Security Dilemma across the Taiwan
Strait: Peace by Pieces
*Yuan-ming Yao
Director of Research, Prospect Foundation
Abstract
Since the 1990s, the historical evolution of cross-Strait dynamics could be explained by lukewarm experiences through the shelving of political disputes but without the avoidance of political interference. In light of the broader backdrop of cross-Strait rapprochement in 2008, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have held eight rounds of negotiations and have signed eighteen agreements on economic and functional issues. Intergration Theory precisely illuminates the econo-mic logic of cooperation and interdependence in cross-Strait dynaecono-mics and appropriately explains the current phenomena of multiple channels and different agendas across the Strait. However, Intergration Theory hardly explains political disputes in cross-Strait relations. Cross-Strait relations have been on-again and off-again, having been inter-rupted by or compromised due to political concerns. Nowadays it is crucial to encourage cross-Strait cooperation through a bilateral in-stitutionalized mechanism to consolidate current cooperation on func-tional issues. Furthermore, this article argues that by putting the sov-ereignty dispute aside, the current cross-Strait relations have to face
*Part of this paper concerning security dilemma theories and analyses had first
pub-licized in the CNAPS working paper at the Brookings Institution in 2011. Herein the author thanks comments from Richard Bush, Kevin Scott and Jennifer Mason.
a security dilemma that is raised by fears of uncertainty such as that China fears Taiwan independence and any sovereignty measures, that Taiwan fears unification maneuvers and the Chinese military buildup, while the cross-Strait security dilemma causes US-China relations to deteriorate in solido. From the mitigation perspective, irresolvable uncertainty will not be absolutely eliminated, but could be mitigated instead. By bearing security dilemma sensitivity in mind, Taiwan and China could adopt pragmatic measures to mitigate the security dilemma and to sustain comprehensive cooperation or even transcend uncertainty to reach peace in the Taiwan Strait.
Keywords: Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations, Security Dilemma, Irre-solvable Uncertainty, Economic and Societal Integration, Mitigation
I. Background
Cross-Strait economic interaction over the last two decades has exhibited a growing interest in doing business to liberalize economic exchanges in spite of existing sovereignty concerns. Since the early 1990s, economic activity across the Strait has grown rapidly and steadily (please refer to Table 1).
Table 1 Key Facts of Cross-Strait Trade and Investment in 2012
●The total volume of cross-Strait trade was US$ 160 billon in 2011; China is Taiwan’s largest
trade partner, and Taiwan is China’s seventh-largest.
●China ranks as Taiwan’s first export destination and Taiwan is China’s fifth-largest import
supplier.
●China (including Hong Kong) accounted for over 28.9% of Taiwan’s total trade and 41.1%
of Taiwan’s exports.
●Taiwan and Hong Kong are the two largest investors in China.
Source: China’s Customs Statistics, “China Statistics”, July 27, 2012, Hong Kong Trade
Devel-opment Council, <http://www.hktdc.com/info/mi/ccs/en/China-Customs-Statistics.htm>;
National Statistics,《中華民國統計資訊網》(National Statistics), <http://www.stat.gov. tw/mp.asp?mp=4>.
Although the development of semi-official cross-Strait relations has experienced ups and downs over the past decade, Taiwan has re-laxed restrictions on economic and societal contacts with China, and cross-Strait interaction has been increasing rapidly. China is now Ta-iwan’s largest trading partner, and Taiwan is China’s seventh-largest. Estimates of Taiwan investment in China, both officially approved by the Taiwan authorities and investment entered into by Taiwan firms through third parties, range from US$150 billion to over US$300 bil-lion, making Taiwan and Hong Kong the two largest investors in China.1 In 2011, China (including Hong Kong) accounted for over
28.9% of Taiwan’s total trade and 41.1% of Taiwan’s exports. More than one million people from Taiwan are estimated to be residing in China, and more than 70,000 Taiwan companies have operations there.2
Since President Ma Ying-jeou began his first term in May 2008, he has initiated political rapprochement with China. Over the past four years, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have rapidly reached a détente via economic and functional exchanges and have held eight rounds of negotiations between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). The two parties have signed eighteen agreements on func-tional issues including weekend charter flights, Mainland tourist visits to Taiwan, cross-Strait air transport, cross-Strait sea transport, postal Taiwan firms had invested about US$84.4 billion in China as of the end of 2009, which is more than half of Taiwan’s stock of direct foreign investment. Many unofficial estimates put the actual number at between US$150 and over US$300 billion as much Taiwan investment in the P.R.C. is via Hong Kong and other third-party jurisdictions. Please refer to Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Fact Sheet: Taiwan,” U.S. Department of State, August 20, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm>.
Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), R.O.C. (Taiwan), “Economic Indicators,” Department of Statistics, <http://2k3dmz2. moea.gov.tw/gnweb/English/Indicator/wFrmEnIndicator.aspx>.
services, food safety, regular flights, and financial and judicial coop-eration, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), Investment Protection Agreement, Customs Cooperation Agreement, etc. The former President Chen Sui-bian’s “active opening, effective management” policy and former President Lee Teng-hui’s cautious “no haste, be patient” policy had tried to include capital limits on Taiwanese investment projects in China, which has reflected Taiwanese concern that economic dependency on the Chinese market will make Taiwan vulnerable to a possible downturn in China, while China appears econ-omically fragile with the growing disparity of wealth, worsening pol-lution, increasingly serious incidents of social disparity, public disorder, and uncertainty regarding political reforms, etc.
As a result, the core question underlying the cross-Strait dynamics is whether further cross-Strait cooperation and integration would put Taiwan at risk of involuntarily losing its autonomy, and how long China could bear the hope for unification through economic benefits without Taiwan’s political concession. In light of this context, Integ-ration Theory and the Security Dilemma will provide perspectives to explain the cross-Strait dynamics.
II. The Security Dilemma across the Taiwan Strait
Integration Theory optimistically argues that cooperation and interaction will result in functional and political spillover effects. There are multiple channels that connect societies of states in cross-Strait relations and a multitude of different agendas come to the fore-front. In addition, the use of military force is not likely to be exercised when interdependence prevails in the integration process and the economy plays a critical role in that process.3The Integration Theorist
has argued that the “imperatives of cooperation push states to establish an international regime in which policy costs are reduced, and the
in-ternational regime, which refers to a set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, will let states become much stronger.”4
Initially, states integrate with each other in limited functional or economic areas, and afterwards, partially integrated states experience increasing momentum for further rounds of integration in related areas. This “invisible hand” associated with the integration phenomenon has been termed the “spillover” effect. Mitrany argued that the “In-tegration school concludes two kinds of “spillover” effects: functional and political. A functional spillover refers to the interconnection of various economic sectors or issue-areas, and integration in one policy-area spilling over into others; Political spillover refers to the creation of supranational governance models, as far-reaching as the European Union, or as voluntary as the United Nations.”5 The process starts
with low-politics issues and then spills over to different sectors or supranational institutions. Integration Theory also holds that inter-actions between states are conducted via high-politics communication and low-politics exchanges as well. Although integration can be re-sisted, it becomes harder to stop inter-state integration as it progresses. The logic of Integration Theory suggests that increased economic interaction across the Strait serves to decrease the chances of war and George T. Crane & Abla Amawi, The Theoretical Evolution of International
Political Economy: A Reader (2nd ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997), pp. 107-108.
Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger claim that the politics of interdependence is influenced by the international regime, which refers to a set of “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures” that allows states to become much stronger. Please refer to Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, & Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge Studies in
In-ternational Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 1.
David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London: London School of Economics & Political Science, 1975).
instability and to advance Strait relations. For China, cross-Strait economic cooperation could “help fulfill Beijing’s wishes of unification by creating an economic dependency and perhaps even by weakening Taiwan’s economy or autonomy to such an extent that sup-porters of Taiwan independence lose their influence; for Taiwan, em-bracing more cooperation with China could be a means whereby Taiwan could reinvigorate its economy and increase its security through a more peaceful political environment.”6 The historical dynamic of
cross-Strait relations explains the “Officially Cold, Socially Warm （官冷民熱）” experiences by shelving political disputes but hardly avoiding political interference. Intergration Theory precisely illumi-nates the economic logic of cooperation and interdependence in cross-Strait dynamics and appropriately explains the current phenomena of multiple channels and different agendas laid across the Strait. However, Integration Theory hardly explains political disputes in cross-Strait dynamics in terms of unavoidable sovereignty and security dimensions. First, Integration Theory has assumed that more cooperation or integration across the Strait would prevent the use of military force. Whether Taiwan or China will slow down the military buildup toward each other is to be observed in the future. While both sides have paradoxically claimed that military procurement or buildup is aimed at stabilizing cross-Strait relations, each of them has disagreed on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan: Taiwan claims that the U.S. arms procure-ment will help advance cross-Strait relations and boost its confidence in dealing with Beijing;7 On the contrary, China claims that further
Danny Roy, “Cross-Strait Economic Relations: Opportunities Outweigh Risks,”
Occasional Paper Series, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS),
April 2004, <http://www.apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/PDFs/Ocasional %20Papers/Cross-StraitEconomicRelations.pdf>.
military modernization will entrench “separatist forces for Taiwan independence,”8even at a time of warming ties. Furthermore, China
has argued that the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan infringe upon China’s security interests as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and interfere with China’s internal affairs.9Integration Theory
hardly explains the paradoxical trend on further economic integration with increasing military buildup. The trend implies that the two sides have shelved sovereignty disputes to pursue cross-Strait interaction on the basis of economic and societal needs, but are still preparing for possible war due to some political cause. Secondly, Integration Theory assumes that more interaction or integration will necessarily result in inter-state or international institutionalization. Integration Theory’s “spillover” effects for different sectors have taken place in relation to low-politics functional and economic issues. However, the historical evolution of cross-Strait interaction since 2008 has not illuminated an upgrading from low-politics issues to high-politics cooperation such as peace accords, confidence building measures (CBMs), etc. Political concerns such as the incompatibility of elite values, the threat of force, the difficult learning process, and the possibility of disintegration may constrain spillover effects in high-politics institutionalization as mentioned in Integration Theory.10
package,” Taipei Times, January 31, 2010, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/ front/archives/2010/01/31/2003464842>.
Information Office, State Council, People’s Republic of China, China’s National
Defense in 2008, January 2009, pp. 5-6.
Xuequan Mu, “China again reaffirms resolute opposition to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan,” Xinhuanet, January 9, 2010, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng-lish/2010-01/09/content_12779436.htm>.
Yu-Shan Wu, “Theoretical Approaches in the Study of Cross-Strait Political Relations,” paper presented at the Conference on Below the Storm: 60 Years of Cross-Strait Connections (Taipei: Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley,
Whether the format could be upgraded to official or quasi-official cooperation remains to be observed in subsequent negotiations of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)11
or in ongoing discussions to establish liaison offices for SEF and ARATS.12According to ECFA, which was signed on June 29, 2010,
Taiwan and China were to set up an Economic Cooperation Committee (ECC), composed of delegates from both sides, to handle follow-up negotiations and arrangements related to the ECFA.13 Due to
sov-ereignty and security concerns that still prevail in cross-Strait dynamics, the most feasible course of action available to the two sides is to take incremental steps---referred to as a “piecemeal” approach-in order to gradually institutionalize cross-Strait interchanges.
February 5-6, 2010), p. 8.
Taiwan and China proposed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) across the Taiwan Strait with a consensus being reached on the text of the major accord and five sets of attached documents. “China will offer either tariff exemptions or reductions on about 500 products from Taiwan, more than twice the 200-plus Chinese products that will enjoy similar tariff concessions upon entering the Taiwan market. The so-called ‘early harvest’ lists of goods and services are subject to tariff waivers or easier market access terms under the landmark agreement.” Please refer to The China Post, “Taiwan to gain in ECFA,” The China Post, June 16, 2010, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/ta-iwan/2010/06/16/260848/Taiwan-to.htm>.
Both sides have already established semi-official travel agencies—the Taiwan-based Taiwan Strait Tourism Association (TSTA) in Beijing and the China-based Cross-Strait Tourism Exchange Association (CTEA) in Taipei—in May 2010 to cope with increasing tourism affairs on each side. Please refer to Xinhuanet, “Mainland tourism association opens office in Taiwan,” China Daily, May 7, 2010, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-05/07/content_9822967. htm>.
The China Post, “MAC head defends establishment of ECC,” The China Post, June 16, 2010, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/2010/06/16/260870/MAC-head.htm>.
1. Behind the Cross-Strait Integration Process
Integration Theory points out the critical role played by economic exchanges and their political implications. In fact, many of Beijing and Taipei’s mutual policies are based on integrationist assumptions. Taiwan’s willingness to reach rapprochement on the basis of ambiguous political principles (e.g., the “Three Nos”- no independence, no un-ification, and no use of force, “the 1992 Consensus,” “mutual non-denial” and so on) allow China to take a more accommodative policy toward Taiwan. The two authorities are both optimistic about the beneficial effects of economic integration and its spillover implications, although furthering cross-Strait economic integration does not necess-arily result in unification in the long run. In terms of different political systems, asymmetric national capabilities, and the Chinese military threat existing in cross-Strait relations, the reality constrains Taiwan’s capability to fight back once China adopts the “revisionist” approach to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait or to penalize Taiwan’s non-integrative behavior. During the former Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations, interruptions and the lukewarm progress in cross-Strait relations suggested that shelving political issues in cross-Strait relations would not necessarily build up enough momentum to drive cross-Strait relations further due to fear and uncertainty across the Strait.
Most Taiwan people would agree that the gradual increase in communication between Taiwan and China will not result in political integration across the Taiwan Strait if the socio-economic and political conditions of the two parties remain unbalanced.14Once faced with
China’s defection in the integration process, Taiwan could only apply
Hsin-Hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for
limited measures such as domestic public opinion (especially elections) and diplomatic relations (especially the U.S. involvement) to leverage China.15 Most notably, reaching a minimum political solution may
“spill back” to the economic realm and cause the relations there to deteriorate. The sovereignty dispute and military buildup in the cross-Strait dynamics will remain unresolved uncertainties. Taiwan’s former President Lee Teng-hui’s “Southward Policy” and the Green camp’s opposition to President Ma Ying-jeou’s ECFA are both based on the acceptance of the integrationist theme, but look differently at the negative effects. Since China holds more dreams of political unification with an ongoing military buildup, the Ma administration desires more economic benefits to consolidate his approach toward China. By the same token, Beijing is so far tolerating the pace of cross-Strait en-gagement and seems confident that over time the unification position will strengthen. China’s preferred solution is to persuade the Taiwanese government (especially the Kuomintang administration) to rejoin China in some form by giving carrots but carrying an enormous stick. More observation may be required as to the extent to which Chinese leaders may determine that even the Kuomintang leader is unable to deliver any of what Beijing is seeking and may therefore lose patience.16
2. Irresolvable Uncertainty in the Cross-Strait Integration
Process
By assuming the existing uncertainty, Booth and Weeler argued that “the Security Dilemma (SD) is a two-level strategic predicament Yu-Shan Wu, “Theoretical Approaches in the Study of Cross-Strait Political Relations,” p. 9.
Shelley Rigger, “Ma’s Puzzling Midterm Malaise,” Brookings Northeast Asia
Commentary, March 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/03_taiwan_
in relations between states and other actors, with each level consisting of two related dilemmas (or propositions that can be assumed to be valid) which force decision-makers to choose between them. The first and basic level consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others; the second and de-rivative level consists of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding.”17 Booth and Weeler argued that
...dilemma of interpretation is the predicament facing de-cision makers when they are confronted, on matters affecting security, with a choice between two significant and usually (but not always) undesirable alternatives about the military policies and political postures of other entities... This di-lemma of interpretation is the result of the perceived need to make a decision in the existential condition of irresolvable
uncertainty, about the motives, intentions and capabilities
of others. These responsible leaders have to decide whether perceived military developments are for defensive or self-protection purposes only (to enhance security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to seek
Booth and Weeler have different definitions of the security paradox and security challenge depending on whether it is a dilemma of interpretation or response. As Booth and Weeler argued, “a dilemma of response logically begins when the dilemma on interpretation has been settled. Decision-makers then need to determine how to react. If the dilemma of response is based on misplaced suspicion regarding the motives and intentions of other actors, and decision-makers react in a militarily confrontational manner, then they risk creating a significant level of mutual hostility. When leaders resolve their dilemma of re-sponse in a manner that creates a spiral of mutual hostility, when neither wanted it, a situation has developed which we call the security paradox.” Please refer to Ken Booth & Nicholas J. Weeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation
to change the status quo to their advantage).18
Therefore, the possible returning of the sovereignty dispute and military buildup still features in the situation regarding the security dilemma across the Taiwan Strait. The irresolvable uncertainty may occur in the following scenarios across the Taiwan Strait.
A. China Fears Taiwan’s Sovereignty and Security Position (a) If a pro-Taiwan independence leader took power in the future, China might change its interpretation to one where Taiwan would drift away from the “one China” principle.
(b) If a pro-status quo leader remained in power and the two sides had not tackled any political arrangement, China might change its interpretation to one where Taiwan would maintain a peaceful se-cession from China forever.
(c) China’s perception of Taiwan’s military transformation as an offensive move toward peaceful secession and the perception of the U.S. arms sales would hurt China’s core interests where it would see Taiwan drifting from unification.
B. Taiwan Fears Unification Maneuvers and a Chinese Military Buildup:
(a) Taiwan perceives further cross-Strait social exchanges and economic integration as China’s “united front” tactics toward unifi-cation and that they may harm or endanger Taiwan’s sovereignty po-sition.
Ken Booth & Nicholas J. Weeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation
(b) Taiwan perceives China’s military buildup as an offensive and emergent menace toward Taiwan’s security and has decided to strengthen its defense capability by acquiring more arms packages from the U.S..
C. Cross-Strait Security Dilemma Resulting in a US-China Security Dilemma
(a) China interprets U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as infringing upon China’s “core interests” as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Thus China has became more belligerent and assertive in the Taiwan issue vis-à-vis the U.S.
(b) The U.S perceives that China is unwilling to become a con-structive actor and stakeholder in the international system and that China is striving to limit the U.S. influence in the Taiwan Strait in terms of Beijing’s lack of transparency in its growing military buildup and military intention toward Taiwan.
With each side possibly portraying a security dilemma sen-sibility,19 Taiwanese and Chinese leaders have repeatedly agreed to
adopt a pragmatic approach of “shelving controversies, and finding commonalities despite differences” since 2008. The two sides have agreed to reenergize economic and functional exchanges on the basis of “the 1992 Consensus.”20 Taiwanese President Ma and Chinese
Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler have defined security dilemma sensibility as an actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. Please refer to Ken Booth & Nicholas J Weeler, The Security Dilemma:
Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics, p. 7.
The Ma administration and the Kuomintang (KMT) define “The 1992 Consensus” as “One China, respective interpretation.” However, Beijing only seconds “The
President Hu Jintao have both reclaimed “the status quo”21 policy
and pragmatic spirit of “shelving controversies”22 in dealing with
cross-Strait relations. Both sides have released positive interpretations and responses and the process has led to a period of experimental cooperation. However, putting sovereignty disputes aside does not resolve the pending issue at the core of cross-Strait relations. Fur-thermore, China continues with its military buildup with a more ad-vanced power projection beyond its territory, while Taiwan also 1992 Consensus” without defining part of its content as “respective interpretation.” President Ma Ying-jeou claims the “Three Nos Policy,” that is “no unification, no independence and no use of force.” In December 2008, the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, made a six-point proposal for peace in the Taiwan Strait. The “six-points” outlined in Hu’s speech are: (1) abide by the “one China” principle and enhance political mutual trust; (2) advance economic cooperation and promote common development; (3) promote Chinese culture and strengthen the spiritual cord; (4) strengthen two-way visits of people and expand exchanges in various circles; (5) safeguard national sovereignty and hold consultations on external affairs, and (6) end the state of hostility and reach a peace agreement. Please refer to Hu Jintao,〈胡錦濤：攜手推動兩岸關係和平發展 同心實現中華民 族偉大復興〉(Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Straits Relations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation),《新華網》(Xinhuanet), December 31, 2008 <http:// news.xinhu anet.com/newscenter/2008-12/31/content_10586495_2.htm>; Alan D. Romberg, “Cross-Strait Relations: ‘Ascend the Heights and Take a Long-term Perspective,’” China Leadership Monitor, No. 27, Winter 2009, pp. 3-5, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/5524>.
Ma Ying-jeou declared a 16-character guideline for cross-Strait relations as “shelving controversies, finding commonalities despite differences, facing reality, and together creating a win-win solution”（擱置爭議、求同存異、正視現實、 共創雙贏）while Hu Jintao declared “To build mutual trust, lay aside disputes, seek consensus while shelving differences, and create a win-win situation”（建 立互信，擱置爭議，尋求共識，共創雙贏）. Ma also expressed the same con-cept in different phrases: “facing reality, adhering to mutual non-denial, working for the benefit of the people, and seeking cross-strait peace”（正視現實、互 不否認、為民興利、兩岸和平）.
strengthens defense capability by requesting arms sales from the United States, which is legally obligated to provide weapons for Tai-wan’s defense under the Taiwan Relations Act.23Still, the structural
tendency of the security dilemma still exists in cross-Strait relations. Besides the Security Dilemma, “tit-for-tat”24 could be another
political signal to observe respective good willingness and benevolence in the situation of security challenge.25 For the time being, both
China and Taiwan have responded, and will respond, to each other’s messages, needs, and actions cautiously and adequately and without resort to violence if they consider that proceeding with integration is in their interests.26 Based on this viewpoint, many cross-Strait
economic and societal exchanges are positioned as low-politics func-tional cooperation, which had not been interrupted so much in the past by political disputes and thus set up some workable models. To be precise, China is prepared to give benefits and resources to Taiwan because the Chinese leaders and people think that Taiwan is part of The Obama administration announced the sale of US$6 billion worth of Patriot anti-missile systems, helicopters, mine-sweeping ships and communications equipment to Taiwan on January 29, 2010. Please refer to John Pomfret, “U.S. sells weapons to Taiwan, angering China,” The Washington Post, January 30, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/30/ AR2010013000508.html>.
Robert Axelrod’s classic advice for “tit-for-tat” is to reflect China’s actions back at it, in order to induce cooperation. Please refer to Robert Axelrod, The
Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
Yu-Shan Wu suggested that “tit-for-tat” should be reconfigured based on domestic politics and the aim should be to reinforce accommodative policies backed by integration justification, especially as their supporters struggle for policy dominance in internal Chinese debates. Please refer to Yu-Shan Wu, “Theoretical Approaches in the Study of Cross-Strait Political Relations,” p. 7. Hsin-Hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for
China. Ma’s commitment to “the 1992 Consensus” has convinced China of Taiwan’s position on “no independence.” Within a broader “one China” framework, China could give more benefits to Taiwan on any concrete deal. Although “shelving controversies” under “the 1992 Consensus” will maintain the momentum of cross-Strait functional cooperation for a period of time, they can not resolve the core pre-dicament in cross-Strait relations, although the process of cross-Strait integration has been and will remain a learning process. How could the two sides improve cooperation while remaining sensitive over the security dilemma?
III. Mitigating the Security Dilemma by Pieces
Booth and Weeler indicate that security competition can never be avoided in international politics. However,
...security competition can be ameliorated or dampened down for a time, but never eliminated; and human society can seek to become what it chooses to be, though inherited structural constraints will always be powerful. A global community of peace and trust is in principle possible if in practice it currently looks improbable... Even if states rec-ognize that their security postures may be seen as threatening by others, the very nature of uncertainty causes them to act on worst-case assumptions. The mitigation logic of the se-curity dilemma suggests that states can recognize that the danger of conflict can be managed by reducing uncertainty amongst themselves if the security dilemma cannot be avo-ided. Policymakers can establish security regimes based on norms of restraint, enabling them to achieve long-term co-operation to reduce mutual tensions and build trust.27
The mitigation logic accepts that the international system is technically anarchic, but does not believe that this must necessarily mean that anarchy is synonymous with chaos and violent conflict. “States on either side may enter into cooperative arrangements as tactical maneuvers designed to enhance their own long-term capacity to renew security competition at a later date.”28
From this mitigation perspective, irresolvable uncertainty would not be absolutely eliminated, but could be mitigated instead.29Taiwan
Booth and Weeler identify below three a priori logics that have framed the way theorists and practitioners of international politics have thought about the security dilemma: Fatalist logic is the idea that security competition can never be avoided in international politics. Human nature and the condition of international anarchy determine that humans will live in an essentially conflicting world; Mitigator logic is the idea that security competition can be ameliorated or dam-pened down for a time, but never eliminated. Here, notions of regimes and societies are key, blunting the worst features of anarchy; Transcender logic is the idea that human society is self-constitutive, not determined. Humans have agency, as individuals and groups, and so human society can seek to become what it chooses to be, although inherited structural constraints will always be powerful. A global community of peace and trust is in principle possible if in practice it currently looks improbable. Please refer to Ken Booth & Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World
Politics, p. 15.
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 164-165.
Some scholars retain fatalist thinking in regard to the Taiwan Strait. Christensen argues that Beijing’s fear of eventual Taiwanese independence with U.S. backing, rather than Taipei’s actual near-term declaration of independence, would appear to be the most likely cause of war across the Taiwan Strait in the next 10 years. Please refer to Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, Autumn 2002, pp. 7-21, <http://www.ou.edu/uschina/SASD/SASD2006/Christen-sen2002Security%20Dil.pdf>.
and China could take pragmatic measures to mitigate the security di-lemma and to sustain comprehensive cooperation across the Strait in terms of economic and societal dimensions. There are several critical, strategic areas in which the two sides could march forward in the future.
1. Advancing “the 1992 Consensus Plus”
Since the two sides have been disputing much over “one China” or “Taiwan independence,” “the 1992 Consensus” maintains the spirit of “agreement on disagreement” and is rather a pragmatic starting point for cross-Strait cooperation. The prospects for broader pragmatic cooperation could be improved if both sides were to avoid negative ideological interpretations and respond more positively. A good exam-ple is that China’s Xiamen city and Taiwan’s Jinmen Island, supported by their respective coast guards, have held two rounds of joint and-rescue exercises. These are the first ever aero-amphibious search-and-rescue exercises held across the Straits since the opening of a direct shipping link between Xiamen and Jinmen.30
2. Developing a Constructive Spiral in security Dilemma
Sensibility
Theoretically speaking, “the 1992 consensus” fails to tackle
Ir-resolvable Uncertainty, and so the security dilemma sensibility could
be supplemented in interpreting the actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In par-ticular, it refers to “the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behavior, including the role that one’s own
CRI English, “Across-the-Straits Search and Rescue Exercise Held,” Bridging
the Straits, October 24, 2008, <http://english.cri.cn/4426/2008/10/24/2101s
actions may play in provoking that fear.”31Tactically speaking, China
has less of an incentive in economic cooperation vis-à-vis Taiwan because of asymmetry in terms of national scale, economy and tech-nology, while Taiwan is also worried about its economy becoming too dependent on China. However, both China and Taiwan face chal-lenges related to the economic downturn and it is also of great economic significance to develop economies on the basis of relative strengths. For example, the two sides provided a good example when the Ma administration declared a “diplomatic truce” to avoid foreign competition for alliances while Beijing welcomed Ma’s policy and did not undermine Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with a limited number of allies. However, another weird and negative example is Beijing’s condemning Washington for selling arms to Taipei in violation of China’s “core interest” and thus suspending bilateral military relations. In spite of neglecting its military threat toward Taiwan, China skillfully targeted the U.S. instead of Taiwan for hindering the cross-Strait peaceful process.
3. Transparent Defensiveness
As mitigation logic, predictable peace comes largely through norms and trust-building measures, marginalizing the culture of military competition and the promotion of security dilemma sensiti-vities.32 With further economic integration across the Strait,
institu-tionalization and signals of a defensive military are much encouraged to be released unilaterally or bilaterally in terms of comprehensive cross-Strait interaction. The two sides could build trust through the adoption of less threatening defense postures to signal defensive Ken Booth & Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation
and Trust in World Politics, p. 7.
Ken Booth & Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation
intent, as well as through the undertaking of significant military and political concessions as costly signals. Effective cooperation requires that potential partners make defensive military capabilities a distinction. In the context of military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan has less room to make a costly signal. Instead, China could send a con-structive message to Taiwan by redeploying its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that are currently aimed at Taiwan in exchange for doing nothing. Although the move is not costly enough for China’s military capability, it would be welcomed in Taiwan society as it faces an asymmetric military imbalance.
4. Mitigating the Security Dilemma by Cross-Strait
“Piece-meal” Cooperation
However, what if the aforesaid ideal measures do not work to mitigate the security dilemma? As the historical evolution shows, societal and trade relations could probably remain lukewarm even if there were no further economic exchanges during the Lee and Chen administrations. Societal and functional cooperation would not by and large be affected by sovereignty and security disputes. A funda-mental goal of momentum building is to enhance the ability to evaluate and address the crucial questions related to policy choices and modes of implementation among progressive options with a better under-standing of sovereignty disputes and security dilemma sensibility, environmental potential and limits, etc. In view of the existing com-plexity in the cross-Strait dynamics, both governments should involve some academic or “Track Two” task force made up of officials and experts. The “Track Two” dialogue could identity key “must-not-do” issues, which may temporarily shelve attempts to consolidate sover-eignty disputes. The aim of the “Track Two” dialogue is to consolidate current cross-Strait cooperation, to mitigate possible conflict, and to think beyond the functional dimension. Meanwhile, by adopting the
piecemeal approach, the two sides may consider institutionalizing cooperation and setting up a semi-official mechanism to tackle func-tional and low-politics issues.
IV. Conclusion
Since the 1990s, the historical evolution of cross-Strait dynamics has sought to explain the lukewarm experiences by shelving political disputes but hardly avoiding political interference. In light of the broader backdrop of cross-Strait rapprochement in 2008, the two sides across the Taiwan Strait have held eight rounds of negotiations between Taiwan’s SEF and China’s ARATS and the two parties have signed eighteen agreements on economic and functional issues. In-tegration Theory precisely illuminates the economic logics of coope-ration and interdependence in cross-Strait dynamics and appropriately explains the current phenomena of multiple channels and different agendas laid across the Strait. However, Integration Theory hardly explains political disputes in cross-Strait relations. According to the aforesaid analysis, cross-Strait interaction has sometimes been inter-rupted or impaired by political concerns. Nowadays both sides across the Taiwan Strait have become more economically interdependent. It i s crucial to encourage cross-Strait cooperation through a bilateral institutionalized mechanism to consolidate current cooperation on functional issues. Furthermore, this paper also argues that, by putting the sovereignty dispute aside, the current cross-Strait relations have to face the security dilemma raised by fears of uncertainty such as China’s fear of Taiwan’s sovereignty and security position, Taiwan’s fear of unification maneuvers and a Chinese military buildup as well as the cross-Strait security dilemma resulting in the US-China security dilemma.
not be absolutely eliminated, but could be mitigated instead. Bearing the security dilemma sensitivity in mind, Taiwan and China could take pragmatic measures to mitigate the security dilemma and to sustain comprehensive cooperation across the Strait. This paper argues that both sides need to face the challenges arising from the security dilemma and to try to mitigate them through (1) advancing “the 1992 Consensus plus”; (2) developing a constructive spiral in security di-lemma sensibility; (3) making defensiveness transparent; and (4) mitigating the security dilemma by cross-Strait “piecemeal” coope-ration. Nowadays, the rapid dynamics of cross-Strait relations is being overwhelmingly dominated by a variety of exchange agendas as a result of which policy-makers may not be remaining alert to the danger of the security dilemma. As the twenty-first century unleashes a variety of global challenges ranging from economic downturns to sovereignty disputes, any cooperation lies in the opportunities with a better understanding of uncertainty in security relations and a wil-lingness to mitigate or even transcend uncertainty to reach peace.
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