Chapter 5: Research Findings and Future Scenario 5.1 Research Findings
5.2 Future Scenario
led by the US protects the waters of the Persian
Arms Sales In 2012 China's share in military export to the Middle East was 2.5 percent. It is not clear if China can increase its
Even though currently a scenario of power transition between the US and China is still premature, as the former still has a long way to go before replacing the US in the Middle East become a viable possibility, it does not mean that China does not play an
3 “China's Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue Gong Xiaosheng Attends Third International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Repblic of China, April 1, 2015, accessed August 26, 2015,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1251859.shtml
4 “The United States Response to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia”, U.S. Department of State, accessed August 26, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/c32662.htm
5 “Syria”, USAID, August 19,2015, accessed August 26, 2015, https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria
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important role in the Middle East, a role that in all likelihood will only expand in the years to come.
The Middle East is a complicated region that suffers violent conflicts, terrorist attacks, groups of extremists and rivalries between many actors: Sunni-Shiite, Israel-Arab and so on so forth. However, China is not deterred by that. As China is building its presence even in the most dangerous regions in the Middle East, a scenario in which it decides to pull out of the region because of security issues seems unlikely. As a matter of fact, it seems as if China is willing to go to areas where other foreign companies are staying away from. China uses all means at its disposal to ensure access to more energy resources, and its energy dependence is only increasing from year to year, so most likely in the future China will only be more involved in the area.
China is interested in upgrading its status within the international community, but first and foremost, for the benefit of its economy. Both China’s national and international main interest will remain the growth and stability of its economy. China would also be interested in reinforcing its status in Asia: among the South-Eastern Asian countries and in the South China Sea.
Nevertheless, even though China is interested in increasing its influence in the Middle East, it is not interested in being influential the same way the US is. China is interested in positioning military personnel to the area, but only in order to secure Chinese interests, not to fight insurgencies groups. China will not take an active part, or most likely, any part in fighting organizations such as ISIL. Moreover, as long as the US is taking the responsibility for securing the Persian Gulf SLOCs, China has no reason to relieve the US from this heavy burden. It entails investing huge amounts of money, and China has no interest in using its budget to fund this mission, especially when the US already took it upon itself. As the US has declared that fighting ISIL and stabilizing the Middle East is a long process, it seems like the American commitment to continue carrying this burden almost single handedly will continue, and thus, China will not take its place in this regard.
Presently, China does not pose too big of a challenge to US in the Middle East. The US can freely execute its policy with its military spread in manifold strategic points, and so far it did not have to take Chinese considerations into account. For example, even though China is the largest investor in Iraq’s oil industry, the US is operating there,
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sending more military personnel and training local forces, all of that without consulting with China or engaging it in the military operation.
It seems that China does not consult too often with the US either. Some of China’s Middle East policies, such as supporting Assad’s rule despite the cruel oppression of the opposition, and siding with Iran during years of negotiations over its nuclear program, to the extent of assisting it to evade sanctions and showing its solidarity by conducting joint military exercises, prove that China does not hesitate to defy the US in the region. Presently, China’s capabilities in the Middle East are still quite limited, especially when comparing to those of the US, but in the future, when China becomes more influential in the area, its damage potential to American interests is likely to grow as well.
So far, China’s interest in challenging and undermining the American policy in the Middle East is rather confined, for two main reasons. The first reason is that China is still in the process of building its political and military capabilities, and the second reason is that growing on the expense of the US is not China’s main objective. China is focusing its attention on the development of its economy, and this goal can be achieved only by its ability to ensure the flow of energy resources. Thus, entering into conflicts with the US in the Middle East not only does not contribute to achieving this goal, but even might backfire and hurt China’s energy interests.
Nevertheless, the Middle East cannot be analyzed on its own, but to be seen as one part of the whole. As global powers, China and the US are active in different regions of the world, and occurrences between China and the US in other areas are likely to influence their interactions in the Middle East in the future, and vice versa.
In the most updated version of China’s defense white paper, it is stated clearly that China will defend its interests not only in its own neighborhood, but worldwide. These are not mere empty words, as China is building its military capabilities in order to support this objective. At the same time, China is becoming more active in Latin America, the backyard of the US and even in the US itself – investing in the American industry and becoming more active in local economy, a trend many Americans fear.
This is relevant because China could use the Middle East arena to promote maneuvers in these regions.
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One can examine the conflict of the South China Sea to get an idea about how Sino-American relations might play out in other parts of the world. China has adopted a more dominant policy, or some would even say aggressive, in the South and East China Sea, getting into conflicts with Vietnam and the Philippines. China is also not trying to solve its dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In the Middle of these Asian territorial disputes, the US is playing a very active role, despite the fact that it is a long way from the borders of the US. The US is undermining China in its own neighborhood by siding with its rivals, building military bases that surrounding China, such as the one in Okinawa and sending American military aircrafts to patrol the borders of China’s maritime territory.
So far, the US and China tit for tat dynamics are taking place mostly in the region of Asia Pacific. However, in the future, as China’s presence and capabilities in the Middle East will grow, it might chose to react in the Middle East for an American military action conducted in the Asia Pacific, or in any other region China and the US have conflicting interests. For instance, China could block American navy vessels in the waters of the Persian Gulf or sell Iran or Saudi Arabia weapons that the US believes will disrupt the balance in the Middle East.
Realization of the One Belt One Road initiative will definitely make it easier for China to do so, with Chinese ports and personnel spread over the region, especially as these might also be used as military bases, or in assisting Chinese military vessels away from home. However, I believe that even though China will be able to intervene in American interests and challenge the American presence in the Middle East, it will not choose this option. Because of their strategic relations, China and the US will still prefer cooperation over conflicts, as these two powers can benefit more from cooperating with each other than from hurting each other’s interests. Hence, I do not find open conflicts in the Middle East to be a likely scenario.
However, it does not mean that the US and China will avoid conflicts completely, only that these would be handled in a more diplomatic and calculated manner. China could take advantage of its improved position in the Middle East and use its power of leverage for negotiations with the US instead of taking unilateral actions. The current situation in which the US does not have to take Chinese interests in the Middle East into account in formulating its foreign policy and in the process of its decision making
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could not last. The US would have to recognize China’s power in the area and could no longer take unilateral actions without consulting China, if not on regular basis, at least occasionally.
As long as China will not interfere with American core interests in the Middle East, the US will not actively oppose China’s rising power in the region. However, in case China will chose to interfere with American interests in the Middle East, a scenario I find quite unlikely, the US could influence its local allies to curb China’s involvement and harm China’s economic interests or even its access to energy resources in the area.
In conclusion, the Middle East will not be a region of utmost importance of China besides its role as a source for energy resources. However, the Middle East could still have a central role in China’s foreign policy – as a bargain chip. China could use its influence in the Middle East in order to gain economic or security related benefits in other regions of the world – in the Asia-Pacific, in Latin America, in the US or in international organizations.
Furthermore, China is not the only country that could rip benefits from its rising influence in the Middle East. The Arab countries in the Middle East could use the triangular relations between them, China and the US for their own benefit. The Arab countries could not rely on China in most aspects, but they could proclaim to the US that they have an option to improve their relations with China on the expense of their relations with the US, and by doing so bargaining better aid packages or political support in exchange for pushing China away. For example, Arab countries can commit to the US not to buy sophisticated arms from China in exchange for better arms deals with the US, or not to hold military exercises with China in exchange for permission to act independently against extremist groups. Thus, I do not believe that the Middle Eastern countries will oppose China’s increasing involvement in the region, as this involvement is beneficial to them, contributing to its leverage power over the US and their economy.
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