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However, sluggish trade situation seems to be slightly improved in recent years after the bilateral relations in general was revived through high-ranking official visits. Even though the figure on Burmese goods imported to the U.S. remains frozen due to the sanctions, there has been a positive signs regarding the figure on U.S. goods exported to Myanmar. In addition, the president signed it into law stating that the U.S. would back Myanmar in receiving economic assistance from international financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank. The U.S. Treasury Department has issued permission to four Burmese banks for conducting financial transaction in the beginning of 2013 (See Appendix II)

4.3 Traditional Security Relations

Strategically speaking, apart from the issues related to Chinese support to the BCP and the U.S. assistance to the KTM in the early period after its independence, Myanmar did not receive much attention from both China and the United States until the late 1990s (Joonsiriwong 2007, 495). After the country’s bloody civil war ended with the Communists’ victory, Beijing had turned itself into an isolationist whose diplomatic activities with other countries were maintained minimal. Washington, similarly, did not view Myanmar as the key actor in the war of political ideology presumably because Naypyidaw obviously expressed itself of desiring not to be aligned with any sides and there were other Southeast Asian countries that needed more U.S. attention.

However, the Myanmar’s strategic ties with China were impressively improved since the late 1990s while the one with the United States slowly became sour. Beijing has been considered to be the major arm supplier for the Tatmatdaw, on the other hand, Washington’s policy toward Myanmar clearly aimed at crippling the Burmese army. This section, therefore, attempts to investigate the drastic change occurred in Burmese-Chinese strategic connection and explore the incentives behind that change.

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Comparatively, the U.S. opposition to the military government and its punitive policy are also examined.

The proximity between PRC and the SLORC/SPDC is always described as the

“paukpaw” or “brotherhood” by the leader both from the PLA and Tatmadaw (Arnott 2001, AlamGir 2008, 987; Haacke 2010, 121; SUN 2012, 79). Besides an exchange of official visits for economic purposes, high-level defence delegation exchange was seen to be relatively frequent. At invitation of General Zhang Wanian, Vice-Chaiman of SLORC, General Maung Aye visited China to boost military cooperation in 1997(See Appendix I).

The military cooperation accord was finalized in the following year by the SLORC’s chairman, Sr. Gen. Than Shwe and the Chinese premier, Li Peng. Military cooperation was also fostered through the often regional military commander visits. Lt. Gen Tin Ngwe, the Commander in Chief of the Myanmar Air Force met with Fu Quanyou, the Chief of the PLA in Beijing in 1997, Major General Wang Jitang, commander of Yunnan Provincial Military Command of the Chinese PLA with military delegation visited Yangon in 1999, and recently in 2010, the Commander of Jinan Military Region, Fan Changlong, led a PLA military delegation to visit Myanmar (See Appendix I).

Through the time that the country was struggling with the civil unrest and enduring with the pressure from Western governments combined with the fact that its Southeast Asian neighbours, who were bound by the pressure of Western sanctions and their own internal security conflict, were unable to provide assistance, China remained Myanmar’s sole ally who was capable of helping (Thitiporn 2000, 106). As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Burmese army suddenly began to modernize its capability in 1988 in order to maintain internal stability and to deter foreign intervention, and its key sponsor was its giant neighbour from the north. It is suggested that 90% of Myanmar’s military hardware has been supported by China (Saez 2007, 676).

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According to RAND’s Project Air Force Research, China began to provide an extensive range of military equipment for the Tatmadaw in 1989 after a successful arms deal negotiation conducted during Sr. Gen. Than Shwe’s Beijing visit in the same year (See Appendix I and Byman and Cliff 1999, 20). Chinese conventional weapons shipped to Myanmar included Type-62 and Type-63 lights tanks, Type-69 battle tanks, F-6 and F-7 fighter jets, A-5 attack aircraft, PL-2 air-to-air missiles, HN-5A portable surface-to-air missiles, Hainan-class patrol craft, multiple rocket launchers, Y-8 and Y-2 transport aircraft and fire control radars (19). The Southeast Asian affairs scholar, Ian Storey claimed the evidence on China’s weapons exported to Southeast Asian countries collected by SIPRI that half of them were delivered to Myanmar (2012, 298). During the 1988-1989, the cost of Chinese arm and ammunition purchased by the Tatmatdaw was estimated to be US$ 1.594 billion, and the scale of purchasing was reduced during 2000-2010 to be US$ 183 million (298).

Apart from the economic interests and the partnership as an authoritarian with Myanmar, there are evidences suggesting that China’s enthusiasm in boosting security ties might derive from the perceived threat from India. The strategic location can be used to fulfil China’s strategic ambition in gaining am access to Indian Ocean (SUN 2012, 79). Its naval facilities were seen to receive special attention through a frequent visit of leading officials from the PLA. In August 1994, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that China successfully secured an access to three islands off the Burmese coast for signals intelligence. Those three naval bases were Ramree Island which located in the Western Arakan state, Zadetkyi Kyun or St. Matthew’s island which was close to the northern entrance to the Straits of Malacca and CoCo Island which was in Andaman Sea, Indian Ocean (12). Among those bases, the last one seems to trouble India the most as the island is knowingly close to India’s naval base and the rumour that China has installed surveillance and communication equipment there (Byman and Cliff 1999, 19 and Jirasawad 2000, 80).

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Contrast to what is seen in Chinese-Burmese relations, the security ties between Naypyidaw and Washington is rather estranged than cordial. The fears of foreign invasion deeply rooted in the junta combined with the U.S. solemnity on the difference of political ideology are the obstacles hindering the development of strategic connections.

Despites its dire need of military hardware to maintain its internal stability during 1988-1990, not being the democratically-accountable armed forces made it was impossible to receive military support from Western governments (Storey 2013, 294).

Instead, the military regime perceived threat from the U.S. since 1988 when the country was experiencing grave political situation. In September 1988, five U.S. naval vessels were detected off the Myanmar’s coast (Selth 2008, 381). The Burmese generals’ anxiety grew stronger when the U.S. embassy failed to convince that present of the vessels was for embassy staff evacuation (382). Moreover, the Tatmadaw had long been concerned about the military exercises, namely the Cobra Gold, between Thailand and the United States. The military drill was possibly seen as the act of opposition against Myanmar’s military regime as it sometimes took place near to the Thai-Burmese borders (Steinberg 2012, 222).

Apart from the suspicion on the U.S. relations with Thailand, the Tatmadaw has to strive to avoid the possible danger of being seen by Washington as a threat to regional security.

In spite of the treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEAWFZ) that Myanmar has signed in 1995, the international concerns over Burmese nuclear ambitions have been expressed at times (ABAD, Jr., 2005, 166). The suspicion that Myanmar was allegedly purchasing a nuclear reactor from Russia first brought up in U.S. Congress in 2001 (Haacke 2006, 68). Later on, Myanmar’s Minister of Science, Thaung firmly denied the allegations and explained that the nuclear reactor was intended for research on medical purposes and the possibility of nuclear power generation (69).

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Regardless to the lack of financial sources and specialist advice and the government’s vigorous refusal, the military’s obsession with secrecy, distrust of foreigners and commitment in self-reliance rather insist the U.S. to believe that Myanmar is potentially seeking its own nuclear weapons than defend it. Though there were claims made by locals of having seen nuclear weapon facility in Myanmar, evidences have not been substantiated.¹⁵ In June 2010, a documentary film about Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions released by the Democratic voice of Burma (DVB) triggered international debates whether the Burmese army was constructing nuclear reactor and enriching uranium to develop atomic bombs (Selth 2010, 5). The U.S. Senator Jim Webb cancelled his trip to Myanmar as the allegation broke out (See Appendix II). Under such circumstance, Myanmar’s military felts threatened, by the United State particularly, as the State Department’s Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation presumed that Myanmar may have an interest in pursuing nuclear program and receive assistance from North Korea to develop nuclear weapons (Selth 2010, 8). The U.S. was nevertheless unable to provide proof to support its claims, and the evidence which the DVB obtained from a mid-ranking Burmese military officer appeared to be weak and failed to affirm the Burmese intentions regarding nuclear program (9).

However, the unsteady relationship has been slightly improved recently. The U.S. took the first step in military re-engagement by inviting Myanmar to observe its military exercise with Thailand, Cobra Gold in 2012 (Aljazeera, 2012). Despite claiming that the cooperation was conducted for the humanitarian purpose, the initial success to boost Myanmar-U.S. security was followed by the invitation to the two Burmese officers participating as an observer in the same military drill in 2013 (Bangkok Post, 2013).

Additionally, the two countries have shown their willing to increase military diplomacy and to solve issues regarding nuclear issues. In October 2012, head of the U.S. Army’s Pacific Command, Lieutenant General Francis Wiercinski led 22 senior U.S. military officials visited Myanmar to discuss strategic issues and to continue the re-engagement

15 Interview with Burmese Journalists on August 23, 2013, Chiangmai, Thailand.

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between two countries (See Appendix II). In the beginning of 2013, the meeting between the U.S. representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Myanmar’s Ministry of Science and Technology’s Department of Atomic Energy was held to discuss the International Safeguards and the Additional protocol (See Appendix II).