3. Historical Background: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations, 1949-2000. .30
3.2 Cross-Strait Relations in the Context of the Cold War
3.2.2 Cross-Strait Relations and the Impact of Taiwan's Democratization
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the other hand Taiwan had to be re-sinicized after attempts by the former Colonial power to “japanize” the island's inhabitants. For this purpose they used the state's education system to strengthen the public's Chinese identity and to promote Mandarin as the only “national language.” By using its monopoly under martial law, the KMT could pursue its own “version of collectivistic ethnic nationalism” (HAO 2010: 43).
3.2.2 Cross-Strait Relations and the Impact of Taiwan's Democratization
The early years of Chiang Ching-kuo's (蔣經國) rule over Taiwan (1978-1988) were overshadowed by the diplomatic setbacks in the UN and in the ROC's relations with the United States as well as the resulting international isolation. As these developments undermined the KMT's legitimacy even regarding its rule over Taiwan (let alone China), it is often argued that Chiang recognized the need to turn his attention more towards Taiwan's domestic developments. Legitimacy for the government was now sought from economic successes as its international trade expanded despite increasing diplomatic isolation (in the late 1980s Taiwan had the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world) as well as a gradual process of democratization (WU 2007: 980). Under Chiang Ching-kuo a process of political reform was launched that led from “soft authoritarianism” to a democratic transition.
The literature gives a variety of reasons that led Chiang Ching-kuo to take this step, ranging from international and domestic oppositional pressures to personal reasons such as his deteriorating health and his own political values.41 The democratization on the other hand fostered an increasingly prominent concept of a separate “Taiwanese identity” as opposed to a “Chinese identity” within Taiwan's society.42 In December 1980, the first supplementary elections for the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly were conducted and followed by many more thereafter. On September 28, 1986 the Democratic Progressive Party became the first organized opposition party that had formed out of the previous dangwai (黨外) oppositional movement. And on July 15 the following year, the Emergency Decree was formally abolished, ending the almost four decades long period of Martial Law on the island. As a result, more rules and regulations regarding press freedom or the right to assemblies were relaxed in the
41 For an extensive overview see NATHAN / HO 1993.
42 The effects of democratization on national identity in Taiwan have been discussed at length, for example in WACHMAN 1994.
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following months and years. Finally, by designating Shieh Tung-min ( 謝東閔 ) and later Lee Teng-hui as his vice-presidental candidates, the status of native-born Taiwanese, who had long been barred from high government and party positions, was as high as never before.43
Despite the diplomatic setbacks in the international arena, there were little changes with regard to speech acts around Taiwan's China policy. Instead Chiang's public statements remained very consistent or even “rigid” for the time of his rule (CLOUGH 1993: 158). After the step of US-PRC normalization had been announced, president Chiang Ching-kuo made the following statement:
The Republic of China is an independent sovereign state with a legitimately established government based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. It is an effective government, which has the wholehearted support of her people. The international status and personality of the Republic of China cannot be changed merely because of the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime by any country of the world. The legal status and international personality of the Republic of China is a simple reality which the United States must recognize and respect.44 (Emphasis added.)
This assertive stance became the backdrop for Chiang's “three noes” policy vis-a-vis the PRC of “no negotiations, no communication, and no compromise” (bu jiechu, bu tanpan, bu tuoxie 不接觸，不談判，不妥協 ). With regard to its construction of Cross-Strait relations as a domestic relationship, agents in the younger Chiang regime also sticked to old formulas in its performances of speech acts. With regard to the Cross-Strait sovereignty dispute, Chiang Ching-kuo held on to the assertion that
the government of the Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the people of the whole nation. The mainland is the territory of the Republic of China, and the government of the Republic of China will never abandon its sovereignty there.45
He objected to the idea that there was a “Taiwan issue,” a term preferred by Beijing, and instead insisted that “there is only a China issue.”46 Similarly, any attempts for
43 It is worth noting, however, that Chiang Ching-kuo was not without reservations about the trend that was later called the “Taiwanization” of the KMT. When asked in an interview if the nomination of Shieh Tung-min as vice-president was meant as a reaction to the political aspirations of native Taiwanese, Chiang replied: “When I nominated Mr. Shieh Tung-min as my running mate, I never thought about where he comes from. I knew only that he is Chinese. As a matter of fact, all the people in Taiwan are Chinese.” [see GIO (1984): “Dialogue with David Reed, Editor of Reader's Digest” in: Perspectives: Selected Statements of President Chiang Ching-kuo, 1978-1983. Taipei:
Government Information Office, 139-143. In later interviews he would continue to speak out against dividing the people living in “Free China” into Taiwanese and non-Taiwanese since both of them were Chinese.
44 (n/a): “Document 31 President Chiang Ching-kuo's Five Principles on US-ROC Relations in the Postnormalization Period, December 29, 1978,” in: Chiu, Hungdah (ed.) (1979): China and the Taiwan Issue. New York: Praeger, 262-263.
45 GIO (1984): “Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly, December 25, 1978,” in: Perspectives: Selected Statements of President Chiang Ching-kuo, 1978-1983. Taipei: Government Information Office, 16-19.
46 GIO (1984): “Republic of China's Basic Position on Current Issues: Remarks at a Military Affairs
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pursuing an independent Taiwan, a discourse that slowly but steadily emerged with democratization during the 1980s, were stigmatized as Communist schemes to undermine the ROC government and take over Taiwan.47 Just like his father, Chiang Ching-kuo emphasized the importance of Taiwan's status as a “model province” in which traditional Chinese culture had not only been conserved but also further refined and which would function as a “bastion of national recovery” from which the Communists, who “illegally occupied” the mainland, would be expelled eventually.
On the other hand, the KMT formally gave up the increasingly remote goal of
“recovering the mainland” during its Twelfth Party Congress and instead stressed its efforts on “reunifying China” under the Three People's Principles. In that regard, the ROC Constitution was regularly invoked in speeches on important occasions not only as a guarantor for an “honest and competent government” but also as a prerequisite for the KMT rule's legitimacy over Taiwan and, by extension, all of China:
So long as the Chinese government, established under the Chinese Constitution, exists, the legality of the Republic of China exists. So long as the Constitution of the Republic of China exists, the legality of the Republic of China will exist […] China has to be unified, it has to be identified with the constitutional system of the Three Principles of the People and unified under the name and flag of the Republic of China.48
Equally, there was no doubt concerning the relationship between the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait which was constructed as one that consisted of ties of blood:
“the billion compatriots on the Chinese mainland are our kith and kin, and the same flesh and blood.”49
Despite this tenacious stance, relations between the two sides grew increasingly complex. Total trade rose from US$ 77 million to US$ 1.1 billion between 1979 and 1985 (MYERS / ZHANG 2005: 18). After informal exchanges had increased, relations relaxed towards the end of the 1980s and by late 1987 Taiwanese residents including ROC military personnel were allowed to apply for visiting relatives in China. While this might have been done with the goal of strengthening the population's identity with China in mind, it has quite probably achieved the opposite (WACHMAN 1994:
Meeting of the Armed Forces, January 12, 1981” in: Perspectives: Selected Statements of President Chiang Ching-kuo, 1978-1983. Taipei: Government Information Office, 93-99.
47 Ibid. 97-98.
48 GIO (1984): “Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly, December 25, 1983,” in: Perspectives: Selected Statements of President Chiang Ching-kuo, 1978-1983. Taipei: Government Information Office, 54-58.
49 GIO (1984): “Congratulatory Message on the 1983 National Day, October 10, 1983” in:
Perspectives: Selected Statements of President Chiang Ching-kuo, 1978-1983. Taipei: Government Information Office, 68-70.
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112). However, these new contacts soon led to a “mainland fever” and by the end of 1989, about 800,000 Taiwanese had visited China (CLOUGH 1993: 156).
After the Cultural Revolution had forced China's leaders to focus on its internal matters and brought the PRC's Taiwan policy to a temporary halt, new initiatives in the late 1970s were boosted by the country's recent diplomatic successes and the insight that increasing economic links would lead to a dependence of Taiwan's economy on China's in the long-term. Speech acts by agents during the early years of Deng Xiaoping's (鄧小平) rule over the PRC were characterized by more flexibility on the one hand and more assertiveness on the other. An example for the softened attitude towards Taiwan can be found in the “Message to the Taiwan Compatriots”
dated January 1, 1979. Not only is the call for Taiwan's “liberation” noticeably absent (and indeed even the bombardments of Taiwan's outlying islands were stopped thereafter) but in its stead one finds an appeal for “peaceful negotiations” in order to achieve China's “reunification.” On the other hand, an example for the increasing assertiveness can be found in wording that was included in the new PRC Constitution of 1982, and therefore loaded with a high degree of formality. Despite the fact that the PRC has never ruled a single day over Taiwan, its government wrote into the preamble of its constitution that: “Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China” and further stated the that “[i]t is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.”50 Despite the previously mentioned willingness of the CCP to enter into negotiations with Taipei, Deng Xiaoping gave a clear vision of what the China-Taiwan relationship was supposed to look like after negotiations, that is, like one between a central and a local government. Based on Marshal Ye Jianying's (葉劍英) “Nine-Point Proposal on Peaceful Reunification” of September 30, 1981 in which a PRC agent for the first time called on the CCP and KMT to hold talks “on an equal footing,” Deng Xiaoping proclaimed the formula of “one country, two systems”
which promised to grant Taiwan extensive economic, cultural and even military autonomy for a certain period of time on the one hand while firmly integrating it as a local government into the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China on the other.
Naturally, it was rejected by Taipei and objectively did not offer anything that Taipei
50 (n/a): “Constitution of the People's Republic of China, (Adopted on December 4, 1982),” via:
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (accessed: 2011-10-03).
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did not already possess.
Decisions by agents in the US executive branch had never been more favorable towards the PRC than under the Nixon and Carter administrations. The constellation of the Cold War brought a new strategic importance to China. Taiwan by contrast was not needed as a support base anymore after the Vietnam War had ended (CLOUGH
1993: 137-138). The process of diplomatic normalization between the two countries had a huge perpetuating impact on the “one China” rule. Although the US recognized the PRC as the “sole legal government of China” in the “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” that was signed on December 15, 1978, it once more merely reaffirmed its “acknowledgment” of “the Chinese position that there is but one China and [that] Taiwan is part of China” while pledging to only maintain unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.51 Furthermore, the move of de-recognizing an old ally in favor of its communist rival set off an internal struggle in the US which was (and remains to this day) characterized by a scrambling over influence over US Taiwan policy between the executive and legislative branches (see for example, GOLDSTEIN / SCHRIVER 2001: esp. 151-152; 170-71). Instead of fully abandoning Taiwan, the US Congress became the driving force that spoke in favor of continued US commitments to Taiwan, efforts which finally led to the establishment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in April 1979. A domestic law in nature, the TRA basically treats Taiwan as a sovereign nation-state and gives it security as well as economic guarantees. Indeed, Taipei soon “had come to value the TRA as affording protection and giving Taiwan a unique legal status, which it did not have in other countries where it lacked diplomatic relations.”52 (CLOUGH 1993: 152) In sum, the US
“one China” policy under the Carter administration was two-fold: on the one hand it wanted to accommodate Beijing's “one China” principle and stop openly questioning the internal nature of Cross-Strait relations by de-recognizing the sovereign status of the ROC. On the other hand the Taiwan Relations Act made sure that the US would not abandon the (former) allies on Taiwan completely (HUANG / LI 2010: 93-103).
During the Reagan administration, the US created a set of very contradictory
51 (n/a): “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations January 1, 1979,” via:
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique02.htm (accessed: 2011-10-03).
52 To be sure, other authors have pointed out the vagueness of the TRA's wording which they describe as leaving open the extend to which Washington would react. (HSU 2010: 143-144; GOLDSTEIN / SCHRIVER 2001)
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commitment rules for itself, seemingly in an attempt to please all sides and to uphold its own strategic ambiguity with regard to Taiwan. On August 17, 1982 the third and final communiqué between the PRC and the US was signed and was aimed at addressing US arms sales to Taiwan that had long become the biggest issue of contention between the US and China in Beijing's eyes. In this communiqué the US promised to gradually decrease weapons sales to Taiwan and reaffirmed previously made statements with regard to Beijing's definition of “one China” and Taiwan's place therein. According to BUSH (2004: 163-175) in this final document Beijing was able to extract certain concessions from Washington and even insert a “moral asymmetry”
therein without that the US would get much back in return. However, while still in the process of drafting the communiqué, Reagan made “six assurances” to Taipei, three of which concerned the arms sales issue. The assurances basically strengthened US commitments to Taiwan and gave optimistic prospects on the future of arms sales while promising not to consult with Beijing on this issue. Similarly during a press conference on July 28, 1982 Reagan promised that
“[w]e are not going to abandon our long-time friends and allies on Taiwan […] I am going to carry out the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act […] It is a moral obligation that we'll keep.”53
These contradictory speech acts regarding the Cross-Strait relationship left Taiwan with a “considerable room to maneuver in maintaining a secure and separate existence alongside the mainland” (HUANG / LI 2010: 121) but also necessarily led to insecurity on the parts of agents in both Taipei and Beijing as to the reliability and true value of US commitments.
By the late 1980s agents in Beijing started to become more and more concerned about the effects of democracy on Taiwan's society and possible changes that the demise or replacement of the “old pro-unification guard” would have on the development of Cross-Strait relations. One of the effects of democracy had been a necessary preoccupation of the island's population with themselves rather than with
“China,” a development that had repercussions that went beyond the political sphere and also touched on cultural discourses such as the one of the Chinese nation. By the end of the 1980s, the DPP tried to overcome the concept of one more or less homogenous “Chinese people” that was at most be classified into several “ethnic
53 (n/a): “The President's News Conference, July 28, 1982,” via: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives/speeches/1982/72882e.htm (accessed: 2011-10-03).
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subgroups” and actively promoted the idea of the “four great ethnicities“ (si da zuqun 四 大 族 群) that emphasized equality, not only for Taiwan's Hoklo majority and the newly arrived elite of “Mainlanders,” but also the one of Hakka (who make up about one fourth of Taiwan's population), as well as the the Austronesian-speaking aboriginal people of the island (HSIAU 2005: 144-145). However, any cautious efforts that aimed at a renewed KMT-CCP rapprochement and were driven by this new sense of urgency were relinquished after Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988.