4. A Constructivist Analysis of Recent Cross-Strait Relations, 2000-2011
4.4 Academic Construction of Cross-Strait Relations: New Trends
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4.4 Academic
Constructionof Cross-Strait Relations: New Trends
Instead of trying to give a comprehensive overview, this subsection again only aims at giving some broad comments on general trends that could be observed in academia's discussion and construction of the Cross-Strait relationship institution during the past years. For example, one obvious development that went hand-in-hand with the emphasis that the DPP government has put on establishing Taiwan Studies as new academic discipline (furthering the trend of “nativization” that was started under Lee Teng-hui), works that concerned themselves with giving historical and political accounts of the island have been written in abundance in the past decades. An increasingly high amount of them has emphasized that the status of Taiwan was basically one of a “virtually independent nation” (PHILLIPS 2003: 3) and not few of them made a Case for Independence (see DAVISON 2003, see also SHIH 2003). Few of these texts elaborated on how such a statement itself was also vital for constructing the island's status or identity in such a way in academic circles, a tendency that was especially evident for the part of academia that has made the history and anthropology of the island the foremost subjects of its concern. This kind of scholarship has frequently picked up on the developments of Chinese vs. Taiwanese identities and analyzed them historically (see ANDRADE 2008) or deconstructed the discourse about ethnicity based on anthropological considerations and evidence (see BROWN 2004).
Other works clearly have an agenda and are backed by prominent politicians. The series of books published by Taiwan Advocates, whose chairman is Lee Teng-hui, for example has tried to highlight the separateness of Chinese and Taiwanese historical developments (HSUEH / TAI / CHOW 2005)246 or argued for legal foundation of Taiwan's statehood (CHEN / HSUEH / LI / HU 2005) and are clearly following a “Taiwan agenda.”
On the other hand, based on my observations, the mainstream of the social science scholarship analyzing the Cross-Strait relationship seems to by default use certain terms that cause controversies in the political sphere with a high degree of matter of course. For example, to describe status of the participants in the Cross-Strait
246Two important themes in such a narrative include the emphasis on Taiwan's maritime culture that is contrasted with China's mainland-centered culture as well as the intermarriage of settlers from China with Aborigines. The writers also highlight the cultural and geographical meaning of
“China,” and assert that a political or national connotation of the term has only arisen over the course of the last two centuries (HSUEH / TAI / CHOW 2005: 8) and describe ROC rule over the island as “colonial rule” like the Japanese. As can be seen, many of their ideas are similar to the DPP's tools of constructing a separate identity for Taiwan as was shown in chapter 4.1.
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relationship, the mainstream usually refers to such terms as “mainland China” when referring to the PRC and “Taiwan” when meaning the ROC (on Taiwan), and makes it therefore, whether accidental or not, somehow reflect most closely the “two areas”
description that can be found in the ROC Constitution (see, for example, MYERS / ZHANG 2005; QIANG 2010; SHENG 2001; WANG 2006). The same writers also regularly opt for using the term “reunification” instead of “unification,” with MYERS / ZHANG
(2005: 117) even going so far as to advocate this outcome when they ask rhetorically in their conclusion: “Is it not true that the advantages of joining together to work toward 'one China' far outweigh the disadvantages?” Similarly, the “1992 Consensus”
for example is often mentioned in recent scholarship and almost always taken for granted, with the origins of term rarely ever being explained. Sometimes, even when its disputed background is highlighted, the term itself is still being used in a matter of fact way (see LI / HUANG 2010; see also CHAO / DICKSON 2002; QIANG 2010; SHENG 2001). Even with regard to the cultural aspect, some scholars tend to use terms that reflect the position of one political camp in Taiwan. For example, even though MYERS / ZHANG (2005: 82) have argued that certain policies during the DPP administration such as the promotion of “Taiwan independence” or the “name rectification” campaign were indeed acts of “de-sinification” and “separatism,” they sill also acknowledged that more and more Taiwanese have identified with this line of thought according to polls since 1991 (see also HAO 2010; WANG / LU 2008; WANG 2006). While some authors have tried to emphasize the cultural differences between Taiwan and China, others stressed their similarities. WANG (2006), for example, emphasized many times throughout his work the cultural similarities between Taiwan and China and interpreted them as conducive for a peaceful settlement of the Cross-Strait situation. The “Taiwan issue” for him, in fact, mainly arises from
“misunderstandings” or a “lack of understanding” between the two sides that are the results of Taiwan's historical separation from China for the most part of the last century. Admittedly, except for the cases where the work can be tied directly to an agenda, it will always remain somewhat obscure if these kinds of observations are the result of political considerations or an attempt at influencing them. Either way, their assertions are part of the construction process of the Cross-Strait relationship institution.
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In other cases these connections are much more evident. Chinese and Taiwanese academics sometimes seem to be representatives of the respective positions of their governments when they discuss Cross-Strait issues at common conferences where the Chinese side emphasizes the importance and irreplaceability of the “one China”
principle whereas the Taiwanese side argues that the “1992 Consensus” should not be neglected. Such occasions also highlight the differences that separate both sides with regard to their interpretation of the “Consensus.” When Chinese academics came to participate in a Taipei forum in 2009, the director of China's Taiwan Research Institute, Yu Keli (余克禮), outright admitted that for Beijing the “1992 Consensus”
was not equal to “different interpretation on one China.”247 Interestingly though, on another topic, both sides could find a common ground, when they advocated a united stance on the dispute that surrounded the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. Both sides would rather see it belong to an unspecified China, and could agree that it certainly did not belong to Japan.248 This echoed remarks by Yang Yi, spokesman of the TAO, from a few months earlier that both sides of the Taiwan Strait had a “shared responsibility to safeguard the sovereignty over the islands” (HSIAO 2011).
In US academic circles, one discourse has been emerging over the past two or three years that deserves some more attention. This discourse relates directly to the question of the feasibility of US commitments to Taiwan (or more concretely US arms sales) and it more or less circled around the question of whether or not it would be in the interest of the US to “abandon Taiwan” in order to improve its relationship with China. This discourse came to the fore prominently when Bruce GILLEY (2010) suggested in an article that was published in Foreign Affairs that Taiwan pursue a course of “Finlandization.” Because like Finland during the Cold War, Gilley argued, Taiwan had, too, come under the firm influence of its neighboring superpower that it was connected to closely culturally and historically since the process of
“normalization” was started in 2008. By giving up its external sovereignty, and position itself neutrally between China and the US, Gilley said, Taiwan would stop being a liability for the delicate relationship between the two strong states and
247China Post (15 November 2009): “DPP Protests Chinese Scholar's Views,” via: http://www.china post.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2009/11/15/232818/DPP-protests.htm (accessed: 2011-11-20).
248Taipei Times (3 September 2011): “Diaoyutais Belong to 'China': Official,” via:
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/09/03/2003512325 (accessed: 2011-11-20).
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maintain its own long-term interests. In order to support such a course, all the US had to do was to gradually scale back (and eventually stop) its arms sales to the island.
This started a fiery debate. Other analysts, such as Bonnie Glaser, have argued that every major arms sale package to Taiwan has led to major diplomatic breakthroughs between the two sides, because Beijing only “punishes” the US for them, not the government in Taipei.249 Together with Georgetown University Professor Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, she argued against Taiwan's abandonment or a decrease in US commitments to the island, a few weeks before the US administration was preparing a decision on the sale of the F-16 C/D fighter jets (BERNKOPF TUCKER / GLASER 2011).
However, Joseph Bosco, professor at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service and national security consultant, called similar to Gilley on the US to abandon its current approach of “strategic ambiguity” due to the potential for miscalculations and replace it with clear statements that it would not recognize an independent Taiwan if China would renounce its use of force in return.250 In a commentary published by National Interest John F. COPPER (2011) argued on value-based (shared ideal of democracy) and strategic considerations for “Why We Need Taiwan.” Michael D. SWAINE (2011) on the other hand argued in that same publication two weeks later that the US should reconsider its current arms sales policy that might end up being “unsustainable” due to China's military modernization and could indeed “prove disastrous.” Like a response, again, was a Washington forum with many congressional aides in attendance, that argued in favor of the question whether Taiwan is defendable.251 Surely, the picture looks more divided than it is and most analysts are against the idea of letting Taiwan alone cope with China as long as it continues to threaten the island's democracy. However, the debates in US academia also reflect the changes that have occurred as the ties between both sides of the Taiwan Strait have become closer in recent years and the US relative strength in the world has declined. Therefore, it is not the thoughts of “abandoning Taiwan” as such but the fact that they have been so persistent that is striking for the observer. That alone might be enough to influence
249Taipei Times (13 June 2011): “Analysis: Demystifying China's 'red line' on the F-16a,” via:
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/06/13/2003505668/1 (accessed: 2011-11-20).
250Taipei Times (22 August 2010): “Policy Change Needed: US Expert,” via: http://www.taipei times.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/08/22/2003481004 (accessed: 2011-11-20).
251Taipei Times (28 October 2011): “Pundits Debate If Taiwan Is Defendable,” http://www.taipei times.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/10/28/2003516884 (accessed: 2011-11-20).
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decision-making in Washington at some point in the future.
4.5 Conclusion
The more Taiwan-centric outlook of this chapter is justified by the fact that any destabilization of the previous strong “one China” rule was mostly a result of developments in Taiwan itself, as started under Lee Teng-hui, rather than a consequence of a change in speech acts initiated by agents in Washington or Beijing who had to react to new developments rather than having been in a position to determine their outcome. And nowhere did the goals of speech acts fall that far apart from each other than between the ruling and opposition parties in Taipei. The analysis of speech acts in the context of the three discourses in this chapter has highlighted these stark differences between Taiwan's two governments from 2000-2008 and 2008-2011 respectively. In particular, their antithetic understandings of Taiwan and views on its relation to China were seen as the main cause for their different interactions with the “one China” rule. Undoubtedly, speech acts by DPP agents have weakened the rule over time (see figure 4).
Figure 4: The "One China" Rule Under the DPP, 2000-2008
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With regard to Taiwan's status, the DPP has emphasized the political separateness between the island and China. The old ROC governmental institutions and the ROC Constitution in particular were unwanted additional burdens that stood in the way for turning “Taiwan” from a merely geographical term into a political or even national one. Therefore the DPP tried to either assert that Taiwan already was an independent state whose official name “happened to be” Republic of China but that had no connection to the Chinese mainland. Similarly they rejected the commitment of the
“1992 Consensus” to that historic “China” by declining it to play a prominent role for conducting Cross-Strait negotiations as not only the KMT but also the CCP have urged to do. Finally, the DPP tried to cut off old discourse that argued for a shared feeling of belonging between both sides by the way of the ethno-nationalist concept of the Chinese nation. Although they thus exploited every possible way that was highlighted in this framework to undermine the “one China” rule they were unable to break it. The dilemma for the DPP since it took over government responsibility has been described – its ultimate goal of establishing a “Republic of Taiwan” was prevented by several restrictions. First of all, there was the military aspect. When Chen was voted into office, the ROC Army was not yet a “neutral” national army, but one with deep connections to the previous ruling party, and one that had fought for the unity of China since the early Republican period back on the Chinese mainland. It was not in their interest to fight for “Taiwan separatism” and they made this clear to President Chen early on. Although there were signs at the beginning of the Bush administration in 2000, that the US would chose a new course of strategic clarity over one of ambiguity, more urgent geopolitical considerations after 2001 led a continuation of the previous more cautious approach towards Taiwan. When the US felt pressed by speech acts from Taiwan's government that aimed at achieving some sort of independence, especially after 2004, it stated openly it was against unilateral changes of the “status quo” and made it clear that its commitments to a defense of Taiwan was no blank cheque for Taipei to do whatever it wanted. Instead of using its military to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the US used the military component in a way of that saw it declining to support the island militarily if that attack was caused by unilateral steps taken by Taipei, while, at the same time, it continued to advocate a peaceful solution to China's leaders (HSU 2010: 148). By defining the status of Taiwan
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as “unsettled” in 2007, the US held on to a “one China” policy that had been more or less in place since the immediate years after World War II, when the “one China” rule had been created. Beijing for its part, warned with new emphasis and most prominently in the ASL, that any moves toward a formal independence by Taiwan would be a tantamount to a casus belli. Therefore, similar to the decades before 2000, albeit under completely different circumstances, the military aspect remained a real restriction for what agents on all sides wanted to achieve and despite heated rhetoric at times, a delicate balance could be continued to be maintained.
The second limitations arose from the way in which democracy had developed in Taiwan. By enabling the people to be the only sovereigns over their land, this system also gave them the right to decide about Taiwan's future. Since a majority of them were opposed to drastic changes that would make Taiwan de facto independent during the reign of the DPP era, the government party had to bow to that preference.
The DPP could try to influence it further by adjustments to school curricula or “by example” but as opposed to the authoritarian era under the KMT had much less means at its disposal to actually enforce its reading of history and preferred narrative for their
Figure 5: Construction of the Cross-Strait Relationship, 2000-2008
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“nation” on the island's people. However, support for their proposals has indeed risen over the years that it was in power and its efforts of moving the national narrative of Taiwan into its preferred direction did have significant effects (see figure 5).
When ZHENG (2001) had argued after Lee Teng-hui's presidencies, the main direction of the discourse surrounding Taiwan's future had been changed from unification with China to independence from it, this was even more true so after Chen Shui-bian stepped down from office in May 2008. The government party's real restrictions on the other hand perpetuated an unstable and hardly definable situation that is usually referred to as the “status quo.” Despite the many different views across the Strait as well as in the US as to what this exactly means, all sides could agree on the idea that unilateral changes to this “status quo” would lead to unwanted results for at least one of them, while they continued to perform their respective speech acts to do exactly that: influence the “status quo.” It is in this mishmash of opposing goals and attempts to outplay each other that the “status quo” rule came into existence under Lee Teng-hui and gained further momentum, and with it normative force, during the eight years of two consecutive DPP administrations. The rule was grounded by the overwhelming majority of more than 80 percent of Taiwan's population who wish to maintain (an undefined) “status quo,” although minorities among them prefer an eventual outcome about Taiwan's status. Listening to the people and following any choice that they will finally make is not only a restriction for the three parties in this relationship that share the democratic value (DPP, KMT, US). Even China under Hu Jintao has, after 2005, been careful not to overly antagonize Taiwan's population.
Being also restricted militarily by US commitments to Taiwan, agents in Beijing have started to take an approach of promoting “peace, stability, and development” and
“never lose hope in Taiwan's people” instead of emphasizing “peaceful unification”
under “one country, two systems.”
These developments do not mean that the “one China” rule has disappeared. It was merely supplanted to a large extent by the “status quo” rule that had emerged out of it as it was still affirmed by Beijing's “one China” principle, Washington's “one China” policy and even the DPP's scrambling with the ROC institutions that it had inherited and redefine for its own purposes (for example declaring the ROC is Taiwan, and Taiwan the ROC etc.). The main predicament for the DPP was that by
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emphasizing Taiwan's separateness or equality with the PRC on a state-level, it was in constant violation of its own “five noes” commitments that Chen had made at the beginning of his presidency and reaffirmed many times thereafter.
When the KMT was voted into office in 2008, it had to build upon the foundation that was left for them, despite their party's own preferences, similar to the DPP in 2000. That is why President Ma began his term with a set of pledges against unification, independence, and the use of force, that is a commitment to continue to
When the KMT was voted into office in 2008, it had to build upon the foundation that was left for them, despite their party's own preferences, similar to the DPP in 2000. That is why President Ma began his term with a set of pledges against unification, independence, and the use of force, that is a commitment to continue to