以建構主義的觀點分析兩岸關係 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master's Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 碩士論文 Master's Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 以建構主義的觀點分析兩岸關係. ‧. A Constructivist Analysis of Cross-Strait Relations. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. i Un. v. e n g cAdvisor: 指導教授：袁易教授 Prof. Yuan I hi 研究生：何得中 Student: Sebastian Hambach Student No. 98926024. 中華民國 100 年 12 月 December 2011.

(2) A Constructivist Analysis of Cross-Strait Relations. 研究生：何得中 Student: Sebastian Hambach 研究生：袁易教授 Advisor: Prof. Yuan I. 國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. 立. 治政碩士論文大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 y. sit. Nat. A Thesis. n. al. er. io. Submitted to International Master's Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. v. National ni C Chengchi University. hengchi U. In partial fulfillment of the requirement For the degree of Master in Asia-Pacific Studies. 中華民國 100 年 12 月 December 2011.

(3) Acknowledgments I have to thank my thesis adviser Prof. Yuan I for his course on Cross-Strait relations of the IMAS program that inspired me to write about this topic. His emphasis on the importance of theory and his immense knowledge in the field of International Relations were not only exemplary to me but also challenging for my own pursuit of gaining a more complete understanding of the subject matter. Similarly, I wish to express my thanks to the other members of my committee, Prof. Shih Chih-yu and Prof. Wu Der-yuan, for their invaluable comments that required me to look at my topic from perspectives that I would not have been able to find without their questions and suggestions. My special thanks go to the German Academic Exchange Service and Taiwan's Ministry of Education who sponsored my studies at National Chengchi University with a scholarship. I consider myself very lucky to have received this support, because it allowed me to freely focus on my studies during the past two years.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. I will forever be indebted to the Kuo family from Kaohsiung for their friendship and care which over many years has led me to establish a deep and personal connection with the beautiful island. Their support played a major role in my life including the decision to pursue this academic ambition focused on Taiwan.. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. I do not know how to thank HueiJiun. In my loneliest year of thesis writing she took me on a roller coaster ride and taught me many lessons about the freedom and burden of independence along the way. I will forever remember all the new worlds that you opened up for me.. i Un. v. Last but not least, I owe heartfelt thanks to my parents who always did their best to encourage me and who tried to make things easy for me when everything else was difficult. Their support remains the greatest source of inspiration and guidance for me, not only for completing my studies but also for finding my own way in life.. Ch. engchi. SH Taipei, Taiwan December 2011. i.

(4) Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to analyze changes and constants of the Cross-Strait relationship since 1949 on the basis of a constructivist framework of International Relations theory. After having introduced basic assumptions of rule-based constructivism, mainly following Nicholas Onuf, the thesis argues that the Cross-Strait relationship can be analyzed as a social construct that has mainly been governed by the “one China” rule, which is designed and influenced by speech acts performed by relevant agents in Taiwan, China, the US, as well as academia. A summary of the historic context of Cross-Strait relationship developments (1949-2000) which highlights the circumstances of the creation of the “one China” rule as well as gradual challenges to it, is followed by a comparison between the approaches of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) of constructing this relationship between 2000-2008 and 2008-2011, respectively. Due to the DPP's and KMT's very different ideologies, and their antithetic definitions of Taiwan's relationship to China, there were distinct variations in their performances of speech acts, that are analyzed in the context of three discursive examples and which, together with related practices, aimed either at weakening (DPP) or strengthening (KMT) the “one China” rule as a cornerstone for Taiwan's relationship to China. Despite attempts by Taiwanese agents during the two consecutive DPP administrationsa to break the “one China” v rule, it remains an i l n important aspect of theCCross-Strait relationship as it is sustained, to U h i e h n gChina, c the US and the current KMT different degrees, by agents in government. However, due to their adjustments over time and the development of Taiwan's democratic system, a new “status quo” rule has steadily gained momentum. Therefore, the thesis argues, that it will be crucial to see how the preferences of the Taiwanese populace with respect to their home's relationship to China will evolve in the future and how the relevant agents will respond to these developments.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Key Words: constructivism, Cross-Strait relations, one China, speech acts, status quo. ii.

(5) TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction................................................................................................................ 1 2. Analytical Framework................................................................................................ 7 2.1 Constructivism....................................................................................................... 7 2.2 Rules.................................................................................................................... 13 2.3 Speech Acts.......................................................................................................... 18 2.4 Agents.................................................................................................................. 22 2.5 Rule-based Constructivism and Cross-Strait Relations.......................................25 3. Historical Background: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations, 1949-2000. .30 3.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................30 3.2 Cross-Strait Relations in the Context of the Cold War........................................30 3.2.1 The Inception of the “One China” Rule......................................................... 30 3.2.2 Cross-Strait Relations and the Impact of Taiwan's Democratization.............37 3.3 Cross-Strait Relations under the Trend of Taiwanization....................................43 3.3.1 From Rapprochement to Flexible Interpretations of “One China”.................43 3.3.2 Towards Open Challenges of the “One China” Rule......................................51 3.4 Academic Construction of Cross-Strait Relations: Some Thoughts....................59 3.5 Conclusion........................................................................................................... 61. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 4. A Constructivist Analysis of Recent Cross-Strait Relations, 2000-2011................67. ‧. 4.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................67 4.2 Challenging the Rules: DPP Rule under Chen Shui-bian, 2000-2008.................68 4.2.1 Taiwan's Status and the Republic of China Constitution................................68 4.2.2 The “1992 Consensus”................................................................................... 79 4.2.3 Chinese Nation and Cultural Assumptions.....................................................89 4.3 Revitalizing the Rules: KMT Rule under Ma Ying-jeou, 2008-2011..................92 4.3.1 Taiwan's Status and the Republic of China Constitution................................92 4.3.2 The “1992 Consensus”................................................................................. 101 4.3.3 Chinese Nation and Cultural Assumptions...................................................106 4.4 Academic Construction of Cross-Strait Relations: New Trends........................111 4.5 Conclusion..........................................................................................................115. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. 5. Conclusion..............................................................................................................122 6. References.............................................................................................................. 130 6.1 Source Materials................................................................................................ 130 6.1.1 Documents, Speeches, Interviews................................................................ 130 6.1.2 Online Sources for Newspaper and Journal Articles.................................... 134 6.2 Secondary Literature.......................................................................................... 134 7. Appendix................................................................................................................ 140 MAC Poll: Unification or Independence (2001-07)................................................ 140 7.1 NCCU Election Study Center Poll: Unification-Independence.........................141 7.2 NCCU Election Study Center Poll: Taiwanese/Chinese Identity......................141. iii.

(6) Abbreviations and List of Figures and Tables Abbreviations Anti-Secession Law Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chinese Communist Party Council on Foreign Relations Democratic Progressive Party Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement Formosan Association for Public Affairs Government Information Office Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party Mainland Affairs Council Ministry of National Defense, PRC National Chengchi University New Party National People's Congress National Unification Council National Unification Guidelines People's Liberation Army Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) People First Party People's Republic of China Republic of China Republic of China on Taiwan Straits Exchange Foundation Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC Taiwan Relations Act World Taiwanese Congress Taiwan Solidarity Union. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. ASL ARATS CCP CFR DPP ECFA FAPA GIO KMT MAC MOD NCCU NP NPC NUC NUG PLA PO PFP PRC ROC ROCT SEF TAO TRA WTC TSU. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. List of figures and tables Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7. “Thinking Like a Constructivist” Construction of the Cross-Strait Relationship, 1950-1990 Construction of the Cross-Strait Relationship, 1991-1999 The “One China” Rule Under the DPP, 2000-2008 Construction of the Cross-Strait Relationship, 2000-2008 The “One China” Rule Under the KMT, 2008-2011 Construction of the Cross-Strait Relationship, 2008-2011. iv. p. 10 p. 62 p. 63 p. 115 p. 117 p. 119 p. 120.

(7) “If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.” The Analects by Confucius, Book 13, Verse 3, translation by James Legge. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. v. i Un. v.

(8) 1. Introduction As every regular newspaper reader is told, the relationship between Taiwan and China has been tense ever since the inconclusive ending of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Interestingly, however, even though hostilities between the two sides have never formally been ended, for example by passing a bilateral peace treaty, there have been perceivable changes in the way in which both sides of the Taiwan Strait have interacted with each other over the course of the past decades. During the Cold War, the two Chinese Civil War war participants Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continued to bombard each other with military and. 政治大 inability of either side to 立conquer the other between the 1950s and late 1970s. After. propagandistic means, and the continued state of war was basically perpetuated by the democratization in Taiwan and China's course of reform and opening, military. ‧ 國. 學. confrontation became less of an immediate issue. In its stead, economic relations started to take shape and increasingly entangled both sides with each other over the. ‧. course of the 1980s and 1990s. The transformation of democracy brought significant. y. Nat. changes with regard to how the leaders in Taiwan viewed themselves and the other. io. sit. side or more correctly enabled them to portray these images to the outside. Instead of. n. al. er. representing a country named “China” new emphasis was put on the place that was. i Un. v. already under effective governance: the island of Taiwan. And instead of seeing it. Ch. engchi. merely as a small part of a greater whole, people started to identify with the place and emphasized its equality vis-a-vis the big neighbor, culminating in the claim that it, too, was a full-fledged state in its own right by the late 1990s. The leaders on the other side, however, holding on to an old orthodoxy continued to make threats of forceful military incorporation into their “motherland,” and tried to intimidate the islanders of choosing a course that would move them too far away from “one China.” Being undeterred, when the DPP government took over government responsibility in 2000, a formerly pro-independence opposition had finally been voted into office. It then did what it stood for: following a course that sought a formalization of Taiwan's de jure independence from the People's Republic of China, a move that was and remains detrimental to Beijing's claim of sovereignty over the island. Consequently, 1.

(9) the eight years of DPP rule were overshadowed by a strong notion of potential military escalation, which became ingrained into everyone's mind after China passed its Anti-Secession Law (ASL) in 2005 that formalized, among other things, the use of force as a deterrent to “Taiwanese independence.” When a new KMT government assumed office in 2008 with the promise to stop pursuing any immediate course of action that would decide about Taiwan's status, the picture began to look much different once again. The characteristic discourse of Cross-Strait relationship now moved from one of aggression and potential military escalation to one of political “thaw” (GLASER 2010)1 or “rapprochement” (SUTTER 2011). Media outlets and academic circles alike have pointed out the more “conciliatory” approach that both governments in Taipei and Beijing have pursued since then. And indeed, where. 政治大. negotiations had been slow at best or come to a standstill at worst for more than a decade, the new government was able to sign 15 agreements in only three years.. 立. Among other things, the increasingly important bilateral trade that had made progress. ‧ 國. 學. even during the DPP administration2 despite its efforts at preventing a “hollowingout” of Taiwan, became institutionalized for the first time in June 2010, when both. ‧. sides signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Also, suddenly, Beijing allowed Taiwan to participate in the WHA as an observer in 2009. Nat. sit. y. after the twelve previous attempts since 1997 had failed to achieve this goal when the. al. er. io. harsh rejection of this aspiration by a Chinese official amidst the SARS crisis in 2003-. n. 2004 was still on everyone's mind.3 When saber-rattling, (the failure of) money. Ch. i Un. v. diplomacy, and an overall aggressive posture brought relations across the Strait to its. engchi. lowest trough during the past decade, then the new era of cooperation after 2008 was indeed a new high point. Paradoxically, all these changes happened against a backdrop of old assertions that have never changed. Until today neither the People Republic of China's (PRC) 1 A brief note on the citation format used in this thesis: I used the Harvard style for quotations of secondary sources throughout the text (see 6.2). However, due to the high amount of primary source materials and internet sources I opted for putting the references to these materials in footnotes on the pages where they are cited (see 6.1). 2 For example, China's share of Taiwan's total exports surpassed the one of the US for the first time in 2002 (MYERS / ZHANG 2005: 74). 3 When a Taiwanese reporter at the WHO General Assembly that year asked if Taiwan had a chance of obtaining observer status in the WHA, a Chinese official answered in a widely-reported rant: “Who cares about you people?,” see GIO (2007): “The Practical Imperative of UN Membership for Taiwan,” via: http://www.gio.gov.tw/unfortaiwan/inun01e.htm (accessed: 2011-07-10). 2.

(10) claim over Taiwan, which it considers to be part of its territory, nor its actual military threat have ceased to exist. Likewise, the current KMT government has not given up its legal claims over mainland territory. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) continues to target long- and short-range ballistic missiles at Taiwan and their quality as well as quantity have increased rather than decreased over the years and even after 2008. The same can be said about other aspects of China's military buildup and spending, after all, the White Paper on China's National Defense in 2010 still attributed the greatest challenge to its security to the “separatist force” in Taiwan. 4 Although the current government in Taiwan does not follow a course of achieving formal independence as a new state, the most significant part of its own Defense White Paper in 2011 concerned the eventualities of a Chinese invasion of the island. 政治大. (MEI 2011). Then there is the persistent rumor that China's first aircraft carrier, a potent symbol of the country's increasing naval power, might be named after Shih. 立. Lang (施琅), the Qing dynasty admiral, who was in charge of defeating the resistance. ‧ 國. rule over the western parts of the. 學. of the Zheng family on Taiwan and who played a major role in establishing China's island in 1683. 5 How is it possible that the. ‧. prevailing perception in academic and media circles as well as the one shared by a large segment of the public is one of gradual improvement while the “security. Nat. sit. y. dilemma,” as mainstream IR scholars call it, seems to get worse by the day? Or how. al. er. io. do such contradicting developments provide for a fertile ground that future political. n. talks for formally “achieving peace” or at least military confidence-building measures. Ch. i Un. v. between both sides could be based on? Evidently, the process of perceiving or, really,. engchi. constructing the Cross-Strait Relationship has not been consistent over the past decades, especially in Taiwan, and depended very much on which party was in power or how this party presented itself and its ideas with regard to Taiwan's status. Obviously, explaining these changes can not be done by realist or liberal approaches alone with their focus on structures and “wholes.” There is, however, one strand of constructivism that deals with speech acts, one of whose basic tenets is that we, as agents, construct social reality by the words we say, or that indeed saying equals doing. Using this framework, the Cross-Strait relationship can be analyzed as a 4 See MOD (2010): White Paper on China's National Defense in 2010, via: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ TopNews/2011-03/31/content_4235292.htm (accessed: 2011-07-10). 5 Asia Times (13 April 2011): “Ming Dynasty Admiral Spooks Taiwan,” via: http://atimes.com/ atimes/China/MD13Ad03.html (accessed: 2011-07-10). 3.

(11) social arrangement or construct. By giving the agents in society, especially one like Taiwan's where the focus on and the role of identity has always had far-reaching implications (socially and politically), as well as the language that these agents use, the prominent place in analysis that they deserve, this framework seems more adequate for gaining a deeper understanding of the above-mentioned changes and how they came about. Identifying the dominant speech acts means to understand what the rules are that agents on both sides of the Taiwan Strait make and that, at the same time, define these agents and their interactions with one another. In this thesis the argument shall be put forth that the changes in the way which the Cross-Strait relationship has been conducted, have mostly derived from changes in perceptions of oneself as well as of the other side and are reflected in corresponding. 政治大. speech acts. Using my reading of Nicholas Onuf's rule-based constructivism, which will be explained in the next chapter, this thesis aims at analyzing the speech acts that. 立. have been used in past Cross-Strait exchanges as well as the rules that have resulted. ‧ 國. 學. from them and that have been characteristic for governing Taiwan-China relations. These changes have been more visible in Taiwan than in China due to its development. ‧. from an authoritarian state to a democratic one that, starting from the late 1970s, gave the then-opposition and the people living in Taiwan a more prominent role in deciding. Nat. sit. y. the island's future and the opportunity to challenge existing orthodoxies that had. al. er. io. characterized rule in Taiwan until then. The two subsequent power transitions that. n. have taken place since in 2000 and 2008 respectively have further emphasized the. Ch. i Un. v. possibility of seemingly very different Cross-Strait relationships as they allowed. engchi. parties with antithetical ideological backgrounds to take over the responsibilities of governing the island. The thesis shall address the following questions: 1. Starting from the premise that Cross-Strait relations can be understood as a social construct, who are the major agents that are actively shaping this relationship and what are their respective interests? 2. What are the rules, established by speech acts, that have governed the developments across the Strait since 1949 and how do these developments contrast with the current “rapprochement” between both sides? 3. Are there rules in the making that will maintain this development? What are the general prospects for future Cross-Strait relations based on the findings?. 4.

(12) 4. Since rule-based constructivism does not exclude the influence of material resources or external circumstances from the analysis, another question to be posed is: what are some of these constraints in the case study of Cross-Strait relations and how do they influence agents in the process of construction? After introducing the basic assumptions of the framework, the third chapter will go back to the beginnings and take a closer look at the history of the Cross-Strait relationship since 1949 and its development over time. Enriching the secondary literature with a selected important primary sources, a brief historic account of 19492000 will inform us about the context for the current development of Cross-Strait relations. Although it is to be assumed that a historic review of this evolution from the presidencies of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) to Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and putting them. 政治大. into relation to the dominant ideas in Washington and Beijing, will mostly highlight changes in Taiwan, there were also adjustments of views in China and the US. Using. 立. the rule-based constructivist framework, it will be seen what mechanisms were. ‧ 國. 學. responsible for holding the relationship together and in what parameters or unsurmountable restrictions agents had to deal in when making their choices in. ‧. pursuit of their respective goals. One central rule most speech acts centered around and that therefore governed Cross-Strait relations during most of that time span could. Nat. sit. y. be called the rule of “one China.” Although the exact definition of “one China” was. al. er. io. (and remains) quite different for agents in Taipei, Beijing and Washington, it was the. n. adherence to this rule that upheld the “status quo” over the Taiwan Strait. Only during. Ch. i Un. v. the last years of Lee Teng-hui's presidency was this rule severely challenged by. engchi. speech acts from Taipei that aimed at breaking or circumventing it, namely Lee's “state-to-state” remarks and following discourses. Chapter III will be the main part of the thesis. It starts with the year 2000, for it was then that the world witnessed the first change of governing parties in Taiwan, which led to a critical juncture in Cross-Strait developments and revealed many new dynamics. In addition to some secondary literature, I will rely on primary source materials as well as news reports to trace the drastic changes of development in speech acts and rules governing Cross-Strait interactions. As outlined above a special focus will be put on the “one China” rule. In the framework of three main discourses that have been used in relation to this rule during that time and that became especially. 5.

(13) dominant after 2008, it will be analyzed how different agents have tried to weaken or strengthen the rule. These are the discourses of Taiwan's status and the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, the “1992 Consensus,” and the idea of the “Chinese nation.” Based on this framework, the nature of the Cross-Strait situation should become clearer and should allow to draw inferences about future developments in this volatile relationship. Therefore, the thesis will be rounded out with a conclusion that sums up the findings and comments on prospects of Cross-Strait relations for the time after Taiwan's presidential election in 2012.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 6. i Un. v.

(14) 2. Analytical Framework 2.1 Constructivism Over the course of the past sixty years, Cross-Strait relations have been the subject of a wide variety of often contradicting interpretations and definitions by the leaders on all sides as to the nature this relationship was supposed to be of. Like a recurring theme, each time when there was a change in identities this had an impact on the way in which the relationship between the two sides was being constructed by leaders, government officials and other agents across the Strait, in particular in Taiwan.. 治政 “Taiwan,” as well as their relation to one another, it 大seems to make sense to start with a framework that does 立 not limit its focus on structures or organizations, but one that Therefore, when analyzing this contention over intersubjective meanings of “China,”. ‧ 國. 學. instead puts emphasis on the people that are primarily responsible for conducting this relationship. One of the basic concerns of constructivism is to analyze the way in. ‧. which human beings, as social beings, interact with each other and how we, through our interactions, construct the world we live in. By implication, relationships between. y. Nat. sit. states in the international arena can be analyzed as a system of social constructions. al. er. io. and arrangements. In these social worlds deeds, acts, and words that shape these. n. relationships become the matter of analysis for “[t]hese are all that facts are” (ONUF 1989: 36).. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Constructivism is now often regarded as a third approach to the field of International Relations6 and has either been granted an equal standing next to realism and liberalism (see KUBÁLKOVÁ 2001: 4, WEBER 2010: 62) or it has been described as a “middle ground” between positivist and post-positivist epistemologies (ADLER 1997; see also CHECKEL 1998: 327). Quite a few scholars have pointed out, however, that the definition of constructivism has become blurred over time and that under its many proponents there are actually quite different understandings as to what constructivism as a way of analyzing international relations is supposed to entail (KLOTZ / LYNCH 2007: 4; KUBÁLKOVÁ et al. 2001; MO 2002; ZEHFUSS 2002). 6 In this thesis I follow the convention of using the Upper Case for IR as an academic field of study and the lower case when referring to its subject. 7.

(15) Generally regarded as the mainstream of constructivism are the writings by Alexander Wendt (especially WENDT 1992, WENDT 1999).7 In his work, Wendt has questioned the prevalent realist concept of anarchy in the study of International Relations and advocated a new focus on state practices. He criticized neorealists and neoliberals for what he called their self-imposed rationalist constraints as well as their reification of structures, which these previous theories took as a natural given. Instead, he introduced the concepts of state identity and state interests, which together he said are responsible for the way states interact with one another, and asserted that it was necessary to examine the process of how states construct their identities. According to Wendt, the behavior of states in this process might be either conflictual, cooperative, or change from one to the other over time, resulting in different “cultures. 政治大. of anarchy,” which he elaborated on in his major work Social Theory of International Politics. Wendt argued that through interaction states do not only construct their. 立. respective identities and interests, but when these result in relatively stable structures,. ‧ 國. 學. institutions are created, which he defined as “fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works” (WENDT 1992: 399). In. ‧. turn, the way in which states act within these institutions shape their identities and interests, therefore making both levels mutually constitutive. However, in order for. Nat. sit. y. his framework to function, Wendt, like his realist and liberal counterparts, had to hold. al. er. io. on to the idea of state-centrism, that is, seeing states as the most important agents or. n. decision-makers in international relations (therefore the title of his article “Anarchy is. Ch. i Un. v. What States Make of It” [WENDT 1992; my emphasis]). He defended this view by. engchi. saying that if the authors of practices, identities, interests etc., that is the states, were to be forgotten, then they could not be held accountable for their actions. However, it becomes clear that holding on to a state-centric view of international relations necessarily neglects domestic influences on foreign policy behavior (see SMITH 2001: 45). In fact, for Wendt the role of domestic politics in shaping state identity is external or precedes a state's international interactions which is the reason why he excludes them from his framework. For a case such as Taiwan, where the issue of identity politics on the domestic level directly relate to the problem of the state's standing in 7 See, for example, the discussion by PETTMAN (2000). For the fact that this still holds true today, see Weber's recently published introduction to IR studies, which in its discussion of constructivism limits itself to the Wendtian school and merely glosses over other constructivist scholars (WEBER 2010: 59-80). 8.

(16) the international arena, that is, where the consistency of construction is often challenged domestically or essentially dependent on what party is in power, Wendt's take on constructivism seems to leave out a very vital part that is necessary for the way in which Taiwan interacts with other states, especially its big neighbor the People's Republic of China.8 Nicholas Onuf, who first came up with the term constructivism, and whose school of thought is going to be one of the main sources for the framework used in this thesis, has quite a different definition of constructivist ontology. For him, constructivism was not envisaged as a new paradigm to replace old ones but rather as a theoretical framework for the analysis of any world of social relations, including the one of International Relations, a field that Onuf saw in disarray and that he wanted to. 政治大. reconstruct (ONUF 1989: 1-31; ONUF 1998: 58; ONUF 2002: 120; 135-137). Voicing his opposition to the prevalent notion that international relations are defined by an. 立. environment of anarchy,9 he suggested to shift the focus on two more general. ‧ 國. 學. properties of political society: rules and rule. Rules guide but do not determine human conduct by giving social meaning to political society. Rule, on the other hand, results. ‧. when these rules cause an unequal distribution of advantages (ONUF 1989: 21-22). Both properties are linked to each other by agents' use of language or their. Nat. sit. y. performance of social acts, called speech acts, that they perform in order to achieve. al. er. io. their respective goals. The phenomena of both rule and rules can be seen as. n. representations of the macro- and microlevels often found in social science. Ch. i Un. v. scholarship. Their linkage is similar to the constructivist premise that people and. engchi. society construct each other through recurrent practices in that neither of them has primacy over the other (ONUF 1989: 36-41; 58).10 This rule-based constructivism as initially conceptualized by Onuf and further developed by the Miami IR Group of scholars (cf. KUBÁLKOVÁ et al. 1998; KUBÁLKOVÁ 2001) is going to be the main framework for this thesis. The theory's emphasis on 8 Wendt's understanding of identity has been criticized before by ZEHFUSS (2002: 38-93) in a different thematic context. (See also ZEHFUSS 2001.) 9 Onuf's challenge to this concept has been conceived of as “a sophisticated attack” that “threatens the very foundations of the Neorealist framework” by some mainstream IR scholars (see BUZAN et al. 1993: 5). 10 The mutual constitution of these two levels is a pivotal ontological pillar of constructivism for Onuf as well as for Wendt (at least in his early writings), as both of them draw on Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration, which Onuf has described as a “constructivist social theory” (ONUF 1989: 58). 9.

(17) agents' social construction of relationships via the use of speech acts seems to be more promising in gaining a deeper understanding of the Cross-Strait situation than would, say, the Wendtian constructivism, which has the notion of a state-as-actor at its center that fails to include domestic political influences on a state's foreign policy behavior. After all, domestic politics seem to be an obvious factor for the changes in the way that different agents in Taiwan have defined their relationship to China over the past decades and as will be examined in later chapters. Suffice to say at this point that each time when identity or definitions of the respective “in-groups” and “out-groups” in this relationship shifted, this had an according impact on the choices that agents across the Strait could or wanted to make with regard to each other. In turn, these identities gradually became institutionalized, changing the environment in which the. 政治大. agents acted and continue to act.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i Un. v. Figure 1: “Thinking Like a Constructivist” (adapted from KUBÁLKOVÁ 2001: 65). Figure 1 is a simplified visual conceptualization of rule-based constructivist ontology. The mutual constitution of agents and structures (here replaced by the term institutions) is the premise at the center of this framework. It indicates that neither of the two is taking precedence over the other. While institutions make people into 10.

(18) agents, the way in which agents act within these institutions has defining effects on the latter. The course of actions of agents can be derived from the goals that they have (material ones may or may not be among them) and which they will try to achieve rationally while they are limited by certain constraints such as the (non)availability of information and resources as well as by the actions of other agents who may pursue diametrically opposed goals. Central for constructivism are rules which govern the relationship between agents and institutions. These rules come into existence by the use of language, or more precisely, speech acts, that are used by agents to affect existing rules or create new ones. The repetition of certain speech acts influences rules in the way that they either support them or are aimed at breaking them. At the same time, rules thus being established, supported or broken in turn reveal who the active. 政治大. participants in society, that is, its agents are. The relationship between rules and agents is therefore also one of mutual constitution. Finally, the frequent reaction to. 立. rules by agents leads to practices that have intended as well as unintended. ‧ 國. act in, thus concluding the circle of mutual constitution.. 學. consequences. Together they in turn have an impact on the institutions that all agents. ‧. It is important to note at this point that Onuf's framework does not function without logocentrism. Although language and its use to construct social reality are. Nat. sit. y. given a prominent role within his framework, in opposition to poststructuralist and in. al. er. io. particular deconstructivist schools of thought, constructivism does not question that. n. there exists a natural or material reality to individuals as biological beings. In other. Ch. i Un. v. words, constructivism takes the separateness of “words” and the “real world” as a. engchi. given. This epistemological premise is reflected in the assumption that “[s]ociety constructs human beings out of the raw materials of nature, whether inner nature or […] the outer nature of their material circumstances” (ONUF 1989: 46). In fact, for constructivists the relation of rules to resources entails “at least some control over material conditions” (ONUF 1989: 60). This tendency to logocentrism has, of course, been criticized by more poststructuralist-oriented scholars. For example, ZEHFUSS (2002: 195) concluded her thorough critique of Onuf's approach by stating: It seems awkward […] to present material reality as the explanation for the limitations of our constructions. This sits uneasily with the notion that there is something behind them, so to speak. Even if there was, it could never matter to us other than within our constructions. Even if material reality imposed a limit, what is significant is how we conceptualise this limit. […] In remaining abstract and aloof from particular constructions of reality, Onuf seems to exclude the problematic of the political character of constructions.” 11.

(19) Zehfuss followed up on this deconstruction with a reading of the writings by Jacques Derrida with a special emphasis on what she calls the “politics of reality” in his writings (see ZEHFUSS 2002: 236-249). In his critical analysis, Derrida has questioned the logocentrism of Western thought in general and asserted that a reality as a separate “world” of its own, even if it did indeed exist, would never be accessible to us apart from our representations of that reality. For whatever is conceptualized as “real” is necessarily also an effect of representation or, in other words, there is no reality outside of a textual level. Onuf was well aware of deconstructivist objections against his framework. In World of Our Making he stated that “[w]hat cannot be reconciled with constructivism is deconstruction, at least when that practice is carried very far” due to the fact that. 政治大. deconstructivism is also logocentric “in its own narrow way” (ONUF 1989: 42; see also ONUF 2002: 126). However, in pointing out that Onuf's conceptualization of reality is. 立. in itself also a construction, criticisms such as the one by Zehfuss that are inspired by. ‧ 國. 學. poststructuralist insights, provide valuable contributions in that they call on observers to heighten their own sense of self-awareness and involvement in the process of. ‧. construction while discussing a certain subject matter. On the other hand it also becomes clear that there are in effect two different world views or epistemologies. Nat. sit. y. colliding with each other, and which to some degree will always remain incompatible.. al. er. io. Furthermore, ZEHFUSS (2002: 260) herself has pointed out that Derridean thought may. n. not provide “security” or what passes as scientific knowledge in the field of IR. She. Ch. i Un. v. admitted that deconstruction, by subverting texts, can not solve the metaphysical. engchi. problems it addresses and may only offer a possibility to analyze these problems on its own terms (ZEHFUSS 2002: 204-205).11 In any case, problems related to epistemology will not be solved here, so that for the moment I can but acknowledge their existence.12 Instead, I am going to follow Onuf's “ontological turn” (ONUF 2002: 138) in that I will elaborate on three important properties of the constructivist ontology in the next sections and for the main part of this thesis: rules, speech acts, and agents.. 11 However, using her case study she was able to show convincingly that material or “real” constraints do not necessarily have to be a crucial limit to the construction of reality by agents. 12 For a more recent discussion of the epistemological divide that continues to plague the field see KLOTZ / PRAKASH (2008: 1-7). 12.

(20) 2.2 Rules The central positioning of rules as a linkage between agents and institutions in a constructivist analysis makes some elaboration on them necessary. For ONUF (1998: 59), in the absence of a given beginning, the starting point for constructivists is an analysis of rules (see also KUBÁLKOVÁ 2001: 74-75). Rules can be understood as a guide that tells people how to carry on with their affairs when facing certain circumstances. They influence decisions insofar as they reveal what agents have to take into account when they try to pursue whatever it is that they intend to do. Put more succinctly, rules bind situations in which agents make choices (ONUF 1989: 260). Similarly, another constructivist, Friedrich Kratochwil has argued that the most important function of rules13. 政治大. is the reduction in the complexity of the choice-situations in which the actors find themselves. Rules and norms are therefore guidance devices which are designed to simplify choices and impart 'rationality' to situations by delineating the factors that a decision-maker has to take into account. (KRATOCHWIL 1989: 10). 立. ‧ 國. 學. Rules maintain social order in that they are devices to deal with conflict and cooperation (KRATOCHWIL 1989: 69). One should keep in mind, however, that while. ‧. rules have this guiding function, they themselves do not provide closure about the purposes for people acting as they do “because rules are not the sufficient agency. y. Nat. sit. whereby intentions become equivalent to causes” (ONUF 1989: 51). Rules present. er. io. agents with certain choices and therefore affect their conduct. On the other hand, the. al. iv n C of rules, a prevalence of any ofh which causes a different e n g c h i U condition of rule (although in most cases a mixture of different kinds of rules is more likely): instruction-rules (also n. pattern of choices will affect rules over the long turn. Onuf identified three categories. including principles14), directive-rules, and commitment-rules, all of which depend on the speech acts that sustain them (see next section). There are certain questions related to rules that constructivism tries to answer: “(a) Who makes the rules and how do the makers benefit from doing so? (b) Why do people follow rules without considering who makes them and how are they and others affected by doing so? (c) How is a rule orientation (“the acquisition of rule”) related to reflection, habit, cognitive development?” (ONUF 1989: 50). 13 As the title of his book suggests, throughout Rules, Norms, and Decisions Kratochwil speaks of rules and norms, but does not provide a clear distinction between the two. 14 Onuf defined the function of principles as “promot[ing] general conformity of behavior by reference to shared values. This is done by example, by appeal and, if necessary, discrimination.” (ONUF 1989: 135) 13.

(21) In answer to the first question and as a reflection of his constructivist framework as outlined above, ONUF (1989: 66) started out from the premise that “[p]eople make rules, rules make society, society's rules make people conduct themselves in specified ways.” Thus, rules are authored by human agents who use all available resources at their disposal in order to support these rules as long as they can gain advantages over other agents, that is, as long as these rules are beneficial to their own purposes. As stated above, rules create an environment of rule that is always characterized by an unequal distribution of privileges, therefore leading necessarily to exploitation (ONUF 1989: 83-88). Unsurprisingly, disadvantaged agents, will use all resources available to them in order to subvert rules and reverse the asymmetries that these rules cause (ONUF 1989: 60). Rules are linked to resources in the way that the former is the social. 政治大. and the latter the material component of what it is that human beings strive for. Again there is a mutual constitution between two parts in that “[r]esources are nothing until. 立. mobilized through rules, rules are nothing until matched to resources to effectuate. ‧ 國. 學. rule.” (ONUF 1989: 64; see also ONUF 2002: 132-133).. In his discussion of rules, Onuf mostly discards the findings of legal positivism. ‧. and postpositivist theories after having shown their respective limitations and draws the conclusion that rules must be investigated as a matter of language (ONUF 1989:. Nat. sit. y. 78). Drawing on the writings of Wittgenstein about rules in language, he asserts that. al. er. io. “[r]ules govern language which people then use for social purposes” (ONUF 1989: 48).. n. In other words, rules are statements that tell people how to act. They are also self-. Ch. i Un. v. explanatory. Any inference about the content of a rule can be drawn from the rule. engchi. itself, people need not even have to know its history or who authored the rule in the first place. But why do people follow rules? Kratochwil remarked that apart from being guidance devices, rules allow us to pursue goals, share meanings, criticize assertions, justify actions and in general stabilize mutual expectations of one another. In short, they make communication possible and provide the opportunity to resolve conflicts or grievances in a peaceful manner (KRATOCHWIL 1989: 11; 34; 181). Onuf explained, thereby also answering the third question, that following rules is deeply ingrained in the process of human socialization. Beginning from our childhood we are conditioned to follow rules, because it is then that we start to learn how to exercise judgment and. 14.

(22) how to make use of existing rules. As the moral development of children progresses, rules provide the link between them and their environment, and subsequently allow them to acquire the skills to interact with rules, that is, they learn to know what rules require of them and how they can use them for the their own purposes (ONUF 1989: 97-115). The judgment on how to respond to certain rules results from practice and consciousness: We do not simply learn to respond to instruction-, directive-, and commitment-rules, having learned to recognize them in successive stages of development. We judge them differently, once we have learned how to, and respond accordingly.” (ONUF 1989: 119). Part of knowing how to respond to rules is to know their external dimension, that is, the consequences that arise from breaking rules. Breaking an instruction-rule will cause denigration or mockery. In the case of a directive-rule, which usually has some. 治政 For breaking a commitment-rule, that is, neglecting 大 the rights and duties that one promised to commit to,立 one would very likely have to face reciprocal behavior (O external structure of support (such as a law-making body), the result will be sanctions.. NUF. ‧ 國. 學. 1989: 120-121). For all of these rule-categories applies that their effect depends on internalization as well as their external support through institutionalization, the latter. ‧. providing them with a higher degree of legality. This legality in turn is characterized by (a) a formal statement of rules, (b) the institutionalization of their external. y. Nat. sit. dimension of support, and finally (c) a specially trained personnel that is responsible. al. er. io. for formalizing and institutionally supporting these rules. Accordingly, the support for. n. instruction-rules comes in the form of exhortations, that for directive-rules is based on. Ch. i Un. v. threats. Commitment-rules will be supported by opinions and interpretations issued by. engchi. impartial third parties. (ONUF 1989: 135-139; also see KRATOCHWIL 1989: 48) Legality of rules does not imply that rules must be legal to be effective or that there are only legal rules. Zehfuss, for example, using her case study of Germany's military involvement abroad, mostly followed a rather narrow definition of rules as being “legal rules.”15 Speech acts in her rendering of Onuf's theory refer therefore almost exclusively to lawmakers' drafts related to changing Germany's constitution or Basic Law. While this approach makes perfect sense in the context of her subject, which touches on Germany's constitutional boundaries with regard to military 15 She did, however, also mention a commitment-rule that was the result of repeatedly given promises about Germany's role in international politics by certain prominent parliamentarians. (See ZEHFUSS 2002: 177) 15.

(23) involvements, rules and their related speech acts should not be merely judged by their relationship to law. In fact, “law is better understood as a particular style of reasoning with rules” (KRATOCHWIL 1989: 211; my emphasis). Onuf, at one point, suggested to call laws “highly formal” rules, while norms or conventions could be referred to as “informal” rules (ONUF 2002: 132). In any case, the normative strength of rules increases if they possess a high level of formality and the longer agents follow them (ONUF 1998: 69). The rule that is most in evidence in governing the Cross-Strait relationship since 1949 is one that can be called the “one China” rule. ZHENG (2001), in his application of the rule-based constructivist framework to Cross-Strait relations, identified it as one of two rules that were maintained by agents and their speech acts over the time. 政治大. from 1949 until 1999. He argued that the “one China” rule has remained in place during all those decades, despite the fact that definitions of what exactly “China”. 立. stood for (Republic of China or People's Republic of China), and therefore also what. ‧ 國. 學. territories it encompassed, have changed over time, especially due to several “identity crises,” which the government in Taipei went through, it has never been directly. ‧. broken. This did not even change after president Lee Teng-hui challenged this rule openly by proposing his “special state-to-state”-formula in 1999. Chapter II will take. Nat. sit. y. a closer look at this historical background and the reasons for this persistence. In. al. er. io. chapter III, I will argue in the context of three discourses that, although this rule is. n. still dominant in governing Cross-Strait relations, it does have a challenger in what. Ch. i Un. v. might be termed the “status quo” rule. The second rule identified by Zheng, is the one. engchi. that he calls the “rule of no military threat.” He argued that this rule has been in place since the involvement of the US military in the Korean War when Taiwan was used as a strategic base or an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” Subsequent US protection made a Chinese attack on Taiwan unfeasible. On the other hand, the Mutual Defense Treaty between Washington and Taipei also prevented then ROC president Chiang Kai-shek to pursue his goal of militarily “reconquering” the areas that were then already under PRC control. This rule was presumably broken when Beijing fired “test missiles” into the waters off of Taiwan's coasts in 1995-1996, with the possible goals of strengthening its symbolic authority over Taiwan at a time when leaders there followed a route of emphasizing the island's separateness from China, as well as. 16.

(24) increasing the credibility of its military power in the Taiwan Strait. However, taking into account the above discussion about the relationship between “words” and “world” in this framework, I would rather suggest a reading of the military component as highlighting the aspect of the “real limitations.” The whole discourse about US military support of Taiwan is intrinsically related to the “one China” rule: Beijing protests against arms sales, for example, because it sees them as an intrusion of a foreign power in its “domestic” affairs and dramatically complicates any plans of its own to solve the “Taiwan Issue” by force; Taipei on the other hand needs US military support in order to deter China's aggression and maintain its de facto sovereignty as either ROC or, even more so, if it wanted to declare independence as a new state. The effects of Taiwan's democratization, and the related question of self-determination of. 政治大. Taiwan's population, since the mid-1990s might be seen as the most imminent way to influence the institution of Cross-Strait relations and change the “one China” rule. But. 立. in the face of Beijing's evident military threats that are aimed at deterring such an. ‧ 國. 學. event, it becomes clear that without the necessary military capabilities, that is, facing these material constraints, Taipei's potential to effectively break the “one China” rule. ‧. will remain limited.. Describing the “one China” rule as dominant in the institution of Cross-Strait. Nat. sit. y. relations seems obvious. After all, agents in the PRC, ROC and the US, who are. al. er. io. mainly involved in shaping this institution (but also most other countries in the world). n. follow their own distinct versions of a “one China” principle or a “one China” policy,. Ch. i Un. v. which provides an important pillar for their respective foreign or China-Taiwan. engchi. policies. At the same time, differences between their approaches, while preventing the “China/Taiwan” issue to be resolved in any party's favor any time soon, subsumes the relationship under a construct of a rather abstract “one China” concept that has many definitions and whose definitions in turn have evolved over time. The prominence and role of the “one China” rule has been analyzed in various ways and under the use of very different frameworks, although it has not always been described as a rule. HUANG / LI (2010: 87-88), for example, referred to it as a “'one China' strategic framework,” which, based on Beijing's “unyielding 'one China' principle” and the US “accommodating 'one China' policy,” was established after the US-PRC normalization in 1979 and whose roots date back to the “one China”. 17.

(25) principles adhered to by ROC and PRC leaders since the 1950s. Since then this rule has become the prime source of many of “Taiwan's Dilemmas” as almost each of the dozen contributions in FRIEDMAN (2006) has pointed out. Similarly, WU (2005a) described this “hegemonic One China world order” as an “institution” that has gradually boosted Beijing's profile at the expense of Taiwan's diplomatic space and standing in the international arena. Although Wu used a historical and sociological version of a new institutionalist framework, his definition of “institution” offers many parallels to how rule-based constructivism defines rules: [Institution can be defined as] a human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized, which consists of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that serve to stabilize interactions or provide meanings to human actions.” (WU 2005a: 320). He also stressed the importance of mutual constitution of agents and institutional. 治政 institution” this was done through the incorporation 大 of the concept into diplomatic texts between the PRC 立 and other countries, especially since the 1970s, as well as in structures for the development of these institutions. In the case of the “one China. ‧ 國. 學. various policy realms. Finally, he argued that this institution is constantly being reconstructed and reproduced by the PRC as it benefits from it the most.. ‧. In the later chapters it will be analyzed how, as a rule, “one China” gradually began to and continues to favor the People's Republic over the Republic of China (on. y. Nat. sit. Taiwan) in the international arena. After having reached this step it seems natural for. al. er. io. agents in Beijing to use all available resources at their disposal to maintain the. n. predominance of their interpretation of “one China,” while different agents in Taipei. Ch. i Un. v. either try to emphasize their own interpretation or try to break the rule altogether.. engchi. 2.3 Speech Acts Rules are sustained by speech acts. According to the theory of speech acts, utterances not only represent deeds but can in fact perform them. Under the premise that people use language in order to achieve certain goals, speech acts establish a connection between a speaker's utterances and his or her intentions. Moreover, being the mechanism behind rules, speech acts can be understood as an “act of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act” (ONUF 1998: 66). Certain verbs like claim, promise, warn etc. are not merely descriptions of actions (like walk, leave, stand etc.) but at the same time performances of these actions. However, clearly identifiable 18.

(26) verbs are not a prerequisite for speech acts. Instead, speech acts may deploy their effect just through the context in which they are uttered (KRATOCHWIL 1989: 29). When there are rules (or norms) underlying these kinds of actions, speech acts have a normative component or are situated within a practice in which they “'count' as something” (KRATOCHWIL 1989: 7). Or in the words of ONUF (2001: 77): speaking is an “activity with normative consequences.” Simply put, in equalizing speech with deeds, the theory of speech acts elevates the act of speaking to the most important way in which human beings construct the world (ONUF 1998: 59). The concept of speech acts as understood here dates back to the linguistic philosophical treatments of the term by J. L. Austin and John Searle. AUSTIN (1962) originally distinguished between three levels of speech acts: locutionary, illocutionary. 政治大. and perlocutionary acts. While the locutionary act refers to the (phonetic) performance of an utterance and the ostensible meaning of what is said, illocutionary. 立. acts refer to the actual intention behind the utterance. Perlocutionary acts go yet one. ‧ 國. 學. step further in that they concern the effect that what was said had on others, for example, the listener's reaction to threats or promises. SEARLE (1969) equated most. ‧. speech acts with illocutionary acts that are called rule-governed, and differentiated between five different types: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and. Nat. sit. y. declarations. In his adaptation of the theory into the realm of social science theory,. al. er. io. and in particular the field of International Relations, ONUF (1989: 89-90) regarded. n. expressives and declarations as being unable to produce rules and therefore negligible. Ch. i Un. v. for IR analysis, which leaves us with three classifications of speech acts that. engchi. correspond to the three types of rules mentioned above: assertives, directives and commissives. All of them let us draw inferences about a speaker's intentions and they are often (but not necessarily) performed by using certain representative verbs. In the following paragraphs I will give a short description for each of the three types of speech acts followed by practical examples taken out of frequent Cross-Strait relationship discourses before discussing them in more detail in the following chapters. Firstly, assertive speech acts are statements about beliefs that express what, in the eyes of the agents, is a real fact or what they wish to portray as such. By giving this kind of information assertive speech acts are coupled to the speaker's expectation. 19.

(27) that the hearer accepts this belief. Some of the typical verbs linked to assertives are “state,” “affirm,” “insist” etc. Assertive speech acts create instruction-rules or establish principles. Common examples from the realm of Cross-Strait relations include the often repeated assertion by agents from Taiwan's government that “[t]he Republic of China is a sovereign country,”16 or the statement often heard from Beijing's agents that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.” 17 Secondly, directive speech acts tell us what we should do and inform us about the consequences if we fail to act accordingly. Thereby, the speaker reveals his intentions by letting the hearer know what kind of act he would like to have performed. Typical representative verbs include “ask,” “demand,” “permit,” “caution” etc. The rules caused by directive speech acts are called directive-rules. For example,. 政治大. before the long and controversially discussed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China was finally implemented in June 2010, Mainland. 立. Affairs Council Minister Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛) warned in an interview with Taiwan. ‧ 國. 學. Today that “[i]f Taiwan does not sign the ECFA, the country risks being marginalized and losing competitiveness overseas.”18 Similar claims were repeatedly made before. ‧. and after, sometimes more indirectly and more implicitly than in the given example but always with the same illocutionary force. For example, during a meeting with US. Nat. sit. y. scholars President Ma stated that “the ECFA will not only assist in normalizing. al. er. io. economic relations between the two sides, but will also help Taiwan avoid being. n. marginalized in the region.”19 Directives often warn of legal sanctions in case of non-. Ch. i Un. v. compliance. Beijing's Anti-Secession Law passed in March 2005 is a prime example. Article 8 states:. engchi. In the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, […] the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.20 16 PO (19 May 2011): “President Ma holds press conference to mark third anniversary of his inauguration,” via: http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=24428&rmid= 2355 (accessed: 2011-07-19). 17 TAO (23 February 2000): “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” via: http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103/t20110316_1789217.htm (accessed: 2011-10-23). 18 Taiwan Today (12 March 2010): “ECFA talk with MAC Minister Lai Shin-yuan,” via: http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=96009&ctNode=427 (accessed: 2011-07-19). 19 Quoted after PO (14 April 2009): “President Ma meets American scholars Participating in International Conference on 30 Years of TRA,” http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx? tabid=491&itemid=19388&rmid=2355 (accessed: 2011-07-19). 20 NPC (14 March 2005): “Anti-Secession Law,” via: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200720.

(28) Lastly, commissive speech acts occur when agents make promises that hearers accept. “Pledge,” “promise,” “vow,” “intend” are some of the typical verbs associated with this type of speech act. It is important to note that the normativity of commitments increases significantly when the according statement is made publicly instead of, for example, only to oneself (cf. ONUF 1989: 88). Commitments which are accepted by others serve as rules (=commitment-rules) for those who are making such commitments. One more recent example from the field of Cross-Strait relations would be President Ma's promise to “follow the letter and the spirit of the Constitution” 21 or his “three noes” pledge, which refers to his promises of no negotiations for unification, no declaration of formal independence and no use of force in order to keep the “status quo” over the Taiwan Strait.. 政治大. The repetition of speech acts is important because it has the effect of making everyone involved think that the repetition itself becomes significant. As people start. 立. to believe that the words themselves and not the speakers who utter them, are. ‧ 國. 學. responsible for the way things are, conventions are created that are already similar to rules. Just like rules, conventions, when given in the form of a speech act, generalize. ‧. the relation between speaker and hearer. Put differently, rules given in the form of speech acts make hearers into agents to whom these rules apply (ONUF 1998: 66-67).. Nat. sit. y. Although every successful speech act possesses some degree of normativity, their. al. er. io. repetition over time may furthermore increase their normativity and with them that of. n. the respective rules and conventions that they help to sustain:. Ch. i Un. v. When any such rules becomes a convention, constitution of the rule by speech acts accepting its status as a rule begins to supplant its constitution by the repetition of speech acts with complementary propositional content. Then the rule is normatively stronger, its regulative character supporting its independent constitution, and conversely. The change in condition is signified by a change in nomenclature: constitution becomes institution.” (ONUF 1989: 86). engchi. Speech acts are social performances because they have social consequences by affecting others and require them to respond on their own in one way or another. On the other hand, speech acts, by constituting the practices that make material conditions of the human experience meaningful, and charging them with normativity lead to the creation of rules that “fix preferences and expectations and shape the future against the past” (ONUF 1989: 183). 12/13/content_1384099.htm (accessed: 2011-07-19). 21 PO (20 May 2008): “Inaugural Address: Taiwan's Renaissance,” via: http://english.president.gov.tw/ Portals/4/FeaturesSection/Other-feature-articles/20080520_PRESIDENT_INAUGURAL/ e_speech.html (accessed: 2011-07-20). 21.

(29) In order to analyze speech acts related to Cross-Strait relations, I will take a look at sources that provide insights into how norms and rules influence behavior, such as written official documents (white papers, laws etc.), texts of speeches given on meaningful occasions by agents, documents by key individuals, press releases, interviews etc. Therefore, in the following chapters, source or content analysis of speech acts in these documents will be conducted. Apart from these written accounts, there is also a non-linguistic component, such as the participation of key party or government leaders in certain festivals or other practices that these agents observe in order to convey their interests and meanings. Using secondary literature to supplement these sources will help to put them into the appropriate context. I will now turn to discuss some features of agents and how these “relevant participants” can. 政治大. be determined in the Cross-Strait relationship.. 立. 2.4 Agents. ‧ 國. 學. At various points in my reading of rule-based constructivist ontology and the particular focus on rules and speech acts, I have referred to agents. It has been. ‧. mentioned before that agents use speech acts to respond to rules and thereby influence. y. Nat. the environment they act in. By being able to affect rules, agents can be defined as the. io. sit. active participants in society that act on behalf of a larger collective, for “collectives. n. al. er. do not make choices; individuals do as agents of collectives” (ONUF 1989: 260). In. i Un. v. order to act on their respective environment, agents use speech acts, that is, they make. Ch. engchi. statements that in turn are supposed to make other people act in a certain way. The way that people are able to act on the world in which they live makes agency a social condition (ONUF 1998: 60). Agency usually consists of statuses, offices, and roles which depend on the respective institutional context (ONUF 1998: 72). The relationship between rules and agents is not one-sided, instead they are mutually dependent and constitutive: rules do present agents with certain choices in that they help to define situations from any agent's point of view (ONUF 1998: 60) and prescribe what kind of goals are the appropriate ones to achieve; however the ability of agents to break rules shows that they “are not only programmed by rules and norms, but [that] they reproduce and change by their practice the normative structures by which they are able to act” (KRATOCHWIL 1989: 61). Therefore, on the one hand, 22.

(30) rules (as well as their related practices) form a stable pattern that functions as an institutional context in which agents make choices. On the other hand, agents may also chose to circumvent or redefine already existing rules or try to create new ones altogether. Whatever agents do (=say), they are usually aware of their own identities and their choices and they are only limited by the actions of other agents in society. Agents try to get what they want by “skillful manipulation of symbols, control over material values, and use of violence” (ONUF 1989: 228). Who, then, are the relevant agents in the Cross-Strait relationship, whose speech acts are used to deal with the predominant “one China” rule and who construct an identity for Taiwan vis-a-vis China? I will argue that the main agents can be summarized into the following three groups:. 政治大. Firstly, they are the high-ranking government officials on both sides of the Taiwan Strait including the Chinese and Taiwanese presidents as well as officials who. 立. are involved in conducting foreign policy and the personnel that is directly. ‧ 國. 學. responsible for conducting Cross-Strait relations. On the Taiwanese side these include officials working for the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the Straits Exchange. ‧. Foundation (SEF). Their counterparts in China include China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and China's Taiwan Affairs Office. Nat. sit. y. (TAO). For Taiwan in particular the analysis has to further include politicians of the. al. er. io. opposition parties, who as agents with very different ideas as to the nature of Cross-. n. Strait relations, have tried to influence and limit the decision-making process of the. Ch. i Un. v. respective government officials, especially since the late 1980s. The interaction. engchi. between agents in the ruling and opposition parties has necessarily led to compromises, adjustments and concessions time and again and was one of the main factors that have prevented any side from only pursuing their own respective goals when in government. As a democratic society since the late 1980s, these interactions were furthermore grounded in the perception and the expectations of the general public regarding Cross-Strait relations. Although agents may act on behalf of a larger collective, due to the rules and practices of a democratic society, they still have to take the preferences of this collective into account. The effect of domestic politics on Cross-Strait policy makers in Taiwan has been analyzed in detail by WU (2005b). Over past decades several public and private institutions in Taiwan have conducted. 23.

(31) surveys and compiled statistics to find out what exactly the preferences of Taiwan's public are and they have documented how these preferences have changed over time. Results of these surveys will be included in the analysis in order to find out how speech acts performed by agents relate to the ideas of the general public in Taiwan. Secondly, there are the agents from the United States. Due to the US' close historical ties to Taiwan dating back to the early Cold War era, the US has always been an important player in the Cross-Strait relationship and continues to be involved in the island's security, for example through weapons sales but also by making certain statements. Any statement made and action taken by the US president or US foreign policy makers regarding the Cross-Strait relationship is widely perceived and scrutinized on both sides of the Strait as possible changes in US policies are generally. 政治大. assumed to have severe repercussions on Cross-Strait issues. This is even more the case as the US does not have a single authoritative document that characterizes its. 立. Taiwan policy and has for the most part adhered to an approach of “strategic. ‧ 國. 學. ambiguity” (see CHENG 2008; HSU 2010).. Thirdly, academia has necessarily contributed to the construction of the Cross-. ‧. Strait relationship by analyzing, discussing, giving opinions on Cross-Strait developments and especially by making policy recommendations. 22 As Onuf has. Nat. sit. y. pointed out, students of International Relations (as well as any other discipline) may. al. er. io. see themselves as observers, but while they communicate and speak about this world. n. that they observe, they necessarily emphasize certain aspects over others, impose. Ch. i Un. v. boundaries and otherwise influence the view of their subject matter. By making their. engchi. observations normative, they actively take part in the process of construction for they themselves are never able to completely leave their own constructions (ONUF 1989: 43; ONUF 2002: 120-124). I argue that together these three roughly defined groups of agents are mainly responsible for conducting the Cross-Strait relationship by what they say and do in the pursuit of their respective goals. Written materials, especially official documents by ROC, PRC and US agencies as well as academic literature will consequently be the main sources of analysis. A discussion of speech acts related to three discourses that are aimed at influencing the current institution of Cross-Strait relations will show how 22 For example, the role of intellectuals in developing nationalism on both sides has recently been analyzed by HAO (2010). 24.