行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 成果報告
1962 年中西文化論戰重探─從哲學觀點的評析
計畫類別: 個別型計畫 計畫編號: NSC92-2411-H-004-010- 執行期間: 92 年 08 月 01 日至 93 年 10 月 31 日 執行單位: 國立政治大學哲學系 計畫主持人: 何信全 報告類型: 精簡報告 處理方式: 本計畫可公開查詢中 華 民 國 94 年 1 月 4 日
【92 年度國科會結案報告】
﹝二﹞、中、英文摘要及關鍵詞 1. 中文摘要及關鍵詞: 關鍵詞:中西文化論戰、《文星》、知識社會學、社會文化背景分析、哲學觀點、 戰後台灣思潮發展 本研究計畫主題為 1962 年以《文星》雜誌為中心的「中西文化論戰」。儘 管此一思想論戰,為戰後台灣思潮發展的重要環節,惟相關研究並不多見。在 相關研究中,有的是論爭事件的一般性報導,並無學術價值;少數具學術價值 的研究,大抵從知識社會學的觀點,注目於此一論爭之社會文化背景的分析, 及其對戰後台灣政治、社經改革的影響。對於論爭雙方的論述本身,反而欠缺 深入的分析;尤其是對反全盤西化一方論述之探討,或者以「保守衛道之士」 簡單帶過,或者完全付之闕如。然而,對於一項文化論爭的研究,只停留在其 發生背景與產生影響的評估,而幾乎完全忽視對雙方所持論述從學理上的分 析,其實已構成對於此一論戰研究之重大缺陷。基於此一看法,本研究計畫以 論戰雙方的論述本身為研究焦點,從哲學觀點探究雙方持論的哲學基礎,論據 的邏輯性,以及回歸論戰所涉及之中西文化本身進行比對與檢視,據以評估論 戰雙方所持論述的理論得失。在此一哲學的研究觀點之下,對於 1962 年中西 文化論戰的評估,超越以往從戰後台灣政治、社經改革的實際效應著眼之窠 臼,而回歸對思想文化觀點本身在學理上是否站得住腳的哲學檢視,並給予論 戰雙方合理而適當的學術評價。透過此一新的研究觀點,本研究計畫完成一篇 研究論文“A Reconciliation between Modernity and Cultural Identity: HsuFu-kuan on Tradition and Westernization”,發表於香港中文大學主辦「香港中 文大學的當代儒者:錢穆、唐君毅、牟宗三、徐復觀」國際學術研討會
(2004.12.20-24) ,嘗試提出對於《文星》中西文化論戰較為深入而公允的評價。
2. Abstract &Keywords:
keywords: controversy over Chinese and western culture, Wen Hsing , sociology of knowledge, socio-cultural background analysis, philosophical viewpoint, intellectual development of postwar Taiwan
The topic of research project is controversy over Chinese and Western Culture on
Wen Hsing magazine in 1962. I take a critical analysis from philosophical viewpoint.
It is a very important controversy in the intellectual development of postwar Taiwan. But the relevant researches about the debate focus on socio-cultural background analysis from the ‘sociology of knowledge’ viewpoint until now. They explore only the causes of the debate and its influences on political and socio-economic
development of postwar Taiwan. Obviously, it is a serious shortcoming of studying cultural dispute for lacking of the examination of philosophical arguments by these
two controversial parties. In view of above-mentioned considerations, I concentrate my attention, instead of socio-cultural background, on the content of their thoughts, and analyze their philosophical justifications. In addition, I also review the various conceptions about Chinese and western culture in the controversy, and suggest the more reasonable and deeper evaluations from a comparative philosophical
viewpoint. Through these theoretical re-explorations, I have accomplished a paper entitled “A Reconciliation between Modernity and Cultural Identity: Hsu Fu-kuan on Tradition and Westernization”, delivered at “International Conference on
Contemporary Confucians of The Chinese University of Hong Kong”, sponsored by The Chinese University of Hong Kong on December 20-23, 2004. In this paper, I put forward a new critical analysis and interpretation concerning the controversy over Chinese-western culture in 1962.
﹝三﹞報告內容 1.前言 作為一世界性之大的文化體,中華文化自近代以來在西方文化挑激之下,迎拒之 間,幾至進退失據的地步。自晚清以來,以「中西文化論戰」為主軸的思想論爭,亦 實未嘗稍歇。從晚清的「中體西用」論,到 1919 年的五四啟蒙運動,以儒學為主流 的中華文化,可以說步步退卻。現代儒者「儒門淡泊」的感嘆,正反映出儒學在現代 華人世界的主流文化中,其實處於邊緣化的地位。儘管事實如此,不過儒家的倫理價 值體系,以及其價值體系相涵的政治與社經制度,能否具有現代意義,一直是華人世 界一個重大而又饒富興味的議題。就此一議題的論爭脈絡而言,如果說 1923 年的「科 學與人生觀論戰」,為五四中西文化論戰的延伸,則戰後台灣從 1950 年代的《自由中 國》與《民主評論》,延續到 1960 年代《文星》時期的中西文化論戰,仍然可以視為 上述議題在台灣思想文化領域的具現。 2.研究目的 本研究計畫以 1962 年《文星》雜誌的「中西文化論戰」為代表的中西文 化論爭為探討主題,乃是延續上述專題研究計畫,繼續探索戰後台灣自由主義 與儒學及其他哲學傳統之間的思想論爭。透過這兩項研究計畫的進行,一方面 希望深入檢視面對以西方文化為主的現代文明挑戰之下,儒家價值的未來前 景,以及華人世界文化認同的相關問題;另一方面亦希望以這兩個思想文化論 爭脈絡為主要軸線,嘗試去建構戰後台灣完整的哲學與思想文化圖象。1962 年《文星》的中西文化論戰,主張全盤西化的論戰者主要為李敖與居浩然,其 理論脈絡來自胡適與殷海光的自由主義;反對全盤西化,認為吸收西方文化與 中華文化傳統的創新並非不能相容的論戰者,以徐復觀、胡秋原與鄭學稼為代 表。徐復觀的理論脈絡為當代新儒學,胡秋原與鄭學稼二人則深研馬克思主 義;胡秋原對以儒家為主流的中華文化傳統有深入的研究與肯認,而鄭學稼則
以對中國共產黨從理論到實際運動的深入研究名家。相較於胡適與殷海光的西 方哲學淵源為英美自由主義與經驗主義、實證論傳統而言,胡秋原、鄭學稼乃 至徐復觀的西方哲學淵源,毋寧是歐陸理性主義的哲學傳統。這也顯示出從英 美或歐陸的不同哲學傳統出發,對儒學與整個中華文化傳統的詮釋與評價存在 著微妙的差異。本研究計劃針對此一論戰議題,從哲學觀點提出若干相關的分 析。 3. 文獻探討 對於以《文星》的「中西文化論戰」為中心的研究,比較據代表性的研究著述 為同時在 1985 年完成的兩篇碩士論文:一篇是政治大學新聞研究所張裕亮所撰《文 星雜誌有關中西文化論戰問題之言論分析─並論近代思想史上關於中西文化問題之 言論》;另一篇為台灣大學社會學研究所陳正然所撰《台灣五 O 年代知識份子的文化 運動─以「文星」為例》。張裕亮的論文採取「思想史」(intellectual history)的研究方 法,將分析焦點定位在「人類對於他們本身所處的環境(situation)的意識反應 (conscious response)」。因為視中西文化論戰為對環境的意識反應,所以作者一方面 用「依附理論」(dependency theory)來說明論戰發生的時代背景,乃是台灣依附美國 為首的西方勢力以求社會經濟之提昇與進步;另一方面則從「文化變遷」(cultural change)的角度,強調「泛科際整合方法」─亦即透過人類學、社會學、心理學、政 治學、法律學以及經濟學等科學的整合運用,以求對變遷中的社會文化有一全面的 了解。基於此項觀點,本論文在結論指出,有關中西文化論戰的言論「事實上只是 一些文藝性策論性的清說與玄談。」 綜觀張裕亮之論文,雖揭示「思想史研究方法」,實則主要從知識社會學的 觀點分析中西文化論戰的社會環境因素,對思想本身的內在發展之分析,可以 說付諸闕如。相較之下,陳正然之論文著眼於以文化思想分析社會變遷,亦即 以知識份子社群面對社會變遷過程,在社會文化層面所表現的回應策略為重 點。陳文雖亦注目意識與環境變遷之關係,惟更重視思想意識之主動性。陳文 的另一特色是注意到《文星》在中西文化論戰之後,從思想價值理念之爭轉移 到重視落實於制度化的安排問題。此一觀察,可以說頗為中肯。不過,陳文對 論戰雙方的思想內容,仍然欠缺深入之分析;對於反對全盤西化的一方─胡秋 原、鄭學稼與徐復觀等人的思想論點,更是陌生。凡此,皆侷限了其論文在《文 星》中西文化論戰研究上的價值與貢獻。 除了上述兩本學術性論文之外,對於 1962 年中西文化論戰的其他若干 評論,例如侯立朝的〈文星集團想走那條路〉一文,以及無非(許逖)所著《文 星•問題•人物》一書,所著眼的乃是相關人物的政治立場與恩怨,與學 術論點的探討無關,嚴格言之並無學術價值。這也顯示出對於《文星》這 場具有嚴肅意義的中西文化論戰,迄今在研究的品質與數量上皆明顯不足, 而有待於提出基於學術觀點的深入分析與評估。 4. 研究方法
本研究採用之研究方法,主要為文獻的分析與詮釋。首先,蒐集 1962 年中 西文化論戰之原始文獻,包括論戰雙方在《文星》發表的論戰相關文章,以及 當時在其他期刊雜誌發表的論戰相關文章。其次,蒐集參與論戰者本身之著作, 以期更系統而周延地掌握各論戰者的主張與論據。再則,進一步蒐集與此一論 戰直接或間接相關的二手探討文獻,以期對原始文獻的分析與詮釋有所裨益。 透過對上述文獻的分析與詮釋,進行雙方論爭主題與所持論據的梳理。在掌握 雙方論爭主題與所持論據之後,本研究將進行兩項檢視:一是對雙方的主張及 其所持之論據,進行邏輯一致性的檢視;二是回歸中西文化的比較脈絡,據以 評估雙方對中西文化看法的主張。這一部分研究工作的進行,將藉助於比較哲 學的觀點,特別是本人以儒學與自由主義為例示的中西哲學比較的研究心得與 成果。上述兩項檢視,基本上乃是從哲學觀點的檢視。此一哲學研究觀點,構 成本研究重新探討 1962 年中西文化論戰的方法主軸。 5. 結果與討論
本研究計劃目前已完成“A Reconciliation between Modernity and Cultural Identity: Hsu Fu-kuan on Tradition and Westernization”一文,並發表於由香港中 文大學哲學系、新亞書院、崇基學院主辦之「香港中文大學的當代儒者:錢穆、 唐君毅、牟宗三、徐復觀」國際學術會議 (2004 年 12 月 20-23 日)。論文全文 如附件。 這篇論文討論的主題,是以徐復觀論傳統與西化為例,探討現代性的追求 與中華文化認同之間的困境,以及其調諧之道等相關議題。1962 年,在台灣以 《文星》雜誌為主要論壇,引發一場「中西文化論戰」。此一論戰,因胡適在 1961 年一篇題為〈科學發展所需要的社會改革〉的主題演講,引發徐復觀以〈中國人 的恥辱,東方人的恥辱〉為題的強烈反擊而起。本文將徐復觀有關傳統與西化的 相關論述,回歸到近、現代中國在現代性追求與文化認同之間的內在張力脈絡之 中,就其所致力之理論上的調諧之道,進行比較深入的考察。全文主要根據徐復 觀對胡適等西化派的批判論述,來加以分析探討。 徐復觀對胡適以及西化派的批判重點之一,在於指出西化派之科學觀的偏狹 性,乃至是對科學的一種誤解。徐復觀指出,以胡適為首的西化派,採取了一種 科學萬能論,亦即科學主義(scientism)的觀點。在這種觀點之下,從科學獨霸的 角度,將道德與宗教等非科學之精神價值加以貶抑,甚至否定,因而認識不到東 方在道德與宗教等精神領域的成就與價值。胡適等西化派此一否定中國(以及東 方)傳統與文化的論斷,使其強調現代性的追求,必須對中國傳統與文化加以拒 絕,亦即由激進的反傳統論述,引發文化認同危機此一嚴重之問題。徐復觀對胡 適等西化派科學萬能論提出嚴厲批評,並透過對中國文化內涵的分析,探索其與 科學發展相容與相輔相成之道。本文指出徐復觀的論述,深符當代科學哲學與政 治社會哲學之理論發展,本文根據海耶克與波柏的理論,提出若干相關之分析。 徐復觀對胡適等西化派的批判重點之二,在於指出西化派從個人主義觀點,
將中國社會文化定位為威權式的文化與上下隸屬的階層結構。以殷海光的術語來 說,中國社會文化是由經濟意義的「階級」,以及其所對應之倫理意義的「倫級」, 與政治意義的「官級」等上下階層結構所構成。在這樣的社會文化脈絡之中,自 由平等而獨立的個人無由出現,因而中國民主的追求,必須先破壞儒家式的威權 階層結構,及其伴連的一套思維模式。西化派此一論述觀點,同樣指向中國現代 性的追求與文化認同難以一致的困境。關於此一議題,1958 年當代新儒家〈為 中國文化敬告世界人士宣言〉中,從儒家以性善論為出發點的「心性之學」之中, 抉發出在實踐中覺悟個人內在之普遍心性的進路,據以楬櫫「人格平等」與「天 下為公」之普遍性原則,做為與現代自由民主理路接榫之依據。作為宣言的共同 簽署人之一,徐復觀一方面對儒家性善論、人格平等、人性尊嚴與現代自由民主 的理論關聯,有深入之發揮;另一方面,他根據《論語》、《孟子》以及《荀子》 皆以堯舜終篇的微意,闡釋其為代表古典儒家「天下為公」的政治理想,以及此 一政治理想與現代自由民主精神的會通之處。本文並以陳榮捷先生從西方「普遍 的自然法」視域,詮釋孟子性善論之「內在普遍心性」觀點,指出在中國儒學傳 統之中,蘊含西方近代作為自由民主理論根源的「普遍理性觀」(conception of universal reason),透過此一普遍理性的觀點,中國儒學與西方近代自由主義、啟 蒙傳統的理論,二者其實得以會通。就此而言,中國西化派的觀點,似乎並未深 入西方自由民主的理論內在根源。 徐復觀對胡適等西化派的批判重點之三,在於指出西化派從社會文化層面批 判中國傳統與文化,忽略了傳統與文化有不同層次之分。徐復觀根據日本學者務 臺理作的觀點,指出傳統有低次元傳統與高次元傳統之分;同樣,文化亦有基層 文化與高層文化之分。胡適以及殷海光等西化派對中國傳統與文化的批評,實際 上只侷限在低次元傳統與基層文化,而忽視了中國高次元傳統與高層文化之中, 所蘊含之豐沛的現代性資源。另一方面,徐復觀批評西化派所持「傳統 vs.現代」 之二分模式,將傳統與現代視為斷裂,導出徹底反傳統之論,忽略了傳統與現代 複雜的延續性。從晚近學術發展觀點來看,徐復觀的論點實屬深入之論。本文引 述人類學家 Robert Redfield 對於傳統與文化之層次的分類(亦即大傳統與小傳 統),作為討論傳統與文化層次之分的佐證;並根據當代社群主義者 Charles Taylor 與 Alasdair MacIntyre 等人之論述,指出自由主義強調的個人自由,如欠缺傳統 與文化所提供的價值判斷資源,事實上是不可能實現的;由傳統與文化所構成的 社會背境脈絡,亦是個人基於自由、自決去實現自我所不可或缺。就此而論,近、 現代中國在西化派論述中陷於現代性與文化認同的困境之中,其實是建立在對現 代性與中華文化淺層觀察的基礎之上。 本文的結論指出,徐復觀對中國西化派的科學觀、民主觀以及傳統與文化觀 之批評,衡諸晚近相關學術的主流論述,基本上相當深入而中肯;就調諧中國在 現代性的追求與文化認同二者之間的難題而言,可以說提供了重要的理論架構與 有價值的論述內涵。不過,回歸 1962 年《文星》中西文化論戰之一般觀察,卻 似乎是西化派獲勝。這種在學術真理論辯上輸的一方獲勝之情況,這不是第一
次;往上溯至 1923 年的科學與人生觀論戰,以及 1919 年前後的東西文化論戰, 似乎都曾出現類似的情況。就此而論,在二十世紀引發的幾次中、西文化論戰, 顯然仍有重新深入探究與評估之必要。 ﹝四﹞附件:本計畫已發表之論文
Hsin-chuan Ho
National Chengchi University
Delivered at International Conference on Contemporary Confucians Of The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Sponsored by The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Date: December 20-23, 2004
A Cultural Debate
In contemporary Chinese-speaking world, it is one of the most important unsettled questions about the relationships between Chinese traditional culture and modernity. Since the search for modernization often result in the rejection of Chinese
tradition and culture, it seems to be a serious problem of cultural identity of modern Chinese. In 1962, there was a very important cultural debate about the complex relationships between Chinese traditional culture and modernity on Wen Hsing magazine in Taiwan. The fiery debate resulted from Hu Shih’s keynote speech entitled “Social Changes Necessary for the Growth of Science” delivered at Four-Nation Science Education Conference in Taipei on November 6, 1961.1 In this keynote speech, Hu Shih emphasizes the importance of science and technology, and takes a radical critique on the shortcomings of Oriental civilizations for their lacking of the spirit of science.
Against Hu’s critical viewpoints in his keynote speech, Hsu Fu-kuan expresses his counterblast. On the one hand, Hsu refutes Hu’s conception of science, and indicates that it is a prejudice of the omnipotence of science. On the other hand, he makes a defense for the achievements of Oriental traditions and cultures. Hsu does not opposite the efforts to learn modern western civilizations, especially modern science and democracy, which without doubt represent the most important achievements of modernity. But he stresses that the search for science and democracy need not at the expense of giving up Chinese tradition and culture.2 He makes an effort to construct a
*This is a draft. Please do not cite.
1
This keynote speech was collected in Hu Shih, A collection of Hu Shih’s English Writings, entitled:“ Social Changes and Science”, compiled by Chih-p’ing Chou. Taipei: Yuan-Liou, 1995.
2 Hsü Fu-kuan, “Zhong-guo-ren ti chih-ju tung-fang-ren ti chih-ju”﹝The Shame of Chinese, The
discourse for the reconciliation between modernity and Chinese traditional culture for sustaining Chinese cultural identity in the process of Chinese modernization.
Obviously, it is an interesting and important thesis for Chinese-speaking world and worthy of our reflections and explorations.
In this paper, I would like to take an analysis of Hsu Fu-kuan’s discourses about the relationships between Chinese tradition and westernization. My focus concentrates on the three dimensions. First, whether science and Chinese traditional culture are
incompatible? Secondly, are there some beneficial ingredients of democracy in Chinese culture? And thirdly, whether the role of tradition and culture are negative obstacles in the process of the search for modernity. Through some reflective examinations, I’ll take an analysis of Hsu Fu-kuan’s theoretical effort to reconcile modernity and Chinese cultural identity.
Reflections on the Omnipotence of Science
In modern China, democracy and science are two goals of modernization, and at the same time, the modernization seems to be identified with westernization by Chinese Westernizers. Therefore, it is evident that democracy and science are the essential contents of westernization. Just as Chen Tu-hsiu, one of the most important intellectual leaders of May Fourth Movement, points out:
[We] supported the two gentlemen, Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science. In order to advocate Mr. Democracy, we are obliged to oppose Confucianism, the codes of rituals, chastity of women, traditional ethics, and old-fashioned politics; in order to advocate Mr. Science, we have to oppose traditional arts and traditional religion; and in order to advocate both Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science, we are compelled to oppose the cult of the “national quintessence” and ancient literature.3
In other words, according to Chen’s viewpoint, it is a dilemma between tradition and westernization. From this viewpoint one may say that China is in an awkward predicament between modernity and cultural identity. Concerning to “ Mr. Science”, as a Westernizer, Hu Shih believes that science is the core of modern western
civilization. According to Hu’s viewpoint, the Oriental cannot help promoting some kind of intellectual change or revolution for the growth of science. Hu considers that the Oriental intellectual revolution at least ought to include negative and positive aspects. He indicates:
3
Quoted in Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 59.
Negatively, we should get rid of our deep-rooted prejudice that, while the West has undoubtedly excelled in its material and materialistic civilization, we Orientals can take pride in our superior spiritual civilization. We may have to get rid of this unjustifiable pride and learn to admit that there is very little spirituality in the civilization of the East. And positively, we should learn to understand and appreciate that science and technology are not materialistic but are highly idealistic and spiritual values; indeed they represent a true idealism and spirituality sadly underdeveloped in our Oriental civilizations. 4
In short, Hu criticizes that there is little or no spirituality of the Oriental
civilizations, exemplified by the footbinding for women for over a thousand years in China and the caste system for many thousands of years in India. He also takes a strong attack on Indian view of life, such as the conception of life as painful and not worth living, glorifies poverty and mendicancy, and sanctifies diseases as an act of the gods. He eulogizes that the new civilization of science and technology of the West is truly great spiritual achievement of man.5
Hsu Fu-kuan criticizes that Hu’s conception of science is a very questionable assertion. He considers that Hu at least makes two mistakes. First, Hu holds a prejudice about the relationships between science and other human values, such as morality and religion. Secondly, Hu lacks a deep understanding of tradition and culture. About the first point, against Hu’s enthusiastic eulogy of modern civilization of science and technology, Hsu emphasizes the limitations of science. He points out that Hu holds the prejudice of the omnipotence of science, and questions his
motivations of the considerations for maintaining his own social status. In fact, instead of eulogy, the development of science and technology raises the deep
reflections and criticisms. Contemporary important thinkers, such as E. Spranger, A. Einstein and A. Carrel, they reflect the deficiencies of scientific technology, and point out the importance of morality and religion in modern society. There is fairly general agreement that it ought not to replace morality and religion with science for the realization of good life. In short, Hsu criticizes that Hu ignores the achievements of Oriental spirituality manifested in the moral and religious dimensions.6
It is evident that Hu’s conception of science is a kind of scientism from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science. Hu’s conception of science acquired from John Dewey’ experimentalism. Just as Lin Yü-sheng points out:
The denotations and connotations of modernization and modernity for Hu were thus not ambiguous , but meant all those things positively affirmed and argued for by Dewey’s early
4 Hu Shih, op.cit., p.39. 5
Ibid., pp.39-40.
experimentalism. (Hu seemed not to have followed the more mature and subtler later development of Dewey’s philosophy. For instance, he was not very familiar with Dewey’s development of the concept of “quality” in aesthetic and religious dimensions of experience.) The aim of Hu’s intellectual endeavor was simple and clear. It consisted of making Chinese culture a scientistic one in which everything—including ethics—was to be arbitrated by science and the Deweyan method of science.7
It is generally agreed that science is the important ingredient of modernity. But the roles and contributions of science seem to be over-estimated in Hu’s thought. At the same time, owing to Hu’s scientistic perspective, he cannot help rejecting
Chinese culture for the primacy of moral concerns in Chinese culture. This results in the dissolution between modernity and cultural identity in Chinese-speaking world. In fact, Hu’s viewpoints reflect the prevailing tendency of the destruction of
irreplaceable values by scientific prejudice. F. A. Hayek points out:
[The] errors derive mostly from the Cartesian scientism and constructivism as development by Auguste Comte. Logical positivism has been trying to show that all moral values are ‘devoid of meaning’, purely ‘emotive’; it is wholly contemptuous of the conception that even emotional responses selected by biological or cultural evolution may be of the greatest importance for the coherence of an advanced society.8
For Hayek, scientism or scientistic prejudice is a “slavish imitation of the method and language of science”. It is “an attitude which is decidedly unscientific in the true sense of the word, since it involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they have been formed.” And we shall have to be content to describe this characteristic of thought as “engineering type of mind”.9 Karl R. Popper also indicates that scientism is “a dogmatic
methodological naturalism”.10 It is obvious that Hu lacks the deep understanding about the limitations of science.
Hsu’s criticism on Hu’s scientism supplies an important clarification for the resolution about the dilemma between searching for science and sustaining cultural identity in modern China. In fact, Hsu’s propositions along with the general
7 Lin Yü-sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in The May Fourth
Era( Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), p.91.
8 F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation And Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and
Political Economy, Volume 3, The Political Order of A Free People( London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1982), p.173.
9 F. A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason (Glencoe, Ill.: The
Free Press,1952), pp.15-16. Karl R. Popper also indicates scientism as “a dogmatic methodological naturalism”.
discourses of contemporary neo-Confucianism. In term of contemporary
neo-Confucianism, as an intellectual and cultural movement, we cannot but mention a critical essay, entitled “ A Manifesto for a Re-appraisal of Sinology and
Reconstruction of Chinese Culture” in 1958.11 The manifesto signed by Hsu Fu-kuan
and other neo-Confucians, Carsun Chang, Tang Chun-I, and Mou Tsung-san. About science and the development of Chinese culture, they indicate that ancient China laid much emphasis on practical knowledge and skills, and prior to eighteen century, China was more advanced than the West in the manufacture of handicrafts and utensils as well as in farming techniques. But they assert:
If China still falls short of Western scientific accomplishments, it is because the scientific spirit of the West is beyond a purely pragmatic motive. This scientific spirit of the West originated in the Greek dictum of “knowledge for the sake of knowledge.” This demands the suspension, at the least temporarily, of all practical or moral activities, transcending evaluations, and moral judgment to permit the intellect on the one hand to observe each phenomenon objectively and on the other hand to pursue rational inferences by means of which it may illuminate the laws of the universe and its categories of thought and logic. Such a spirit is precisely what was lacking in China’s ancient philosophy so that theoretical science could not evolve, and the progress of her arts and technology was arrested.12
It follows from what has been said that Chinese people must therefore endeavor to achieve self-realization as intellectuals as well as moral beings, and search for a proper balance of morality and intellect.13 In short, despite of emphasizing the importance of leaning science, Hsu Fu-kuan and other contemporary neo-Confucians believe that science and Chinese culture are not incompatible. And at the same time, morality is as important as science. Reflections on some of these will make clear that the search for reconciliation between modernity and Chinese cultural identity is important, and it is also possible through a proper theoretical clarification.
Democracy and Chinese Traditional Culture
In addition to science, democracy is another claim of modern Chinese movement of westernization. It seems to be clear that the Chinese dominant guideline of
11 The manifesto published in the Chinese original simultaneously in The Democratic Review and
National Renaissance in Taiwan, New Year issues of 1958. The English translation as an appendix collected in Carsun Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, Vol.Π( New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), pp.455-83. According to this English translation essay, we take an abbreviation under the title “Manifesto” in the following quotation.
12
Ibid. pp.469-70.
traditional Chinese politics, according to Confucianism, is “rule of sage-king”. In other words, the doctrine of traditional Confucian political philosophy is on the basis of the conception of sage ruler. The Chinese Westernized liberals criticize radically the conception of sage ruler, and point out the incompatibility between Confucianism and liberal democracy. In addition to the liberals, some other Chinese cultural
conservative holds the same viewpoint, too. The former exemplified by Hu Shih and Yin Hai-kuan, and the latter illustrated by Liang Shu-ming.
So far as the conception of democracy of Hu Shih is concerned, just as J. B. Grieder indicates:
Hu regarded democracy…less as a concrete system of political institution than as a state of mind conducive to the maintenance of a particular social condition. It followed logically that the creation of a democratic society would be
essentially an intellectual rather than a political accomplishment.14
Indeed, owing to the influence of John Dewey, Hu stresses the intellectual dimensions of democracy. According to Dewey’s viewpoint, democracy is a kind of the way of life. Hu emphasizes the state of mind of democracy, and advocates individualism as the most important intellectual basis of democracy. From the individualistic perspective, Hu stresses the essential difference between Chinese and western social traditions. Grieder points out:
[Hu considers that] Western concepts of individualism, and Western attempts to reconcile the conflict between individual and social purposes…as a point at which Chinese and Western social traditions diverged radically. Confucian social theory emphasized authoritarian hierarchies and relative status within them, placing a premium on the preservation of social equilibrium and on time-honored distinction between those who govern and those who are governed.15
From Hu’s perspective, contrast to Western type of reconciling the conflict between individual and social purposes on the basis of individualism, Chinese Confucianism depends on authoritarian hierarchies and relative status in society. Accordingly, it is an important task to destroy the authoritarian assumptions of Confucianism for the development of democracy.
As to Yin Hai-kuang, he criticizes that Confucianism replaced rule of law with rule of rite. Yin considers that contrast to “social class ” in the economic meaning,
14 Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution,
1917-1937( Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p.178.
there is a so-called “ethical class” in ethical meaning in Chinese traditional society, and the “ethical class” is one-to-one correspondent to the “official class” in political meaning.16 It is obvious that Yin’s perspective is analogous with Hu’s, their criticisms of Confucianism focus on the authoritarian hierarchies in Chinese traditional society.
On the other hand, as a cultural conservative, Liang Shu-ming stresses on the dilemma between Chinese culture and modernity. Because Chinese culture might be incompatible with modernization, Liang considers that western modern political democracy will not work for Chinese people.17
It has been the prevailing viewpoint that the relationship between Confucianism and liberalism is incompatible since May Fourth era. But the prevailing viewpoint has been challenged by contemporary neo-Confucians. Contemporary neo-Confucians interpret Confucianism on the basis of “the doctrine of ‘hsin-hsin’ (concentration of mind on an exhaustive study of the nature of the universe), which is a study of the basis of ethics and forms the nucleus of Chinese thought and is the source of all theories of the ‘ conformity of heaven and man in virtue.’ ”18 Contemporary neo-Confucians admire the excellence of the doctrine of “ hsin-hsin”, and points out that the doctrine “does implicitly contain a metaphysics, but this metaphysics is more like Kant’s ‘ethical’ metaphysics. It serves as the basis for moral conduct, and in turn is testified to by this conduct.”19
Contemporary neo-Confucians also admit that there are some shortcomings of Chinese tradition for lack of science and democracy. But, they stress the point that “ China certainly lacks the modern democratic system and scientific and technological achievements of the West; yet, it is erroneous to think that her culture contains neither the seeds of democracy nor such tendencies, or that it is hostile to science and
technology.” 20Moreover, how the contemporary neo-Confucians to justify the germ of democracy in Chinese traditional culture? They consider that “ Chinese monarchy was quite different from its West counterpart, for Chinese political thought early identified popular will with the decree of Heaven.”21 According to this point of view, “ the limitations on the power of the ruler must be transferred from the ministers to the people outside the governmental structure if they are to be effectual.”22 In the
16 Yin Hai-kuang, Re-appraisal of Cultural Change in Modern China (Taipei: Kwei-kuan, 1990),
pp.197-98.
17 Liang Shu-ming, Chung-kuo min-tsu tzu-chiu yun-tung chih tsui-hou chueh-wu (Final Awakening of
the Chinese People’s Self-salvation Movement)(Taipei: Hsueh-shu, 1971), pp.101-41. See also Guy S. Allito, The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley & Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1979), chap.3,4.
18 “Manifesto”, p.461. 19 Ibid., p.463. 20 Ibid., p.469. 21 Ibid., p.471. 22 Ibid., p.472.
other hand, the Confucians stress on “ the conception that the nation belonged not to one man but to the people of the nation and that government aimed at the good of the people.”23 It follows from what has been said that democracy is the natural direction of development for Chinese history.
In addition to the conception that the nation belongs not to one man but to the people of the nation, contemporary neo-Confucians emphasize the importance of Confucian conception of the equality of human personality that everyman as a moral subject. And for the achievement of everyone’s own moral self-realization, it is necessary to establish a democratic government. According to the traditional Confucian idea of “reign by virtue”:
[The] monarch could, to be sure, reign with moral integrity and the people thus bathe in his morality. But the people would still be passive, and therefore unable to achieve moral self-realization….the
ruler must first make his position accessible to each and every one of those qualified for it, and in this way affirm political equality for all the citizens. It then follows that a constitution must be drawn up, in accordance with the popular will, to be the basis of the exercise by the people of their political rights. Only thus may the people all attain moral self-realization, since self-realization demands, politically, the freedom both to ascend to and to retire from official positions.24
Hsu Fu-kuan on democracy, along with the basic assertion of “the doctrine of hsin-hsin” of Manifesto, and take a further interpretation. He considers:
Chinese culture is based on the theory of the original goodness of human nature. This is the true origin of human dignity, human equality, human peaceful interactions, and of course the origin of political liberal democracy.25
In short, according to Hsu’s viewpoint, Confucius is the first philosopher who discovered the conception of “universal social world” in Chinese cultural history. Confucius’s ideas broke the unreasonable social classification, and recognized the universal equality of human beings.26 In other respect, Hsu considers that the rule of Yao and Shun represents Confucius’s political ideal, i.e. the nation belongs not to one man but to the people. Therefore, the ending chapters of The Analects, The Book of
Mencius and The Hsun Tzu entitled “ Yao and Shun”. The editorial arrangements
23
Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Hsu Fu-kuan, Ru-jia zheng-zhi si-xiang yu min-zhu zhi-you ren-quan [Confucian Political Thought
and Democracy, Freedom, Human Rights]. (Taipei: The Student Press, 1988), p.99.
26
Hsu Fu-kuan, Zhong-guo ren-xing-lun shi [A history of Chinese Theory of Human Nature]. (Taipei: Shang-wu,1984), pp.64-65.
reflect the classical Confucian political ideal.27
It seems to be acceptable that the original goodness of human nature is the
dominating thinking in traditional Chinese culture. Mencius is the father of the theory of original goodness of human nature. According to Mencius, “Man’s nature is
naturally good just as water naturally flows downward. There is no man without this good nature; neither is there water that does not flow downward.” “What is it that we have in common in our minds? It is the sense of principle and righteousness (i-li, moral principles).”28Wing-Tsit Chan indicates:
In saying that one is of the same kind as the sage, Mencius was pronouncing two principles of utmost significance. One is that every person can be perfect, and the other is that all people are basically equal. Also, in pointing to the moral principle which is common in our minds, he is pointing to what amounts to the Natural Law. Belief in the Natural Law has been persistent in Chinese history. It is called Principle of Nature (T’ien-li) by Neo-Confucianists. It is essentially the same as Mencius’ i-li.29
If we agree to Chan’s interpretation of Mencius’s theory of original goodness of human nature, which amount to natural law, then we need to accept that there is the source of the conception of universal reason in Chinese cultural tradition. And it seems to be possible to search for the congruence with the Enlightenment of the West. From this point of view, we can find out a key to open the door of the world of
modern liberalism. Concerning to modern liberalism, just as David T. Goldberg points out:
[Liberalism] seeks foundations in universal principles applicable to all human beings or rational agents in virtue of their humanity or rationality. It is concerned with broad identities, which it sees uniting persons on moral grounds, rather than with those identities that divide politically, culturally, geographically, or temporally. The philosophical basis of this broad human identity, of an
essentially human nature, is presumed to lie in a rational core common to each individual, and so in the (potential) capacity to be moved by reason.30
If we agree to what has been said that the universal reason is the common basis of Chinese and Western assumptions of human nature, then it seems to be plausible that there is an approach to reconcile democracy and Chinese culture.
27
Ibid., p.67.
28 Quoted in Wing-Tsit Chan (trans. & ed.), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963). The Book of Mencius, 6A:2,7. pp.52-56.
29 Ibid., p.56. 30
David T. Goldberg(ed.), Ethical Theory and Social Issues: Historical Texts and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed.( New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1995), p.148.
Reconciling Modernity and Cultural Identity
In addition to the critical reflections on the prejudice of scientism of Hu Shih, Hsu Fu-kuan makes an effort to re-explore the theoretical roots of liberal democracy in Chinese traditional culture. Hsu indicates that Hu and other Chinese Westernizers lack deep understanding of the roles and functions of tradition and culture in the progress of human civilizations, and they also don’t realize deeply the achievements of Chinese tradition and culture. Contrast to Hu’s attitude of rejection, Hsu Fu-kuan holds a positive and respectful attitude to Chinese traditional culture.
About the general understanding of tradition and culture, Hsu adopts the
classifications of tradition and culture by a Japanese scholar, Mutai Risaku. According to Mutai’s viewpoint, tradition and culture may be classified into “low and high tradition” and “low and high culture”.31 The low tradition comprises customs, habits and conventions, and the high tradition composes of the spiritual creations of religious prophets, saints, artists or thinkers. In other hand, the low culture is represented by general and popular culture, and the high culture is just the creations of intellectuals for the search of knowledge, the liberation of individuality, the acquisition of new things and the establishment of new atmosphere.32 From Hsu’s perspective, owing to Hu’s ignoring the distinction between high and low tradition and culture, Hu
maximizes the footbinding and the caste system as the primary representations of Chinese and Indian civilizations. For the reason given above, Hu refuses to acknowledge the value and achievements of Oriental civilizations. In fact, the
footbinding and the caste system are the phenomena of low tradition and culture. It is evident that besides the footbinding and the caste system, there are some other achievements of high tradition and culture in the Oriental civilizations.
Besides ignoring the distinction between high and law tradition and culture, Hsu criticizes that Hu holds a superficial conception of tradition and culture. From the viewpoint of Hsu, Hu and modern Chinese antitraditionalists don’t have a deep
understanding about Chinese tradition and culture. Take May Fourth Movement for an example, the intellectuals make an effort to destroy Chinese tradition, and at the same time search for a new culture. It must be noted that they make a serious mistake for
31 See Hsu Fu-kuan, Hsu Fu-kuan wen-lu xuan cui [The Best Selections from Hsu Fu-kuan’s Essays]
(Taipei: The Student Press, 1980), pp.97-99, 110-12. According to Redfield’s classification, this pair of phrases is “little tradition” and “great tradition”. Redfield also indicates that this pair of phrases is chosen from among others, including “high culture” and “low culture”, “folk and classic cultures”, “popular and learned traditions”, and “hierarchic and lay cultures”. See Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Civilization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp.70-75.
their identifying political reign and social tradition, and therefore, they advocate a thorough overthrow to the unreasonable authoritarian rule in political area together with the traditional culture in social area. In fact, traditional culture is in the
evolutional process in any society. Owing to the occurrences of new things in society, tradition is changing successively and uninterruptedly. 33
So far as we know that Hsu’s conception of tradition and culture is conformable to contemporary communitarian viewpoints. In cotemporary communitarian discourses, they emphasize the importance of tradition and culture as the social condition required for the self-realization of individual. For Charles Taylor, it is the assertion of “social thesis”. Taylor criticizes the political and social theories which are based on
“atomism”. According to atomistic theories, individuals are self-sufficient outside of society. They are not in need of any communal context in order to develop and exercise their capacity for self-determination.34 Taylor indicates that atomism is a very questionable thesis. In fact, human beings are social animal, and they possess sociability. Taylor points out:
What has been argued in the different theories of the social nature of man is not just that men cannot physically survive alone, but much more that they only develop their characteristically human capacities in society. The claim is that living in society is a necessary condition of the development of rationality, in some sense of this property, or of becoming a moral agent in the full sense of the term, or becoming a fully responsible, autonomous being. …What they have in common is the view that outside society, or in some variants outside certain kinds of society, our distinctively human capacities could not develop. 35
According to “social thesis”, society is not only an institution, it comprises of tradition and culture in the historical process. In other words, concerning to the development of human capacity of autonomy, “surely it is something which only within an entire civilization”, and “ the free individual and autonomous moral agent can only achieve and maintain his identity in a certain type of culture”. 36Taylor indicates, further:
I am arguing that the free individual of the West is only what he is by virtue of the whole society and civilization which brought him to be and which nourishes him; that our families can only form us up this capacity and these aspirations because they are set in this civilization; and that a family alone
33
Ibid., pp.113-14.
34 See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2002), p.243-46.
35 Charles Taylor, Philosophy And The Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.190-91.
outside of this context—the real old patriarchal family—was a quite different animal which never tended these horizons.37
In short, from Taylor’s perspective, so far as human capacity to be free agents is concerned, the roles of tradition and culture are indispensable. In addition to Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre also stresses the importance of tradition and culture. According to the virtue-based moral theory of MacIntyre, the moral character of person has to develop in social practice, i.e. “coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate”.38In other word, MacIntyre considers that the realization of excellence in human life bases on coherent and complex social practice, and it embodies in tradition and culture. MacIntyre points out:
A social setting may be an institution, it may be what I have called a practice, or it may be a milieu of some other human kind. But it is central to the notion of a setting as I am going to understand it that a setting has a history, a history within which the histories of individual agents not only are, but have to be, situated, just because without the setting and its changes through time the history of the individual agent and his changes through time will be unintelligible.39
In short, from MacIntyre’s viewpoint, a social setting which comprises of
historical tradition and culture is necessary for human activities. It follows from what has been said that contemporary communitarians criticize the conception of “liberal neutrality” of liberalism. Just as Kymlicka indicates:
Meaning choices concerningour projects require meaningful options, and (the social thesis tell us) these options come from our culture. Liberal neutrality, however, is incapable of ensuring the existence of a rich and diverse culture which provides such options.40
Besides what has been mentioned about communitarian discourses on the
importance of tradition and culture, Honghe Liu also indicates that contemporary political and social thoughts can no longer remain content with the inherited clear-cut dichotomy of liberal and conservative, of progressive and reactionary. According to his studies of contemporary sociologists and political philosophers,
37 Ibid., p.206.
38 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed.(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984),
p.187.
39
Ibid. pp.206-07.
such as Edward Shils, Lloyd I. Ruldoph, Susanne Hoeber, Rudolph and Carl J. Friedrich, Liu points out:
They point out that tradition and modernity, instead of being dichotomous, infiltrate and transform each other. For them, the political system of freedom must be accepted by its members as given, and this acceptance must be based on the affirmation of what in the present is involved in the past; therefore, the free society must rest on tradition.41
It is obvious that Hsu’s discourses on tradition and culture are conformable to the contemporary prevailing intellectual viewpoints. Let us now return to the cultural debate in 1962, we may go on from this the conclusion that antitraditionalists seem to be distant from the truth despite of being the winner in the controversy.
Concluding Remarks
It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that Hsu Fu-kuan and Hu Shih are almost diametrically opposed to each other concerning the relationships between Chinese traditional culture and modernity. On the one hand, with respect to modernity, they all agree to the search for science and democracy, but their agreement stop here. About the nature of science, the limits of scientific technology and the relationships between science and spiritual values, such as religion, morality, etc., their viewpoints are very different. About the development of democracy, Hu holds western individualism, and criticizes Chinese social and political tradition from an individualistic perspective. Contrast to Hu’s rejection of Chinese traditional culture, Hsu makes an effort to explore the roots of democracy in Chinese Traditional culture. On the other hand, Hsu and Hu hold the different viewpoints about the roles of tradition and culture, they mutually disagree to the problem whether there is continuity between tradition and modernity. Because of the different viewpoints of these two aspects about the relationships between modernity and Chinese traditional culture, Hu considers that Chinese traditional culture and modernity are incompatible, and contrast to Hu’s pessimistic viewpoint, Hsu holds an optimistic attitude and search for a reconciliation between Chinese traditional culture and modernity.
It must be noticed that the relationships between Chinese traditional culture and modernity is a difficult and complex question, which puzzled the contemporary Chinese intellectuals, and make painstaking efforts to find the answer for the development of country. Concerning liberalism, there are at least two types of
41
Honghe Liu, Confucianism in the Eyes of a Confucian Liberal: Hsu Fu-kuan’s Critical Examination of the Confucian Political Tradition (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), pp.15, 177-84.
liberalism in modern western history of political philosophy. One connected with British empiricism, the other based on the foundation of the tradition of European Enlightenment. In most contemporary Chinese liberals, such as Hu Shih and his follower Yin Hai-kuang, they introduce the first type of liberalism and neglect the second type of liberalism. As mentioned above, behind Hu’s discussions about
liberalism, we can find out the influence of his teacher John Dewey’s experimentalism and instrumentalism. It is evident that the Deweyan conception of scientific method is the extension of the tradition of British empiricism. In Yin’s discourses of liberalism, the arguments base on empiricism and logical positivism. Hu and Yin emphasize the incompatibility between liberalism (modernity) and Confucianism (Chinese
traditional culture), their propositions base not only on liberalism but also on experimentalism and logical empiricism. Owing to following British empiricism tradition, Chinese Westernizers can’t find out the beneficial resources to solve the problem of reconciliation between modernity and Chinese traditional culture. Just as above-mentioned, contemporary neo-Confucians indicate that Confucianism contains a metaphysics, which is more like Kantian ethical metaphysics. Generally speaking, Chinese traditional culture is analogous with European rationalism or Enlightenment, rather than British empiricism.
In short, Hsu Fu-kuan makes an effort to reconcile modernity and Chinese cultural identity through a new interpretation of Chinese tradition and culture. Hsu and Liang Su-ming all agree to the ultimate solution to China’s predicament is modernization through cultural revival. But contrast to Liang’s project of “rural reconstruction”,42 Hu’s project is “to reconstruct Chinese new tradition through the self-consciousness of Chinese high tradition and reconciliation between Chinese and Western culture”.43 It follows from what has been said that Hsu’s approach is valuable and important for the solution of the predicament between modernity and Chinese cultural identity. 42
See Alitto, op.cit., chap. ix.