大公無私或別有所圖？中國對菲律賓的人道援助，2000-2018 - 政大學術集成

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(1)M.A. Thesis International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi Univeristy. 政治大. Selfish or Selfless? The case of Chinese Humanitarian Aid in the Philippines, 2000-2018. 學. ‧ 國. 立. Student’s Name:Yi Xin Qiu Advisor. Dr. Chienwu Hsueh. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. July 2019. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(2) Abstract In recent years, the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) had not only succeed as a major player in the world economy, but had also emerged as a key player in foreign aid donorship which received worldwide attention due to its massive scale and underlying controversies. One of which is its humanitarian aid. In this regard, this paper aims to identify if Chinese Humanitarian aid to the Philippines is selfish or selfless by examining if Chinese humanitarian assistance allocation to the Philippines from 2000 to 2018 is dependent to 1.) Philippine’s Foreign Policy to China; Chinese Foreign Policy to the Philippines; 2.) Philippines’ domestic perception to China; 3.) Chinese domestic perception of the Philippines and 4.) Severity of disaster. I argue that. 政治大 not significantly affect Chinese humanitarian aid allocation to the Philippines. The case studies 立 Chinese humanitarian aid to the Philippines during this period is selfless because politics does. of Chinese humanitarian aid donation are under the Arroyo, Aquino and Duterte administration. ‧ 國. 學. which had varying foreign policies to China support my argument.. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(3) Table of Contents. Chapter 1 Introduction. 1. Chapter 2 Literature Review and Methodology. 7. 2.1 Global Context of Humanitarian Aid. 7. 2.2 Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid. 8. 2.3 The Influence of Chinese Humanitarian Assistance. 9. 2.4 History of Filipino-Sino Political Relationship. 11. 治政大 2.6 Research question and Methodology 立 2.6.1 Limitation 2.5 Philippine Humanitarian Landscape. 14 16 17. 3.1 Philippine Foreign Policy and Domestic Perception to China. 17 20 23. y. 24. Nat. 3.2 Chinese Foreign Policy and Domestic Perspective to the Philippines 3.3 Chinese Humanitarian Aid. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter 3 Case Study 1: Macapagal-Arroyo (2000-2010). 12. n. al. 27. er. io. Chapter 4 Case Study 2: Aquino (2010-2016). sit. 3.4 Analysis of Chinese Humanitarian Aid to the Philippines. v ni. 4.1 Philippine Foreign Policy and Domestic Perception to China. Ch. engchi U. 27. 4.2 Chinese Foreign Policy and Domestic Perspective to the Philippines. 30. 4.3 Chinese Humanitarian Aid. 31. 4.4 Analysis of Chinese Humanitarian Aid to the Philippines. 32. Chapter 5 Case Study 3: Duterte (2016-Present). 35. 5.1 Philippine Foreign Policy and Domestic Perception to China. 35. 5.2 Chinese Foreign Policy and Domestic Perspective to the Philippines. 37. 5.3 Chinese Humanitarian Aid. 38. 5.4 Analysis of Chinese Humanitarian Aid to the Philippines. 39. Chapter 6 Conclusion References. 41 44. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(4) List of Figures. Figure 1.1 China’s Estimated Net Foreign Aid in USD (billion) Figure 1.2 Chinese Humanitarian Aid Total Funding in USD Figure 1.3 Chinese Humanitarian Aid to South East Asia in USD form 2000-2016 Figure 2.1 Top Philippine Humanitarian Aid Funding Service Figure 2.2 Conceptual Framework of Chinese Humanitarian Aid to the Philippines. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(5) List of Tables. Table 3.1 Awareness Trust Rating of the Philippines to China September 2002- June 2010 Table 4.1 Awareness Trust Rating of the Philippines to China September 2010- March 2015 Table 5.1: Awareness and Net Trust Rating of China September 2016-September 2018 Table 6.1 Annual Growth Rate and Amount of Chinese Foreign Investment in the Philippines, 2003-2018. 政治大 donation and Philippine Foreign Policy to China 立. Table 6.2 Summary of Chinese HA and its disaster category, casualties and damages, mode of. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(6) List of Acronyms. APEC Asia Pacific Partnership Cooperation ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Cooperation CRED Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster DFA Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines DOE Department of Energy of the Philippines EDCA Enhance Defense Cooperation Agreement FTS Financial Tracking Service. 政治大 IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 立 GDP Gross Domestic Product. JSMU Joint Seismic Marine Undertaking. ‧ 國. 學. MOF Ministry of Finance of China MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce of China. NDRRMC National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council. y. Nat. sit. ODA Official Development Assistance. er. io. PRC People’s Republic of China. al. n. PSA Philippine Statistics Authority ROC Republic of China SCS South China Sea. ‧. NATO National Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. SEA South East Asia SWS Social Weather Station TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation UN-OCHA United Nation’s Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNSC United Nation’s Security Council US United State. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(7) Acknowledgements. Thank you to all the Taiwanese Tax Payers.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(8) Chapter I. Introduction In recent years, the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) had not only succeed as a major player in the world economy, but had also emerged as a key player in foreign aid donorship which received worldwide attention due to its massive scale and underlying controversies. One of which is its humanitarian aid. In this regard, this paper aims to identify if Chinese Humanitarian aid to the Philippines is selfish or selfless by examining if Chinese humanitarian assistance allocation to the Philippines from 2000 to 2018 is dependent to 1.) Philippine’s Foreign Policy to China; Chinese Foreign Policy to the Philippines; 2.) Philippines’ domestic perception to China; 3.) Chinese domestic perception of the Philippines and 4.) Severity of disaster. I argue that. 政治大 not significantly affect Chinese humanitarian aid allocation to the Philippines. The case studies 立 Chinese humanitarian aid to the Philippines during this period is selfless because politics does. of Chinese humanitarian aid donation are under the Arroyo, Aquino and Duterte administration. ‧ 國. 學. which had varying foreign policies to China support my argument.. ‧. During the Cold war, China was a recipient of aid from fellow communist country, Russia. However, during the course of the war, the Chinese started giving aid in forms of military and. y. Nat. sit. agricultural aid to communist countries in Asia such as North Korea and Vietnam. From the. er. al. n. (Copper, 1976).. io. 1990s onwards, China started donating a development oriented aid to developing countries. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Today, according to the white paper released by the Chinese government State Council (2014), China appropriated a total of $14.41 billion for foreign assistance in three types: grant (aid gratis), interest-free loan and concessional loan from 2010 to 2012. Furthermore, Kitano (2018) estimated China’s net foreign aid have been $5.2bn in 2012, $5.4bn in 2013, and $4.9bn in 2014.. 1. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(9) 立. 政治大. 學. ‧ 國. Figure 1.1: China’s Estimated Net foreign aid in billion USD Source: Kitano (2018, p. 60). ‧ y. Nat. sit. Although, Chinese aid is famous for its massive infrastructure projects and/or economic official. al. er. io. development assistance (ODA), it has also emerged as a major actor in providing humanitarian. n. aid with an extension of 1.5 billion yuan worth of materials and cash assistance in emergency. Ch. i n U. v. humanitarian aid to more than 30 countries from 2010-2012 (PRC State Council, 2014) while. engchi. $368.5 million from 2000-2017 according to Financial Tracking Service -United Nation Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of or FTS- UNOCHA (n.d.) data.. 2. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(10) 政治大立Source: FTS -UNOCHA (n.d.). Figure 1.2: Chinese Humanitarian Aid Total Funding in USD. ‧ 國. 學. Humanitarian Assistance is defined as an aid that is governed with the key humanitarian principles; humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. It is given to alleviate human. ‧. suffering by reducing risks and preserving human dignity of vulnerable population affected by. y. Nat. natural or human induced disasters/emergencies (Development Initiatives, n.d.). However,. n. al. er. io. countries.. sit. scholarly debates show that not all humanitarian aid are given out of selflessness by donor. Ch. i n U. v. For Example, during the Kosovo and Afghanistan crisis, the United States (US) through National. engchi. Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO), justified their roles in improvement of ground relief effort because they wanted to sell the war at home and have favorable publicity by televising aid delivery via shelter building of refugees. It also helped them to win the “hearts and minds” campaign, very important to the war effort. In this case humanitarian aid was used out of interest; to achieve desirable outcome by the donor (Barnette, 2005). Another case is the “humanitarianism problem” in Gaza wherein according to Feldman (2009), even the most well intentioned humanitarian aid can be politicized whereas aid was disbursed by foreign donors through the Fatah and Ramallah branch of the Palestinian Authority or the United Nations agencies and non-profit organizations to bypass Hamas. Feldman then said that 3. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(11) “Whatever its intent, and however carefully delimited its mandate, humanitarianism always has political effects.” (Feldman, 2009, p.24). These cases show that humanitarian aid can actually be a double-edged sword.. As China emerges as a leading global power, its foreign aid had also become one of the leading topics in development sector. One aid initiative that is in question is its humanitarian aid which scholars’ debate on whether it is given altruistically or it is influenced by political, economic or social motivations. These debates are divided into three views; the selfless view that believes humanitarian aid is given to disaster prone countries wherein according to Fuchs and Rudyak (2017) that it reflected China’s humanitarian and developmental motives via quantitative. 政治大 affected countries receive more humanitarian assistance, all else being equal” (Fuchs and 立. research which showed that “poorer countries receive more Chinese aid and that more disaster-. Rudyak, 2017, p. 15). ‧ 國. 學. The second perspective is the selfish view that it is given to promote China’s national interest. ‧. like Hirono (2018) who compared Chinese Humanitarian aid expenditure from 2011-2015 and concluded that it promoted China’s foreign policy via strengthening of bilateral relations in. y. Nat. sit. African countries that supported its diplomatic efforts and peripheral bilateral ties to countries in. al. er. io. Asia Pacific; enhanced its image as a “responsible state” and motivated by the economic and. n. commercial opportunities that humanitarian aid indirectly brings as result of good bilateral relationship.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The last view is that it is given according to the traditional Chinese philanthropic culture which Krebs (2014) described as influenced by Confucian notions through the belief that the government and the emperor should protect its people from suffering because it legitimates their ability to rule. While Teitt (2013) believed that ideology of communism and Mao influence Chinese humanitarian through the state as determiner of what is human rights. As reported by the Chinese government’s foreign aid white paper (2014), China provided assistance to 121 countries; 30 in Asia, 51 in Africa, nine in Oceania, 19 in Latin America and the Caribbean and 12 in Europe (PRC State Council, 2014) from 2010-2012. In this regard, 4. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(12) Figure 1.3 below shows that China had donated a total of $6,124,206 of humanitarian aid to the Philippines; $40,000 to Vietnam; $7,861,635 to Cambodia; $6,069,583 to Indonesia; $6,462,692 to Myanmar and $2,822,327 to Thailand from 2000-2016 (FTS- UNOCHA, n.d.).. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. Figure 1.3: Chinese Humanitarian Aid to South East Asia in USD from 2000-2016 Source: FTS- UNOCHA (n.d.). sit. y. Nat. io. er. One of the recipient countries is the Philippines. It has been the largest recipient of Chinese loans in South East Asia (SEA), which totaled $2 billion in 2007 (Lum et. al, 2009) and had. n. al. i n U. v. experienced the highest and lowest peak of bilateral relations through different administrations’. Ch. engchi. China policy. Thus, the humanitarian aid of China to the Philippines serving as a case study.. To answer my thesis question, my thesis is divided into five chapters. First is the introduction whereby brief discussion of Chinese aid and its humanitarian aid together with the main question and argument of this paper are introduced. Second chapter is the Literature review that discusses different viewpoints regarding the nature of humanitarian aid in a global context, Chinese foreign aid and Chinese Humanitarian aid. In the same chapter, historical accounts of Filipino-Sino relationship and current disaster situation in the Philippines is also discussed followed by methodology. Third, fourth and fifth chapter containthe three case studies of Chinese humanitarian aid donation during the two Philippine administration from 2000-2018 together. 5. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(13) with their Philippine foreign policy to China, China’s foreign policy to the Philippines, Domestic perspective of the Philippines to China and vice versa. Last chapter is the conclusion and recommendations.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 6. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(14) Chapter II. Literature Review. This section is arranged according to the size of the scope of the subject in relation to humanitarian aid. First section discusses the general definition of humanitarian aid and the debates whether the nature of humanitarian aid is selfish or selfless. This is followed by discussion of previous research on Chinese Foreign Aid to be able to know what motivates China in aid giving. The third section contains the selfish, selfless and cultural view regarding Chinese Humanitarian Aid followed by the historical review of Filipino-Sino relationship and Philippine Humanitarian situation. The last section contains the research question and methodology.. 政治大. 2.1 Global Context of Humanitarian Aid. 立. In providing humanitarian assistance, the behavior of both donors as well as beneficiaries are. ‧ 國. 學. guided by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 46. 182 or “Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations” (UNOCHA, 2012,. ‧. p.1) which has internationally recognized operating norms of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and voluntariness in donating and receiving aid (Zwitter, 2011). Miller (2000) argued that. y. Nat. sit. “humanitarian interventions appear to be a form of altruism writ large, a kind of self-sacrificial. al. er. io. love in which strong nations protect vulnerable strangers” (Miller, 2000, p. 4). Miller used this. n. argument base from humanitarian invention of the US in Somalia and NATO intervention in. Ch. i n U. v. Kosovo where areas humanitarian intervention was not motivated by national interest nor. engchi. resources such as oil but to alleviate humanitarian suffering. While in the research of Heinrich (2013), he said that “selfless” behavior are influenced when the donor leader has incentives to regard humanitarianism and it is “selfish” when states bargain. This is base from his empirical model that used policies in former colonies, distance in policies via capital to capital distance, policy concessions, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) membership of recipient country and news coverage as measurement in influencing donors in aid provision.. On the other hand, de Torrentte (2013) argued that funders such as private entities and governments, especially Western ones commit to the "good humanitarian donorship" principles, their political ambitions and strategic interests are intertwined in funding allocation. Examples 7. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(15) are underfunding of critical emergencies by state donors like the conflict in Ivory Coast in 2010. In relation, Barnette (2005) found that some donors use humanitarian assistance as a strategic instrument in achieving their foreign policy goals. This was illustrated in his observation of transition of humanitarianism during 1990s. While in the study of Cooper et.al (2005), they concluded that the United States’ foreign policy and domestic factors influence disaster assistance allocations and are an overriding determinant base on the US disaster assistance in 1964-1995. Currently, humanitarian organizations/actors are classified into two types, “Wilsonian” and “Dunantist”. Wilsonian agencies believe that transforming political, economic, and cultural. 政治大 believe that “agencies are extension of the State into charitable activity,” (Vaux, 2006, p. 2444). 立 structures is necessary to liberate individuals and produce peace progress (Barnette, 2005) and. While Dunanist organizations and actors like the International Federation of the Red Cross and. ‧ 國. 學. Red Crescent (IFRC) defines humanitarianism as neutral, independent and impartial in providing relief to vulnerable population (Barnette, 2005).. ‧ y. Nat. er. io. al. sit. 2.2 Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid. n. 6o years ago, the Chinese Government started providing aid during 1950–78 to North Korea and. Ch. i n U. v. Vietnam focusing on agricultural aid, technical assistance and turn-key projects. According to. engchi. Copper (1976), China’s first initial aid strategy was aimed to comply with China’s foreign policy in the short and long term. It was more politically motivated than economical. He also said that “China’s foreign aid diplomacy is an important tool of China’s foreign policy and thus inextricably related to important foreign policy goals in a number of ways.” (Copper, 1976, p.129) From the 1990s onwards together with the increase of China’s economic policy, China started to emerge as a more significant donor, a development that was related to its own domestic development policy of “going out”, and to its greater involvement in multilateral and international organizations (Brant, 2013). 8. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(16) Currently, China provides eight types of foreign aid; complete projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development cooperation, medical assistance, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs, and debt extension. Chinese government states that their foreign aid do not have political conditions and believes in mutual respect, equality, keeping promise, mutual benefits and win-win (State Council of PRC, 2014). However, the forms of aid. are very important tools in China’s diplomacy, which serves its political, economic, strategic and global image interests according to Zhang and Smith (2017) and Copper (2016).. A positive example of Chinese aid initiative is the Chinese international education assistance. 政治大 Program help foreign students to be positive about building friendships with their home countries 立 through the Chinese Government Scholarship Program. The Chinese Government Scholarship. and China (Dong & Chapman, 2008); and 150 international students were satisfied in the. ‧ 國. 學. scholarship program in the survey of Latief and Lin (2018). They used the quality of education, living situation, stipend amount, and other relevant factors as measures of satisfaction.. ‧. However, to some scholars like Lancaster (2007) Chinese aid appears negatively because it is. y. Nat. sit. tied more to Beijing’s interests in raw material which is often part of a larger package of. al. er. io. investments and trade deals with recipient governments which are mainly low-income. n. developing countries. Examples of which are mining in Africa, mining and agribusiness in Latin. Ch. i n U. v. America, and hydropower in the Mekong region (Lancaster, 2007).. engchi. 2.3 The Influence of Chinese Humanitarian Assistance. One of the eight types of aid provided by China is humanitarian aid with a total of $368.5 million from 2000-2017 (FTS- UNOCHA, n.d.). Chinese provision of Emergency Humanitarian Aid is defined by PRC’s State Council (2014) as a type of aid provided by the Chinese government when a country or region suffers a severe natural or humanitarian disaster. Aid provision can either be aid materials or cash. The affected country must request for help first to the Chinese government in order for them to respond. Furthermore, according to Chinese State Council 9. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(17) (2014), Chinese aid distribution is according to people’s living conditions and economic development of recipient countries so that aid benefits as many needy people as possible.. Currently, there are three academic perspective on Chinese Humanitarian Aid. The first view is the positive one which scholars like of Dreher and Fuchs (2015) argue that Chinese foreign is incomparable to Western donors in terms of political motives but is independent of beneficiary country’s natural resources and institutional characteristics. This was concluded in their case of Chinese projects, food aid, medical staff and aid to developing countries from 1956-2006.. 政治大. The second view is the negative perspective where Hirono (2018) argued that China’s. 立. Humanitarian Aid allocation is based on national interests and multiple processes, paths and actors. ‧ 國. 學. in foreign policy-making. She compared Chinese Humanitarian aid expenditure from 2011-2015 and concluded that it promoted of China’s foreign policy via strengthening of bilateral relations in African countries that supported its diplomatic efforts and peripheral bilateral ties to countries in. ‧. Asia Pacific; enhanced its image as a “responsible state” and motivated by the economic and. y. Nat. commercial opportunities that humanitarian aid indirectly brings as result of good bilateral. sit. relationship. This is seconded by Zhang and Smith (2017) explored China’s aid decision-making. al. er. io. processes by examining the main agencies, identities and informal interactions. Chinese aid system. n. iv n C Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the of Foreign h eMinistry i U Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of h n c g Finance (MOF) and the companies responsible for implementing Chinese aid projects where they is characterized by fierce and ongoing competition for influence among actors, especially the. concluded that aid is a very important tool in China’s diplomacy, which serves its political, economic, strategic and global image interests. Copper (2016) added that Chinese aid across Asia is a tool to project its foreign policy when he assessed Chinese Investment and Aid across Asia in his book which also laid down the successes and failures of this strategy and its political impact on China’s accession to world dominance. Bogg’s (2015) research showed that China prefers to allocate more humanitarian aid to South East Asian countries like Cambodia, Indonesia than the Philippines because it had a better diplomatic ties with the previous two. These arguments imply that Chinese humanitarian aid is given by other motivations rather than alleviating human suffering. 10. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(18) The third view believes that culture and ideology influence Chinese humanitarian aid allocation. Krebs (2014) suggested to look to the Confucian ideology together with its particular cultural values and state ideology influence because this creates a distinct ‘humanitarian’ identity of Chinese humanitarianism because Confucian notions influences the belief that the government and the emperor should protect its people from suffering because it legitimates their ability to rule. While Teitt (2013) believed that ideology of communism, Mao and Lenin influence Chinese humanitarian through the state as determiner of what is human rights and served as guidance to legitimize international action. However, no case was provided by both authors.. 政治大. 2.4 History of Filipino-Sino Political Relationship. 立. According to Tuazon (2014), Philippine-Chinese Relationship can be traced back in the 9th. ‧ 國. 學. century when people from Canton (now Guangdong) sailed around the Philippines to barter trade. Chinese merchants settled around the country and became a powerful community that had. ‧. been part of local elite during the Spanish reign in the Philippines. As Chinese merchants grow their trade, many commodities from mainland China were traded in Manila and then deliver to. y. Nat. sit. European markets via Spain. Spain then decided to annex the Philippines as a gateway to. al. er. io. penetrate China, but was not successful. Americans also saw the Philippines as an entry point to. n. China when American soldiers stationed in the Philippines were send to assist in the Boxer rebellion (Baveria, 2000).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. During the Spanish colonization, non-Catholic Chinese restricted passage within the Capital city and thousands of Chinese massacred in three uprising against Spain. And during the American occupation, the banning of Chinese immigration under the United States’ Exclusion Act was implemented. This act forced many Chinese to adopt new identities with new names. Although the Chinese in the Philippines have faced discrimination, they have strong influence in the domestic political scene since the colonizers favored Chinese mestizos who were educated to hold administrative and elective positions (Tuazon, 2014).. 11. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(19) The Republic of China (ROC) was one of the first countries to recognize Philippine independence in 1946. The establishment of Philippine Consulate in Xiamen and Shanghai then followed in 1947 (Baveria, 2000). In 1949, the Republic of the Philippines recognized the Republic of China or Taiwan as the legitimate representative of China because the Quirino administration submitted to US pressure to recognize Taiwan.. Diplomatic and trade relations were conducted between Taiwan and the Philippines with no formal contact with communist China since the Philippines banned Communism under Republic Act 1700. However, formal Philippine-Taiwan relations ended, except in trade, because the Philippines opened its diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China on June 5, 1975. 政治大 nontraditional markets and for security concerns (Baveria, 2000). The Philippines then complied 立 under President Marcos (Tuazon, 2014) to open up to socialist countries, to expand trade with. with the One-China Policy where in a nation can only recognize Communist China as the. ‧ 國. 學. legitimate government that represents Chinese interests in the world stage (Tuazon, 2014). As written in the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) website, there have been almost. ‧. 100 bilateral agreements between the Philippines and China that varies from:. y. Nat. sit. “Political, defense, trade and investments, judicial cooperation, infrastructure development,. al. er. io. energy cooperation, air services, cooperation in combating transnational crimes, consular. n. cooperation, tourism, culture, sports, media exchange, agriculture, science and technology, sister. Ch. cities, and people to people exchanges.” (DFA, 2014). engchi. i n U. v. 2.5 Philippine Humanitarian Landscape. The Philippines is the third most vulnerable country out of 172 countries in terms of exposure to disaster and hazards, just behind Vanuatu and Tonga (Heintze et. al, 2018). Its proneness to disaster is due to its high risk from cyclones, earthquakes, floods, landslides, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, and wildfires. A total of 60 percent of the country’s total land area is exposed to multiple hazards and 74 percent of the population is vulnerable to their impact. (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2017).. 12. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(20) The Philippines is located along the boundary of major tectonic plates in the Pacific ring of fire and at the center of a typhoon belt that cause extreme weather conditions. Furthermore, poverty in the communities (Doroteo, 2015) and the Philippines geographic structure that have extensive, flood-prone, interior lowland plains, the steep mountainsides, and the narrow, low-lying, coastal plains of the islands also contributes to its vulnerability (Bolettino et. al, 2018).. Almost 10-25 disaster events are experienced yearly by the Philippines 7000 plus islands. This includes an observed 900 earthquakes annually and 20 tropical cyclones yearly visits, which 6-9 of it makes landfall. The Philippines has encountered 565 natural disaster events that have claimed 70,000 lives and caused an estimated $23 billion in damages since 1990. The biggest disaster. 政治大 million homes in nine regions (Bolettino et. al, 2018). 立. happened in 2013 where Super Typhoon Haiyan claimed mora than 6,000 lives and damaged 1.1. ‧ 國. 學. Although the Philippine Government had prioritize its path towards resiliency by creating the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) in 2009 and by enacting. ‧. the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 where it transformed Philippine disaster approach from emergency relief to disaster risk reduction and prevention. y. Nat. sit. (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 2017), the Philippines still acquires aid from. n. al. er. io. foreign donors to its support its disaster efforts especially in humanitarian emergencies.. Ch. i n U. v. In 2018, the top 5 state donors who are also called traditional donors are the United States (40.5%),. engchi. Germany (12.3%), European Commission (10 %), Sweden (7.8 %) and Australia which prioritize (top 5) issues on Child Protection, Coordination and support services, Early Recovery, Education, Emergency Shelter and Non Food items(FTS-UNOCHA, 2018).. 13. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(21) 立. 政治大. Figure 2.1: Top Philippine Humanitarian Aid Funding Sources. ‧ 國. 學. Source: FTS-UNOCHA (n.d.). ‧. 2.6 Research question and Methodology. sit. y. Nat. There is a limited study on Chinese humanitarian aid compared to the literature on Chinese foreign aid or official development assistance, especially in South East Asia, but one previous. io. al. er. research on Chinese Humanitarian aid in South East Asia exists which concluded that China is. n. iv n C hPhilippines such as Indonesia and Cambodia than the (Bogg, i U2015). engch. more likely to allocate more of its humanitarian assistance to countries with stronger bilateral ties. Literature regarding Chinese Humanitarian aid varies indicating that scholars have not reached a consensus about whether Chinese Humanitarian aid is selfless when humanitarian aid is given to disaster prone countries according to Fuchs and Rudyak (2016); selfish when Chinese Humanitarian aid is given to promote China’s national interest like Hirono (2018) who compared Chinese Humanitarian aid expenditure from 2011-2015; and the last view is when it is given according to traditional Chinese philanthropic culture coming from Confucianism according to Krebs (2014) and Chinese humanitarian aid is given because of communist and Maoist according to Teitt (2013). In this regard, the goal of this research is to find out the missing link of the. 14. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(22) literature about whether Chinese Humanitarian aid is affected by the political relationship of China and the Philippines.. This research paper uses a qualitative approach using case study of the three Philippine administration namely; Arroyo, Aquino and Duterte that includes their diplomatic relationship with China by examining whether the varying political relationship of Philippine administration with China, Chinese Foreign Policy and Domestic Perception to the Philippines from 2000-2018 and severity of disaster affected Humanitarian aid allocation. Thus, the main question would be whether China’s Humanitarian aid allocation to the Philippines varies or determined based on the political relationship China and the Philippines via Philippine foreign policy to China, Chinese. 政治大 and severity of disaster in the Philippines. 立. foreign policy to the Philippines, Chinese domestic perception to the Philippines and vice versa. ‧ 國. 學. Above mentioned measures in determining if the nature of Chinese Humanitarian aid donation to the Philippines is politically motivated is derived from previous study of Cooper Drury et.al. ‧. (2005) in their study in determining if US disaster assistance in 1964-1995 is politically motivated or not. They concluded that the United States’ foreign policy and domestic factors. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. influence disaster assistance allocations and are an overriding determinant.. n. In consideration of these factors, if Chinese aid is “selfish”, the Philippines and China’s bilateral. Ch. i n U. v. relationship will greatly affect Chinese aid allocation behavior while if it “selfless”, the. engchi. intervening variables 1 and 2 as written in Figure 2.2 below, will not significantly influence Chinese aid allocation behavior.. Figure 2.2: Conceptual Framework of Chinese Humanitarian Aid to the Philippines 15. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(23) 2.6.1 Limitation Although there are other sources of the quantitative data in terms of the overall Chinese Aid from Aid data, Chinese embassy in the Philippines and Reliefweb, this study only used quantitative data from FTS-UNOCHA data. Furthermore, research about the other South East Asian countries or even other developing countries is needed to further clarify whether the Philippines is an outlier.. The next three chapters discusses the foreign policy and domestic perspective of the Philippines to China and vis a vis followed by Chinese Humanitarian Aid during the Arroyo administration (2001-2010), a president who started with a strong pro US foreign policy and ended with an. 政治大 anti-China foreign policy mostly because of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and; the 立. equi-balance foreign policy with China and US; Aquino administration (2010-2016) who had an. Duterte administration (2016-present) who promoted an independent foreign policy from the US. ‧ 國. 學. but closer ties with China.. ‧. According to Lande (1967), political party system in the Philippines is dominated by the Nacionalistas and Liberals which are identical because of their regional association, avoidance of. y. Nat. sit. class oriented ideological stance and no full time loyalty of their interests groups. Ricamora. al. er. io. (1998) said that the most distinct characteristic of political parties in the Philippines are “parties. n. of the elite” because wealthy families have large influence or control in non-elite representatives. Ch. i n U. v. of the parties from the community level to the national level. Ricamora also identified the. engchi. “balimibing” charactersitic of shifting of parties according to the elected leadership. In agreement, Teehankee (2012) research shows that “clientalism” largely influence the political party system which can be traced from colonial rule where Spain governed the Philippines indirectly and Americans relied on clans. In this regard, all three presidents came from political elite families. Arroyo and Aquino comes from political clans from the North while Duterte’s political family is from the South. Furthermore, Arroyo and Duterte are currently in the same party called “PDP-Laban” or Democratic Party of the Philippines while Aquino form the Liberal Party.. 16. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(24) Chapter III. Case Study 1: Macapagal-Arroyo Administration (2001-2010). This chapter focuses on the Philippine-China relation during the Macapagal Arroyo period. It is consists of three sections. The first section discusses the Philippine Foreign Policy and domestic perception to China from 2000-2001 followed by China’s relationship to the Philippines as well as its domestic perspective to the Philippines in the same period. The third section contains the humanitarian aid donation of China to the Philippines ended with a chapter conclusion.. 3.1. Philippine Foreign Policy and Domestic Perception to China. 政治大 2001) which was cut short due to the people power movement motivated by illegal gambling 立. Macapagal-Arroyo was the vice president during the Erap administration (June 1998- January. activities of Joseph Estrada. The Erap administration conducted Bilateral talks between the. ‧ 國. 學. Philippines and China because of Chinese occupation in the Mischief reef in 1995 (Baveria, 2000). This resulted to the two parties agreeing to resolve the matter peacefully via confidence-. ‧. building measures, non-usage of force and compliance with the principles of international law which led to an increase in the number of official state visits between the two countries and part. y. Nat. sit. of it was the state visit of president Estrada to China in 2000 (Baker, 2004) during which both. al. er. io. countries agreed to promote peace and stability in the South China Sea (SCS) and agreed on a. n. framework for Chinese-Philippine relations in the 21st century covering science and technology,. Ch. i n U. culture, agriculture, and business relations (Medeiros et. al, 2008). engchi. v. When Macapagal-Arroyo came into power in 2001, the Philippine economy was not progressive compared with the previous year. Peso remained weak, poverty rate was high, economic growth was at low, electronic production slowed, banking system was weak, and huge budget deficit (Labrador, 2002) and total trade deficit was at $907 million according to the Philippine Statistics Authority of PSA (2001). The US still remained as the top trading partner with 23.6% (PSA, 2001) followed by Japan, Singapore and Taiwan. China ranked only ninth as a trading partner within the Asia Pacific Economic Partnership Cooperation (APEC) trading block. Furthermore, Philippine Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rate was at 2.8% (World Bank, n.d.).. 17. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(25) In that same year, the Philippines revived its relations with the US at the height of the September 11 terrorist attack via Arroyo being the first Asian leader to support the fight against terrorism. This led her to earn military and economic support from Washington (Labrador, 2002). Strong ties of the Philippines with the US continued which led to US dominating the Philippines foreign policy in 2003 via support of Arroyo on US’s war in Iraq (Montesano, 2004).. By 2004, GDP was at 6.6% (Worldbank, n.d.) while total trade $83.720 Billion (PSA, 2004). Japan became the top trading partner at 18.7% of the country’s total trade and US at second place. China became the top four trading of the Philippines in terms of exports at 6.7. % (PSA, 2004). However, in that same year, according to Robles (2004), Macapagal-Arroyo used her. 政治大 withdrew its humanitarian mission in Iraq to comply with the demand of a terrorist group who 立 “China card” to gain diplomatic leverage against the United States when the Philippines. abducted a Filipino truck driver. The Americans were against the decision for they believe that it. ‧ 國. 學. promotes kidnapping. Consequently, the Philippine-US bilateral security relations were jeopardize (Robles, 2004). After a few weeks, Arroyo had a state visit to China where she and. ‧. Premier Wen Jia-bao discussed defense cooperation in rescue, disaster mitigation and exchange of training (De Castro, 2016).. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. Morada (n.d.) assumes that the warming of relations of the two countries is because Arroyo. n. wanted to depend less with the US military, China wanted to expand its defense ties with the. Ch. i n U. v. Philippine military and push joint scientific exploration of the South China Sea; and to improve. engchi. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) China relations in the context of ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Community building projects. On the other hand, Baveria (2000) believes that Arroyo was driven by the promotion of economic and development cooperation with China. Furthermore, President Gloria Arroyo based her foreign policy according to the eight realities of Philippine foreign which helps reinforce the three pillars of Philippine Foreign Policy. The first reality being as “the dynamics of relations between China, Japan and the United States determine the security situation and economic evolution of East Asia.” (DFA, n.d.).. The strengthening of the Philippines and China relations resulted to high-level exchange visits such as Arroyo’s almost yearly state visit to China since 2004 and state visit of President Hu to 18. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(26) the Philippines in 2005 wherein he signed 10 intergovernmental agreements and for business-tobusiness agreements of investments, grants, and loans to finance infrastructure and other development projects in the Philippines. Hu then invited Arroyo to work closely with China to increase trade, agriculture, defense cooperation and many more (Robles, 2004). Furthermore, bilateral trade between the two countries increased by 41% from 2001-2009 (Robles, 2004). This increase in trade made China the third largest trading partner after the United States and Japan. Aside from trade, China invested mostly in agricultural and mining in the Philippines (De Castro, 2016).. In terms of the South China Sea dispute, the Arroyo administration agreed with Beijing to. 政治大 cooperation rather than a potential conflict. She then adopted the Regional Code of Conduct in 立. conduct a joint seismic survey in the area. President Arroyo declared that the issue is an area of. the South China Sea where it prevents of conflict and establishment of peaceful resolution. ‧ 國. 學. among claimant states. However, the Joint Seismic Marine Undertaking (JSMU) execution were flawed for one-sixth of survey area are within Philippine boundaries and data was solely. ‧. managed by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), which was not fully shared with the Philippines and Vietnam (Mais, n.d.).. sit. y. Nat. al. er. io. According to Schofield & Storey (2009), critics labeled the JMSU unconstitutional and is an. n. exchange for the concessional loans infrastructure projects from China. The Philippine. Ch. i n U. v. responded by its legislation updating its baseline claims which resulted to strained relationship. engchi. with China. Arroyo was criticized domestically. Thus, she distanced her administration from the issue (Schofield & Storey, 2009).. In terms of domestic perception to China, according to the Philippine Social Weather Station (SWS) survey and as shown in Table 3.1 below, Filipinos had a negative trust in China in 2005, 2008 and 2009 while positive trust in 2002, 2007 and 2010.. 19. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(27) Table 3.1: Awareness and Net Trust Rating of China September 2002- June 2010 Month. Year. Net Trust. September. 2002. 3. May. 2005. -21. December. 2005. 4. June. 2007. 12. March. 2008. -10. September. 2008. December. 2008. February. 2009. June. 2010. Source: Social Weather Station (2018) retrieved. -12 -33 -12 17. 學. ‧ 國. 立. 政治大. from:https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20180714202446 accessed on. ‧. June 13, 2019. y. Nat. sit. Macapagal-Arroyo administration started with a balance foreign policy between US and China. al. er. io. and ended with the golden age of Philippine-China bilateral relationship during her second term. n. iv n C from political, defense, agriculture, economics, media, h e nsports, i Uyouth, scientific, tourism , h c g infrastructure, consular and many more.. which had produced more than 60 (Morada, n.d.) bilateral agreements with China that varied. 3.2 Chinese Foreign Policy and Domestic Perspective to the Philippines. Since 1997, during the time of Jiang Zemin, China has been more committed to regionalism according to Wan (2010). This was due to Jiang wanting to establish his own diplomatic trait, the return of Hong Kong to China allowed China to connect more to the Association of South East Asian Nations and counteract US influence in Taiwan (Nakai, 2003).. 20. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(28) By 2001, there was no specific Chinese foreign policy towards the Philippines unlike in the Philippines to China where it is written in the eight realities of the Philippine foreign policy. However, since the Philippines is part of ASEAN, it is my assumption that Chinese foreign policy/strategy to ASEAN includes the Philippines. Hence, this section’s format discusses mainly the policy of China to ASEAN while integrating complementary events that happened in the Philippines as result of those policies during the Macapagal-Arroyo administration.. South East Asia is important to China due to its geography, economics, history and security (Harris, 1985). By 2000, China had advanced its plans of regionalism in ASEAN. This started with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) within ASEAN and China; Building of soft power in the. 政治大 strengthening of economic ties and development of infrastructures for North-South linkages; and 立 region via rapid growth of cultural contact and reassuring language kept from China;. Active growth in non-traditional security operation (Rozman, 2010). This year was also the time. ‧ 國. 學. where bilateral framework of cooperation in the 21st century was concluded during the Estrada administration.. ‧. Furthermore, SEA is where great powers such as the US and Japan have expanded economic. y. Nat. sit. openness and security. In this connection, some of Chinese strategy to SEA had been shaped by. al. er. io. reaction from the actions of the great powers in the region. This was illustrated when George. n. Bush’s policy towards Asia in 2001 had coincided with China’s policy in Asia and beyond.. Ch. i n U. v. However, since the US’s war is located in other corners of Asia, China set its intentions to SEA. engchi. (Rozman, 2010). China had also advocated over time that their rise is via peaceful means, assuring its Asian neighbors that China is not a threat. This approach reinforced positive momentum with Asian neighbors including SEA (Stutter, 2013). At the same time, US’s war against terrorism have impacted SEA while Chinese oil imports that crossed the SEA straits have increased. This worried China because they thought that the US might use the war against terrorism to control the straits. As a result, China supported Malaysia’s non acceptance of US’s proposal of regional maritime security initiative (Rozman, 2013). Also, according to Rozman (2013), US’s war on terrorism in SEA gave opportunity to China to strengthen economic ties to ASEAN because SEA nations prefers stability and economic 21. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(29) development. However, US’s war on terror reached the Philippines. This resulted to US military being deployed to combat terrorism against extremist in the Philippines. China’s public had minimal reaction (Percival, 2007). Furthermore, 2001 was also the time where China advocated for the “ASEAN +3” initiative where it allowed free trade among SEA nations, China, Japan and Korea (Nakai, 2003).. In 2003, Chinese strategic thinking in South East Asia reached its peak with the signing of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). This reassured ASEAN as a unit and helped military ties with specific states. It also accelerated economic relations complemented by strategic partnerships put relation on a new plain in the context of deepening great power competition.. 政治大 functions of ASEAN +3 as response to US’s internationalization of security in the region 立. That same year to 2004, China supported a regional alternative by including security to the. (Rozman, 2010).. ‧ 國. 學. During this time, China attempted to endorse Chinese military hardware to the Philippines. ‧. (Percival, 2007) and joined forces with the Philippines and Vietnam in exploring oil and gas or Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking in South China Sea (SCS). By 2006, China allocated USD 2. y. Nat. sit. billion loans per year for the next three years to the Philippines. Chinese aid to the Philippines. al. er. io. grew from USD 35 million to USD 1.14 billion from 2001-2010. The donation symbolizes the. n. ties of the Philippines and China. However, the amount of donation to the Philippines when. Ch. i n U. v. compared to other ASEAN nations is unimpressive according to Baveria (2016).. engchi. By 2009-2010, China became assertive in claiming its territory within SCS by building military bases. This shifted from naval and air power build up that focuses to Taiwan to extension military bases towards SCS (Rozman, 2010). As response, SEA nations appeared to join the US and other regional organizations (Stutter, 2013). This action coincided with the US’s pivot to Asia in 2010 wherein China viewed that Philippine response to SCS was influences by the US (Baveria, 2016).. From 2000-2016, China had two presidents. First was Jiang Zemin wherein his approach to regionalism including ASEAN was aggressive (Nakai, 2003) and utilized soft power through 22. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(30) business deals, increase of diplomatic exchange, promotion of economic partnership and culture (Kurlantzick, 2006). Second was Hu Jintao who continued the Asian regionalism strategy which includes ASEAN through the ASEAN +3, TAC and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation or APEC (Wan, 2010). According to Stutter (2013), China’s foreign policy in ASEAN is consistent but priorities and/or goal depends on China’s interest per country. In relation with the Philippines, China’s strengthened its economic relations and sought peaceful political cooperation in terms of joint exploration in disputed territories. Chinese investments and construction contracts accounted to US $ 201, 390 million (American Enterprise Institute, n.d.). Overall, China’s strategy in South. 政治大 largely contribute to China’s economic modernization and regime stability (Rozman, 2013). 立 East Asia is primarily driven by economic and military interests. These pursuant of interests. ‧ 國. 學. 3.3 Chinese Humanitarian Aid. ‧. In 2004, there were three typhoons that hit the Philippines namely; Unding, Violeta and Winnie.. y. Nat. sit. The typhoons damaged eight regions or 35provinces affecting 712,981 families or 3,629,193. al. er. io. persons, destroying 38,358 houses. Furthermore, the typhoons took 1,060 lives, and injured 1,023. n. people while 566 still missing to date. The damages totaled to Php 5, 148, 421 (Reliefweb, 2004).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. China was among international donors who donated to the Philippines to the three typhoons According to Reliefweb (2004). However, the donation was unspecified. On the other hand, China donated $50,000 (Aid data, 2018) that after Typhoon Violeta and Typhoon Unding as it triggered floods in the northern parts of the country. That same year, China again donated more than $100,000 (Aid data, 2018) to the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs to aid victims of landslides and floods due to heavy rains.. In February 2006, Philippine authorities recovered 52 dead bodies, 951 people (NDRRMC, 2011) who were identified to be buried alive in barangay (community) Guinsaugun, Leyte Samar. This tragedy was caused by bad weather conditions and continuous rain that had fallen 23. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(31) for two weeks that resulted to landslides evacuating 3,314 people (NDRRMC, 2011). The Chinese government responded by pledging $1,000,000 (FTS, UNOCHA, n.d.) for cash and material assistance.. That same year, Super Typhoon Durian made landfall on late November in the Bicol region affecting 3 provinces which affecting 3,536,342 people or 707,966 families and claimed 734 lives, injured 2360 people and 762 missing people. Durian damaged 588,037 houses and cost a loss of Php 5,448,609,476 to infrastructure and agriculture (NDCC, 2006). China donated $200,000 (FTS, UNOCHA, n.d.) in cash to the Philippines to assist victims of typhoon. While China gave relief goods, including 930 tents, 3000 mattresses, 3000 sheets, and 3000 blankets. 政治大 donation of China to the Philippines is at 29.36% compared with its overall humanitarian aid that 立 (Aid Data, 2018), to the Philippines to help the victims of Typhoon Durian. The percentage of. amounted to $4,086,063 in 2006 (FTS, UNOCHA, n.d.).. ‧ 國. 學. 3.4 Analysis of Chinese Humanitarian Aid to the Philippines. ‧. The Chinese Foreign aid white paper indicates that humanitarian aid covers relief materials or. y. Nat. sit. cash aid and dispatching rescue and medical teams. The type aid mentioned above was only. n. al. er. io. limited to cash and relief materials. Furthermore, no preconditions was mentioned.. Ch. i n U. v. Although the Philippines had encounter 194 disasters (CRED, n.d.) during the Arroyo. engchi. administration, 66 was from 2001-2004 where the administration is closer to the US and 128 happened from 2005-2010 where the relation of the Philippines with China was at its peak. China had only donated twice base on FTS-UNOCHA data in 2006 while thrice base on Aid data; twice in 2004 and once in 2006. Since this study supports the FTS UN-OCHA data, it is observed that the Philippines only received humanitarian assistance after Arroyo decided to stray away from the US and lean closer to China despite Chinese foreign policy focused on regionalism from 2001-2010. Thus, indicating that it is selfish. However, FTS UN-OCHA data also showed that Chinese Humanitarian assistance from 2000-2003 was small and limited.. 24. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(32) In relation to the domestic perception of the Philippines to China, China had received more negative net trust in 2005, 2008 and 2009 and positive net trust in 2007 and 2010, China still gave humanitarian aid. Thus, it is selfless. In terms of severity of disaster, China had given more aid amounting to $1,000,000 after the Guinsaugun landslide where it only killed 52 people and damaged Php 5, 148, 421 compared with the 2006 typhoon Durian which claimed 742 lives and damage was worth Php 5,448,609,476 but only donated $200,000. However, it should also be considered that the former disaster happened during the first quarter of the year and received more media attention compared with the latter that happened in the last quarter of the year. Since China only. 政治大 donated to the Philippine landslide and Java earthquake for $2,000,000 (FTS-UNOCHA, n.d.) it 立 prioritizes or gives huge funding to two humanitarian crisis per year (Hirono, 2018) and already. would have less allocation to the typhoon Durian. Chinese donation in 2006 ($1,200,000). ‧ 國. 學. compared with the other years is still within the average donation. Also considering that more media attention creates more awareness and receives more aid like what happened in the Haiti. ‧. earthquake and Pakistan flooding (Wakar, n.d.), the landslide disaster received more aid.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 25. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(33) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 26. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(34) Chapter IV. Case Study 2: Aquino Administration (2010-2016). This chapter is the same as the previous chapter except that it covers Philippine foreign policy and domestic perception to China and vis a vis followed by Chinese Humanitarian aid during the Aquino administration from 2010-2016.. 4.1 Philippine Foreign Policy and Domestic Perception to China. Aquino came from the opposition party and wanted his administration to dissociate with the previous administration, especially on the corruption issues it faced. According to De Castro. 政治大 campaign which resulted to the halt of Arroyo’s equi-balancing strategy of the Philippines to 立 (2012), Aquino then started his first two years in office with the “Anything But Arroyo”. China and US, but tried his best in maintaining peaceful bilateral relations with China in his first. ‧ 國. 學. year in office when he supported China by not sending representatives to Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony in late 2010 and by extraditing Taiwanese nationals accused of fraud in China in. ‧. February 2011. Despite this peaceful approach, Beijing still executed the three Filipinos guilty of carrying drugs to China after the Aquino administration pleaded to grant clemency to the accused. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. (De Castro, 2012).. n. Also, during Aquino’s first year marked the country’s second highest GDP of 7.6% (World. Ch. i n U. v. Bank, n.d.) rate which was motivated by strong export earnings, increased flow of remittances. engchi. from overseas Filipino workers, high election spending in terms of advertisement and higher purchasing power of Filipinos. Consequently, Filipino-Chinese investment and Chinese firms had also increased in an amount of to $2.742 billion for the former and $202 million for the latter (Abinales, 2011). However, despite strong economic relations, Aquino’s political relationship with China turned sour when China asserted aggression in the South China Sea. This started when Chinese patrol boats harassed a survey ship commissioned by the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) in the Reed Bank in 2011. After two days of the incident, Manila filed a protest with the Chinese embassy but China stand that the island is within their territorial boundaries (De Castro, 2012). Aquino responded by increasing military presence in the disputed territory. 27. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(35) and promotion of a closer Philippine-U.S. security relations by acquiring American military equipment and security guarantee from Washington under the Mutual Defense Treaty.. In 2012, tension between China and the Philippines heated because of a two month standoff in the Scarborough Shoal. As response, Philippine legislators campaigned to the Aquino administration to allocate more funds for the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. That same year, Aquino appealed to the US for support and the latter deployed its submarine as commitment of their defense treaty with the Philippines (De Castro, 2013). The next year, the Aquino administration legally challenged its territorial claim in the South China Sea through the United Nation’s arbitral tribunal in The Hague (Sidel, 2014).. 政治大 The Philippines reached out again to the United States with the Enhanced Defense Cooperation 立 Agreement (EDCA), a 10 year agreement that maintains US military rotational presence at. ‧ 國. 學. agreed bases and other facilities in the Philippines; and to pre-position and store defense nonnuclear weapons and supplies in 2014. This was followed by a joined military exercise in May. ‧. which intensified the tension of Chinese and Filipino vessels in disputed waters (Sidel, 2015). The Aquino government also strengthened security relations with Japan- a rival of China in East. y. Nat. sit. Asia (De Castro, 2016). Manila also continued with its legal pursuit in the South China Sea by. al. er. io. submitting formal protest against the alleged Chinese violation of international laws to the. n. tribunal court. During the ASEAN Summit in Myanmanr, foreign ministers expressed their. Ch. i n U. v. concern that parties involved in the dispute should practice self-restraint and respect for international law (Sidel, 2015).. engchi. In terms of domestic perception to China, it had received a consistent negative net trust except in September 2010 and 2011 as well as December 2012 according to the Philippine Social Weather Station survey and as shown in Table 4.1 below.. 28. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(36) Table 4.1: Awareness and Net Trust Rating of China September 2010-March 2015 Month. Year. Net Trust. September. 2010. 17. September. 2011. 3. December. 2011. -1. March. 2012. 10. May. 2012. -36. August. 2012. -15. December. 2012. -20. March. 2013. -13. June. 2013. September. 2013. December. 2013 2014. -17 -15. 2014. -36. 2014 2015. -29 -35. sit. y. Nat. March. -31. ‧. September. ‧ 國. June. -10. 學. March. 立. 政治大. al. er. io. Table 4.1: Awareness and Net Trust Rating of China September 2010-March 2015. n. iv n C from:https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20180714202446 accessed on hengchi U June 13, 2019 Source: Social Weather Station (2018) retrieved. In summary, the Aquino administration started with a disinterest in prioritizing foreign affairs over domestic issues (De Castro, 2012 & 2013). However, aggressive assertion of China in the South China Sea pushed his foreign policy to legally assert territorial claim through the international tribunal court and strengthen military relationship with the US until his last year of service in 2016.. 29. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(37) 4.2 Chinese Foreign Policy and Domestic Perspective to the Philippines. In relation with the previous section, Chinese foreign policy towards the Philippines during the Aquino administration is also associated with Chinese foreign policy strategy to the Association of South East Asian Nations. However, this section focuses mostly towards the policies and reactions of the government of China from Philippine’s response to its aggression in South China Sea.. In 2010, the Manila hostage crisis took place which claimed lives of eight Hong Kong tourists. Xinhua news agency denounced Aquino for his refusal to apologize for the event. Hong Kong. 政治大. government responded with removal of free visa for Philippine officials and diplomats (Ng,. 立. 2014).. ‧ 國. 學. After a year in office, the Aquino administration already encountered challenges regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In 2011, China fired three shots to Filipino fishing. ‧. boats in the atolls Quirino or Jackson Atoll. The Philippines then strengthen its military presence in the western maritime border. A month later, news media reported Chinese buildup of military. y. Nat. sit. basis in Kalayaan Islands. The Philippine government responded by calling the sea as “West. al. er. io. Philippine Sea.” China then protested to the Philippines bid for exploration in the Reed bank. n. claiming that the Philippines should respect Chinese sovereignty in the area (Rappler, 2016).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. By April 2012, the dispute have escalated to a two month standoff between the two governments that started when Chinese fishing boats were seen in the Scarborough Shoal. The Philippines responded by deploying a warship that was acquired from the US (Rappler, 2016). At the same time, a joint military exercise by the Philippines and US was implemented followed by the first Philippine-US ministerial dialogue held in Washington involving secretary state and defense. China believed that the Philippines confrontational approach is fueled confidence in US support if the issue escalates. China then deployed an overall 92 vessels (military and nonmilitary). The stand-off ended with the Philippines exiting the area and China staying (Baveria, 2016). Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson claimed that China only occupied its islands and adjacent waters (Stutter, 2013). 30. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(38) When Manila legally challenged its claim in the South East China sea at the UN tribunal court in 2013, China retaliated by uninviting Aquino to attend the 10th China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning, despite the Philippines status as the ‘‘country of honor’’. Furthermore, Xi Jinping refuse to meet with the Philippine president and Philippine business leaders that affecting opportunities in trade, tourism, and investment. The last quarter of that same year, Beijing build structures in the disputed territory in the South China Sea (Sidel, 2014).. The standoff was followed by small scale economic sanctions by China to the Philippines. First was the Chinese imposition of phytosanitary measures on Philippine Banana imports. This was. 政治大 political motivations. Second was the travel advisory that discourages Chinese tourists in visiting 立. resolved via Philippine official stating that the decision was purely of technical issues rather than the Philippines for safety reasons as response to anti-China protest’s regarding occupation in the. ‧ 國. 學. shoal. In the next year of September, Philippine exhibitors complained that China’s customs appeared discriminately delaying the release of certain Philippine products during the China. ‧. ASEAN expo in Nanning. This was followed by China pulling out of the North Rail project agreed during the Arroyo administration. Chinese media was also strong driving in the issue by. y. Nat. al. er. io. sit. publishing editorials that are labeled by Filipinos as bullying (Baveria, 2016).. n. Chinese political strategy during the Aquino administration was aggressive in terms of claiming. Ch. i n U. v. territories in disputed areas in SCS while issuing small scale economic sanctions but their. engchi. investments and construction contracts to the Philippines accounted to US $ 779, 330 million (American Enterprise Institute, n.d.), the most amount of money up to this date among the three administration.. 4.3 Chinese Humanitarian Aid in the Philippines. In December of 2011, Typhoon Washi (local name Sendong) made landfall on the Mindanao region or 14 provinces of the Philippines. 1,268 lives were claimed; 6,071 had been injured; destroyed 51,144 houses with an overall 667,602 people were affected. Its total destruction is estimated at PhP15.553B and named it as the most destructive tropical cyclones for 2011 31. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(39) (NDRRMC, 2012). Officials from the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines said they offered $10,000 (De Castro, 2011) to Philippine National Red Cross for relief funds for disaster victims in areas hit by tropical storm (ASEAN- China Centre, 2011) while in the FTS UN-OCHA data showed that the Chinese government donated $1,000,000 to the government of the Philippines and donated $128,206 to Save the Children. The percentage of donation of China to the Philippines is at 3.97% compared with its overall humanitarian aid that amounted to $28, 388, 152 (FTS, UNOCHA, n.d.) .. In November 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan affected 44 provinces in the Philippines. It claimed. 政治大 affected 3,424, 593 families or 16,078,181 people. Total damages were Php 95,483, 133,070.67 立 6300 individuals, injured 28, 688, 1062 people reported missing, destroyed 1,430,332 houses,. (NDRRMC, 2013). FTS-UNOCHA data shows that China donated an initial amount of $200,000. ‧ 國. 學. through the Chinese Red Cross, followed by $1, 600,000 as in-kind relief efforts in the form of blankets, tents and other materials handed over to the Philippine Department of Social Welfare. ‧. and Development (DSWD). China then deployed the "Peace Ark" or medical vessel with 93 medical workers and 12 disaster relief experts and deployment of a 50-man medical team. China. y. Nat. sit. again donated $100,000 to support post-disaster relief efforts and rehabilitation in areas affected. al. er. io. by earthquake in Bohol, Cebu and the rest of Central Visayas through the Philippines. n. government and local Taiwanese communities according to Aid data (2018). The percentage of. Ch. i n U. v. donation of China to the Philippines is at 13.78% compared with its overall humanitarian aid that. engchi. amounted to $13,060,000 (FTS, UNOCHA, n.d.) .. 4.4 Analysis of Chinese Humanitarian Aid to the Philippines. From 2011 to 2016, 132 natural disasters (EMT, n.d.) was experienced by the Philippines. Despite the high number, China had only donated to two disasters which amounted to $3,186,206 (FTS-UNOCHA, n.d.). Despite the tension between the Philippines and China, the latter still disbursed aid to the Philippines and exceeded the given aid during the Arroyo administration not only by the amount of cash but also the type of aid through deployment of 32. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(40) medical team and rescue personnel. However, some may argue that Typhoon Haiyan was a more massive disaster than the Ginsaugun Landslide and typhoons in 2006. Thus a need for a more extensive humanitarian aid which is aligned to the foreign aid white paper released in 2014 that states “China has made quick response to the appeals of the international community by providing relief materials or cash aid and dispatching rescue and medical teams as needed, to help the victim countries with disaster relief and post-disaster reconstruction.” (PRC State. Council, 2014).. In terms of domestic perception of the Philippines which was dominated with consecutive negative net trust except in September 2010 and also the domestic perception of China to the. 政治大 backlash from China and Chinese media regarding his administration’s actions towards the South 立 China Sea and Manila Hostage Crisis, China still disbursed a larger amount of humanitarian aid Philippines, which was also negative justified by the Aquino administration received a lot of. ‧ 國. 學. to the Philippines during Aquino’s time in office than Arroyo.. ‧. In relation with the severity of disaster, Table 6.2 in chapter conclusion shows that it is observed that the severity of a disaster (total deaths, affected people, total damages and signal variation). y. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. do not contribute to a large variation (in millions) of donated amount per year.. Ch. 4.4.1 Typhoon Haiyan Controversy. engchi. i n U. v. In late November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan, hit the Philippines killing almost 7000 people. Donors all over the world had extended their hand to help the country to recover. One of those donor is China, where it initially donated $100,000. The donated amount was widely criticized by international media since corporations such as IKEA and Coca-Cola have donated amounts in millions of USD which is more than the Chinese Government. It was perceived as the repercussions of China's territorial disputes with the Philippines in the South China Sea and the latter's pending arbitration case (European Parliament, 2016).. 33. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(41) However, this paper argues that the Chinese humanitarian assistance allocation was not influenced by the South East China Sea Dispute because; First, it was the only the initial amount donated but, the Chinese government donated an overall amount of USD 1, 900, 000 ( FTSUNOCHA, 2018 & Aiddata,2017) the following year. It is also consistent with the funding allocation in past disasters in the Philippines which is more than $1, 000, 000, no matter the impact of magnitude of the disaster.. Secondly, China only prioritizes or give huge funding to two humanitarian crisis per year. In this regard, China already donated to the Syrian Crisis ($3, 280, 000) and Pakistan Earthquake on September ($ 6, 380, 000) in 2013. The two mentioned crisis happened earlier than Typhoon. 政治大 Philippines in 2014 as part of recovery and rehabilitation. 立. Haiyan which happened in the last week of November and China donated more to the. ‧ 國. 學. Furthermore, Chan (2013) stated that China donated $10 million during the Japanese earthuake in 2010 despite the tension between the two countries caused by collision of boats. However, its. ‧. donation to Japan was economically motivated rather than political. She also argued that China’s Southern part was also devastated by the same typhoon and “Beijing should do more to channel. y. Nat. sit. aid to its affected provinces instead of diverting vast sums of taxpayers’ monies towards. al. er. io. providing foreign aid. Following the 2008/09 financial crisis.” (Chan, 2013, p.2). Despite this,. n. China still donated an initial amount of $100,000 USD to the Philippines. In this case, Chinese aid allocation is selfless.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 34. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(42) Chapter V. Duterte Administration (2016-2018). This chapter is the same as the previous chapter except that it covers Philippine foreign policy and domestic perception to China and vis a vis followed by Chinese Humanitarian aid during the Duterte administration from 2016-2018.. 5.1. Filipino-Sino Relation: Philippine Foreign Policy. There were plenty of literature review for the Philippine foreign policy to China during the Duterte administration. Therefore, this section contains a mixture of theories regarding Duterte’s. 政治大 assertiveness in the South China Sea and other political issues between the countries. 立. pursuance of independent foreign policy and his actions and reactions regarding Chinese. ‧ 國. 學. Duterte came to power on July of 2016. His campaign was fueled by war on drugs, fight against guerillas in Mindanao and pursuance of an independent foreign policy that aims to move away. ‧. from the US and on to China or aligned states (Hendler, 2018).. y. Nat. sit. After four months in power, Duterte went to a four day state visit in China where he secured. al. er. io. business contracts, public financing agreements and soft loans for development project and. n. announced the Philippine military and economic split with the US (Roberto, 2018). In his. Ch. i n U. v. speech, at the Great Hall of the People on 20 October 2016 he said: “I announce my separation. engchi. from the United States. Both in military, not maybe social, but economics also. America has lost. I've realigned myself in your ideological flow and maybe I will also go to Russia to talk to (President Vladimir) Putin and tell him that there are three of us against the world - China, Philippines and Russia. It's the only way.” (Acedillo, 2016, slide 3). Duterte’s pivot to China is the result of too much reliance to the US, especially in defense whereas Duterte seek to avoid to be part of major power competition in the region. Furthermore, the importance of diversification of allies in terms of economic and security aspects in a multipolar world is also one of the reason for his shift (Pitlo, 2016). This was illustrated when the economic slowdown of US markets make China an attractive alternative to development and 35. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.

(43) economic opportunities for the Philippines (Ibarra, 2017). This was supported by Kreuzer (2018) when he said that Duterte’s evaluation of the outcome relies on “benefits calculated in the currency of economic profit and more comfortable bilateral relation” instead of “the symbolic rewards of international recognition and respect.” and Heydrian (2018) when he said that China is a “crucial partner for national development”. Other scholar’s emphasized Duterte’s fostering closer security partnership with Japan to equibalance an emergent China instead of the US through major infrastructure and investments deals and resorting to bilateral negotiations with China (De Castro, 2016). While Heydrian (2018) argues that the Western criticism and Chinese support to Duterte’s war on drug also influenced his closer ties with the latter.. 立. 政治大. In terms of maritime issues, in 2016, the Philippine won the arbitration case filed in The Hague. ‧ 國. 學. during the administration of Aquino regarding the disputed territories in SCS. However, Philippine fishermen are still harassed despite the result. While in 2017, images of Chinese. ‧. construction on disputed the waters surfaced in the media but Duterte argues that he is helpless against China and might lose in war against them. It was also said that the Philippines used it. y. Nat. sit. chairmanship to avoid discussion of SCS during the ASEAN summit in that year. A year after,. al. er. io. the Philippines gave a permit to China to explore Bernham rise and argued that it was the only. n. country qualified (Roberto, 2018).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 36. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201900736.