2. Analytical Framework
2.5 Rule-based Constructivism and Cross-Strait Relations
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these agents interact with that environment in the following chapters.
2.5 Rule-based Constructivism and Cross-Strait Relations
The fact that the strand of constructivism as conceived by Onuf and further developed by the Miami IR Group has not become the mainstream in International Relations scholarship has had its effect (or better lack thereof) on studies regarding Cross-Strait relations. The mainstream version, that is, Wendtian constructivism, has been applied somewhat more often, although mostly tentatively and with mixed results. In one part of his analysis, ACHARYA (1999) tried to adapt the framework of mainstream constructivism to Cross-Strait relations only to notice its short-comings. Similarly, WU (2000: 426), in his more comprehensive overview of “nine contending approaches” to Cross-Strait relations, referred only to Alexander Wendt's definition of constructivism and concluded that as a “vanguard approach” constructivism “needs further polishing and elaboration to be an effective instrument” for Cross-Strait relation analysis. The only notable exception is the above-mentioned article by Zheng Shiping that was published in a book by the Miami IR Group of scholars.
In order to capture the fluidity of identities that has been a characteristic of Cross-Strait relations development, rule-based constructivism seems helpful to analyze the process of mutual constitution of agents and institutions. However, discussing a topic where there is being put much (or some would say hypersensitive) emphasis on words and their contested meanings, some preliminary clarifications on terminology used in this thesis seem necessary in order to avoid confusion.
Throughout this thesis “China” shall refer to the People's Republic of China with its central government in Beijing that does not include the island of Taiwan nor any other place currently administered by the government in Taipei. Likewise “Taiwan” shall refer to what is still officially called the Republic of China and currently includes Kinmen and Mazu but not any other place on the “Chinese mainland.” Despite being aware of the overlapping claims over each others' territories by agents in both the PRC as well as the ROC (they will be discussed in depths in chapters II and III), I do firmly believe that these are the most commonsense definitions, although not everyone will agree that this choice is completely without consequences. HARRISON (2006) has already pointed out that even by merely contrasting “China” and “Taiwan”
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in the way that I do here means to take part in the discourse that separates the two entities (at least semantically). Similarly, SHIH (2009: 195) has argued that by using a framework of International Relations theory, which is designed to analyze the relationships between different nations or states, the academic observer already reveals his standpoint and willingly or not contributes to define the status of Taiwan vis-a-vis China, that is, the nature of Cross-Strait relations. Although I have addressed the equal importance of agents in Taiwan, China and the US, by just looking at the chapter outline, it becomes evident that the structure of this thesis is rather Taiwan-centric in that it follows a chronology of historic events that have originated on the island. This is primarily done to allow for analytic clarity but might have unintended repercussions and I can not but point out my own self-awareness regarding this aspect here.
Another choice regarding the structure of this thesis, that might be seen as a restriction but was at least intended to serve the purpose of lucidity, and provide for a more pragmatic handle in the face of the opaqaueness of “one China” discourses, is that I chose to analyze Cross-Strait speech acts surrounding the “one China” rule in the context of three specific discourses in chapter III. Before I turn to analyze the historical background of the “one China” rule as well as that of these discourses in chapter II, I will give a brief overview over their respective propositional contents:
(1) Taiwan's Status and the Republic of China Constitution (Zhonghua Minguo xianfa 中華民國憲法): questions regarding the sovereignty of the Republic of China are central to any discussion of the Cross-Strait relationship as they directly relate to Taiwan's international standing. The island's external relations and the ROC Constitution play central roles in this discourse. Insisting on being the only legal government of China of which Taiwan is supposed to be a part, agents in the PRC try to limit the ROC's space in the international arena with regard to diplomatic relations as well as its participation in non-governmental organizations. The constitution, as the state's most important document, has great normative force. Speech acts surrounding it are therefore directed at the state's core structure and denomination. Like many institutions of the Republic of China governmental structure, the ROCC was brought to Taiwan when the KMT took over control in the 1940s and relocated to the island.
The ROCC version of 1947 became applicable at that time, although it was suspended
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shortly thereafter until the era of Martial Law in Taiwan came to an end in 1987. As time went by, the likeliness of the ROCC being implemented for “all of China” any time soon faded away. Furthermore, the democratization of Taiwan required constitutional revisions and five of them were conducted in the 1990s alone under President Lee Teng-hui's leadership. When the DPP came to power in 2000 it displayed a rather ambivalent attitude towards the constitution as it did to the idea of a
“Republic of China” in general. In accordance with its party ideology of pursuing formal independence for Taiwan, the DPP had in the past called for abolishing the ROC Constitution and writing a new constitution that would be tailor-made for a
“Republic of Taiwan.” However, after being elected into office under the ROCC framework and facing domestic and non-domestic opposition, the DPP somewhat moderated its stance to one of accepting the ROCC for the time being out of practical considerations. When the KMT came back to power in 2008, the new government followed a very different path again. It gave up previous attempts at returning to the UN in order to focus on admission into some of its specialized agencies such as the WHA. Also, the attitude under the new Ma administration towards the constitution might be expressed in the slogan of a “constitutional one China” in which the ROCC is seen as an important cornerstone and stabilizing force for the “status quo” for the government in Taipei. Accordingly, the focus moved from changes of the constitution to one of adjustments within the system. Ma has pledged time and again that upholding the constitution and protecting the ROC's sovereignty is one of his utmost duties as president.
(2) The “1992 Consensus” (jiu-er gongshi 九二共識): according to its followers the consensus refers to an understanding reached between Taipei and Beijing in 1992 with the help of which the impasse in Cross-Strait negotiations at the time was overcome. It basically entails the notion that each side agrees to the existence of “one China” while there are different interpretations of what exactly “one China” means (namely PRC or ROC). While its proponents in Taiwan claim that the Koo-Wang talks of 1993 were a direct result of the consensus (SU / CHENG 2002: I-II), the pan-Green camp has mostly rejected its existence and did not make use of it during the Chen presidencies (not even interpreting it as “one China, excluding Taiwan”). Today about
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every aspect of this term remains contested.23 Whether it was really achieved in 1992 or to what degree Beijing embraces the core idea of the consensus remains unclear (although there are notable exceptions, agents in Beijing usually avoid directly referring to the “different interpretations” aspect of the “Consensus”). But although the concept faces strong opposition, it frequently appears in speech acts surrounding the Cross-Strait relationship and has long forced the DPP to come up with alternatives if it plans to persist on its rejection of the term. Since its inauguration, the new Ma government has frequently announced to conduct Cross-Strait relations on the basis of the “1992 Consensus.” The strong emphasis that it receives by the current government and the cautious embrace (or at least non-rejection) by Beijing have turned the “1992 Consensus” into an important support mechanism of the “one China” rule.
(3) Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu 中華民族) and cultural assumptions: When the KMT came to Taiwan in the 1940s, it not only brought the political apparatus of the ROC to the island, but also the dominating cultural discourses of Chinese nationalism as it was espoused in the teachings of the ROC's founding father Sun Yat-sen. For Sun Yat-sen the Chinese nation had national, cultural, and racial dimensions.
In his teachings, the Chinese were described as having “common blood, common language, common religion, and common customs,” making them “a single, pure race”24 and a nation of “great antiquity, with more than four thousand years of authentic history.”25 The many decades of Western imperialist aggression against China was an important background and source of motivation for Sun's ideas. His aim was to mobilize nationalism in his homeland to “reawaken the spirit and restore the standing of the Chinese nation,”26 which he so fervently constructed. Diluting this discourse was deemed especially necessary in Taiwan by the KMT government since the islanders had just endured a 51 year long colonial experience which in its last years had aimed at “japanizing” the people of Taiwan. Although the KMT tried to
23 To see just how far the opinion are apart from each other, the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) filed a law suit against President Ma Ying-jeou and former Mainland Affairs Council Su Chi, two ardent supporters of the phrase for treason and forgery, see Taipei Times (28 October 2011): “TSU Sues President, Su Chi for Treason,” via:
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/
2011/10/28/2003516859 (accessed: 2011-11-20).
24 SUN Yat-sen (1953): The Principle of Nationalism. Translated into English by Frank W. Price.
Abridged and edited by the Commission for the Compilation of the History of the Kuomintang.
Taipei: China Cultural Service, 6.
25 Ibid. 10.
26 Ibid. 61.
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instill its cultural orthodoxy of the a Chinese nation into the minds of the population during the Martial Law era, the following period of democratization opened up a window of pluralization which has become wider ever since. Just like in its political discourses, the early opposition movement and later the DPP tried to emphasize the separateness of Chinese and Taiwanese ethnic and cultural identities or at least emphasized an equal instead of subordinating standing between the two. During the eight years of DPP administration, policy-wise this was handled by conducting certain movements like the one of “nativization” or “name rectification.” Speaking from a different ideological angle, the KMT and agents in Beijing have called these movements attempts at “de-sinification.” Since 2008 the Ma government has been eager to reconcile “Taiwanese” and “Chinese” cultures by combining them into the new formula of “Chinese Culture with Taiwanese Characteristics.” Beijing on the other hand likes to invoke the picture of a common family, of brothers and sisters or
“compatriots” living on both sides of the Strait and that have belonged together over the ages. While multiethnic discourses have emerged in Taiwan since the era of democratization, agents in Beijing still hold on to the idea of being a homogenous society of a Han ethnic group that covers more than 90 percent of its population and that follows the myth of sharing the same ancestry dating back to the Yellow Emperor who is said to have reigned “China” between 27th and 26th centuries BCE. Its definition of the Han as a single, unified race extends to Taiwan despite its very different history (see DIKÖTTER 2010), and functions as one of the justifications for unification.
In the next chapter, a historical background of the “one China” rule and a brief overview over the developments of these three discourses between 1950-2000 will be given. This will provide a the context for the changes that occurred after the time of Taiwan's first change of government party in the year 2000, which will be the starting point for chapter III.
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