relating to PRC espionage against Taiwan should be a cause for concern. It demonstrates that the PRC has already been successful in curtailing criticism over some of its threatening. ‧. actions towards Taiwan. As a maturing democracy, Taiwan’s academic community must naturally take a part in raising security awareness, educating the populace of Taiwan, and. y. Nat. advising ROC military and government bodies on issues related to Taiwan’s security (contrast. io. sit. with American academics who advise congress on PRC espionage threats). If Taiwan’s academic. al. er. community remains silent on this issue, the security challenge of PRC espionage may not receive. n. iv n C U and raising awareness h e nmaintaining fostering better relations with the PRC, while g c h i vigilance enough attention and emphasis. Taiwan’s security scholars have the challenging task of. against enduring security threats.. 1.5 IR Theory and Espionage Espionage has been a feature of international relations since antiquity. Most nations, especially great powers, are active practitioners. Simply stated, espionage is the effort to discover by concealed methods the guarded secrets of other nations.12 The practice of espionage in international relations can best be understood by examining espionage from the perspective of. 11. Appendix 1, Interview 9. Louis Farago, War of Wits, The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1954).. 12. 9.

(17) political realism. One of the central propositions of the Realist Theory holds that international relations are conducted in an anarchic environment. Espionage helps states reduce this anarchy by revealing the motives, plans and intentions of other nations. States have a natural need and motivation to collect as much information as they can about other nations. States and national leaders feel more secure when they understand the intentions and disposition of other nations. Information, especially information gleaned from espionage, reduces strategic ambiguity and therefore allows national leaders to make decisions with greater confidence and effectiveness. The intelligence organizations of most major powers garner significant attention from national leaders and play an important role in national decision making. The president of the United States receives an intelligence briefing from the CIA every morning on world events and issues. 政治大. of concern. Civilian and military leaders are very reliant upon and demanding of their. 立. intelligence organizations.. ‧ 國. 學. The second principle of Political Realism holds that states are interested and driven to maximize their power.13 Political scientists often speak of a nation’s power in terms of economic,. ‧. military and diplomatic capability. However, knowledge and information concerning one’s friends and enemies is also a form of power. This is especially true in the information age where. y. Nat. acquiring sensitive information often provides an advantage for whoever can attain it first.. io. sit. Information superiority can enhance the effects of a nation’s economic, diplomatic and military. n. al. er. initiatives. Likewise, a deficiency of information reduces the effectiveness of a nation’s tools of. i n U. v. influence. It is thus in the interest of all nations to acquire sensitive information about the business of other nations.. Ch. engchi. The relationship between espionage and military objectives is especially strong. Since ancient times, military strategists such as Sunzi have recognized and stressed the value of attaining the secrets of the enemy. In contemporary military thinking, good intelligence is often considered to be a “force multiplier.” Attaining, and acting on accurate information about one’s enemy increases the chance of successful military endeavors. Having good intelligence can save lives; failure to collect accurate intelligence can result in tragedy and loss of life.. 13. Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973).. 10.

(18) Given that states are motivated to acquire the secrets of other nations, the perceived benefits of espionage generally outweigh the costs. While the rewards can be substantial, states are seldom severely punished for their espionage activities.14 Most countries use official diplomatic cover to conduct their espionage activities. Therefore, they have a certain measure of protection if they are caught. Espionage is often hard to detect. When it is detected, it is usually difficult to acquire hard proof of an enemy agent’s activity. It is often easier to catch one’s own citizen in the act than it is catch both the citizen and the foreign agent conspiring together. Moreover, because foreign agents often have official diplomatic cover, it makes retribution against the offending nation even more difficult. Hence, while the payoffs of espionage can be substantial, the ultimate risk for the spying nation is often fairly low.. 政治大. Despite the cooperation that often exists among friendly nations, extensive espionage. 立. operations sometimes do still occur. The relationship between friendly states can simultaneously. ‧ 國. 學. show strains of Complex Interdependence and of Political Realism. The US relationship with Israel and the ROC provides a case in point. The state of Israel is closes American allay yet. ‧. intensive espionage operations continue to occur, especially on the part of Israel. Several recent, high profile cases attest to this fact. The US relationship with the ROC has also experienced. y. Nat. several high profile espionage cases. In 1987 the CIA procured information from an ROC. io. sit. military officer on Taiwan’s nuclear weapons program. The United States successfully used this. al. er. information to pressuring the ROC government into terminating its nuclear weapons. n. iv n C U NSB agent who provided him h e nbyga young spying on behalf of Taiwan. He was recruited c h i female development program. More recently, a high level US DOD official was fired and punished for with romantic affections.15. In spite of the mutual practice of espionage, most countries continue to maintain strong relations with each other and they rarely face substantial diplomatic repercussions for their actions. In many cases, the victim nation is unwilling to undertake serious retribution against the offending nation. The effort to punish the offending nation may simply not be worth the effort. This is often the case for smaller nations who are espionage targets of larger nations. In some cases, a “tit for tat” situation occurs in which countries each country expels a number of 14. Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, (Arlington: Newcomb Publishers, 1998). “Error of Judgment” Time Magazine, 20 September 2004. Online at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,699471,00.html accessed March 5, 2010. 15. 11.

(19) diplomats. However, most countries seek to avoid this development because it causes undue problems for both sides. Taiwan was unwilling to punish the US for the CIA’s discovery of its nuclear program. Similarly, some Taiwanese politicians are unwilling to take tough measures against PRC espionage for fear of harming relations.16 States that discover espionage activities in their borders may be unwilling to punish transgressor nations because the victim states are also engaged in espionage against the same states which target them. If a state undertakes retribution against another nation, its own diplomats and espionage agents may face similar scrutiny and reprisal. The punishing state may loss current sources of intelligence information as well as losing future espionage sources. For. 政治大. this reason, states may conclude that they stand to lose more than they gain by punishing the other nation.. 立. 1.6 German Cold War Espionage. ‧ 國. 學. The frequent espionage which occurs between Taiwan and China has historical parallels. Similar. ‧. security situations between divided societies, ruled by separate governments can shed light on the contemporary cross-strait relationship and serve as a basis for comparison. Intelligence. sit. y. Nat. expert Ken DeGraffenried, the former director of intelligence for the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration, compared the espionage situation between Taiwan and China. io. al. er. to the state of affairs which existed between West Germany and East Germany during the Cold. n. iv n C h e n"the language -- and are divided mainly by politics, h i U of successful espionage is pretty g cpossibility War. He observed that since Taiwan and China have a common ethnic bond - family ties, same. high.”17 The political situation between Taiwan and China and the divided Germany of the Cold War is also roughly analogous. Taiwan and West Germany are democratic whereas East Germany was a communist totalitarian state and the PRC is a socialist authoritarian state. In military terms, both cases were, or are, characterized by large scale military buildups. During the Cold War, East Germany was home to 400,000 front line Soviet troops. On the other side, West Germany was a member of the powerful NATO military alliance. Here again, Taiwan and the Mainland face a similar, yet less severe, military standoff. The PRC is increasing its annual 16. “Justice Ministry Denies Spy Tipster Reward Plan” Taipei Times, 18 February 2009. Paul Sperry “Taiwan Swarming with Chinese Spies” WorldNetDaily.com, March 24, 2000. Accessed on December 2, 2009. 17. 12.

(20) military budget in double figures and it currently stations some 1,500 ballistic missile in proximity to Taiwan. Although much smaller, the ROC maintains a moderate sized military which receives substantial support from the United States. Finally, in both cases the two sides maintained at least a moderate degree of openness to the other. The Germany of the Cold War and the contemporary cross-strait relationship is nowhere as restrictive and closed as the relationship between other divided societies like North and South Korea. Despite the existence of the Berlin Wall, West German citizens could travel to East Germany. For its part, East Germany appears to have had little trouble in planting spies in the West.18 The most striking feature of Cold War German espionage is the massive scale of human. 治政 operations agency, was well known for its skillful espionage 大 and they had some of the best 立 spymasters of the Cold War. It has been estimated that the Stasi had between 17,000 to 23,000. spying which occurred between the two sides. The Stasi, East Germany’s intelligence and covert. ‧ 國. 學. human assets operating in West Germany. New research has shown that the West German government was just as active and that they had recruited up to 10,000 spies in East Germany.19. ‧. Most of the thousands of German citizens who spied for the other side were, for the most. y. Nat. part, just average citizens. They would usually engage in simple surveillance and report on. sit. events relating to the military, political, economic and social situation inside their country.. al. er. io. Although much of the information appeared fairly innocuous, the thousands of insights and bits. iv n C the enemy’s situation. In essence, East Germany (as well asU h e n g c h i West Germany) was utilizing the mosaic approach to intelligence collection. n. of information could later be pieced together and analyzed to provide a clearer understanding of. Another important aspect of East German espionage was the success it had in putting spies in high places. One East German spy, Gunter Guillaume, obtained the position of secretary of labor in Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s government. The eventual exposure of Guillaume as an East German spy led to the downfall of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1974. Another. 18. For a detailed account of East German espionage activities see: Glees, Anthony, The Stasi Files: East Germany’s Secret Operation against Britain (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 19 Siobahn Dowling “10,000 East Germans Spied for the West” Dier Spiegel, September 28, 2007.. 13.

(21) East German spy working in the West German government even provided details of communication between Chancellor Schmidt and then US President Jimmy Carter.20 Espionage operations between the two Germanys appears to have paid off, especially for East Germany. The East Germans had riddled the West with spies and had even managed to obtain American war plans. According to deGraffenried, if an actual shooting war had broken out, the West would have been seriously compromised because of the East Germany’s espionage exploits.21 Given the amount of espionage between East and West Germany during the Cold War, the threat posed by Mainland China should be taken very seriously. In comparison to Cold War. 政治大 greater and it continues to increase 立as time goes by. The PRC’s intention to exert control over Germany, the degree of human interaction between Taiwan and the Mainland is now much. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan is just as great, or greater, than was the East German desire to control and exploit West Germany. In terms of budget and human resources, the PRC has all the advantages over the ROC.. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 20. Adam Bernstein “Markus Wolf, 83, East German Espionage Chief” The Washington Post, November 10, 2006. Paul Sperry “Taiwan Swarming with Chinese Spies” WorldNetDaily.com, March 24, 2000 Accessed on December 2, 2009. 21. 14.

(22) Chapter 2 PRC Policy towards the ROC and Major Drivers of Espionage. In order to fully understand the significance and motivation for PRC espionage against the ROC, it is first necessary to review PRC policy towards the island. The subject of Taiwan is an extremely important issue in PRC foreign and domestic politics and it deeply impacts PRC foreign and military policy. The One China Principle is the central, and most important concept in PRC policy towards Taiwan, all other statements are essentially footnotes and developments of this principle. Simply put, the One China Principle holds that there is only one China and Taiwan is an. 政治大. inalienable part of it. Further, the PRC is the only legal representative of China. Since 1979, the PRC has been promoting reunification with Taiwan under the “One. 立. Country, Two Systems” concept. This concept recognizes that Taiwan’s government, economy. ‧ 國. 學. and society have evolved differently than the PRC. Accordingly, it promises that Taiwan would be granted a high degree of autonomy after reunification. Taiwan’s capitalist system would not be altered and the PRC would not station troops or administrative personnel on the island.. ‧. During the middle of the 1990s, the PRC emphasized the military dimension of its. sit. y. Nat. Taiwan policy and relations between the PRC and Taiwan became severely strained. The situation became particularly serious in 1995 and 1996 after ROC President Lee Teng-hui made a. io. al. er. visit to Cornell University in June of 1995. In response to Lee’s visit, the PLA held a series of. n. iv n C China’s saber rattling towards the islandh increased military U between the two sides to the e n g c h i tensions. missile tests and military exercises near the island later that year and in early March of 1996.. highest point in decades and it reminded ROC leaders that Beijing would back up its policy with force if necessary. In 2000, the election of Chen Shui-bian as President of the ROC created further headaches for Beijing. Chen sought to increase Taiwan’s international profile, distance the island from Beijing and continue the process of ‘Taiwanization’ which had begun under Lee Teng-hui. In response to Chen’s moves, the PRC changed its approach to Taiwan and began to use Washington to censure and pressure Chen into submission. In December of 2003 U.S. President George Bush publicly rebuked Chen’s cross-strait policies. The following year, Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked that the U.S. did not regard Taiwan as an independent state. PRC policy towards Taiwan took a decidedly different under the leadership of Hu Jin-tao. 15.

(23) Whereas Jiang Zi-min took a rather direct and aggressive approach towards Taiwan, Hu was much more nuanced and less militant in his policy towards the island. According to Taiwanese scholar Lin Chong-pin, Hu initiated several significant Changes towards Taiwan.22 First, he discarded the rhetoric of a timetable for reunification between Taiwan and China. This idea, initiated under Jiang, increased the potential for conflict and tensions if progress between the two sides did not meet set goals. As other scholars have pointed out, PRC leadership is now much more confident that Taiwan will become increasingly dependent on the PRC as time goes by. Secondly, there has been less emphasis on displays of military force directed at the island. There have been no large scale missile exercises like the 1995-96 Missile Crisis, nor have there been sustained, threatening sorties by PRC fighter planes down the center line of the Taiwan Strait.. 政治大 as importantly, the PRC has avoided or downplayed news and media coverage of military issues 立. The yearly amphibious exercises held on Dongshan Island have also been moved elsewhere. Just. relating to Taiwan. After 2005, Chinese leaders have also refrained from mentioning or. ‧ 國. 學. emphasizing that the PRC has not renounced the use of force against the island. Verbal emphasis of this position was a hallmark of the Deng and Jiang administrations.. ‧. China has also resumed political, civil and even military outreach to Taiwan. Cross-strait interaction between political leaders was essentially cut off in 1999 by Jiang in response to Lee. y. Nat. sit. Deng-hui’s “state to state” remarks to the media. Under Hu, political and scholarly exchange has. al. er. io. been strongly supported and encouraged. In 2005, several KMT leaders from Taiwan made. n. historic visits to the Mainland which received worldwide attention. This undercut Chen’s. Ch. i n U. v. position in Taiwan and it provided positive press for the PRC. Finally, Hu was able to use. engchi. Washington to constrain Chen Shui-bian’s pro-independence moves rather than leveling direct criticism against Taiwan. The Bush Administration complied, and publicly criticized the Chen government on numerous occasions. For a time, the PRC also sought to steal diplomatic allies away from Taiwan. From 2004 to 2008 China was able to persuade six countries to severe diplomatic ties with the ROC and establish relations with the PRC.23 However, this policy quickly ended with the election of Ma Ying-jeo in Taiwan. The Ma Administration sought to improve relations with the Mainland and 22. Chong-pin Lin “More Carrot Than Stick: Beijing’s Emerging Taiwan Policy” China Security 4:1 (Winter 2008) 329. 23 2004: Commonwealth of Dominica, 2005: Grenada, Republic of Senegal, 2006: Republic of Chad, 2007: Republic of Costa Rica, 2008: Republic of Malawi.. 16.

(24) engineered a diplomatic truce. The PRC agreed to stop stealing the ROC’s allies in return for Taiwan not pursuing independence activities. In 2009, PRC President Hu Jintao sought to further promote cooperation with Taiwan by issuing a six point proposal for cross-strait relations. Although Hu did not waver from the “OneChina” Principle, his other points helped open the way for strengthened economic relations, increased exchange of people, increased international space for Taiwan and a possible future peace agreement. As cross-strait specialist Alan Romberg observed, Hu’s speech recognized that reunification is not currently on the table, but these proposals seek to foster a cross-strait relationship which will contribute to ultimate reunification in the future.24. 政治大 several important aspects of PRC policy which have not changed. First, the One China Principle 立 While Hu Jin-tao ushered in a number of new policy changes towards Taiwan, there are. remains the same. Secondly, China’s buildup of military power and its deployment of ballistic. ‧ 國. 學. missiles near the Taiwan Strait continues to increase. The PLA’s yearly budget grows by double digits and the number of missile pointed at Taiwan increases each year.. ‧. A particularly sensitive issue for PRC leaders is foreign, mostly American, arms sales to Taiwan. The PRC has been strenuously lobbying the United States to cease arms sales to Taiwan. y. Nat. sit. since the early 1980s.25 The United States cites the Taiwan Relations Act as the principle. al. er. io. document in support of continued arms sales to Taiwan. However, the PRC cites the Shanghai. n. Communique’s pledge to reduce, and eventually terminate, arms sales to Taiwan as the rightful policy.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Even as the PRC’s relations with the ROC government improved, they still maintained strident opposition to arms sales. In fact, PRC protests and threats of punishment over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have become stronger in recent years as the PRC’s power and prestige has increased. In early 2010, PRC leaders strongly protested the sale of Patriot missile batteries and Black Hawk helicopters to Taiwan and raised the stakes by threatening to punish American companies which sold military hardware to Taiwan. This comes in addition to the fact that the 24. Alan D. Romberg “Cross-Strait Relations: First the Easy, Now the Hard” China Leadership Monitor, May 8, 2009, No. 28. 25 Robert G. Sutter October, 2006, from a class lecture. According to Dr. Sutter, in the early 1980s, a PLA officer assigned to the Chinese embassy in Washington went so far as to locate Sutter’s office at the Congressional Research Service and demand that arms sales to Taiwan be halted. At the time, Dr. Sutter was a researcher and not directly responsible for policy.. 17.

(25) PLA cut off all military relations with the US military. The PRC’s pressure tactics to terminate US arms sales to Taiwan appears to be having some influence in US academic circles. In April of 2011, US scholar Charles Glaser wrote a controversial piece in Foreign Affairs where he called for the United States to terminate weapons sales to Taiwan.26 The same year, Joseph Prueher, and Timothy J Keating, both retired US Navy admirals, urged that official steps should be taken to break the “vicious cycle” of arms sales to Taiwan.27 Although Glaser’s view represents a minority opinion, it does signal a new development in the debate over US support to Taiwan. As the PRC’s clout continues to increase, views such as this could become more prevalent in the near future. The PRC’s One China Policy will not waver in the future, if anything, China will become. 政治大 against Taiwan, this implies that China’s high tempo spying operations will continue. As long as 立 more assertive in pursuing its policy objectives towards Taiwan. With regard to PRC espionage. PRC leaders continue to emphasize Taiwan as a core interest, the Chinese government and the. ‧ 國. 學. PLA will make Taiwan a priority focus. This in turn will maintain, or increase, the demand for information and intelligence on a wide range of issues. The major targets of PRC HUMINT. io. sit. y. Nat. 2.1 ROC Military. ‧. operations are discussed in greater detail below.. al. er. In terms of scope and overall weight of effort, The ROC military is arguably the PRC’s highest. n. iv n C U officers, foreign military in scale. Espionage tactics have includedhrecruiting e n g cROC h imilitary. priority target. Chinese HUMINT collection against Taiwan’s military is both diverse, and large. officials, employing PLA cadres for surveillance, utilizing Taiwanese residents for surveillance as well as PRC tourists in Taiwan. Since 1997 there have been at least twelve individuals who have spied against Taiwan on behalf of the PRC. Additionally, it is almost certain that many more are engaged in passive surveillance against ROC military installations.28 From the available evidence, it appears that the PRC is particularly interested in five major areas of Taiwan’s military establishment: 1, Military C4ISR, especially the Po-Sheng System, 2, weapons development programs at the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and 26. Charles Glaser “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2011). Parameswaran Ponnudurai “US Ties with Taiwan Questioned” Radio Free Asia, March 31, 2011 Available at: http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/east-asia-beat/security-03312011211454.html 28 Appendix 1, Interivew 2. 27. 18.

(26) Technology, 3, U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan, 4, ROC military bases, 5, military software issues. First, Taiwan’s C4ISR architecture, especially the Po-Sheng system, is naturally a high priority. Given the critical importance of C4ISR systems to modern military operations, it is natural that China would emphasis HUMINT collection against this target. Out of five C4ISR related espionage cases, three have been particularly high-profile and damaging to the ROC.29 Another area of prime focus for PRC espionage is the ROC’s weapon development and procurement programs. More specifically, the PRC heavily targets the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology as well as US agencies and individuals who are responsible for arms sales to Taiwan. As Taiwan’s primary military R&D center, the Chung-Shan Institute has produced some of Taiwan’s most sophisticated weapon systems including the Tien Kong surface-. 政治大 cases occurred at the Chung-Shan Institute involving senior researchers. In two separate 立. to-air missile system and the Hsin-Feng cruise missile. In 2003 two particularly damaging spy. incidents, Chen Shir-liang (陳士良) and Huang Chen-an (黃正安) both compromised sensitive. ‧ 國. 學. details about Taiwan’s current and future weapon systems. Chen, age 52, had been a researcher at the institute since 1979. He was accused of supplying the PRC with a variety of information on. ‧. Taiwan’s military. More importantly, he may likely have compromised information relating to. y. Nat. Taiwan’s electronic warfare plans. In the second incident, Huang Chen-an, provided the PRC. sit. with details regarding Taiwan’s future Po-Sheng C4ISR system and its missile and radar. al. er. io. programs. Huang was a retired air force major who had worked at the institute since 1979.30. v. n. The PRC’s concern over weapons sales to Taiwan has also led it to conduct direct. Ch. i n U. operations against U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) organizations. One of Chen Shir-lang’s. engchi. accomplices in the 2003 espionage case was retired Taiwanese-American, Hsu She-che (許希哲), who had worked as a technician at Boeing. Although no exact details regarding Hsu’s contribution were released, media reports revealed that Hsu would regularly fly to Taiwan where he would meet Yeh Yu-chen. Yeh was an accomplice in the Chen espionage case and he owned a high-tech company in Chong Li.31 After meeting in Taiwan, both Yeh and Hsu would fly together to Mainland China. It is likely that Hsu’s career at Boeing had provided him with extensive contacts in the US aviation industry, and possibly the defense community. China’s concern over US arms sales to Taiwan has even led to more aggressive HUMINT 29. See Appendix 2, Cases: 2012-1, 2011-1, 2008-1 Appendix 2, Case 2003-2 31 See Appendix 2, Case 2003-1 for details 30. 19.

(27) operations in the United States. The Bergersen espionage case in 2008 and the Fondren case in 2009 both highlight the PRC’s high interest in US arms sales to Taiwan. These cases and related developments are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. Another important target for PRC espionage is the ROC’s network of military bases and military operations. Surveillance operations against military bases and military operations provide a great deal of practical intelligence for enemy military planners. Persistent surveillance operations provide a baseline by which to judge changes and developments in enemy military operations. It can also help provide a general picture of the scale and intensity of military exercises. The PRC employs a wide variety of human assets to conduct this type of surveillance. It. 政治大 conduct simple surveillance against military bases and attempt to befriend military personnel. 立 has been noted that some merchants or residents in the vicinity of ROC military facilities. 32. According to a former ROC military officer, street vendors and local merchants routinely appear. ‧ 國. 學. in greater numbers during military exercises. It has been noted that some of these street vendors have Mainland Chinese accents. It is assumed that these individuals are likely engaged in simple. ‧. surveillance activity. Surveillance activity on the part of local residents could very well be more intrusive and meticulous, as in the case of the Hong Kong born engineer who worked at the. y. Nat. sit. Hsinchu Science Park. Identified only by his surname Chen, the individual had been taking. al. er. io. photos and detailed notes of military aircraft operating at Hsinchu Air Base. After conducting. n. surveillance for four years, he had compiled nine notebooks worth of information on operations at the Air Base.. 33. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In addition to these major targets, the PRC almost certainly gains a wealth of valuable intelligence on software issues in Taiwan’s military. In contrast to military hardware and quantitative information, software issues describe the human element of a military. Central issues such as military morale, training levels and strategy trends are just as important as order-of-battle and technical intelligence. The quality and combat capability of a fighting force is largely determined by the courage and commitment of the people who operate the equipment. Gaining insight into military software issues undoubtedly gives PLA leaders a much clearer picture of the ROC’s fighting capability and the strengths and weaknesses in Taiwan’s military.. 32 33. Appendix 1, Interview 2 Appendix 2, Case 2002-1. 20.

(28) The fact that PRC intelligence has access to a wide variety of ROC human assets should provide them with a very comprehensive picture of Taiwan’s military. PRC spies, and especially ROC military defectors to the PRC, are valuable sources of software intelligence. Additionally, many retired ROC military personnel have either moved to the Mainland or in some cases even work for PLA front companies.34 These individuals would be perfect targets for software-related intelligence elicitation due to their experience and position within the ROC military. Some of these retired soldiers may have given in to the temptation to “talk about old times” in the military over a few drinks with new Mainland friends. It is well known that PRC intelligence exposes visiting scientific and technical experts to copious amounts of alcohol, flattery and social pressure to glean a few tidbits of sensitive information from their targets.35 Similarly, the PRC. 政治大 with loyalty among some current and former ROC military and security personnel, discussed 立. could employ this tactic on retired ROC soldiers in the Mainland.36 Given the current problems. further in chapter 5, retired ROC military officers are undoubtedly a vulnerable target for the. ‧ 國. 學. PRC’s intelligence agencies.. Seeking software related intelligence from ROC targets may likely be easier than attempting. ‧. to acquire classified documents and technical information. Military software issues such as morale, training levels and strategic thinking is essentially composed of informed opinion rather. y. Nat. sit. than technical facts. The line between official secrets and unclassified information is not always. al. er. io. distinct in this area. Some individuals may have less awareness or reticence when discussing. n. military software issues, which are unclassified but still sensitive. Furthermore, providing. Ch. i n U. v. military software secrets to enemy agents is much easier and less risky than providing classified documents or military plans.. engchi. At worst, PRC agents simply bribe retired soldiers to divulge sensitive information. This danger especially increases for people who face economic hardship. PRC agents have successfully bribed retired ROC military and intelligence personnel working in the Mainland for secrets. In one instance, a retired MJIB agent was recruited after his travel magazine business was losing money. The fact that PRC intelligence targeted him during a vulnerable period suggests that they keep close tabs on the personal affairs of retired ROC officials who live in the 34. “Retired navy hands working for China” Taipei Times, July 30, 2001 Jane’s, pg. 23 36 As of 2002, it was estimated that over 3,000 former ROC soldiers were working in the PRC. (Eyton, Lawrence “Taiwan: Island of insecurity” Asia Times Online, June 18, 2002 Available at: http://www.atimes.com/china/df18ad01.html 35. 21.

(29) Mainland.. 2.2 ROC HUMINT Networks in the PRC One of the PRC’s highest priority espionage targets is the ROC’s own HUMINT network and its operations against the PRC. The ROC has maintained vigorous espionage activity against the CCP ever since it became a force in Chinese politics. In the 1980s, the ROC’s MIB (Military Intelligence Bureau) stepped up HUMINT operations against the PRC when it began recruiting Taiwanese businessmen to collect military intelligence during their visits to the Mainland. Many of these untrained individuals were caught by PRC security and sent to prison.37 The ROC’s. 政治大. stepped-up intelligence collection operations in the PRC were a likely factor in the PRC’s own. 立. efforts to penetrate Taiwan’s MIB.. The PRC may also assume that Taiwan’s intelligence community is cooperating with, and. ‧ 國. 學. sharing secrets with, the United States. This would provide the PRC with added incentive to neutralize ROC HUMINT networks. The US and Taiwan cooperated on numerous intelligence. ‧. collection efforts during the Cold War and the two governments continue cooperation to this day.. y. Nat. Given that the US is Taiwan’s only military allay, it is not unreasonable to assume that the two. sit. sides would share PRC related intelligence.. al. er. io. The rampant corruption and lack of ideological values in contemporary Chinese society. v. n. and government likely aids the ROC’s efforts to recruit spies. Additionally, the fact that ROC. Ch. i n U. agents are ethnic Chinese may also provide them with an added advantage in recruiting PRC. engchi. spies. The high level of nationalism and the acute sense of historical grievance against the West and Japan may make it harder for these nations to recruit PRC nationals to spy against their own government. In contrast, PRC citizens likely see ROC agents as “less foreign” and some may even feel a certain sense of sympathy for the ROC’s achievement. For these reasons, it is even more imperative that the PRC maintain a high level of vigilance and aggressiveness against ROC agents and their spy networks. In recent decades, Taiwan has continued to achieve some notable success in its own 37. Cindy Sui “Taiwan’s forgotten amateur spies” BBC News, August 16, 2010 Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-10986630 accessed on 25 June, 2011. 22.

(30) espionage efforts against the PRC. During the 1995-96 Missile Crisis, President Lee Teng-hui was able to assuage public fears over the missile tests by revealing that the missiles in question did not contain live warheads. It was later discovered that the source of this information was a PLA general in the Nanjing Military Region. Major general Liu Lian-kun and senior colonel Shao Zheng-zhang were some of the ROC’s most valuable HUMINT assets in the Mainland. Unfortunately, because of Lee’s statements, the PRC realized that it had a spy in its ranks. It subsequently conducted a major counter-espionage operation and the two officers, along with General Liu’s mistress, were caught and executed.38 Harsh punishments against accused Taiwanese spies have continued. In 2008 the PRC executed medical scientist Wo Wei-han for allegedly passing information to Taiwan. The Wo Case received international attention and. 政治大 death sentence on Wo’s behalf. The fact that Taiwanese spies continue to be caught suggests 立 condemnation as high-level representatives from the US and the EU attempted to appeal the 39. that the ROC is still very active in recruiting, and maintaining, spies in the Mainland. For every. ‧ 國. 學. spy caught, there could be several others which continue to operate undetected. Recent incidents of espionage in the PRC suggest that China’s intelligence community. ‧. may be more vulnerable to penetration. As China has becomes more open, and as corruption has festered, the PRC will likely be more vulnerable to espionage. In early 2012, the personal. y. Nat. sit. secretary of an MSS vice-minister was arrested for spying for the U.S.40 In 2007, China’s. al. n. that he was actually spying for South Korea.41. Ch. er. io. ambassador to South Korea was arrested on charges of corruption. However, it was later found. i n U. v. The fact that the PRC pursues aggressive operations against Taiwan’s HUMINT. engchi. operations in the Mainland is evidenced by their success at recruiting ROC agents and officials to spy for the PRC. Between 1997 and 2010 there were seven known cases of ROC HUMINT related agents or officials who were recruited to spy for China. In several of these cases the damage is very clear as entire networks, or large segments, of ROC spies were compromised. In 1997 two KMT intelligence officials compromised the identities of ROC agents in Hong Kong. 38. J. Pomfret “Taiwan accidently outs top spy in China” The Seattle Times, February 21, 2000 “China executes Taiwan spy suspect Wo” The China Post, November 28, 2008 40 “China ‘arrests high-level US spy’ in Hong Kong, reports” BBC News, June 1, 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18299065 39. 41. Michael Bristow “China general reveals spy cases in web footage” BBC News, August 29, 2011 Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14707920 accessed on March 1, 2012. 23.

(31) and Macau. In 1998 Taiwan may have lost its entire network of informants in Hong Kong after an unidentified MIB agent was discovered to be working for the PRC.42 In 2010, ROC intelligence suffered a serious blow when MIB colonel Luo Chi-Cheng reportedly compromised Taiwan’s intelligence networks in the PRC. Luo was responsible for developing Taiwan’s HUMINT networks in China and some sources described this case as the worst compromise of Taiwanese intelligence in decades. ROC HUMINT collection against the PRC has also most likely been degraded by defections of high level officials in the intelligence bureaucracy. In early 2001 Liu Guan-chun (劉冠軍). , a colonel in the NSB and the bureau’s chief cashier, reportedly fled to China after stealing. NT 180 million from secret funds.43 It must be assumed that a criminal of Liu’s stature would. 政治大 who betray Taiwan and flee to the 立PRC are essentially at the mercy of China’s government for. certainly have been willing to share the NSB’s secrets with his new hosts. Moreover, ROC agents. protection and well-being. As the chief cashier, Liu would have had access to funding details for. ‧ 國. 學. the NSB’s clandestine operations on the Mainland. This knowledge most likely enabled the PRC to gain a much sharper understanding of Taiwan’s HUMINT operations on the Mainland, both in. ‧. terms of the scope and detail of operations. Additionally, Liu probably had access to general. io. 2.3 ROC Government. al. er. sit. y. Nat. information regarding future operations against the PRC.. n. iv n C of PRC HUMINT and the executive branches have been targets hen i U operations. The Legislative Yuan h c g appears to have been a fairly lucrative target for PRC intelligence. In June of 1996, PRC PRC intelligence is also interested in Taiwan’s political establishment and both the legislature. intelligence used Taiwanese businessmen Chang Ming-ho to acquire classified documents from a friend who worked for a New Party legislator. Chang failed to acquire the information and subsequently turned himself in to ROC authorities once he fully realized the seriousness of his actions.44 More disturbingly, it is possible that a PRC agent had actually been working for a Taiwan. 42. “Military agents held in alleged espionage case” The China Post, March 4, 1999 “Court clears Hsu of embezzling secret diplomatic fund” Taipei Times, September 28, 2006 44 Appendix 2, Case 1996-2 43. 24.

(32) legislator from 2002 to 2003.45 Yang Zhi-yi (楊芷宜), originally from Mainland China, was accused of using her position as legislative assistant to gather information for China. During her time at the Legislative Yuan, it appears that Yang had some degree of involvement with military issues as she had sent three written requests to the navy seeking unspecified military-related information. Two of the requests were fulfilled and one was denied due to its highly confidential nature. Yang also attempted to arrange a visit to a navy base near Kaoshiung for Lin’s supporters. The navy did not grant the request. Although no official charges or indictments occurred, the events and actions surrounding Yang’s activity are extremely suspicious. In addition to her duties as a legislative assistant, Yang established connections with several ROC navy officers and often invited them out to expensive. 政治大 actions but three senior officers were removed from their posts and transferred to other positions 立 restaurants and nightclubs.46 The navy denied that any of its secrets were compromised by these as a result of an investigation into their relationship with Yang.47 One of the officers, Ku Chun-. ‧ 國. 學. chu, was accused of having an affair with Yang. Although Ku denied these allegations, it was reported that Ku treated Yang to a vacation in Hawaii.. ‧. The fact that Yang, a married woman, was developing relationships with Taiwanese military. y. Nat. personnel in nightclubs raises the distinct possibility that she may have been attempting to trade. al. er. io. officials into providing the PRC with classified information.. sit. sexual favors for information. The PRC has frequently used sexual entrapment to coerce foreign. v. n. At the very least, this case shows how easily the PRC could have placed an agent in a. Ch. i n U. sensitive position close to ROC government activity. Yang’s position as a legislative assistant. engchi. would have put her in close proximity to sensitive topics such as defense and foreign affairs budgets, topics which the PRC had already been known to target. Even with good security practices, it is difficult to conceal general details regarding diplomatic, defense and security legislation. The fact that Yang was able to request information from the navy shows that she had access to, and was trusted with, some degree of defense related information. Over time, Yang’s position as a legislative assistant would have enabled her to form friendships and working relationships with a wide variety of important individuals. One traditional espionage target where the PRC appears to have had less success against is 45. KMT Legislator Lin Nan-sheng (林南生) “Two China-born women accused of spying in Taiwan” The Straits Times, January 31, 2004 47 The three officers were: Wan Shang-chun, Ku Chun-chu and Ran Chi-chang. 46. 25.