Political Instability

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Chapter Three: Myanmar’s National Concerns (Domestic Perspective)

This chapter aims to touch upon Myanmar’s national concerns in different areas from the internal perspective. After having been held back and isolated for many years, Myanmar has gone through a major change recently. As the government has unexpectedly embarked the reforms to lead the country to democratization, Myanmar’s relations with the U.S were improved. The key objectives of this chapter are to identify domestic concerns and investigate whether the driving force of such transition derive internally.

The scope of discussion covers five parts which are political stability, economic concerns, security concern, non-traditional security concerns and further discussion.

3.1 Political Instability

Ever since the independence from British rule in 1948, Myanmar has been struggling with its internal political uncertainty which is partially an offshoot of the divide and rule policy. Through a several times of power transition, the issue has clearly been the thorn in a flesh of every Burmese central government and also affected their alternatives in making both internal and foreign policy. This section aims to discuss political concerns that have been a long-standing challenge to the central government since the political transition during 1988-1990. In the current Burmese political landscape, it is argued that the persisting armed conflict with the ethnic groups and the Tatmadaw political opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi, are regarded as the important keys in the government’s policy-making process.

The first issue which internally threatens Myanmar’s stability and poses a challenge to any Burmese administrations is the fragmentation of ethnicity. Within 55 million of its

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population, the country is composed of 135 ethnic groups⁶ (Roycee 2008, 32-33). Some of these ethnic groups have been anti-government rebels since Myanmar became independent republic in 1948 as to fight for independence in the beginning, and later on, struggling for some type of autonomy under a federal system (Steinberg 2012, 221). The clashes between the army and ethnic groups have been erupted at some times displacing tens of thousands of people within Myanmar and fleeing thousands more across the borders. However, the demand of self-government among the ethnic groups has been clearly rejected because the regime has firmly stood on its principle of national unity (Turnell 2012, 160).

In the long-standing conflict, the Burmese government periodically uses offensive campaigns to suppress the ethnic rebels alongside its reconciliation plan with a number of minorities along the Burmese periphery. The SLORC signed ceasefire agreements with eleven ethnic rebel groups including Shan State Army, the Kachin Independence organization and the Karenni group in 1989 (Callahan 1994, 205). A more flexible approach was later on made by the SPDC. The central government created the proposal to integrate the minority military into the Border Guard Forces under the national control by offering economic development and freedom of travel for unarmed ethnic leaders in exchange (Moe Thuzar 2012, 211). In spite of the offer which successfully persuaded a few ethnic groups, the plan was quietly set aside after President Thein Sein took office in 2011 (Steinberg 2012, 222).

However, the newly inaugural civil-backed government has shown its intentions to put more effort on the peaceful dialogue with ethnic minorities. As to continue the promising democratization process and prepare for ASEAN chairmanship in 2014, the president

6. Roycee 2008, 32-22. The figures of population are roughly estimated by the Ministry of Home and Religious Affairs in 1983. Also, the number of recognized ethnic groups is suspect as it based on the survey in the early colonial era.

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recently set the national solidarity as one of the country’s priorities in his inauguration speech and emphasized that the ethnic minority issue needed to be resolved (The New Light of Myanmar 2011). Despite the intensified fight with Kachin rebels recently, the president was meeting with ethnic leaders to seek a peaceful solution for the ethnic insurgencies, and some preliminary peace agreements have been successfully negotiated (Moe Thuzar 2012, 211).

Moreover, foreign aids to Myanmar have decreased since 1988 as a result of violent military crackdown in 1988 and the rejection of 1990 election. With this damning reputation of human rights abuse and aid restriction, Myanmar has become one of the least funded countries in the world. The amount of international aid that the country receives is considerably scarcer than, for example, Laos or Cambodia, which are at an equal level of poverty (IRIN 2009).

Regarding Burmese politics since 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD party have been treated as the perpetual enemy to the military regime. The leader of NLD was perceived negatively by the military as a wife of foreigner and should not be accepted as the leader of the country⁷ Despite being put under the house arrest over 20 years by dubious charges, Aung San Suu Kyi’s struggle against the junta has not only been an inspiration for democratic movement within the country but also been the influential factor determining the international community’s reaction toward Myanmar.

As Steinberg describes, “Aung San Suu Kyi has emerged as the avatar of democracy both to many opposition within Myanmar and to the external world” (2010, 36). In one of the Burmese biggest protest in 2007 led by 10,000 monks, the anti-government protestors reportedly marched to greet the NLD’s leader at the gate of her home and shouted

7 Interview with Thai scholar on August 13, 2013, Chiangmai University, Thailand

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support for her along the street in Yangon (Mydans 2007). Myanmar has also been criticized by international institutions and other countries including the U.N., EU, ASEAN, the United States and Philippines on the human rights issue, and some even refuse to support the country unless Aung San Suu Kyi was released (Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung and Maung Aung Myoe, 2008, 19).

Being seen as a threat to the regime stability, the generals were attempting to use a

‘stricter’ approach in order to handle the Aung San Suu Kyi’s domestic and international influence. After the release of the first round of detention in 1995, Aung San Suu Kyi was invited to the first round of negotiations with Sr. Gen. Than Shwe. Basically, the chairman of SPDC thought that she would be easily persuaded and asked her to accept the military government. The negotiation unquestionably failed, and there was a rumour that the general has become very hateful about ‘the lady’ since then. He refused to addressed Aung San Suu Kyi by her name but called her by using Burmese term which mean ‘a wife of foreigner’ instead (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012, 202).

Although the NLD leader and its members was considered as threat to its stability in the past, the current Burmese government is now taking a more pragmatic approach to the

‘lady’ and allowing more space for its political oppositions. The government tends to see that the standoff against Aung San Suu Kyi is detrimental to its credibility domestically and internationally; thus, having her as the part of reform process possibly reduces the scepticism from both sides. Internal pressure was evidently lessened when the government’s mild approach took place. Celebrations among the Burmese people were reported to be seen when Aung San Suu Kyi was released from the third detention in 2010, allowed to participate in 2012 election and seated in the parliament (Mydans 2010 and DiMaggio and Clapp 2012). Internationally, ‘the lady’ has a new role as the country representative travelling to many countries including Thailand, the United States, the United Kingdom and South Korea to rebuild the international confidence in Myanmar (Pitman 2012, Min Zin 2012, and Kim 2012).

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