New Foreign Policy Initiatives 2012-2015

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(2011) under the framework of UNSC, perhaps the most important UN entity responsible for maintaining international peace and security, China's activity remains relatively low. It abstains from critical votes in order to avoid to go on the record as supporting or opposing certain measures. China used its veto right in the council only nine times since 1971, a negligible number as opposed to the number of times it was used by the US, Russia or the UK. China used its veto vote in decision regarding its claims of sovereignty over Taiwan, reject international political or martial intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, it seems like this trend is changing as well, as part of China's intention to take a more active role. In Diplomatic Relationships: Substance and Process (2013) Bonnie S. Glaser argues that China did become more assertive as now it has the power to maneuver negotiations over UNSC resolutions to directions more favorable to China.

For example, China vetoed a 2007 resolution over human rights in neighboring Myanmar and later it vetoed several resolutions condemning Syria.⁵⁵

2.2.4 New Foreign Policy Initiatives 2012-2015

Before discussing China's current trend of foreign policy, I would like to quote Barry Buzan's thought provoking comparison between Chinese foreign policy shaped by Deng Xiaoping's dictum "adopt a low profile and never take the lead" and the US foreign policy:

"Ironically, the most obvious comparator for China’s peaceful rise, although one would not want to push the parallel too far, is the US. Like China, the rising US sought to engage with the world economically while remaining aloof from high politics and the balance of power. Like China the rising US also adopted a policy of military restraint, favouring economic development over the pursuit of world class military power. And like China, the US resisted taking on leadership responsibilities until global events forced it to."⁵⁶

54 Stephen Olson and Clyde Prestowitz, The Evolving Role of China in International Institutions, Working Paper, (Washington D.C.: The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011), p. 43.

55 Bonnie S. Glaser , "Diplomatic Relationships: Substance and Process", in Tangled Titans: The United States and China, (Plymoth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), p. 168.

56 Buzan, "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise Possible?", p. 15.

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Besson, Kurlantzick and Yuyen Deng in How to Understand China’s Foreign Policy (2013) agree that for many years China's foreign policy was passive and docile as the saying of Deng Xiaoping. China was often criticized for maintaining this kind of passive foreign policy, as a country that enjoys the international society benefits without bearing some of the responsibilities of maintaining it. China's lack of a dominant foreign policy also raised questions about its ability to lead the world the same way the US does today. Instead of formulating its own rules, in the last several decades China followed those formulated by the West. It did not create its own institutions, but increased its participation within Western governed institutions. China does not explicitly states what are its goals and objectives and by what means it plans to achieve them. Moreover, China does not offer unique values and norms, a new Chines vision and model for other developing countries to follow.⁵⁷

However, it seems like this kind of criticism is no longer valid since Xi Jinping took office as the new president of China in 2012. Tim Summers states in Chinese Foreign Policy: What to Expect in 2015 (2015) that Xi advanced foreign policy to an issue of prominent importance. There is no Chinese government that was as devoted to foreign policy as Xi's government. Xi embarked on many diplomatic tours and hosted many international leaders in China. Xi frequently addresses the issue of foreign policy and announced several ambitious policies. China's Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, is also very active in the international arena especially in dealings with Europeans and Southeast Asian countries.⁵⁸

In November 2014, the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (CFAWC) of the Chinese Communist Party was convened. According to Christopher K. Johnson in Thoughts from the Chairman: Xi Jinping Unveils his Foreign Policy Vision (2014) this was the first meeting of the conference, the highest level foreign relations forum to be

57 Besson, "Can China Lead?”, p. 239 ; Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World, p. 40; Yuwen Deng, " How to Understand China’s Foreign Policy", Foreign Policy, April 23, 2013, accessed May 15, 2015,

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/23/how-to-understand-chinas-foreign-policy/

58 Tim Summers, "Chinese Foreign Policy: What to Expect in 2015", Chatham House, January 13 2015, accessed May 15, 2015, http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/16637

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held under Xi. As a matter of fact, these meetings are extremely rare and during Hu Jintao's reign as president of China, only one CFAWC meeting was held.⁵⁹

According to Ting Shi and David Tweed in Xi Outlines ‘Big Country Diplomacy’

Chinese Foreign Policy (2014), Xi was quoted as saying that big country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics has to be established and that under his government's foreign policy would feature distinctive Chinese style, Chinese manner and Chinese attitude, or in other words, that foreign policy under his leadership will be more focused, unique and assertive.⁶⁰ One of the most important declarations in Xi's speech is that China will continue to cherish the concept of peaceful rise and peaceful development.⁶¹ In addition, Xi confirmed that China is still in a period of strategic opportunity. This concept was coined in the 16^th CPC's congress 2002 and has been validated and revalidated since, including in China's defense white paper. The period of strategic opportunity is a twenty years period of time in which China's relations with its neighboring countries and global powers, mainly the US, are expected to remain stable and peaceful in order for China to focus on building its economy. Accordingly, Xi said that foreign policy will help to achieve two goals for the CCP: double China's national income from the level it was at 2010 and achieving the renewal of the nation by the 100^th anniversary of China's national day in 2049.⁶²

Perhaps one of the most outstanding examples of this new foreign policy 'with Chinese characteristics' is the "One Belt and One Road" initiative that is fully detailed in China’s way: the new Silk Road (2014) by Camille Brugier. In 2013 on a visit to Kazakhstan, Xi proposed to Asian countries to build an economic belt along the ancient path of the Silk Road that would stretch from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea. One

59 Christopher K. Johnson, "Thoughts from the Chairman: Xi Jinping Unveils his Foreign Policy Vision", CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 8, 2014, accessed May 15, 2015, http://csis.org/publication/thoughts-chairman-xi-jinping-unveils-his-foreign-policy-vision

60 Ting Shi and David Tweed, "Xi Outlines ‘Big Country Diplomacy’ Chinese Foreign Policy", Bloomberg Business, December 1, 2014, accessed May 15, 2015,

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-01/xi-says-china-will-keep-pushing-to-alter-asia-security-landscape

61 Johnson, "Thoughts from the Chairman: Xi Jinping Unveils his Foreign Policy Vision".

62 Shi and Tweed, "Xi Outlines ‘Big Country Diplomacy’ Chinese Foreign Policy".

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month later Xi raised the maritime Silk Road initiative during a visit to Indonesia. These initiatives encompass 65 countries and population of 4.4 billion people.⁶³

According to One Belt and One Road "Far-reaching Initiative" (2015) by Wu Jianmin, a member of the foreign policy advisory committee in China's foreign ministry, these initiatives aim to promote the development of the Middle East, Asia and Europe. Wu explains that as the Middle East suffers instability, Europe is dealing with a severe financial crisis and many Asian countries fail to join develop their economies and enjoy increased growth, these Chinese initiatives are the solution. Therefore, these initiatives are for the benefit of the whole world, and not China alone.⁶⁴

Wu argues that this is the answer to the international community that expects China to play a more active role in the international society and that these initiatives are part of the public goods China is willing to provide to the world in order to contribute to global peace and prosperity.⁶⁵

Another international initiatives is the establishment of two new development banks.

In July 2014, the BRICS association countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa signed an agreement for establishment of a new development bank (NBD),⁶⁶ and in October 2014, 21 countries signed a memorandum of understanding on establishing AIIB - Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank⁶⁷. This new China-led bank will focus on building infrastructures throughout Asia, a new institution with about the same objectives as already existing international organizations, such as the World Bank and Asia Development Bank. China chose to establish a new institution out of nothing instead of working through existing organizations.

Today, China is a member of these organization, but objectively, its ability to influence their policy is very low. Under reforms that were taken already in 2010,

63 Camille Brugier, "China's Way: The New Silk Road", European Union Institute for Security Studies, May 2014, accessed May 15, 2015,

http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_14_New_Silk_Road.pdf

64 Jianmin Wu, ""One Belt and One Road", Far-reaching Initiative", China-United States Exchange Foundation, March 26, 2015, accessed May 15, 2015, http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/one-belt-and-one-road-far-reaching-initiative/

65 Ibid.

66 Jordan Totten, "BRICS New Development Bank Threatens Hegemony of U.S. Dollar", Forbes, December 22, 2014, accessed May 15, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/12/22/brics-new-development-bank-threatens-hegemony-of-u-s-dollar/

67Yanting, ed., "21 Asian countries sign MOU on establishing Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank", Xinhuanet, October 24, 2014, accessed May 15, 2015,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/business/2014-10/24/c_133740149.htm

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China's voting share should have increased to about 6 percent, but these reforms are still not in effect. This situation is quite similar in the Asian Development Bank.

Long Yongtu, who served as the chief negotiator for China's entry to the World Trade Organization said that China established AIIB not only because of the slow pace of reforms in existing organization that prevent China from influencing world system as the biggest economy in the world, but also because Asia's demands are not being taken care of by these organizations.⁶⁸

In other words, this is a clear signal from China that it will not sit aside and wait for the great powers to grant it more influence in the global economy. China is now willing to start a new global order with its own institutions not headquartered in Washington, New York or Geneva, but in Beijing. This is why the US did not join China's AIIB and even tried to stop its allies to join. In the past, Western governments and Japan used their leverage in multilateral development banks in exchange for favors in the international arena, such as votes in the UN, or to influence domestic politics of developing countries. Now China wants to enjoy the same benefits as well.⁶⁹

In conclusion, in the past few years Chinese foreign policy was transformed from taking a passive role focusing on the country's domestic affairs to a country aspiring to be more involved in the international society. China increased its cooperation with international organization and started establishing its own organizations for cooperation. China is now not afraid to formulate its own global initiatives and act more like a global power on the rise rather than a successful developing country.