New Confucianism

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which China had at that time. The last point implicitly justifies the adoption of certain elements from the West as well as certain elements from China’s own traditions, because they should only provide the ‘specific cultural needs of China’ at this time.²³ While doing so, Wu argues that the party tries to implant this kind of cultural pragmatism as a merit in the eyes of the population.

Pragmatism and opportunism thus motivate the party to opt for Confucian populism. It steers the societal Confucian revival into constructing a version of Confucianism which is beneficial to the party, resulting in a very fragmented Confucianism.

4.1.2. Intelligentsia

Authors categorize Chinese Confucian scholars by using different terms and categories.

However, most agree that there are roughly three branches: there are those who follow the party line; there are those who wish to use Confucianism to opt for Westernization;

and there are those who wish to reform society radically towards Confucian ideals.

Before an overview of this scholarly field will be given, this section will first of all present the spiritual father of all the above categories: ‘New Confucianism’.

4.1.2.1. New Confucianism

The elaboration on Confucianism in the terminology section of this thesis stopped shortly after the explanation of the May the 4^th Movement’s thinking. However, history did not stop there. In a sense, this section will continue the story by introducing the New Confucian movement, which has its roots in the early 20^th century and was a reaction to the May the 4^th Movement.

In the second half of the 20^th century, while Confucianism was repressed in mainland China and around 1976 seemed to be dead, the study of Confucianism in China’s cultural periphery – Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and in diaspora communities all over the world – was kept alive by scholars who would later call themselves ‘the third wave’. The first wave refers to Confucius and his followers, whereas the second wave refers to 11^th and 12^th century Neo-Confucianism. It has

23 Ibid, 6-7.

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previously been made clear that Confucianism has taken on many forms throughout time and space, and was often adapted to particular needs and challenges. The same is true for the modern era. Instead of blaming Confucianism for all kinds of ills, New Confucians take a great deal of pride in China’s traditions. However, these Confucians make a clear distinction between their interpretation of Confucianism – which they call ‘core Confucianism’ – and the state cult of Imperial China. They nonetheless argue that Confucianism was instrumental in facilitating China’s glorious past.²⁴ In the last few decades, developments such as Confucian-capitalism’s success, but also the growing geopolitical importance of China, confirmed to them that Confucianism, capitalism and modernity indeed can have a symbiotic relationship. Thus, these scholars supplement historical pride with contemporary glory, which new Confucians all ascribed to Confucianism’s blessings.²⁵

In order to deal with the challenge of Westernization, many of these New Confucians adopted the ‘substance/application’ theory, which holds that Confucianism should be the basis of the Chinese society and culture, whereas Western elements should only be applied where necessary and where expedient. But why not absorb Western ideas into the substance of society? Well, these scholars criticize the West amongst others for not caring for the elderly, excessive materialism, immorality, self-obsession and indulgence. This approach thus breaths Confucian superiority, which is presented as antidote against the immoral Western influences that have already infested China.²⁶

If Confucianism is superior, how do these scholars explain what happened in the previous centuries? Very easy: they present the ‘Qing dynasty Confucianism’ as less than a degenerated shadow of the original teachings. Thereby, they implicitly categorize May the 4^th Movement’s teachings as criticism of the Qing dynasty, not as criticism of Confucianism. Since they claim to present ‘original Confucianism’, New Confucians often also take the religious – or mystical – dimension of Confucianism into account.

Moreover, instead of focusing on the memorization of classics – as is traditionally conventional in China – New Confucians argue that people should experience, feel, and self-transform according to Confucian values. Consequently, they sometimes equate

24 Lee Dian Rainy, Confucius & Confucianism, the Essentials (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 181.

25 Lee, Confucius & Confucianism, 182.

26 Ibid, 183-184.

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themselves with ‘purification’ movements like the 16^th century reformation in Europe.²⁷ They also compare themselves to neo-Confucianism, which came into being in the 11^th century A.D. as a reaction to Buddhism, which also was a purification movement within Confucianism itself.²⁸

As said before, New Confucians – in differing degrees – adopt elements of Western thinking. However, the reader should realize that there are great differences amongst New Confucians. One example is with regards to democracy. Some argue for a true democracy, others for ‘China-style’ democracy, whereas others state that a meritocracy is much closer to the Chinese culture, and argue that only certain democratic elements should be adopted. Regardless of these different accentuations, how is the (partial) adoption of democracy justified? Well, they argue that although democracy is designed by Westerners, it is a universal instrument. Moreover, they argue that it just puts the Confucian ideal of ‘making the world under Heaven impartial and common to all’

into practice.

The New Confucian movement naturally also received strong criticism:

sometimes for being too pro-Western, too orthodox, too prone to support authoritarian regimes or for being too ambiguous toward democracy.²⁹ The author of this thesis would add that they seem to shop through Confucian teachings and choose elements that fit in with modernity, while hypocritically calling this ‘original Confucianism’. In this regard they are no different from all the previous and later versions of Confucianism, which they sometimes criticize for doing exactly that.

Although Lee mentions that it’s impossible to prove if the New Confucian movement has any influence on CCP policy, she states that the characteristics of the Confucianism that is taught in Chinese schools does correlate to a large degree with the New Confucianism.³⁰ Although for the most part that may be true, Lee’s assertion could lead to a misrepresentation of the actual influence of New Confucianism in China. The New Confucian movement’s greatest contribution, by which it inspired contemporary scholars – as well as broader layers of society and CCP officials –, is their differentiation

27 Ibid, 184-185.

28 Wang, “The Rise of Political Confucianism,” 34-35.

29 Lee, Confucius & Confucianism, 189.

30 Ibid, 188-189.

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into ‘core Confucianism’ and ‘Qing dynasty Confucianism’. However, the CCP promotes its own preferred interpretation, in which Confucianism is just as a tool to enhance its rule.³¹ Any element that runs counter to the party’s interests is discarded, which will be made more clear later in this chapter. Wu also disagrees with Lee, as Wu states that Confucianism as religion is not at all promoted by the CCP, even discouraged, since it will quickly be associated with Confucianism as state religion.³² This makes it impossible to call the CCP’s version ‘core Confucianism’.

4.1.2.2. Categorization of Confucian Scholars: Socialist, Liberal and Confucian