Chapter 3 Military and Security Involvement
3.3 Local Reactions to Military & Security External Involvement
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
63
3.3 Local Reactions to Military & Security External Involvement
After reviewing the dominant American role in the Middle East, including its massive arms sales to the Gulf countries, its wide military presence in the region and its participation in wars and local conflicts, as well as reviewing China’s slowly increasing influence, in this section I will assess the reaction to both Chinese and American involvement in the area, whether it is positive or negative, and if they prefer one over the other.
However positively the US involvement is seen by some countries, my assumption is that the US alone cannot be counted on as the sole source of reliance for the Arab World, as during the Arab Spring the US has abandoned some of its strongest allies, such as the Egyptian former President, Hosni Mubarak,113 and it seems like the Arab countries are interested in having an alternative, at least for the sake of not putting all eggs in one basket.
Iraq is a good example for that. In the beginning of 2014, China held its first high ranking visit since 2003 to Iraq, in which China’s foreign minister visited the country and held discussion on politics and arms sales, a rather unusual topic for China that usually focuses on economic issues. Iraq’s Prime Minister at the time, Nuri al-Maliki, commented that the visit of the Chinese foreign minister, along with a visit of the Russian foreign minister in the same week, means that the isolation of Iraq is over, and that Iraq is becoming a great ally of China.114
Furthermore, in the end of 2014, the Iraqi foreign minister welcomed China’s offer to assist it in fighting ISIL and said that although Iraq is cooperating closely with the US-led coalition, it is also willing to cooperate with other countries outside the coalition.115 Iraq’s foreign minister’s reaction demonstrates that even when a country receive full supported from the US for its security and stability – it can still be highly interested in warming the relations with China as well.
113 Con Coughlin, “Egypt Protests: Barack Obama May Rue the Day he Decided to Abandon Mubarak
“, The Telegraph, February 3, 2011, accessed June 22, 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/concoughlin/8301996/Egypt-protests-Barack-Obama-may-rue-the-day-he-decided-to-abandon-Mubarak.html
114 Mustafa Hamza, “China Joins Race to Arm Iraq”, Asharq Al-Awsat,February 24, 2014, accessed June 22, 2015, http://www.aawsat.net/2014/02/article55329353/china-joins-race-to-arm-iraq
115 Bozorgmehr and Hornby, “China Offers to Help Iraq Defeat Sunni Extremists”.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
64
Moreover, it is not only the main government of Iraq that is willing to build closer relations with China. With the opening of the new Chinese consulate in Erbil in 2014, the Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan, Nechervan Barzani, said that this is the first step in building bilateral relations with China and an opportunity to expand relations in all realms, including security.116
The example of Iraq demonstrate how the Arab countries perceive China – as a potential powerful ally. This view is shared by other countries as well. For example, in a visit to China in 2014, Abdel-Aziz Aluwaisheg, the GCC general assistant secretary for negotiations and strategic dialogue, stated that there is growing interest among the countries of the Gulf to develop a strategic dialogue with China.117 About the same time, Crown Prince Salman, deputy premier and minister of defense, also visited China and stated the Sino-Saudi relations are transforming from strong relations to a strategic partnership with broad dimensions that will benefit both countries.118
China’s policy in international institutions, especially on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly and the UNSC differs greatly than that of the West on issues like human rights and interventions in other countries domestic affairs.119 As a rule, China opposes sanctions and military intervention, and following this policy in Middle Eastern affairs is sometimes welcomed by the Arab countries of the Gulf, but sometimes might arouse antagonism.
For example, in 2011, during the Arab spring, there was an uprising in Bahrain. The government was struggling to dispel the protest by itself and it requested for the help of the GCC. Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent together 1500 soldiers that violently crashed the protest, and the Bahraini government announced martial law.120 The US and the West criticized Bahrain’s actions and the GCC’s military intervention in Bahrain, but China did not issue any criticism against the Arab mobilization to quench
116 "China Opens Consulate in Kurdistan, Will Boost Trade throughout Iraq “, 2015.
117 Imad Mansour, “The GCC States and the Viability of a Strategic Military Partnership with China”, Middle East Institute, March 17, 2015, accessed June 22, 2015, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/gcc-states-and-viability-strategic-military-partnership-china#_ftnref3
118 Ibid.
119 Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 113-120.
120Martin Chulov, “America Rebukes Bahrain after Violent Crackdown on Demonstrators”, The Guardian, March 16, 2011, accessed June 22, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/16/five-die-bahrain-crackdown
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
65
the protest, as China hold the opinion that a sovereign country is entitled to deal with opposition by all available means.121
Yet, when China blocked attempts to stop the atrocities in Syria, in the name of the principle of non-intervention, this was seen as undermining the Arab countries interests and even as siding with Iran.The UNSC resolution China vetoed would have backed the Arab League’s initiative calling for Assad to step down and to start negotiations with the Syrian opposition.122 In response, Nabil Elaraby, The Arab League chief, said that China had lost diplomatic credit in the Arab world, 123 the Saudi King called China’s veto an unfavourable move, and protesters hurled stones at the Chinese embassy in Libya.124
Nevertheless, despite conflicting opinion about how to solve the crisis in Syria, the GCC countries have welcomed the currently most important Chinese policy in the region - the One Belt One Road initiative. During a GCC high-level delegation to China that took place in January 2015,125 two of the GCC countries, UAE126 and Saudi Arabia127 announced that they would actively participate in the execution of the initiative.128
While the Arab countries of the Gulf are navigating between their relations with the US to their relations with China, Iran has a clear interest for a greater Chinese involvement in the Middle East that might push the US away, at least to some extent.
Iran is the biggest country in the region (as opposed to non-state actors fighting
121 Mansour, “The GCC States and the Viability of a Strategic Military Partnership with China”.
122 Based on the interview I conducted with Liu Chang-Cheng (劉長政) from the Department of Arabic Language & Culture in NCCU.
123 Edmund Blair and Paul Ingrassia, “Russia, China Lose Credit in Arab World: League Chief”, Reuters, February 6, 202, accessed June 22, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/06/us-syria-arabs-idUSTRE8150V820120206
124 Michael Martina, “Scolded China Takes Syria Diplomacy to Arab League”, Reuters, February 14, 2012, accessed June 22, 2015,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/14/us-china-syria-idUSTRE81C0L620120214
125 Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, “China, GCC Set to Walk the New ‘Silk Road’”, Arab News, February 3, 2014, accessed June 22, 2015, http://www.arabnews.com/news/518966
126 "Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum of the United Arab Emirates Meets with Wang Yi“,Ministry of Foreign Affaris of the People’s Republic of China, February 15, 2015, accessed June 22, 2015, http://gh.chineseembassy.org/eng/zgyw/t1238327.htm
127 “Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Li Chengwen Publishes Article on "One Belt and One Road" on
"Asharq Al-Awsat" “, Ministry of Foreign Affaris of the People’s Republic of China, April 15, 2014, accessed June 22, 2015,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1149419.shtml
128Based on the interview I conducted with Liu Kuo-Hsing (劉國興), a former diplomat to Arab countries.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
66
American interests) to oppose the American involvement in the area and it perceives it as an existential threat to its rule.129
The US is opposing Iran’s security strategy by various means. Currently, it is obstructing Iran’s movements in the Persian Gulf waters. For instance, In April 2015, an Iranian flotilla of cargo ships and naval vessels suspected of carrying weapons for Houthi rebels in Yemen had to reverse its course in order to avoid American and Saudi ships that threatened to board them.130 Thus, Iran would welcome other powers to be involved in the area, and would rather have Chinese vessels patrolling the Persian Gulf instead of the US fifth fleet, and it signaled this message by conducting joint naval exercise in the Gulf with China.
As for the American involvement in the Middle East, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf support the US military policy in the region. It is important to emphasize that the Arab countries do not just acquiesce with the American involvement, as many of them embrace it and actively support it.
For example, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen and Jordan participate in the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) a multi-national naval Task Force formed by the US in in 2004 to maintain maritime security in the Persian Gulf, while Bahrain even commanded this task force twice.131
More importantly, Middle Eastern countries have also participated in the American campaign in Afghanistan. Since 2001, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE have supplied troops to the US forces in Afghanistan. While the CMF be defined as a neutral force benefiting all the countries in the Gulf, in this case, Arab countries participated in a war waged by the West against a Muslim country.132
The former commander of the US forces in the Middle East testified in the end of 2014 that while relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan and Egypt have weakened
129 Parisa Hafezi, “Khamenei Says U.S. Military Threats against Iran Endanger Nuclear Talks”, Reuters, May 6, 2015, accessed June 22, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/06/uk-iran-nuclear-khamenei-idUKKBN0NR0MC20150506
130 Julian Borger and Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Iran Seizes Marshall Islands Cargo Ship in Gulf Waters, Pentagon Says”, April 29, 2015, accessed June 22, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/28/iran-seizes-marshall-islands-cargo-ship
131 “About CMF”, Combined Maritime Forces, accessed June 22, 2015, http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/
132 “2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength /Middle East”, The Heritage Foundation, accessed June 22, 2015, http://index.heritage.org/militarystrength/chapter/op-environment/middle-east/
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
67
or stagnated, the relations with UAE is only getting stronger and stronger, and it is currently the US most important Arab ally. The UAE ambassador to the US also asserts that it is America’s best friend in the Middle East, emphasizing that his country participated in many US-led coalitions since the 1990s, and is currently the most active country in aerial attacks on ISIL, after the US. Furthermore, the UAE is purchasing advanced weaponry from the US, according to some assessments, not only for the sake of the arms themselves, but also in order to create a long-term commitment with the US military and defense circles.133
The UAE enthusiastic participation in the American missions against militant Islamists does not only emanate from its desire to eradicate ISIL, but mostly from the fear of the Iranian threat. The UAE, along with most of the Arab countries, fear Iran and the possibility it might succeed in developing nuclear weapons. This is the reason why the Gulf countries became rather suspicious towards the policy of rapprochement President Obama is leading and the recent agreement between the P5+1 and Iran.134 Consequently, the GCC countries are considering more seriously unilateral actions, without the US involvement. The UAE had already helped Egypt in attacking an extremist group in Libya, a move the US had privately denounced.135 An Arab diplomat responded by saying that the GCC countries do not have to ask for America’s permission to act. According to the diplomat, collaboration with the US is important and will continue to be important in the future, but that the GCC countries are interested in a more independent stance.136 Yet, the US opposes these acts of independence, and a senior administration official explained that this is unthinkable, as these kind of actions might risk vital American interests in the Middle East.137
Right after signing the framework agreement with Iran, President Obama invited the GCC leaders for a security summit in the US, where they discussed various regional
133 Chandrasekaran, "In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’“.
134Anthony H. Cordesma,” More than Keeping Up the Facade: The U.S.-GCC Summit at Camp David”, Center for Strategic & International Studies (2015): p. 1. Accessed June 22, 201.
http://csis.org/files/publication/150515_US-GCC_Summit.pdf ; Abdullah Al Shayji, “The GCC-U.S.
Relationship: A GCC Perspective,” in Middle East Policy Council Journal, XXI (2014): 60-70.
135 Chandrasekaran, "In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little Sparta’”.
136 Based on the interview I conducted with Liu Chang-Cheng (劉長政) from the Department of Arabic Language & Culture in NCCU.
137 Elise Labott, “Gulf Allies, Worried about Iran, Show More Muscle with U.S.”, CNN, MAY 14, 2015, accessed June 22, 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/13/politics/saudi-arabia-gcc-summit-obama-camp-david/
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
68
issues, such as ISIL, the Houthis in Yemen, the ongoing civil war in Syria, etc. This was a chance for the GCC delegates to express their dissatisfaction with the American role in the region, which according to them is not assertive enough, and to clarify to the administration that they intend to become more active in the area, and act independently of the US.138
In the past few years, President Obama led a policy aiming at getting out of the Middle East, or rebalancing out of the Middle East towards other regions, such as the Asia-Pacific. However, due to current events, the US finds itself again increasing its presence and profile in the area, and thus, having to deepen their relations with the Arab countries, especially the GCC.139 At the same time, the GCC countries realized that they should act in unity in order to confront the extremist groups taking hold of the Middle East, even if the US is not fully on board.140 The two sides will definitely need each other, but the dynamics between them might change as they do not see eye to eye on several issues of importance, the most crucial one being Iran.
This mutual commitment between the US and the GCC countries was manifested in the US - Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement issued in May 14, 2015: “As with Operation Decisive Storm, GCC states will consult with the United States when planning to take military action beyond GCC borders, in particular when U.S. assistance is requested for such action”.
This statement also emphasizes the long stand relationship between the two sides, that they strive to build closer relations, including a strong security and defense cooperation, and that the US will work jointly with the GCC countries to confront external threats to their territorial integrity, including potential use of military force.141 The last part aims at dispelling the GCC sense of threat from Iran, but it is not sure that this commitment is what the GCC leaders were expecting from the summit in Washington, as it is too general and not too binding.
138 Ibid.
139 Abdullah Al Shaiji, “The GCC-U.S. Relationship: A GCC Perspective,” in Middle East Policy Council Journal, XXI (2014): p.p. 60-70.
140 Imad Harb, “The Return of Strong GCC-U.S. Strategic Relations”, National Council on US-Arab Relations, November 26, 2014, accessed June 22, 2015, http://ncusar.org/blog/2014/11/return-strong-gcc-us-strategic-relations/
141 "U.S.- Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement “, The White House, May 14, 2015, accessed June 22, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/us-gulf-cooperation-council-camp-david-joint-statement
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
69
Even though the US and the GCC countries have a significant military and security cooperation, as shown in this chapter, they also have considerable conflicts. The GCC countries accept the US military hegemony, but only partially, as now they are interested in becoming more independent in deciding on their own who to fight and how to do it. It would be convenient for the GCC countries to approach another regional power which might be more accommodating to their needs, but there is no such power at the moment. Even though China is increasing its military presence and security dialogues with the Arab countries of the Gulf, Iraq and Iran, China is still not powerful enough in that realm, and moreover, it seems like it is reluctant to do so. While these countries are receptive to China’s increasing involvement in the area, and they are dissatisfied to some extent with the American policy, there is not an alternative power.
3.4 Conclusion
After reviewing both Chinese and American military and security involvement in the Middle East, it is beyond any doubt that the American influence in the region surpasses China’s influence by far. The US enjoys deep and long relations with the Arab countries. These relations include extensive high-end arms sales, military training, drills and exercises, intelligence sharing and so on so forth. Thus, the conditions required for a power transition between the dominant power, the US, and the challenger, China, do not exist.
Moreover, as the Middle East becomes more unstable, the US is drawn deeper into the region, being involved in local conflict and civil wars. The US is involved in fighting ISIL, perhaps the currently most talked about global threat, as well as in participating in an Arab Sunni coalition to fight Shiite rebels who are supported by Iran in Yemen. Even if President Obama intended to divert the administration’s attention to other areas, it seems as if the US is bound to keep a high profile in the Middle East.
As opposed to the US, China’s presence is, as detailed above, rather minor.
However, I believe it is wrong to assess the situation as plainly as that. After all, the US has been a global power for decades now, and China just hopped on the wagon in recent years. China increased its presence in the area from being an almost non-existent player to a power that cannot be ignored. For instance, China drew a lot of attention when it conducted its evacuation operations in Libya and Yemen, especially the first one as it was the first operation of its kind for China.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
70
Moreover, China is using its participation in international task forces, which is also increasing from year to year, to protect its national interests abroad. This is a rather new
Moreover, China is using its participation in international task forces, which is also increasing from year to year, to protect its national interests abroad. This is a rather new