Towards Open Challenges of the “One China” Rule

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their highpoint with the missile crisis in 1995/1996 forced Washington to reluctantly and temporarily give up its “strategic ambiguity” with regard to Cross-Strait relations and sent aircraft carrier battle groups into the vicinity of Taiwan. Speech acts in this time once more exposed the structural flaw in the US “one China” policy that was reflected in contradictions of its commissive and directive speech acts towards Beijing on the one and Taipei on the other hand:⁶⁴ While it committed to its “one China”

policy that defined Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China, it also performed directive speech acts that aimed at curbing Beijing's overly aggressive stance by stating its military actions were a “grave concern” to the US. At the same time US commitments to Taipei guaranteed a separate existence of Taiwan alongside the mainland, while it warned agents in Taipei that it would or could not help it, if it indeed went through with declaring independence. As H^UANG / L^I (2010: 201-202) have pointed out: The “Third Taiwan Strait Crisis” made clear again, that the US “one China” policy was mainly directed at creating stability in the Taiwan Strait, not at solving any issue of Taiwan or a divided China. However, these experiences led to a feeling of being at the mercy of domestic developments in Taiwan and China, that lay beyond US control. As a result agents in the US became more proactive after the 1996 election.

3.3.2 Towards Open Challenges of the “One China” Rule

On March 23, 1996 Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan ( 連戰) became the first popularly elected leaders of Taiwan. They received more than 50 percent of the vote and with this powerful mandate, adjustments in speech acts performed by agents in Taipei continued. In his inauguration speech, Lee made some conciliatory statements such as referring to the Chinese nation as a common denominator for Cross-Strait relations.

But at the same time he called on Taiwan to combine the island's experiences with the Western world with China's traditional culture and “create a new Chinese culture.”⁶⁵ Despite this new orientation and the fact that he held on to the assertion that “The

64 See for example US DEPARTMENTOF STATE, OFFICEOFTHE SPOKESMAN (1995): “Address and Question and Answer Session by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on U.S. National Interest in the Asia-Pacific Region, July 28, 1995” via: dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1995/9507/950728 dossec.html (accessed: 2011-10-22).

65 GIO (1997): “Inaugural Address, May 20, 1996” in: President Lee Teng-hui's Selected Addresses and Messages, 1996, 81-91.

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Republic of China has always been a sovereign state” it might be read as a reassurance to agents in Beijing that he also added:

Disputes across the Strait center around system and lifestyle; they have nothing to do with ethnic or cultural identity. Here in this country it is totally unnecessary or impossible to adopt the so-called course of “Taiwan independence.”⁶⁶

Domestically however, the course of implementing policies whose goal it was to make state and society more Taiwan-centric continued unabatedly. Firstly, a National Development Conference in late 1996 ended with the suggestion of abolishing or freezing the provincial government of Taiwan since its jurisdiction almost entirely overlapped with that of the ROC's central government, a situation that in turn had led to many structural inefficiencies.⁶⁷ Secondly, the government ordered the Ministry of Education in 1997 to devise a new series of textbooks that focused on Taiwan at the expense of China and aimed, in the long-term, at establishing a “distinctively Taiwanese culture and value system” (CHAO / DICKSON 2002: 5). Thirdly, in the run-up to the election of Taipei mayor in 1998, Lee Teng-hui reverted to his old slogan of

“New Taiwanese” when he voiced his support for the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou (^馬英九), who was born in Hongkong, and thereby once more popularized previous definitions of Taiwan's special history as an multi-ethnic (as opposed to a merely Chinese) immigrant society.⁶⁸ With regard to China, definitions of the nature of Cross-Strait relations made in his previous term were consolidated through a variety of formal speech acts. In 1997, for example, the MAC published a new paper that described the relationship across the Taiwan Strait as one of “shared sovereignty, divided jurisdictions.” Although Lee would occasionally still refer to the importance of “China's reunification” or Taiwan's role as a “safe-keeper” of traditional Chinese culture, in his later years, the shift in focus on Taiwan became the more apparent the closer Lee's final tenure as president came to its end. Instead of experiences and events that were important for the history of China, Lee preferred to mention events in his speeches and addresses that were characteristic for Taiwan's local history such as the insurgence on February 28, 1947 or the 1996 elections, in other words, events that

66 Ibid.

67 Another reason given for this step was Lee's rivalry with the provincial governor James Soong ( 宋 楚瑜), who subsequently stepped down from his post in protest and would later compete against the official KMT candidate in Taiwan's 2000 election, thereby unwillingly contributing to the DPP's early rise to power (CHAO / DICKSON 2002: 7-8).

68 Despite the emergence of this discourse, some critics have accused Lee of having created ethnic tensions between “Taiwanese” and “Mainlanders” in Taiwan (see CHAO / DICKSON 2002: 16).

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have contributed to create a shared memory of people living in Taiwan and that were separate from the Chinese mainland. In an interview with the Washington Post in November 1997, Lee outright stated that Taiwan was an “independent and sovereign country.”⁶⁹ Later when asked to clarify that statement, he said the problem was one of location:

Since it was founded in 1912, the Republic of China has been a sovereign country. Its current location is Taiwan. In another respect, when people abroad talk about the Republic of China, they actually call it Taiwan. In light of this type of acknowledgement, Taiwan is an independent sovereign country.⁷⁰

However, many times during that same interview he also emphasized the importance of people's and the KMT's identification with Taiwan, which allows the conclusion that the above assertion was more than just a play on words and reflected more of a sense-of-mission on Lee's part.⁷¹ This semantic separation of Taiwan and China was flanked on the one hand by his policy of “no haste, be patient” (jie ji yong ren 戒急用 忍) that sought to slow down trade and investment and thereby mitigate Taiwan's dependence on the mainland economy, as well as the pursuit of acquiring more advanced weapons from Europe and the US on the other.

The DPP was even more outspoken than Lee. General point of reference for their criticism was the ROC Constitution which they considered to be “illegitimate”

for Taiwan due to its historical connection with China. Therefore certain clauses in it, such as the one reserving seats for overseas Chinese in the National Assembly seemed especially absurd to them. However, in 1990 the DPP pledged for a “Magna Carta”

that would keep but freeze the constitution (in the hope that this would avert an act of aggression on the PRC's part) while opening up the opportunity for creating a new one that was explicitly tailored for Taiwan. In the same draft, the DPP also opted for a

“normal” tripartite division of powers instead of the ROC's five-part one, and favored

69 RICHBURG, Keith R. (1997): “Leader Asserts Taiwan is 'independent, sovereign,'” in: Washington Post, November 8, 1997, via: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/china/stories/

lee.htm (accessed: 2011-10-22).

70 GIO (1998): “My Taiwan, My Life: An Interview Conducted by Komori Yoshihisa, Editor-at-Large of Sankei Shimbun, March 1998,” in: President Lee Teng-hui's Selected Addresses and Messages, 1997, 17-61.

71 As later events have shown, Lee became more outspoken after he stepped down from office and was expelled from the KMT because many in his party felt his actions had undermined party unity and were a decisive factor in helping the DPP candidate to snatch away the victory in Taiwan's 2000 presidential elections. In the following years, Lee not only started to refer to Taiwan as a separate

“nation” and became one of the prime supporters of “correcting Taiwan's name” (JACOBS / LIU 2007:

390-391). But he also helped to establish a new Taiwan nationalist party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in 2001.

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direct elections for the president, in order to further weaken the “ROC influence.”

These demands were elaborated in the “Draft for a Taiwanese Constitution,”

formulated in 1992. The party emphasized its disavowal for the ROC Constitution and favored a new independent state by openly proposing new definitions for the name of the state (“Taiwan” instead of ROC), new territorial boundaries (that excluded mainland China and Outer Mongolia), as well as an American style government system. Institution-wise, the DPP wanted to abolish the National Assembly that it saw as redundant and illegitimate and favored instead a stronger Legislative Yuan as the sole parliament. Furthermore, the party advocated the inclusion of referenda and plebiscites into the constitutional provisions, since one of its goals was to use such a tool to let Taiwan's population decide on their “national” future. It further argued in favor of direct elections of the presidents on the ground that it regarded the ROC president as a “symbol of an immigrant regime” (see L^IN 2002: 136). Needless to say, the DPP also supported the KMT's mainstream faction in abolishing or suspending the provincial government, albeit for a different reason i.e., to “eliminate any suggestion that Taiwan was merely a province of China” (N^OBLE 1999: 102). On May 8, 1999, the party passed its “Resolution on Taiwan's Future.”⁷² In it they asserted that after the constitutional reforms and free elections since the early 1990s, “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country” and “not a part of the People's Republic of China.” It demanded that any change to this “status quo” should be subject to a plebiscite. The DPP also accepted “Republic of China” as Taiwan's name “under its current constitution.” Under these premises, the resolution called for equality with China and aimed at encouraging a peaceful dialogue between the two sides. The assertive speech acts with regard to Taiwan's status made it clear that maintaining the “one China” rule was not in the interest of the party. Indeed, the DPP opined that

Taiwan should renounce the “one China” position to avoid international confusion and to prevent the position's use by China as a pretext for annexation by force.

The document went further by stating the DPP's goals of Taiwanization of the public education system as well as “rebuilding” an awareness for Taiwan's history and culture. However, the DPP's speech acts could not violate the “one China” rule, because the party was in opposition and did not have the means to implement policies

72 DPP (1999): “Resolution on Taiwan's Future,” via: http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm (accessed: 2011-10-23).

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that would break the “one China” rule. Their performances did, however, exert influence over the domestic and Cross-Strait discourses and, as their ideas gradually became part of the mainstream, they would have restricted the KMT from being overly pro-unification, if it ever were to embark on such a course. It came, of course, much different. Before Lee left office, he did so on a note that would severely challenge (albeit still not violate) the “one China” rule. During an interview with the German broadcaster Deutsche Welle on July 9, 1999, Lee made the following assertions in a well-prepared⁷³ answer to a question on Cross-Strait relations:

The 1991 constitutional amendments have placed cross-Strait relations as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship [ teshu de guo yu guo guanxi 特殊的國與 國 關 係], rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a local government.⁷⁴

Although agents in Taipei went on to clarify that this “Two States Theory” (liangguo lun 兩國論), as it was later called by the media, was not connected to any changes in policy, it created much controversy in Taiwan and triggered strong reactions from agents in Beijing and Washington. The DPP saw it as a gift. Although MAC published a position paper on August 1, in which it called on both sides of the Strait to return to the idea of both sides having a different interpretation of “one China,”⁷⁵ Lee Teng-hui did not attempt to find a tone that Beijing might have interpreted as more conciliatory and instead repeated his “two-states”-remarks in his National Day Address the following month.

An important backdrop for these changes that allowed agents in Taipei to gradually challenge the “one China” rule was the public's embrace of Lee's ideas of fighting for Taiwan's international space as well as the Taiwan-centricity of his policies. As Taiwan become more democratic, the public's perception of government policies became a matter of concern, especially when these policies touched on the sensitive issue of national identity. To measure public opinion, various polls have been conducted by the MAC and the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University since the early 1990s (see appendices 7.1-7.3). They show that by the mid-1990s the percentage of Taiwan's population that supported an immediate or eventual

73 For a discussion of the background on this formula see SHENG 2001: 210-228.

74 (n/a) (1999): “Interview of Taiwan President Lee with Deutsche Welle Radio,” via:

http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9926.htm (accessed: 2011-10-23).

75 MAC (1 August 1999): “Parity, Peace, and Win-Win: The Republic of China's Position on the 'Special State-to-state Relationship',” via: http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/880803.htm (accessed: 2011-10-23).

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unification with China stagnated and then dropped towards the end of the 1990s. In 1999, their number was about equal to the one of people who supported independence, either “as soon as possible” or after a period of maintaining the status quo. While both numbers are dwarfed by the majority of more than 45 percent to around 50 percent of the population who supported to either maintain the status quo⁷⁶ indefinitely or at least postpone a decision until a later time, two trends became obvious. First, an increasingly larger percentage of people on the island spoke in favor of independence. Second, more and more people in Taiwan started to ethnically identify themselves as purely Taiwanese as opposed to purely Chinese.⁷⁷ More importantly, as can be seen in the MAC poll (appendix 7.1), a boost in the numbers of pro-independence answers registered concurrently with aggressive moves by the PRC against Taiwan, as was most obvious in the case of the missile firings in 1995-1996.

In other words, the PRC itself, through its own words and actions, contributed to a rise in attitude among Taiwan's population that was detrimental to its goal of achieving “peaceful reunification.” On the other hand, a huge majority of Taiwanese agreed to Lee's state-to-state remarks as a variety of surveys have shown.⁷⁸

Agents in Beijing could not do much rather than more passively respond to these developments in Taiwan. “Peaceful reunification” flanked by military deterrence remained the cornerstones of its Taiwan policy. Probably in awareness of the changes in the Taiwan people's perception of their own identity but still resolved to keep pushing for Beijing's own “one China” principle, Jiang Zemin said that his government would place “its hope on those people in Taiwan who have a glorious patriotic tradition” when he addressed the 15^th CCP National Congress in September 1997. A more defiant stance was revealed in PRC's agents recourse on calling Taiwan a “province of China” on more occasions than before, purposefully denying any degree of equality between both sides, especially in the immediate aftermaths of the presidential elections in 1996. This stance was moderated over the course of the next two years, enabling both sides to conduct another round of Koo-Wang talks in 1998.

76 It should be noted that no definition of “status quo” is given in these surveys.

77 In the Chinese version of the survey “Chinese” is translated as Zhongguo ren (中國人), which has a more political connotation such as in “people of a state called China” rather than, for example Huaren (華人) which could be translated as “Chinese as a cultural group.” It should also be noted that the “middle ground” between the above-mentioned answers, that is, the self-identification as

“Taiwanese and Chinese” received by far the most responses.

78 MAC (1999): “Public Support for Special State-to-State Relationship (1999-09),” via:

http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=54854&CtNode=5954&mp=3 (accessed: 2011-10-23).

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Preceding this meeting was a redefinition of “one China” at least in the PRC's dealings with Taiwan. The ARATS proclaimed that

There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China, and China is not reunified yet. The two sides should make common efforts to discuss reunification through consultations on an equal footing under the principle of one China. The sovereignty and territory of a country is indivisible and Taiwan's political status should be discussed under the premise of one China.⁷⁹

Almost needless to say that this relatively open-minded approach (references to the PRC as the sole legitimate Chinese government were left out) was abandoned after Lee's announcement of his “state-to-state” formula. Subsequently, directive speech acts became most in evidence on the part of Beijing. The president and TAO officials condemned Lee, sending strong warnings to Taipei not to amend the Constitution in accordance with that theory and urged a return to the “one China principle” (see HUANG / LI 2010: 237). However, when they realized that the independence discourse in Taiwan gained momentum and threatened to severely challenge the “one China”

rule, the TAO issued another white paper⁸⁰ to set the tone on its own terms right before Taiwan's March 2000 presidential election. It consisted of many well-known and already established speech acts with regard to Taiwan's status that basically aimed at countering everything that agents in Taipei tried to convey with their “state-to-state” theory. It defined Taiwan alternatively as an “inalienable part of China” and even denigrated its status to that of a “province” in which the KMT government was merely a “local authority in Chinese territory.” The paper then went on to blame Lee Teng-hui for “betraying” the “one China” principle, and identified the president as the head of the “separatist forces” on the island that not only tried to pursue “Taiwan independence” or the creation of “two Chinas” but also to ideologically undermine the

“Chinese awareness” among Taiwanese. It contrasted these developments of recent years with the presidencies of the two Chiangs that despite ideological differences did not challenge the “one China” rule. It warned Taiwan that if it “denies the One-China Principle and tries to separate Taiwan from the territory of China, the premise and

“Chinese awareness” among Taiwanese. It contrasted these developments of recent years with the presidencies of the two Chiangs that despite ideological differences did not challenge the “one China” rule. It warned Taiwan that if it “denies the One-China Principle and tries to separate Taiwan from the territory of China, the premise and

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