4. CONFUCIANISM AND THE CCP LEGITIMACY STRATEGY SINCE 1989
4.1 UNOFFICIAL DISCOURSE
4.1.1. Society
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that its ideological elasticity extends to the cultural realm. Furthermore, Confucianism could be used as ‘opium for the people’, to mask real conflicts of interest in society such as the rampant corruption and income inequality. Finally, Confucianism could enhance China’s cultural soft power, which shows a more ‘civilized’ and gentle face of China abroad, while the resulting increased international standing leads to national pride at home.
4.1 UNOFFICIAL DISCOURSE
As stated before, the CCP’s policy towards Confucianism and the traditional culture is best understood when the societal and academic perspectives are taken into account.
Indeed, society, intelligentsia and the party are constantly interacting, and the resulting dynamics shape the reality in which they operate.1
4.1.1. Society
The end of the Cultural Revolution started a long process in which the CCP and society at large re-evaluated the Chinese culture.2 A confrontation and fascination with the West and modernity, as well as an interest in the Chinese cultural roots, complemented by an increased sense of insecurity - market laws now increasingly dominated life - societal competition, the pauperization of certain segments of society, and the waning of the previously dominant ideology, altogether made people look for new meanings in life.
This led to fundamental social change, which was more or less facilitated by a progressively less restrictive CCP. The abovementioned factors led to the ongoing popular interest in China’s classical culture, which took on many forms.3 Those forms, and their backgrounds, will be discussed below.
One form is religious, as shown by a renewed interest in Buddhism and Daoism, while foreign religions such as Christianity also made a comeback. Moreover, spiritual and meditational self-help and self-cultivation practices are increasingly popular,
1 Sebastien Billioud, “Confucianism, Cultural Tradition and Official Discourses in China at the Start of the New Century,” China Perspectives 3 (2007): 64.
2 Billioud, “Confucianism,” 52.
3 Billioud, “Confucianism,” 51
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Confucianism holds that one’s happiness need not depend on external circumstances.Instead, as long as one is the master of one’s own spiritual and mental state – through self-cultivation, feelings of self-worth and self-confidence – life can be happy and purposeful regardless of one’s condition. This strand is made popular by amongst others Yu Dan, a Chinese Confucian scholar who wrote an interpretation of the Analects.5 Its popularity probably stems from exactly the dire ‘external circumstances’ of some Chinese – caused by income inequality, corruption, pollution, and millions of disadvantaged and marginalized – for whom these teachings can offer some consolation. 6 Mind Confucianism therefore correlates with the party’s envisaged utilization of Confucianism. It quells people’s discontent about China’s societal ills, as people will focus less on their ‘life circumstances’. The resulting lethargy amongst the population will help to keep the status quo of authoritarian one-party rule in place.
As stated before, the religious revival in society is facilitated by a less restrictive CCP. Party officials’ religious affiliations are illustrative for this increased tolerance.
Research, based on interviews with 3196 randomly selected urban Han Chinese CCP officials, found that among this group 5.8 % was Buddhist, 9.1 % was catholic, and a stunning 18.2 % was protestant.7 As long as these officials don’t show their religious affiliations too publicly, it is condoned by the party.8 Nonetheless, the state still wishes to maintain a certain degree of control. Through the State Administration for Religious Affairs there are only 5 officially sanctioned religious organizations: one each for Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Daoism and Buddhism. This state organ keeps a wary eye on foreign affiliations and subversive movements. Regarding Catholicism for example, the
4 Ibid, 51-52
5 Yu Dan However garnered criticism for presenting a Daoist version of Confucianism. She herself acknowledged to prefer Daoism over Confucianism.
Sheila Melving, “Yu Dan and China’s Return to Confucius,” The New York Times, August 29, 2007, accessed June 18, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/29/arts/29ihtmelvin.1.7298367.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
6 Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism, Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2010), XIV-XVI.
7 The actual amount is probably higher, since officials are expected to keep their religious affiliations low-key. This research was done under urban Han Chinese officials. The number of rural religious followers is expected to be lower, and also expected to show different preferences, as the Christian influences in cities are for example higher.
8 Hong Qu, “Religious Policy in the People’s Republic of China: An Alternative Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 70 (2011): 439-440
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this organ appoints the clergy, as loyalty to Rome is seen as ‘colonialism. However, the winds of change can be felt here too. Previously, the pope was always denied to fly through Chinese airspace. But on the Holy Father’s recent visit to South-Korea in August 2014, he was granted this right for the first time.9 Nonetheless, when a religious developments is perceived by the state to be a threat to its legitimacy, or seems to grow subversive, this tolerance disappears as quickly as it came, which can be illustrated by the government’s crackdown on the Falun Gong movement.10
Another form in which the societal Confucian revival is evident is educational.
There is for instance a clear trend in which classical literature is more and more taught in Chinese schools. This doesn’t only happen in state schools. Many private schools pop up around the country where the elite sends their children, in which classical literature is an important part of the curriculum. Moreover, Meissner argues that the historical discourse changed in a profound way, as Marxist-Leninist/Maoist versions of history are much less present in the current historiography. He relates this to China’s cultural identity, which over time got more and more related to China’s traditional roots. He calls this a
‘paradigm shift’, meant to change national identity and domestic politics. 11
China’s mass culture also progressively incorporated elements of its traditional culture. This can be illustrated by the content of pop songs, fashion, architecture, but also by a renewed interest in traditional phenomena such as ‘Chinese medicine’. Other examples are the popularity of historical TV-shows and the enormous rise of internet sites devoted to the traditions. Dotson writes that the party stimulates some of these developments. For example, in 2010, the movie Confucius – which was produced by the state-owned company China Film Group and funded by the government – was shown in movie theaters around the country. The popular movie Avatar was even removed from
9 Deborah Ball, “Pope Francis Arrives in South Korea in First Trip to Asia as Pontiff, Five-Day Visit Will Showcase the Vatican’s Efforts to Spread Catholicism in Asia, The Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2014, accessed August 15, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/pope-francis-arrives-in-south-korea-on-first-trip-to-asia-as-pontiff-1407984654.
10 Qu, “Religious Policy,” 433-448.
11 Werner Meissner, “China’s Search for Cultural and National Identity from the Nineteenth Century to the Present,” China Perspectives 4, no. 68 (2006): 45-46.
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theaters to let more people watch Confucius, which however nonetheless proved to be a box office failure.1213
Other forms of renewed interest in the traditions are for example the popularity of the course ‘national studies’ (國學) at universities. Wang noticed that it has even become fashionable for businessmen and civil servants to attend these classes. Wang moreover remarks that university classes on Confucianism are very popular, and that some Confucian scholars are treated like stars on television. Moreover, thousands of books have been published on Confucianism and the traditional culture, and magazines focus many articles on China’s identity, culture, history and traditional practices.14 Billioud states that altogether, this is part of a larger framework of rapidly changing mentalities in an increasingly self-conscious society. He emphasizes that most of these changes happen spontaneously, even in state institutions such as schools. Some are initiated by the government but soon thereafter start to live their own live.15
4.1.1.1. CCP & Society
According to Billioud, government policy can be defined as dynamic interaction with society. “Policy adapts and responds to the demands.”16 Holbig and Gilley describe that the party first seemed to only tolerate the societal Confucian revival, but later embraced it more enthusiastically. They suggest that by doing so, the party could seek consensus with the population, and thereby tap into an easy source of legitimacy.17Ai argues that Confucianism serves to stave of harmful Westernization, as well as enables the party to capitalize on nationalism.18 Billioud adds that the traditional culture is meant to reinforce stability and social cohesion. However, the autonomy granted by the government is
12 John Dotson, “The Confucian Revival in the Propaganda Narratives of the Chinese Government,” The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S. Congress, July 20, 2011, 10.
13 The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission is part of the U.S. Congress. It investigates all kinds of issues regarding the bilateral relation between the US and the PRC.
14 Ruichang Wang, “The Rise of Political Confucianism in Contemporary China,” in The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, ed. R. Fan (New York: Springer, 2011), 31-32.
15 Billioud, “Confucianism,” 50-51.
16 Ibid, 59.
17 Heike Holbig and Bruce Gilley, “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China,” Politics & Policy 38, no. 3 (2010):
408-411.
18 Ai Jiawen, “The Refunctioning of Confucianism: The Mainland Chinese Intellectual Response to Confucianism since the 1980s,” Issues & Studies 44, no. 2(2008) 29-78.
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closely kept in check, and ruthless action can follow if unwritten laws and mental boundaries are broken.19
Wu assesses the CCP as seemingly being a pushing factor behind the Confucian revival in society: “By appearing to be a supporter of the revival of Chinese traditional culture, the CCP has tried to transform the picture it presents to the public, from its previous image of a dictatorship based on military force to that of a leader who may combine coercion with persuasion. (…) Persuasion is meant to re-package values and ideology and making it appear as if it is the public’s will.” 20
Holbig and Gilley mention one more motivation for the party to co-opt this societal revival. As narrated in the previous chapter, China’s ‘opening up’ and ‘market reforms’ in the 1980s led to profound socio-economic transformations, which created great feelings of uncertainty amongst the population. Not the iron rice bowl, but the iron laws of the market started to dictate people’s existence.21 Moreover, negative side-effects – income inequality, corruption, environmental degradation, etc. – made itself felt.
Consequently, there are signs that the party tried to shift away from an emphasis on socio-economic performance criteria amongst the population, to a wider basis, amongst which it tried to implant a certain selection of traditional cultural values as new criteria.22 Moreover, the revival of Confucianism – especially specific manifestations like ‘mind Confucianism’ – can be used to mask or even quell sources of tension in society by providing ‘opium for the people’.
Wu makes a couple of observations regarding the way in which the People’s Daily newspaper – which is under party-state control – writes about Confucianism. First, Confucianism is presented as China’s own home-grown tradition, whilst very subtly noting that others like Buddhism came from abroad. Secondly, it is made clear that amongst Chinese indigenous schools of thought, the Confucian one was most defining for the Chinese culture. Third, Confucianism is praised for its openness, flexibility and capability to adopt foreign influences, whereby The People’s Daily writes that foreign influences were sometimes adopted because they matched the specific cultural needs
19 Billioud, “Confucianism,” 60.
20 Shufang Wu, “The Revival of Confucianism and the CCP’s Struggle for Cultural Leadership: a Content Analysis of the People’s Daily, 2000-2009,” Journal of Contemporary China (2014): 1-2.
21 Tong Yanqi and Lei Shaohua, “Large-Scale Mass Incidents in China,” East Asian Policy 2 (2008): 23-33.
22 Holbig and Gilley, “In Search of Legitimacy,” 3-7.
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which China had at that time. The last point implicitly justifies the adoption of certain elements from the West as well as certain elements from China’s own traditions, because they should only provide the ‘specific cultural needs of China’ at this time.23 While doing so, Wu argues that the party tries to implant this kind of cultural pragmatism as a merit in the eyes of the population.
Pragmatism and opportunism thus motivate the party to opt for Confucian populism. It steers the societal Confucian revival into constructing a version of Confucianism which is beneficial to the party, resulting in a very fragmented Confucianism.