Chapter 3 Military and Security Involvement
3.1.4 Naval Capabilities
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neutral mission can be used by China for its own needs, and it is not inevitable that China will use similar forces in other places for defending its interests.
In the same manner, Chinese forces were involved in evacuation operations. In March 2011, a frigate from the seventh Chinese Escort Taskforce arrived to Libya and evacuated about 35,800 Chinese citizens due to unrest in the country. In addition, the PLA Air Force evacuated 1,655 Chinese and other nationalities citizens to Sudan, in over 40 sorties23. Recently, in March 2015, all three vessels from the 19th Escort Taskforce halted their escort operations entirely for several days so they could evacuate approximately 600 Chinese citizens (as well as citizens from other countries). 24
There was another case in which China shifted its Escort Taskforce, only this time not to serve its own interests. In the beginning of 2014, a ship from the 16th Escort Taskforce escorted Danish and Norwegian ships transporting chemical weapons from Syria to Cyprus25. This was part of the international effort to support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OWPC)-UN joint mission for the removal of Chemical Weapons from Syria.26
3.1.4 Naval Capabilities
China is very dependent on sea lanes for its energy resources supply. Most of China’s seaborne oil and natural gas imports from the Middle East pass through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. 27 However, China is still not being very active in these sea lanes protection, and in cases of political instability its energy resources supply might be affected.
23 Andrew S. Erickson, A Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Panel III: 'China’s Political and Security Challenges in the Middle East,”, 'China and the Middle East Hearing”, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2013): p. 1. Accessed June 21, 2015, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/ERICKSON_testimony.pdf
24 Andrew S. Erickson and Austin Strange, “China’s Global Maritime Presence: Hard and Soft Dimensions of PLAN Antipiracy Operations “, The Jamestown Foundation (2015). Accessed June 21, 2015,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43868&no_cache=1#.VWvUzNJViko
25 Ibid.
26 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015”, p. 18.
27Jeremy Bender, “China's Naval Exercises in the Mediterranean Are Linked to Beijing's Ambitious 'New Silk Road' Strategy”, Business Insider, May 15, 2015, accessed June 21, 2015,
http://www.businessinsider.com/china-energy-security-in-mediterranean-2015-5?utm_source=mobilesrepublic&utm_medium=referral
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For the time being, the Chinese navy is not powerful enough compared to that of the US, but the navy is building up so China can handle complicated overseas naval tasks in the future. A good example for China’s increasing maritime capability is the deployment of its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning (辽宁), which enabled the Chinese navy to extend its reach not only into the South China Sea, but also to farther locations such as the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean.28
Although the Liaoning is not yet operative in the Middle East, there is no doubt that China is extending its operational zone. For instance, in the end of 2013, a Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine entered into the waters of the Persian Gulf.29 As long as the current trend of modernization will continue, China is likely to present even more developments in the area in the upcoming years.
Until that happens, it cannot be said that the Chinese navy is absent from the area.
Between December 2008 and 2015, China contributed twenty task forces including over 16,000 sailors and 1,300 marines and special operations forces personnel to serve in the Gulf of Aden, as part of the anti-piracy force. By now, approximately 6,000 commercial vessels have enjoyed the Chinese navy protection.30
The Chinese Navy maintains technical service stops in the Middle East and Africa.
These stops are divided into three types. The first is for ship fuel and material re-supply.
This kind of stops are located in ports in Djibouti, Aden in Yemen, Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Salalah in Oman. The second type is for a more fixed supply ship berthing and fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft take-off and landing, China has this kind of stop in the Seychelles. These two types of stops are based on short-term agreements between China and the local countries. The third type is destined for a complete recharge, weaponry unloading and featuring a large ship repair center. It is located in Pakistan to and is based on a long-term agreement.31
These technical service stops are not the only form of Chinese maritime collaboration. The Chinese navy also holds military exercises with different countries
28 Sun, “China’s Soft Military Presence in the Middle East“.
29 Erickson and Strange, “China’s Global Maritime Presence: Hard and Soft Dimensions of PLAN Antipiracy Operations”.
30 Ibid.
31 Sun, “China’s Soft Military Presence in the Middle East“.
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in the region as well as with global powers. For example, in December 2014, the US and China held a counter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden.32
Yet, the US is not the only country China is holding exercises with. In May 2015, China held its first naval exercise in the Mediterranean Sea “Joint Sea” 2015 in conjunction with Russia.33 The exercise objective was to practice the protection of sea shipping lanes. 34 This exercise is quite impressive, as China has no naval bases nearby.
Thus, this exercise might signal China’s desire to augment its military presence in the area and start taking a more active role in securing Mediterranean Sea lanes.
More interestingly, only three months before the joint exercise with the US, China held a maritime drill with no other than the biggest foe of the US in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran. In September 2014, during the P5+135 negotiations with Iran over the nuclear dispute, the Chinese Navy and the Iranian Navy carried out a joint maritime drill, that also marked the first time that Chinese military vessels entered Iran's territorial waters.36
Prior to that, in May 2014, following a meeting between the Chinese defense minister and his Iranian counterpart, Chinese state media announced that the two countries plan to deepen their defense ties.37
This is a clear Chinese message to the West, that even though China is on board with the P5+1 talks, it will not receive dictations from other countries, and if it desires to do so, it will pledge to strengthen defense relations, and even hold military exercises with a secluded sanctioned country.
32 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015”, p. 68.
33 Defang Kong and Jun Liang eds., “Magnificent View of China-Russia Joint Naval Drill in Mediterranean Sea”, People’s Daily Online, May 21, 2015, accessed June 21, 2015,
http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0521/c98649-8895345.html
34“ Russian, Chinese Navies Hold Escort Drills in Mediterranean “, Russia beyond the Headlines, May 20, 2015, accessed June 21, 2015,
http://asia.rbth.com/news/2015/05/20/russian_chinese_navies_hold_escort_drills_in_mediterranean_46 170.html
35 The P5+1 is a group of six world powers, the five permanent UN Security Council members (the US, the UK, France, Russian and China) plus Germany that in 2006 joined the diplomatic efforts with Iran with regard to its nuclear program.
36 “PLA Naval Taskforce Ends Visit to Iran”, China Military Online, September 26, 2014, accessed June 21, 2015,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-09/26/content_6156735.htm
37Zachary Keck, “China Calls Iran a ‘Strategic Partner’”, The Diplomat, May 6, 2014, accessed June 21, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/china-calls-iran-a-strategic-partner/
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50 3.1.5 Arms Sales
Arms sales is an important factor in Middle Eastern countries defense strategies the region is one of the top consumers of weaponry in the world.38 In the past few years, the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf have been increasing even more their arms imports.39 Thus, it is important to examine China’s role in arms sales to the area.
According to the SIPRI40 arms transfers database, China is the third largest global arms exporter for the years 2010 to 2014, surpassing giant arms exporters countries such as France and Germany, and accounting for 5 percent of the total world deliveries of arms.41 Between the period of 2005 to 2009 and 2010 to 2014, China’s exports of major arms jumped by 143 percent. China supplied major arms to 35 states between 2010 and 2014, including, 18 African states.42
Between the 1960s and the 1990s China was an important arms supplier to Middle.
First, it supplied to revolutionary movements, and later it supplied to countries such as Israel, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.43 As a matter of fact, China’s relations with Saudi Arabia started only thanks to the Missile deals between the two.44
Nevertheless, even with China’s past as an important source for weaponry for the Middle East and its new status as a major global weapons supplier, mostly for developing countries, China is not an important player in the arms sales to the Middle East in the 21st century. In 2000, China's share in military export to the Middle East was almost one fifth, but it plummeted to a meager 2.5 percent in 2012.45
China is supplying weapons to countries that are considered to be ‘problematic’ to the West, such as Syria, Yemen and Iran. For instance, China has sold Iran anti-ship
38 Graver and Alterman, The Vital Triangle. China, the United States, and the Middle East, p. 65.
39 " How Arms Imports Are Destabilising the Middle East “, The Guardian, April 23, 2015, accessed June 21, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/apr/23/middle-east-arms-trade-saudi-arabia-iran
40 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is an independent international institute in Sweden, dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament.
41 “The Top 20 Arms Exporters, 2010–2014”, SIPRI, March 16, 2015, accessed June 21, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/googlemaps/2015_of_at_top_20_exp_map.html
42 Peter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2014”, SIPRI (2014): p. 3. Accessed June 21, 2015, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1503.pdf
43 Al-Tamimi, China - Saudi Arabia Relations.
44 Based on the interview I conducted with Liu Kuo-Hsing (劉國興), a former diplomat to Arab countries.
45 Shichor, “China and the Middle East: Testimony before the U.S - China Economic and Security Review Commission”, p.p. 1-2.
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cruise missiles and produced tactical guided missiles especially for Iran. According to a CIA report, China was one of the main assisting countries (along with Russia and North Korea) to Iran’s ballistic missiles program.46
As a result of this Chinese policy, dozens Chinese companies were sanctioned by the US and by the UNSC. The most recent time Chinese companies were sanctioned by the US was in December 2014, under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act for transferring weapons or weapons related parts that can contribute to development of weapons of mass destruction, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. In 2001, 2002 and 2005, Chinese companies were also sanctioned for transferring to Iran materials for its chemical and biological weapons program. 47
Besides contribution to Iran and Syria’s missiles programs and Iran’s biological and chemical weapons programs, China was also involved in the Iranian nuclear program, although only in its civilian part, according to current assessments. As a result of negotiations with the US, in 1997 China pledged to end its nuclear cooperation with Iran. However, China continued to procure materials for the Iranian nuclear program, assist in uranium mining, supply uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) and assist in operation of centrifuge facilities in uranium enrichment. 48
Even though Middle Eastern countries now prefer to purchase weapons from Russia, China, the UK and the US rather than from China,49 China can still be an alternative for weapons sales, as the following incident illustrates. In 2014 it was revealed that seven years before that, in 2007, Saudi Arabia purchased Chinese made DF-21 ballistic missiles. The US approved the deal on condition that CIA technical experts verify that these missile are not capable of carrying nuclear warheads.50
This is an interesting case of a quiet consent to arms sales between its Arab ally in the Middle East and China. In this case, Saudi Arabia involved Washington in the arms
46 Dan Blumenthal, “Providing Arms: China and the Middle East “, in The Middle East Quarterly, 2 (2005), p. 2.
47 Shirley A. Kan, " China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues", Congressional Research Center (2015): p. 63, p. 65, p. 69. Accessed June 21, 2015, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf
48 Ibid, p.p. 6-8.
49 "How Arms Imports Are Destabilising the Middle East“, 2015.
50 Jeffery Lewis, "Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?”, Foreign Policy, January 30, 2014, accessed June 22, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/why-did-saudi-arabia-buy-chinese-missiles/
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deal, but what happens if Saudi Arabia, or any other Arab country, and the US relations have a fallout? It is not certain that the US will always be asked to be involved and approve such transactions.