Chapter Three: Myanmar’s National Concerns (Domestic Perspective)
3.4 Non-Traditional Security Concerns
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serious economic and politic problems could be resolved by reforms, the hardliners prefer military- ruling system and NLD being under control (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012, 209).
Some generals reveal their desire of a faster pace of reforms, on the other hand, some hardliner ministers are still reluctant to work with Aung San Suu Kyi and feel that the reform are proceeded too quickly (212). Such internal conformities will inevitably become the obstacle in building a confidence both within the Burmese and among the international community with the fear that there might be a regime reversion.
3.4 Non-Traditional Security Concerns
Apart from political, economic and strategic concerns, this section discusses issues regarding Myanmar’s human rights violations, narcotics and energy security. In Asia, there is probably no country which has been the subject of more attention and more criticism for its poor human rights record than Myanmar. With the scale and extent of abuses, the country is ranked 6th in the 2013 Human Rights Risk Atlas after Sudan, Somalia and Afghanistan by the U.K. business advisory company (the Irrawaddy, 2012).
Under the different forms of human rights violations, the case which is drawn to international scrutiny the most is the one related to political freedom.
The demonstration started in 1988 due to the shortages of essential goods and spiralling rice prices was brutally ended by the military opened fire to unarmed demonstrators, and thousands of them were reported to be killed (Smith 1991, 2-3). The abuse of political power continued with the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi, imprisonment and torture of political activists and the rejection of 1990 election results (3-6). These actions, as being described by Western governments as an abuse of political freedom, brought about a series of punitive actions which not only affected the military regime but also its people.
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The regime received strong criticism not only from the West but also its Asian neighbours when brutal force against the opposition was carried on by the military. In May 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members were reported to be attacked in the village on the outskirts of Depayin Township by the troops who were believed to be commanded by Sr. Gen. Than Shwe. Although there were no official reports on the death tolls, the dissidents claimed that there were at least 50 people were slaughtered, and some women were allegedly raped during the penetration (Saw Yan Naing, 2011). After the incident, rumour about the NLD leader being captured by the military was circulating among the public. Malaysia’s prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad urged the SPDC to immediately release her otherwise Myanmar’s ASEAN membership would be in jeopardy (Seekins 2005, 439). Japan, known as being very patient with the military regime, response to the incident by announcing that it would suspend the new official assistance to Myanmar (439).
In 2007, the country was sealed in order to contain the protestors which included roughly 10,000 of monks. During the rally, policemen fired warning shots to people on the street, and troops were reported to be seen chasing the protestors and took them away in the trucks. The military was successfully clearing up the demonstration with an estimated death toll of at least 300 people (Mydans 2007). Once again, the violent suppression caused harsh criticism from ASEAN member states against the SPDC. As Chair of ASEAN, Singapore’s Foreign Minister strongly expressed the brutal suppression as the
‘collective revulsion’ to Myanmar’s Foreign Minister while Indonesia urged the Burmese government to peacefully handle the protest and to stop further violence (Davies 2012, 9).
The country’s performance on human rights is not only crucial to the Burmese people trust in their new government but also important to the international acceptance. In order to develop the country which has been sealed for decades, assistance from other countries can be great helping hands. Moreover, as the country will be soon chaired the ASEAN
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which has been increasingly paying attentions on human rights improvement in its country members, it is important to improve the image of the country as a more democratic and responsible leader.
Although the central government seemed to turn a blind eye on the international condemnation and public outcry over the past twenty years, the new civilian-backed government is taking a new approach by embarking its will to improve human rights through the political and economic reforms. Since the government under Thien Sein presidency took the office, a large number of political prisoners were released, Aung San Suu Kyi was elected as a parliamentary member, and the press restrictions were loosened with the improving ranking in the World Press Freedom Index. However, the U.N. still warns that the key human rights issues remain unaddressed. According to the U.N.
Human Rights Council, “downgrading the scrutiny of the U.N. Human rights body would be premature” as there is still a big gap of improvement regarding the issues of Rohingya Muslim, the law of war in Kachin State and also political prisoners (2013). Moreover, behind the scene of the prisoners charged with the case 1988-1990 political uprising were released, the local newspaper reported there were at least 50 people being arrested in August 2013 because of their involvement with political activities.10
Apart from the issues of human rights violations, Myanmar has long been criticized on its narcotics issue; the United States once called the country “the narco-state". Despite the effect of narcotics is rarely investigated internally, drug trafficking is always the target of condemnation on the country in the international stage alongside its human rights and regime legitimacy. Drug-producing activity in Myanmar has started since the country gained its independence in 1948 (Gibson and Hasema 2003, 2). Although the official has declared that opium sale was illegal since 1959, trade regarding narcotics began to burgeon afterwards (Steinberg 2001, 215). With the lucrative nature of the trade,
10. Interview with Burmese Students on September 15, 2013, Chiangmai University, Thailand
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refineries were built in the Golden Triangle region, the border of Myanmar with Thailand and Laos, and the production of opium increased from a few hundred tons to 2500 tons during 1997-1998 (215). The country currently remains the world's second largest producer of illicit opium and a major exporter of methamphetamine to the black market around the world (Wyler 2008, 79). Such trading activities were reported to generate between US$ 1 billion and US$ 2 billion annually in exports (78).
Narcotic issue nevertheless became Myanmar's national concern when it significantly caused social issues in other countries such as China, Thailand and the United States. The first two countries are very important to Myanmar in patronizing the country's destitute economy while the latter keeps criticizing the military regime and persuading international community to impose sanctions against Naypyidaw. Apart from the absence of the central government's genuine effort to curtail the trafficking activities, the prosperous business has been carried on uninterruptedly because of the lack of control from the central government over the ethnic group areas. Steinberg argues that due to the persisted volatile situation and occasional military confrontation between the Tatmadaw and the rebel groups, trade on illegal drug can generate lucrative income and has become critical in financing the ethnic guerrillas (2001, 216). However, Myanmar’s authorities recently acknowledged that country’s drug problem has been increasingly deepened (AFP 2012). It is also noticed that methamphetamine is currently widely used among young people and adults in some states. 11
Contrast to its economic status, Myanmar is indeed rich in natural resources which fortunately have not been widely exploited yet as those in its neighbouring countries.
According to the estimation of Thailand’s national oil company, PTTEP, Myanmar’s proven reserves for crude oil and natural gas could stand at 11.7 years and 26.8 years respectively (Richardson 2012, 2). As a series of reform have taken place, oil and gas
11. Interview with Burmese students on September 15, 2013, Chiangmai University, Thailand
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industry, among other conventional industries such as minerals, gems and teak, are fully supported by the government and considered to be on the verge of rapid expansion (Shun 2013, 8).
The inflexible investment law was fixed in response to Naypyidaw’s wishful plan to gain a lucrative profit and simultaneously revitalize the relations with Western investors through oil and gas business expansion. However, since the new government claims that the domestic demand should be addressed along the reforms, the question of whether the business would benefit the country as a whole potentially looms large internally as the expansion commenced. Among oil and gas producers in Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar’s appears to be the least democratic and transparent (Sovacool 2010, 255). The lack of transparency consequently increases resistance among the people. Regarding the projects initiated by the by the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), public discontent still exists. Some local villagers are concerned that the construction might bring about demolition, land erosion, deforestation and unfair land compensation from the government (Zhao 2011, 103).
Moreover, as this sector of industry expands, citizen’s awareness whether the natural resources are equitably distributed is raised. While the country is facing with the problem of power shortages in many areas, 25 mega-dam projects have been planned and built, and 90% of the electricity they can produce will be sold overseas (Roughneen 2011).
90% of oil and gas produced in each field is directly managed by the MOGE, but it is reported that only 20% of crude oil and 25% of gas are reserved for the domestic market (Shun 2013, 9).
Further Discussion
In its isolation, Myanmar has long suffered from the unstable political situation, distressing economy, military power struggle and international condemnation on human
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rights violation and narcotics. According to the previous study, it is undeniable that the military regime is not only the initial cause of those issues but their policies also exacerbate the situation. Public opposition and international pressure have been apparent as the response to the lack of legitimacy in a military ruling regime while aggravated economic situation and persisting ethnic conflict are partially the result of government mismanagement. Although the political and economic reforms had long been anticipated in Myanmar, the military regime managed to surprise many people as the reform were announce to be finally taken place.
Kyaw Yin Hlaing mentions Huntington’s idea regarding democratization under authoritarian regime that it might take place under the following conditions: “when the regime is toppled by social movement or seriously weakened by a crisis; when reformers from within the regime and liberals from the movement find a way to work together; or when the regime feels that it cannot survive without initiating political reforms (2012, 199). Clearly, Myanmar has been struggling with social movements and critical economic condition, and the military has finally found the way to work with their political opposition. However, despite the constant political instability and the unprecedented cooperation between the junta and its oppositions, it is argued that the reforms were undertaken by the military as they are essentially important to the regime survival. The generals realize that they could not rule the country indefinitely the change is thus inevitable.
As a result of its inflexible and uncompromising ruling style, the military government had been facing pressure both from its people in the form of social movements and from international condemnation in the form of sanctions. What happened in the 1988 military crackdown and the rejection of 1990 election has toppled the aggravation and dissatisfaction among the Burmese people and the prodemocracy groups which brought about several major demonstrations afterwards. The conflict with the ethnic minority has also persisted, and the army is acutely aware of this hostility evidenced by the country’s
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income which was allocated mainly to increase the military capability. The economic restriction not only has decreased the general income generated from their business but also put the whole country into scarcity.
Despite acute problems which constantly threatened the country and the regime stability, the Tatmadaw stood firmly, and was seemingly confident, on its own principle in managing the domestic pressure. Looking through most of the major anti-government protests, extreme measures were normally the option for the army to clear up the riots.
The military was indeed well-aware that the brutal reaction would inevitably result in even more aggravating public and stricter sanctions; it nevertheless was not hesitate to apply these brutal measures against the demonstrators when such incident occurred.
Although it can be argued that the Burmese central government has been attempting to negotiate with the rebellious ethnic minority groups, it is beyond a doubt that the deal of federal system which is the ultimate goal of those ethnic groups can hardly be accepted by the military or the newly-established government whose majority is from the army and its allies. In the situation where the military confrontation takes place, those ethnic groups would hardly handle the troops with a larger scale of capacity. Moreover, despite the poor economic conditions resulted from the mismanagement, the military was still able to exploit the country's abundant natural resources and remain solvent economically with the help from trade with its Asian neighbours.
Although the NLD leader views her country's democratization progress as in a very beginning process, the military's unprecedented decision which has been recently made about her is relatively convincing to the public and international community that Myanmar is heading to the new era. 12It is completely acceptable to claim that the military and lady, after the twenty years of hostility, finally made a massive step in improving their relationship. However, whether the progress achieved by the two sides
12. Aung San Suu Kyi 2012.
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can be regarded as the driving force to the regime change is still arguable. Before Aung San Suu Kyi's was allowed to participate in and honoured by the landmark election in April 2012, the referendum of the new constitution already took place and the quasi-parliamentary system was established in 2010. The change of power structure was intended to be made even before the victory of Aung San Suu Kyi. It is believed that Sr.
Gen.Than Shwe singlehandedly decided the day of 2010 election and picked the members in the new government himself. (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012, 204-05). Besides, the huge gap of more cooperative attitude between the old and the new parliamentary remains to be filled in spite of the praise to the military received from other countries on the ground-breaking political change.
Regime survival appears to be the most contributing underlining factor which drives the country into the democratization under the Myanmar’s authoritarianism. Considering the central government’s reaction against domestic instability assessed from the past, social movement is seen to be controllable from the Tatmadaw's perspective. The meaningful step undertaken by the military with Aung San Suu Kyi was also evidently commenced after the initial reforms. Genuineness of the cooperation between reform-minded and parliamentary members and the hardliner is still needed to be approved in a long run.
According to Ko Ko Hlaing, the adviser of President Thein Sein, the Tatmadaw has always been aware that the country will be inevitably democratized in the future according to the global trend, and it desires Myanmar to go through the transition as smooth as possible.13 This clearly indicates that the Tatmadaw fears the sudden regime change where their power will be overthrown and some of them might be punished for the things they committed in the past. It is premised that before fully stepping in the so-called roadmap to democracy, the junta had been working to ensure that the country will go through a “smooth” transition. The new constitution which was heavily criticized by
13. Ko Ko Hlaing 2012.
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the oppositions and international community of lacking transparency and genuine political liberation was finally ratified in the days following cyclone Nargis in May 2008 (Seekins 2009, 169).
The constitution gives the military an absolute power by establishing permanent military tribunals which is completely separated from civilian justice mechanism, limits the power of the oppositions by forbidding persons married to foreigner to hold political offices, ensures the junta power present in a parliament by requiring 25% of members of national legislature to be military personnel who are appointed by the commander-in-chief, and provides a blanket amnesty to the member of SPDC for their previous commission of heinous crimes ( Seekins 2009, 169-170 and Aung Htoo 2010).
Besides securing the dominant power from the oppositions, the military also gain advantages in several areas. Internally, the political reforms and Aung San Suu Kyi's new role will calm the public, and the threat from social movement will be consequently lowered. As the country's financial condition is improved as a result of economic reforms, the state income, which is knowingly and mostly controlled by the military elites, will be dramatically increased. Internationally, the outside pressures are alleviated and the central government gains more acceptance. The improved image will pave the way for the country to be worthy to chair the ASEAN in 2014. In addition, some sanctions have been suspended, and more foreign assistances are expected to return.
Since the military thinks it will no longer survive in its isolation with a few allies, the reforms, beyond the outsider's expectation, emerged. Mounting problems suffered internally reach the point where they cannot be solved without adaptation. In a different form of ruling system, the dominant power remains in the hand of military elites so that their interests remain secured. The result of a study in this chapter suggests that the change is likely to commence internally; however, it is interesting to find out whether the
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enthusiastic response from the external factors have contributed to a successfully-established reforms. As a result, the influence from other countries, namely China and the United States needs to be further investigated.
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