The “1992 Consensus”

whether Taiwan should use the name “Taiwan” when applying for participation in the UN (and other international organizations).¹²¹ When trying to turn this statement into actual actions in conjunction with the 2008 election, not only Beijing, but also Washington showed itself increasingly outspoken. Fearing again that the “UN referendum” as heralded in the DPP's proposal would pave the way for changes in the unstable “status quo,” US agents performed a few speech acts that were unfavorable for Taiwan's government in 2007. In late August, National Security Council Senior Director for Asian Affairs Dennis Wilder, said that

for membership in the United Nations requires statehood. Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this point a state in the international community. The position of the United States government is that the ROC -- Republic of China -- is an issue undecided and it has been left undecided ... for many, many years.¹²² (My emphasis.)

More devastatingly, for the DPP's cause, the following month, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas Christensen said in a speech at the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference that:

Some Taiwan leaders in recent years have asserted that Taiwan independence is the status quo that should be defended. On that point, let me be perfectly clear: while U.S. opposition to Chinese coercion of Taiwan is beyond question, we do not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, and we do not accept the argument that provocative assertions of Taiwan independence are in any way conducive to maintenance of the status quo or peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. For the reasons I have given above, in fact, we rank such assertions along with the referendum on joining the UN under the name Taiwan as needless provocations that are patently not in the best interests of the Taiwan people or of the United States.¹²³ (My emphasis.)

Therefore, the DPP basically adopted a course that was opposed by all sides, and in a way, just as rigid as Chiang Kai-shek's, who firmly insisted on using the name “ROC”

some forty years earlier, albeit in a completely opposed direction.¹²⁴

4.2.2 The “1992 Consensus”

From the early beginning of Chen Shui-bian's first presidency, the DPP rejected the core idea of the “1992 Consensus,” that is, the notion that both sides had agreed to

121The referendum was eventually held together with the presidential election in 2008. It remained invalid, however, because the necessary threshold for voter turnout had not been reached.

122Quoted after Taipei Times (2 December 2007): “Lessons From the UN Referendum,” via:

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/12/02/2003390828 (accessed: 2011-11-20).

123Quoted after CHRISTENSEN, Thomas (2007): “Speech to U.S.-Taiwan Business Council,” Defense Industry Conference, September 11, 2007, Annapolis, via: http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports/

2007_sept11_thomas_christensen_speech.pdf (accessed: 2011-11-20).

124One might argue that of course the DPP's approach was more democratic than that of the old KMT regime, but many instances of its “name rectification campaign” had been proceeded with even though no prior consensus on the respective issues had been achieved beforehand.

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adhere to “one China,” although each of them would have different interpretations as to the official name of that “one China” (yi ge Zhongguo, ge zi biaoshu 一個中國，

各自 表述). In essence, the “1992 Consensus” is a commitment to the rule of “one China” and, depending on its interpretation, the “status quo.” The DPP argued that no legal document had been produced that would give proof of a consensus during the 1992 talks in Hong Kong that served as a preparation for the functional talks that were later conducted between SEF and ARATS. Former President Lee Teng-hui, whose tenure covered the time span to which the “1992 Consensus” supposedly traces back its historical roots stated at a seminar in 2002 that even he as then-head of state was not aware of such a consensus.¹²⁵ For the DPP, therefore, insisting on the “1992 Consensus” was equally unacceptable as was abiding by the “one China” principle.

Although the DPP would probably agree that the PRC could represent “one China,” it viewed Taiwan as a sovereign political entity in its own right. However, the party was also interested in establishing some sort of friendly relations with the PRC after 2000 and therefore kept speaking of the “1992 talk” or “1992 spirit” (jiu-er jingshen 九二 精神) as a replacement for the more controversial term “1992 Consensus.”¹²⁶ That is also why in 2002, Chien Hsi-chieh (簡錫皆), a former DPP legislator, appealed in an op-ed piece concerning the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing to replace the “one China”

principle with a “peace principle,” if it was sincere in its hope for lasting peace across the Strait.¹²⁷ Only few voices within the pan-green camp regarded the fact that some people said a consensus between both sides had been reached (even though not necessarily in 1992) as a sign of a softer Chinese tone on the sovereignty issue at the time.¹²⁸ However, because the pan-green camp was generally interested in talks with China regarding economic and trade-related issues, President Chen again invited Beijing to return to negotiations on the “basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong” in

125Taipei Times (27 December 2002): “'One China' a Relic of War, Lee Says,” via: http://www.taipei times.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/12/27/188730 (accessed: 2011-11-14). Although by that time his close ties to the pan-green camp were an established fact after he had “co-founded” the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union in 2001. These developments might put some of the statements he made after leaving the KMT into perspective.

126MAC (2005): “President Chen's Address to the National Day Rally, October 10, 2004,” in:

Important Documents on the Government's Mainland Policy. Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 17-22.

127Taipei Times (4 February 2002): “Give Cross-Strait Peace a Chance,” via: http://www.taipei times.com/News/editorials/archives/2002/02/04/122742 (accessed: 2011-11-14).

128Taipei Times (9 January 2003): “Taiwan Welcomes Offer From China,” via: http://www.taipei times.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/01/09/190303 (accessed: 2011-11-14).

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his 2004 National Day Address, but stopped short of mentioning the “Consensus”

itself.¹²⁹ And indeed some achievements like charter flights for the lunar new year holidays between the two sides were reached in the following years without that the Taiwanese government had to declare that it recognized the term.

The KMT, has emphasized the importance of the “Consensus” since the year 2000. By sticking to their own definition of what “one China” meant, the party showed its willingness to not give up on “one China” rule in general and continue to maintain it. Only when this position seemed to be unfavorable for the blue camp at the end of 2003, after the SARS crisis had led to much anti-China sentiments in Taiwan, gradually swaying electoral momentum into the DDP's favor, Lien Chan stated publicly that the blue camp would stop using the term so as not to give the DPP another opportunity to portray the KMT as “selling out Taiwan.”¹³⁰ Apart from that short-term abandonment, both the KMT's Lien Chan and the PFP's James Soong strongly disapproved of the DPP's rejection of the “1992 Consensus,” because they deemed it irreplaceable if Cross-Strait negotiations and trade talks were to be resumed. When Lien Chan made his plans to visit China public with the goal of overcoming the bilateral impasse, he said he would base the Cross-Strait relationship on the “1992 Consensus.” The opposing views of DPP and KMT are not without irony since a debate about a consensus, that, in its most positive interpretation, was supposed to bridge the gap with the “arch rivals” in Beijing, in fact, led to much dissent and further political deadlock within Taiwan itself.

When James Soong and Lien Chan went to China in 2005 to start new Cross-Strait talks on their own, after having been defeated in the 2004 elections, pro-independence advocates such as the Northern Taiwan Society demanded that during the contacts the “Consensus” should not be mentioned at all.¹³¹ Lien Chan, however, went on to work out a five-point agreement with Hu Jintao, termed “Vision for Cross-Strait Peace,” and which they based on the “1992 Consensus.”¹³² Although, at the

129MAC (2005): “President Chen's Address to the National Day Rally, October 10, 2004,” in:

Important Documents on the Government's Mainland Policy. Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 17-22.

130Taipei Times (17 Decemer 2003): “Unification Can Wait, Pan-blue Leaders Say,” via:

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/12/17/2003079893 (accessed: 2011-11-15).

131Taipei Times (26 April 2005): “An Open Letter to the People of Taiwan,” via: http://www.taipei times.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/04/26/2003252066 (accessed: 2011-11-14).

132Taipei Times (30 April 2005): “Lien, Hu Share 'Vision' for Peace,” via: http://www.taipeitimes.com/

News/front/archives/2005/04/30/2003252532 (accessed: 2011-11-15).

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time, Lien Chan could not speak for Taiwan's government since he was in the opposition with the KMT, this did not deter him from trying to sell the idea that only the acceptance of the “1992 Consensus” would bring a resumption of Cross-Strait negotiations to the international community, as he did, for example, during his visit to Washington in July 2005 when he spoke in front of an international audience.¹³³

Before his own trip to China a few days later, James Soong announced that his meeting with the Chinese officials would likely lead to a new definition of the “1992 Consensus,”¹³⁴ but there is no indication that this actually bore any fruits.¹³⁵ Instead, he reiterated his support for the term and stated in his meeting with the ARATS chairman Wang Daohan (汪道涵):

The 'one China' principle, but with different interpretations, is a reasonable description of the reality of the cross-strait situation. The Taiwanese people hope that China respects the reality of their existence. The Republic of China's Guidelines for National Unification also mention this.¹³⁶

His People First Party (PFP) then tried in a very confrontational way to cement the

“1992 Consensus” as it were into law by including it into the first article of its proposed “Cross-Strait Peace Advancement Bill” (liang'an heping cujin fa 兩岸和平 促進法) which was rejected by the green camp. President Chen verbally lashed out at Soong and Lien for their mentioning of the “Consensus” on many occasions during their respective trips to China, saying that accepting the term would put Taiwan on the same level as Hong Kong.¹³⁷ Therefore, after the trips the impasse continued.

The pan-green camp saw itself finally confirmed in its opposition to the

“Consensus” when in 2006 the former MAC chairman, Su Chi, admitted publicly that he had made the term up in 2000 in the hope that it would serve as a basis for continued Cross-Strait negotiations despite the fact that a pro-independence

133Taipei Times (20 July 2005): “Lien Urges World to Press Chen on Cross-Strait Talks,” via:

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/07/20/2003264241 (accessed: 2011-11-15).

134Taipei Times (5 May 2005): “I'm No Messenger, James Soong Says,” via: http://www.taipei times.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/05/05/2003253214 (accessed: 2011-11-15).

135Soong did try to add the notion of “two sides, one China“ (liang'an yi Zhong 兩岸一中) in a six point communiqué with Hu, although this formula has not replaced the “1992 Consensus”

afterwards, nor did it play any further prominent role in this discourse. Also, by subsuming the “two sides” under “one China” the new formula was even less attractive to the DPP than the more ambiguous “1992 Consensus.” (see: Taipei Times (26 May 2005): “Definitions Differ on 'Two Sides, One China,'” via: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/05/26/

003256682 [accessed: 2011-11-15]).

136Quoted after Taipei Times (9 May 2011): “1992 Consensus a Reality: Soong,” via:

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/05/09/2003253794 (accessed: 2011-11-15).

137Taipei Times (13 May 2005): “Chen Attacks 'Consensus,'” via: http://www.taipeitimes.com/

News/taiwan/archives/2005/05/13/2003254452 (accessed: 2011-11-14).

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government was now being in power.¹³⁸ Su stated that he thought the phrase would be ambiguous enough so that both Beijing and the DPP might find it equally useful.

However, even after Su Chi's revelation, Ma Ying-jeou, who quickly rose among the ranks in the KMT, still showed himself committed to its existence and mentioned that Cross-Strait talks should be restarted under the framework of the “1992 Consensus”

during a speech at Harvard University.¹³⁹ He even kept on urging President Chen to also recognize it during a televised meeting in April that same year. When Ma became the KMT's presidential hopeful for the 2008 election, he increasingly went on the offensive, connecting not only the prospect of overcoming the deadlock in Cross-Strait relations but also regional stability to the acceptance of the “1992 Consensus.”¹⁴⁰ At a 2007 investment forum in Taipei, Ma made it clear that he had grown fond of the fact that the term “1992 Consensus” left many grey areas in that it did not clearly define the relationship between China and Taiwan by saying: “[...] the '1992 Consensus' is something we call a 'masterpiece of ambiguity,' where each side could interpret the nature [of 'one China'].”¹⁴¹ The DPP as well as pro-independence organizations such as the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) continually criticized Ma for insisting on the existence of the “1992 Consensus.”¹⁴² However, by voicing their strong objections to the term they also contributed to keeping the discourse alive, especially when Chen challenged the “Consensus” again, going so far as to say that he would respect it if the KMT could make PRC President Hu Jintao publicly state in their next meeting that it, in fact, really meant for Beijing “each side having their different interpretation of one China,” something that agents in Beijing had so far failed to do. The next meeting between KMT and CCP leaders was,

138Taipei Times (22 February 2006): “Su Chi Admits the '1992 Consensus' Was Made Up, via:

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106 (accessed: 2011-11-14).

Su Chi had made a similar statement in his 2002 book that was published the by the KMT think tank, the National Policy Foundation, without triggering a similar strong reaction at the time. (See SU / CHENG 2002: VII)

139Taipei Times (23 March 2006): “DPP Roasts Ma for Remarks,” via: http://www.taipeitimes.com/

News/taiwan/archives/2006/03/23/2003298761 (accessed: 2011-11-14).

140Taipei Times (18 March 2007): “Ma Adamant on '1992 Consensus,'” via: http://www.taipei times.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/03/18/2003352791 (accessed: 2011-11-15).

141Quoted after Taipei Times (26 June 2007): “Ma Touts APEC as Basis for Regional Trade Deals,”

via: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/06/26/2003366898 (accessed: 2011-11-15).

142Taipei Times (23 March 2006): “DPP Roasts Ma for Remarks,” via: http://www.taipeitimes.com/

News/taiwan/archives/2006/03/23/2003298761; Taipei Times (23 March 2006): “FAPA Labels Ma's Cross-Strait Comment 'Unacceptable,'” via: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/

archives/2006/03/26/2003299283 (both accessed: 2011-11-14).

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however, again fruitless in this regard, since Hu would not make such a commitment.¹⁴³

Despite that, the DPP appeared to have no effective counter against the KMT's continuing adherence to the “Consensus.” Having been defeated in both 2008 national elections by large margins, the pan-green camp as a whole could not really do much else than taking the spectator's seat and observe how the discourse kept unfolding itself in front of them, merely being able to denying its existence and criticizing its ideological proximity to the “one China” principle time and again. Ma's consistent adherence to the “1992 Consensus” and especially its “different interpretations”

component, on the other hand, made it almost seem like a necessity that he turned this concept into a cornerstone of his China policies after being elected.

As has been shown in the previous parts of this thesis, China has made it clear many times that it will always adhere to the “one China” principle. Right before early 2000 when China published its white paper, Beijing asserted with great clarity that this “one China” was the PRC whose central government was in Beijing, that had inherited the legitimacy of government over the whole country, including Taiwan, from the ROC after the Civil War. Since then, the CCP has been relentless in denying any notion of “two Chinas” or “one China and one Taiwan.” If there was a indeed a consensus reached in 1992, what happened to it by the time the white paper was published in 2000? Interestingly however, Beijing's position regarding the “1992 Consensus” is contradictory. On the one hand it has used the term and even said its existence was an “undeniable fact” and rejected the idea that another formula such as

“1992 spirit” would be an adequate replacement for it.¹⁴⁴ On the other hand, CCP leaders have never publicly approved that it actually meant to include “each side having its own interpretation” of “one China.” In fact, the definition of the term given on the website of the CCP's mouthpiece People's Daily states flatly that there has never been a consensus between both sides regarding “different interpretations of one China.”¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, during the early DPP rule, agents in Beijing regularly urged

143Taipei Times (17 April 2006): “No Room for Interpretation of 'One China,' MAC Says,” via:

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2006/04/17/2003303092 (accessed: 2011-11-14).

144People's Daily (1 May 2001): “PD Commentary on 1992 Cross-Straits Consensus,” via:

http://english.people.com.cn/200105/01/eng20010501_69056.html (accessed: 2011-11-14).

145People's Daily (21 November 2001): “The 1992 Consensus,” via: http://tw.people.com.cn/

GB/14864/14920/860191.html (accessed: 2011-11-14). (Chinese)

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Taiwan's government to return to the “one China” principle as well as the “1992 Consensus,” if they wanted to restart negotiations, showing that both slogans had basically the same meaning to them.¹⁴⁶ Only in 2002 there seemed to be some softening in China's stance when Chen Yunlin ( 陳 雲 林 ), head of China's Taiwan Affairs Office, announced somewhat surprisingly that Beijing would neither raise the

“one China” principle nor the “1992 Consensus” as preconditions for resuming talks.

This statement was later qualified by China's Taiwan Affairs spokesman, Zhang Mingqing (張銘清), who said that Taiwan still had to admit that Cross-Strait relations were to be described as internal affairs, suggesting more of an adjustment of China's wording strategy instead oft a real policy change.¹⁴⁷ Zhang also called Chen's 2004 appeal to a resumption of negotiations on the “basis of the 1992 meeting in Hongkong” a “fake” and hereafter reiterated that talks would only be possible if Taiwan's government recognized the “1992 Consensus.”¹⁴⁸

The position that all that Taiwan had to do was to accept the “1992 Consensus” in order to restart negotiations was once again reiterated by the chairman of China's People's Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qinglin ( 賈慶林), in early 2005¹⁴⁹ as well as in Hu Jintao's “four point” proposal in March. In the latter speech Hu mentioned the “Consensus” numerous times but defined it merely as “embodying”

the “one China” principle.¹⁵⁰ Also in the same year, ARATS published a new book on the “Consensus” in which it attributed to its historical existence but also, once again, distanced itself from the “different interpretations” part of the formula which it called a “later addition by the Taiwan side.”¹⁵¹

In its discussions with the US, China's position on the “Consensus” was less ambiguous, since it was rarely mentioned at all, indicating that it was meant for Cross-Strait not international consumption. One of these rare occasions when it was

146People's Daily (22 May 2000): “Authorized Statement Regarding the Question of Cross-Strait Relations Issued by the CCP and the Stat Council's Taiwan Affairs Office,” via:

146People's Daily (22 May 2000): “Authorized Statement Regarding the Question of Cross-Strait Relations Issued by the CCP and the Stat Council's Taiwan Affairs Office,” via:

在文檔中 以建構主義的觀點分析兩岸關係 - 政大學術集成 (頁 86-96)