孔子學院在莫斯科：國家形象與在地認知 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 孔子學院在莫斯科：國家形象與在地認知. ‧. Confucius Institutes in Moscow: National Image and Local Perception. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Student: Maria Borisova Advisor: Alan Hao Yang. 中華民國 104 年 7 月 2014 July.

(2) 孔子學院在莫斯科：國家形象與在地認知 Confucius Institutes in Moscow: National Image and Local Perception. 研究生：瑪麗婭指導教授：楊昊. Student: Maria Borisova Advisor: Alan Hao Yang. 國立政治大學. 學. ‧ 國. 政治大亞太研究英語碩士學位學程立碩士論文. y. ‧. Nat. io. sit. A Thesis. n. al. er. Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. i n U. C. v. h eChengchi National i n g c h University In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國 104 年 7 月 2015 July.

(3) I. TABLE OF CONTENTS. Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Background and Purpose of Study ......................................................................................... 1 1.2 Research Question ................................................................................................................. 3 1.3 Framework ............................................................................................................................. 3 1.3.1 Dependent Variables ....................................................................................................... 3 1.3.2 Independent Variables..................................................................................................... 4 1.4 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 7 1.4.1 List of Interviewees ......................................................................................................... 8 1.4.2 Scope/Limit ................................................................................................................... 10. 政治大. 1.4.3 Chapter Arrangement .................................................................................................... 10. 立. Chapter 2. Literature Review ..................................................................................................... 12. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1 Sino-Russian Relations (1920s-2015).................................................................................. 12 2.1.1 Sino-Soviet Relations (“honeymoon” – “divorce”) ...................................................... 14. ‧. 2.1.2 1990s (normalization, “strategic partnership”) ............................................................ 16. y. Nat. 2.1.3 2000- 2015 (“Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation”, new “honeymoon”) ................................................................................................................................................ 17. sit. 2.2 Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy .................................................................................... 19. al. er. io. 2.2.1 Soft Power ..................................................................................................................... 19. n. v i n 2.3 China’s Perception towardsCSoft 22 h ePower n g.............................................................................. chi U 2.2.2 Cultural Diplomacy....................................................................................................... 20. 2.3.1 China’s Soft Power Initiatives ...................................................................................... 26. 2.4 Confucius Institute (Organization; Critics) .......................................................................... 29 2.4.1 Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters) .................................................................. 30 2.4.2 Organization of the Confucius Institutes....................................................................... 34 2.4.3 Debates and Concerns ................................................................................................... 35 2.5 Russian Soft Power .............................................................................................................. 39 2.5.1 Russia’s Soft Power Initiatives ..................................................................................... 40 Chapter 3. Literature Review ..................................................................................................... 43 3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 43 3.2 Soft Power with Chinese and Russian Characteristics ........................................................ 45 3.3 Goals and Means of Chinese Soft Power............................................................................. 49 3.3.1 Goals ............................................................................................................................. 49.

(4) II 3.3.2 Means ............................................................................................................................ 50 2.4 Limits of Chinese Soft Power .............................................................................................. 53 Chapter 4. Confucius Institute; Moscow Case .......................................................................... 57 4.1 Introduction to Confucius Institute ...................................................................................... 57 4.2 Goals, Means and Limits of Confucius Institute ................................................................ 59 4.2.1 Goals and Means ........................................................................................................... 60 4.2.2 Limits ............................................................................................................................ 62 4.3 History of Sino-Russian Cultural Exchanges ..................................................................... 63 4.4 Confucius Institute in Russia ............................................................................................... 67 4.5 Confucius Institute in Moscow ............................................................................................ 68 4.5.1 Confucius Institute at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation ........................................................................................................... 69. 政治大. 4.5.2 Confucius Institute at Russian State University for the Humanities ............................. 70. 立. 4.5.3 Confucius Institute at Lomonosov Moscow State University....................................... 74. ‧ 國. 學. 4.5.4 Confucius Institute at Moscow State Linguistic University ........................................ 78 4.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 80 Chapter 5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 82. ‧. 5.1 Research Findings ............................................................................................................... 82. sit. y. Nat. 5.1.1 Results of the Interviews ............................................................................................... 82 5.1.2 Conclusion of the Interviews ........................................................................................ 89. io. n. al. er. 5.1.3 Secondary Data Findings .............................................................................................. 90. i n U. v. 5.1.4 Primary and Secondary Data Sources Findings ............................................................ 95. Ch. engchi. 5.1 General Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 98 References ................................................................................................................................. 105 Appendix .................................................................................................................................... 117.

(5) III. Acknowledgments I would like to thank my advisor Professor Alan Hao Yang for his tremendous help during my research. It was a pleasure to work together with him, and I hope that in future we will continue our cooperation. I would like also to thank my committee members, Professor Lien Hong-Yi and Lee Po-Yu, for their constructive feedback and comments. I am also very grateful to my parents, Alexander Borisov and Elena Borisova, for doing everything possible to let me study in Taiwan and supporting me during my stay here.. 政治大. Special thanks to those who agreed to take part in my research and to my. 立. friends and family who are always encouraging me to do my best. Finally, I would. ‧ 國. 學. also like to thank my boyfriend, Konstantin Alpatov, who is always there for me no matter what.. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Taipei, Taiwan. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Maria Borisova.

(6) IV. Abstract Confucius Institute (CI) is one of China's soft power policy initiatives. It aims to promote Chinese language and culture all over the globe, enhance the world's understanding of China. Today there are already 443 Confucius Institutes and 648 Confucius Classrooms in the world. Russia is one China’s closest friends and allies, as well as its important political, economic and strategic partner. Due to the continuous development of the bilateral relations, Russian people are more and more interested in Chinese language. To meet their need in studying Mandarin, China is actively promoting. 政治大. the establishment of the Confucius Institute there. Now there are already 18. 立. Confucius Institutes and 5 Confucius Classroom 5 in Russia.. ‧ 國. 學. The name of this thesis is: "Confucius Institutes in Moscow: national image and local perception." It aims at understanding what kind of attitude Russians, who. ‧. teach or study Chinese either at the CI or somewhere else, have towards the. y. Nat. Confucius Institute. Besides, it was also important to understand whether Sino-. io. sit. Russian relations play a crucial role in shaping people’s attitude towards the CI.. a. er. Throughout the research the author used primary data sources (field work,. n. i v research was conducted only interviews), as well as secondary data sources. Field l. n U e n g about in Moscow, the rest of the information c h i the development of the CIs in Russia. Ch. is observed through the secondary data sources (reports, newspapers, journals). Results of the analysis indicate that the majority of Russian people, on the example of Moscow, have favorable attitude towards the Confucius Institute. Although in general there are also those who are skeptical about this initiative in Russia, stating that China is using the CIs as a part of its intelligence network, but the overall impression is positive. The PRC managed to create a favorable image of itself in Russia, and the Confucius Institute is one of the tools it uses in order to reach its aim..

(7) V. 論文摘要孔子學院是中國軟實力政策的展現。它創設的是目的為了向世界推廣中國文化與漢語，增進世界各國對中國的瞭解，目前全球已設有 443 所孔子學院與 648 間孔子課堂。俄羅斯是中國最友好的朋友之一，也是重要的政治、經濟、戰略夥伴。因為兩國的關係不斷地發展，俄羅斯人對漢語的興趣也越來越高。為滿足俄羅斯人的需要，中國遂把在俄羅斯設立孔子學院列為積極推動的項目。俄羅斯目前已經有 18 所孔子學院與 5 間孔子課堂。. 政治大. 本論文的題目是『孔子學院在莫斯科：國家的形象與在地認知』，旨. 立. 在瞭解在俄羅斯漢語教師與學生對孔子學院的觀感為何。. ‧ 國. 學. 本論文所採用用的研究方法為面對面訪問跟次級資料分析。分析的結果顯示，大部分受訪者持正面的看法，並對孔子學院給予高. ‧. 度評價，以及認為孔子學院對中俄關係的發展產生很重要的作用。雖然有一. y. Nat. sit. 些人認為，孔子學院是中國政府情報機關的部分，但是總的印象是正面的。. al. n. 使用的工具之一。. er. io. 中國在俄羅斯成功地建立其自身的良好形象，而孔子學院是它以達到其目的. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(8) VI List of Figures and Tables Figure 1 ......................................................................................................................................................... 7 Figure 2 ....................................................................................................................................................... 96 Figure 3 ....................................................................................................................................................... 99 Figure 4 ....................................................................................................................................................... 99 Figure 5 ..................................................................................................................................................... 100 Figure 6 ..................................................................................................................................................... 100. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(9) VII List of Acronyms AF: Alliance Française AIIB: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation BTCSOL: Scholarship for Students of Bachelor's Degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages CC: Confucius Classroom CCTV: China Central Television CI: Confucius Institute GI: Goethe Institute. 政治大. HSK: Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi. HSKK: Hanyu Shuiping Koyu Kaoshi. 立. MSU: Moscow State University. ‧ 國. 學. MSLU: Moscow State Linguistic University. MTCSOL: Master’s degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages. ‧. RF: Russian Federation. RSUH: Russian State University for the Humanities. sit. y. Nat. PRC: People’s Republic of China. io. UK: United Kingdom. n. al. er. SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization. UN: United Nations US: United States. Ch. engchi. USA: United States of America USD: United States Dollar USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. i n U. v.

(10) 1. Chapter 1 1.1. Introduction. Background and Purpose of the Study The end of the Cold War marked a new page in history and relations among. various nations. The exchanges between various countries started to develop day by day. One of the most significant achievements in the post Cold War era is the exchanges in the cultural field. In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural (Huntington, 1996). More and more nations feel that it is necessary to introduce their culture to others, to use it as a new tool on the international arena.. 政治大. In 1990, an American political scientist Joseph Nye introduced a new term – “soft power”. According to Nye (2004), everyone knows what a “hard power” is: military and. 立. economic might often get others to change their positions. However, there could be an. ‧ 國. 學. alternative: a country may obtain what it wants because other countries admire its values and are ready to follow it. So it is very important to attract countries, and not only. ‧. threaten them. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – coopts people rather than coerces them (p.5). The soft power of a country rests on three. Nat. sit. y. main resources: its culture, its political values and its foreign policy (Nye, 2004: p.12). When we are speaking about soft power we cannot ignore the mentioning of. io. n. al. er. another term – cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is an integral part of soft power,. Ch. i n U. v. one of its most powerful means and tools. Cultural diplomacy possesses great influence. engchi. which might be very helpful to this or that country when it is spreading its soft power to others. Nowadays, soft power with its cultural diplomacy plays a very important role in building the relationship between different nations. One of the most important and integral parts of culture is language, human culture cannot exist without it (Panopio, 2002: p. 41). Nowadays more and more countries spread their language and culture by establishing in various countries cultural and language centers. The most famous and successful examples of such activity are: the British Council (the UK), the Alliance Francaise (France), the Goethe Institute (Germany), and the Cervantes Institute (Spain). The main and common purpose of these institutions is to develop the popularity of culture and language..

(11) 2. As China continues to grow rapidly, the value of Chinese language also increases. The PRC wants to promote its language all over the world and tethers its own goals of expanding economic, cultural and diplomatic power to the global popularization of Mandarin Chinese1. One of the most significant tools in this arsenal is the Confucius Institute (CI), which was established in 2004 (Ding, 2008: p.118). Since that time the number of Confucius Institutes has grown rapidly. It has been opened on each continent of the world. This study is focused on the development of this organization in Russia, particularly in Moscow. I decided to focus my research on Confucius Institutes in Moscow because I am interested in the development of Chinese soft power in Russia and the attitude of Russian people towards it. When I was completing my Specialist degree2 at. 治政大 University (Taiwan), I took a And when I came to do my Master’s at National Chengchi 立 course called “Chinese Foreign Relations: Perception, Power and Policy” taught by. Moscow State Linguistic University3 I also took part in some events organized by the CI.. ‧ 國. 學. Professor Chiu Kun-shuan from the Department of East Asian Studies. That was him who first suggested that I should write a paper about the development of the CIs in Russia. A. ‧. small paper turned into an idea to dedicate my thesis to this topic.. The research is focused on the CIs in Moscow because it is both interesting and. y. Nat. sit. crucial to understand how such organization is operating in the capital city of one of the. al. er. io. closest China’s friends, to understand how the Chinese soft power works there, and what. n. local people, who are either teaching or studying Chinese language, think about. Ch. i n U. v. Confucius Institute. Besides, when speaking about the national image, we need to. engchi. understand how China itself sees soft power and Confucius Institute, what kind of Confucius Institute image is created in the China.. 1. Mandarin language (官話 guanhua – “officials’ language”) – is the most widely spoken form of Chinese. Mandarin Chinese is spoken in all of China north of the Yangtze River and in much of the rest of the country and is the native language of two-thirds of the population. 2 Specialist degree was the only first degree in the former Soviet Union and currently is being phased out by the Bachelor's - Master's degrees. 3 It is a university in Moscow, Russia. It is the largest and the oldest university in Russia that specializes in linguistics and foreign languages. There are about 10 thousand students and postgraduates in the university. Education is available in 35 languages..

(12) 3. 1.2. Research Question The aim of this study is to understand what Russian people who study or teach. Chinese think about the Confucius Institutes, and how this organization operates in general in Russia. So the main research question is: RQ: What attitude do Russians, who study or teach Chinese language, have towards the CI? This particular target group was chosen because these people are to a great extent connected with the sinological circles of Russia. They could have better understanding of Confucius Institute than those who are not studying or teaching Chinese language. That is why I decided to focus my research on them. Through getting answers to this question we could receive more comprehensive vision on the development of the CIs in Russia, on the example of Moscow.. 立. Framework. 學. ‧ 國. 1.3. 政治大. This study aims at defining the attitude of Russian people (on the example of Moscow) towards the development of the Confucius Institute in Russia. Taking into. ‧. account the current relations between Russia and China which are described as “the best. sit. y. Nat. in history”4, the number of Russians who are studying Chinese either at home or in China or Taiwan it could be assumed that general impression of people towards the Confucius. io. n. al. er. Institute is positive. The independent and dependent variables which will bring us to the. i n U. v. hypothesis should be defined. The dependent variables for this study are the following: 1.3.1. Dependent Variables. Ch. engchi. 1. Attitude towards the People’s Republic of China It is very important to understand the attitude of people towards China. If they have a positive image of the country, then it might be assumed that they are also positive towards its initiatives, like the Confucius Institute, for example. However, if they do not like China, they might have negative impression about the CI.. 『中俄美三國博弈重塑國際格局』，中時電子報， 2015 年 04 月 14 日， http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20150414001052-260310. 4.

(13) 4. If we look closely at the results published in November, 2014, by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) 5 , we will see that the general attitude of Russian people towards China tends to be positive. 49% of the respondents view the PRC as a strategic and economic partner, 36% - as a friend and ally, and only 1% - as a threat. Speaking about future, 43% of people see China as Russia’s friend in the 21st century and 36% as a close partner. 60% of the respondents state that cooperation between the RF and the PRC is mutually beneficial for both of them6 (VCIOM, 2014). As we can see, the major part of the respondents has favorable perception towards China and Sino-Russian relation in general. Thus, it might be assumed that they welcome the initiatives that the PRC is offering all over the world, like the Confucius Institute, for example. 2. Attitude towards Chinese Language. 政治大. Although it might feel natural that people who study or teach Chinese language. 立. like it, it does not necessary have to be this way. They might do it out of need or other. ‧ 國. 學. purposes. Thus, if they like Chinese language, they are likely to feel positive about the well-known institution which provides Chinese courses. However, if they do not like. CI.. ‧. Chinese, it will not necessarily mean that they also have a negative attitude towards the. Nat. sit. y. This dependent variable is an outcome of the first independent variable which the. io. n. al. er. author of this study is going to describe in the next paragraph. 1.3.2 Independent Variables 1. Incentive and Interest. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. When people start learning any foreign language, there is always a reason that stands behind their decision. Sometimes they can be very simple: e.g. when child in a non-English speaking country starts to go to school, it is likely that English will be already included into the compulsory curriculum, thus leaving the kid with no other choice than to start learning it. However, in the modern world people decide to learn this or that language or parents want their children to know this or that language due to several reasons. Among the most common reasons are the following: business, education, family, friends, and common interest towards any language. If we take learning any 5. It is the oldest and the leading marketing and opinion research company in the post-Soviet space. Россия-Китай: от вражды и конкуренции – к дружбе и сотрудничеству [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа: http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115042. – ВЦИОМ. 6.

(14) 5. foreign language in Russia as an example, we will see that among the most popular reasons for doing it are the following: communication with foreigners, work, going abroad, broaden the background knowledge 7 . Thus, all these factors are the driving motive for people to begin learning any foreign language. As it has been mentioned before, attitude towards any language is formed by people’s interest in this or that language. If someone is interested in learning Chinese for this or that reason, his/her attitude towards it would be positive. If someone is not interested, it is very likely that he/she just would not continue or even start learning it. 2. The Degree of Development of Soft Power in Russia If people know what soft power is and see their own country’s performance in that. 政治大. sphere it might be assumed that they would be more friendly towards other countries’ soft power initiatives.. 立. Unfortunately, not many people in Russia are aware of what soft power is.. ‧ 國. 學. Moscow is a relatively new player in this field. Besides Russian rich cultural heritage, the country does not have something special to offer to the world. On the other hand, even. ‧. when there is something important and meaningful that Russia wants to share with the others, they are not ready to accept it due to the circumstances. The bright example which. Nat. sit. y. could be used here are the Olympics. In 1980, Moscow held the Summer Olympics. These Games were the first to be staged in Eastern Europe and promised to be exciting, a. io. n. al. er. bright instrument of Communist regime’s soft power. However, just a year before, in. Ch. i n U. v. 1979, the USSR deployed its troops in Afghanistan. As a result 65 countries leading by. engchi. the USA boycotted the Olympics. Pretty much the same happened in 2014. Russia’s southern city Sochi hosted the XXII Olympic Winter Games. Though the Games were successful, and Russia had a chance to show the world its spiritual wealth and mightiness, a lot of controversy surrounded the Games: e.g. corruption, LGBT rights etc. The events that happened in Ukraine in February, which were followed by the Russian annexation of Crimea in March, 2014 added to the ruining of Moscow’s image on the international arena, thus making the Sochi Olympiad less remarkable event. To sum it up, even though the concept of soft power is not very developed in Russia yet, it does not necessarily mean that Russian people are unaware of it, or even if. 7. Uchit inostrannye yazyki: Dlya chego i pochemu (Why to learn foreign languages). (2014, November 13). Russian Public Opinion Research Center. Retrieved June 26, 2015, from http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115051.

(15) 6. they are, it does not imply that they will have negative attitude towards other countries’ soft power initiatives. Later in this study we will see how the land lies in reality. 3. Sino-Russian Relations This independent variable is closely connected with the first dependent variable of this study (Attitude towards China). As it has been already mentioned, the current state of relations between these two countries is more than good, if both countries’ leaders are constantly repeating that their relations now are “the best in history”. Such state of things is likely to influence people’s attitude towards China. As long as China is a friend of Russia, the majority of people might have a positive influence towards it. However, if this changes, people’s attitude is also likely to change. As an example to prove this statement. 政治大. we can use the changes in the Russian-American relations and how these changes influenced the perception of Russians towards the U.S.. 立. In 2014 the relations between Russia and the West have declined due to the. ‧ 國. 學. Ukrainian crisis. Many countries imposed various sanctions against Moscow, which along with the declining oil prices undermined the country’s economic situation. According to. ‧. VCIOM (2014), the attitude of Russians towards the U.S. during this time has changed towards the worst. In February, 2013 only 2% of the respondents had very negative. sit. y. Nat. attitude towards the U.S., in November, 2014 this number increased up to 27%8. Thus, we. io. er. can see that the state of relations between countries cannot but influence people’s opinion. Taking into account all dependent and independent variables described above, the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. general hypothesis of this study could be formulated. We can see that many Russian. engchi. people have positive attitude towards China. The bilateral relations between Russia and the PRC are currently at the relatively high level. Thus, it may be assumed that while Sino-Russian relations are good, the general attitude of people towards China and Chinese initiatives, like Confucius Institute, will remain positive. All dependent and independent variables, as well as the hypothesis stated above could be described using the macro, micro, meso level of analysis and summed up with the following scheme:. 8. Rossiya i SSHA: Otnosheniya v tochke zamerzaniya (Russia and the U.S.: Relations at the freezing point). (2014, December 3). Russian Public Opinion Research Center. Retrieved June 26, 2015, from http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115075.

(16) 7. Figure 1 Micro. attitude towards China. National soft power policy. Macro. attitude towards CI. Sino-Russian relations influence on the CI. attitude towards Chinese. positive. negative neutral. Source: author In this case the smallest unit of analysis - micro level – is responsible for identifying the reasons why people want to study Chinese, while the largest one – macro level – deals with Sino-Russian relations in general and their influence on the Confucius Institute. The intermediate level between the above mentioned two – meso level – serves as a mediator between micro and macro, and deals with Russian national soft power. 治政大both to the two other levels. In most important one in this case, as it is closely connected 立 Chapter 2, 4 and 5 we will look closer on three of these levels. policy and people’s awareness of this concept. The meso level can be regarded as the. 學. ‧ 國. 1.4. Methodology. ‧. The intention of this study is to cover the concrete opinions of a number of people. y. Nat. on the CIs in Moscow. The qualitative method of analysis will be used for conducting of. io. analysis. The research will follow the next steps:. n. al. sit. this research. It will consist of semi-structured in-depth interviews and second data. er. Meso. Reasons why people want to study Chinese. i n U. v. 1. Selection of the methodology: in-depth interviews. Ch. engchi. 2. Preparing the questions 3. Search of the materials 4. Field work. 5. Conducting the interviews with the selected subjects 6. Analyzing the material 7. Analyzing the secondary data sources 8. Answering the research question through findings The following are the characteristics of the semi-structured interviews according to Cohen and Crabtree (2006): . The interviewer and respondents engage in a formal interview.

(17) 8 . The interviewer develops and uses an 'interview guide.' This is a list of questions and topics that needs to be covered during the conversation, usually in a particular order. . The interviewer follows the guide, but is able to follow topical trajectories in the conversation that may stray from the guide when he or she feels this is appropriate The most part of the interviews was conducted in person, though some of the. interviewees asked to send them questions via email due to the lack of time for the meeting face-to-face. In total, thirteen interviews were conducted with those who either study or teach Chinese in different places in Moscow.. 政治大 The interviews for 立 this study were conducted with four main groups of people:. 1.4.1 List of interviewees:. those who study Chinese at the Confucius Institutes; those who study it somewhere else;. ‧ 國. 學. those who teach Chinese in the Confucius Institutes; those who teach Chinese somewhere else. In order to keep anonymity, the interviewees are named as Ia, Ib, Ic etc. (meaning. sit. y. Nat. Confucius Institute Faculty staff:. ‧. Interviewee a, Interviewee b, Interviewee c etc.).. al. er. io. When conducting a research about the organization of the Confucius Institute it is. v i n C heverything is operated gives better understanding of how within the boundaries of the engchi U n. crucial to interview someone who knows the system from inside. Speaking to such person. institution.. The selection process for this group of people was not an easy one. First of all, the permissions to come and conduct the interviews were needed. The researcher had to contact the CIs staff via email to ask whether he could come and conduct the interviews. Then, it was important to agree on the most suitable time which would serve the interests of both the interviewer and the interviewee. In total, four interviews with the members of Confucius Faculty staff in Moscow were conducted. These interviews are with those who work in two out of three CIs in Moscow. Unfortunately, there was no chance to talk to someone from the third CI. Three out of four interviews are conducted with the staff of the CI at Moscow State Linguistic University. One is with the director of the CI at Russian State University for the.

(18) 9. Humanities 9 . It is also very important to mention that two of the respondents are of Chinese origin, so their answers cannot represent the opinion of Russian people towards the Confucius Institute. However, it is interesting to observe what Chinese people themselves do think about this initiative, though it is very likely that their attitude expressed in the interviews would be positive due to the obvious reasons, even if they do not truly think so. 1) Ia 2) Ib 3) Ic 4) Id Professors who teach Chinese outside of the CIs:. 政治大. The aim of this study is to have the comprehensive understanding of people’s. 立. perception towards Confucius Institute in Russia, thus, it is necessary to interview not. ‧ 國. 學. only those who are directly involved into the CI work process, but also those who are engaged in the process of Chinese studying but outside of the CIs. Their point of view. ‧. might be without bias if to compare with the opinions of those who work in the CIs. In total, three interviews with those who teach Chinese outside of the CI were. Nat. sit. al. n. 3) Ig. io. 2) If. er. 1) Ie. y. conducted. All of the respected professors teach Chinese at different places.. Ch. engchi. Students who learn Chinese at the CI:. i n U. v. Apart from the Confucius Institutes Faculty staff it was also important to understand what do those who picked this institute as a place to study Chinese think about it. Unfortunately, it was not that easy to find someone willing to participate in the interview. Only two persons agreed to take part in this study. Thus, for better understanding the perception of those who learn Chinese in the CIs, the study of secondary data resources is needed. 1) Ih 2) Ii 9. It is a university in Moscow, Russia with over 14 000 students. It was created in 1991 as the result of the merger of the Moscow Public University (est. 1908) and the Moscow State Institute for History and Archives (est. 1930)..

(19) 10. Students who learn Chinese outside of the CIs: The reason to interview those who study Chinese outside of the CI is pretty much the same as for interviewing those who teach Chinese outside of the CI – to get comprehensive point of view towards the CI without bias. This group of interviewees is the largest. People were willing to participate in the study and share their opinion about the subject. In total, four interviews were conducted. Two of the interviewees study Chinese in the same place; two other students are from different educational institutions. 1) Ij 2) Ik 3) Il. 政治大. 4) Im. 立. Of course it must be pointed out, that the interviewees represent only their own. ‧ 國. 學. opinion on the topic and are subjective, and they cannot represent the point of view of the whole country. Thus, apart from the interviews, more detailed analysis of secondary data. ‧. sources about the nature of the development of the Confucius Institute in Russia is needed.. sit. y. Nat. 1.4.2 Scope/limit. io. er. The relations between Russia and China are described from the period of first interactions with the Qing dynasty (1600s) and up to the present day (2015). The case of. n. al. i n U. v. the Confucius Institute is studied since its establishment in 2004 till 2015.. Ch. engchi. Field research was conducted only in Moscow, Russia. Each interview lasted from half an hour to one hour and a half depending on time the interviewees had. Two of the respondents asked to send them the questions via email due to their limited time. As the field research took place only in Moscow, the rest of the information about the development of the CIs in Russia is observed through the secondary data resources (reports, newspapers, journals).. 1.4.3 Chapter arrangement Chapter 1 deals with the Introduction part, where such topics as Background of the study, Framework and Methodology are covered. This thesis is focused on the development of Confucius Institute in Russia, particularly in Moscow. That is why at first it is necessary to understand the nature of.

(20) 11. Sino-Russian relations and the preconditions for their mutual benefit cooperation in various spheres: from economy to education. Then this thesis aims to find out what stands behind such terms as cultural diplomacy and soft power and what point of view China has towards them, whether it is trying to promote these things or not, and if the answer is positive, we will look on the initiatives the PRC is undertaking to expand its cultural influence abroad and find out if there is any possible criticism or concerns towards them. Chapter 2 will be dedicated to the topics mentioned above. Chapter 3 is dedicated to China’s soft power: its means, use, goals and limits. Though in Chapter 2 we already touch upon the subject, Chapter 3 will give the reader more comprehensive view on the topic. In Chapter 4 we will look closer on China’s soft power initiative – Confucius. 治政大 in this part. of three Confucius Institutes in Moscow will be also presented 立 In the last Chapter we will speak about research and theoretical findings, make Institute, its goals, means, and limits, and also its development in Russia. The case study. ‧ 國. 學. some suggestions and summarize everything.. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(21) 12. Chapter 2. Literature Review. The literature review presented below can be generally divided into two larger parts – macro and meso levels. The macro one is related to the analysis of Sino-Russian relations in general and their impact on the attitude of people towards the Confucius Institute, which will be discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The meso level deals with national soft power policy. In this particular research we will review two country’s soft power policy: China and Russia, with the closer focus on the first one, as the body of interest of the thesis - Confucius Institute – is one of the examples of the PRC’ soft power policy. The objective is to analyze how both countries perceive the concept of soft power, develop it, what goals and means they use and what kind of limitations have. In Chapter 4. 政治大 research findings received through the primary data resources and based on the empirical 立 research. The micro level deals with the attitude of people towards the Confucius Institute, and Chapter 5 the author will present the micro level of analysis which is basically her. ‧ 國. 學. their incentives and motivations to learn Chinese. The micro level is closely related to the macro and the meso one, as (all)both of them will to certain extent influence the outcomes. ‧. of the primary data research. The development of the Sino-Russian relations, presented as. y. Nat. the macro level, motivates people to study Chinese and thus might influence their attitude. sit. towards the Confucius Institute; while the national soft power policy in Chinese case. al. er. io. urges to develop the CI as part of this policy, and in Russian case might influence the. v. n. attitude of people towards the CI. Let’s look closer first on macro and meso levels then.. 2.1. C. engchi Sino-Russian Relationsh(1920s-2015). i n U. The relations between Russia and China have long and rich history. As these two countries are neighbors geographically the interactions between them could not but exist. If to describe their relations prior to the establishment of the Republic of China, it should be noted that in most occasions they were humiliating for the Chinese part, as it had to sign some unequal treaties with Western countries, including Russia, and give away their territories. However, in еру 20th century the international order faced crucial changes: e.g. the abolishment of Qing dynasty10 in China and the House of Romanov11 in Russia, and. 10. The last imperial dynasty of China, ruling from 1644 to 1912 with a brief, abortive restoration in 1917. It was preceded by the Ming dynasty and succeeded by the Republic of China. The Qing multi-cultural empire lasted almost three centuries and formed the territorial base for the modern Chinese state..

(22) 13. the creation of the countries: the Republic of China, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Soviet Union. The relations between the USSR and the PRC are one of the favorite topics of discussion for many scholars. These two countries used to be so close, but their friendship has never been an easy one. There were times when Moscow could dictate Beijing what to do and how to behave, because her influence on him was really strong. However, that situation ended and two close friends found themselves on different sides of the trenches for the most part of the second half of the 20th century. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the relations between Russia and China improved, while the balance of power between Moscow and Beijing changed. The demise of the USSR brought Russia to a decade of economic stagnation, social earthquakes, the financial crisis of 199812 followed by the default, Chechen wars etc. The country lost. 治政大called Reform and Opening up At the same time China was growing rapidly. The so 立 policy, announced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, showed its tremendous results, almost everything which made the Soviet Union one of the strongest powers in the world.. ‧ 國. 學. putting China far ahead its former advisor and “big brother”.. Today the relations between these two countries are characterized as “Good-. ‧. Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation”. The treaty with the same name was signed in 2001 by Russian President Vladimir Putin and China’s former General Secretary of the. y. Nat. sit. Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) Jiang Zeming. This treaty has. al. er. io. a validity period of 20 years, and will be automatically extended if neither party notifies. n. the other its intention to terminate the treaty one year before its expiration. Its aim is to. Ch. i n U. v. function as a legal document guiding the steady development of Sino-Russian relations in. engchi. the new century and to have a deep and far-reaching impact on the long-term steady development of the bilateral ties (People’s Daily, 2001). However, the history of Moscow-Beijing relations is a very complicated issue, with its own ups and down. And it certainly requires a deeper look into it. 11. The second imperial dynasty, after the Rurik dynasty, to rule over Russia, which reigned from 1613 until the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II on March 15, 1917, as a result of the February Revolution. 12 After six years of economic reform in Russia, privatization and macroeconomic stabilization had experienced some limited success. Yet in August 1998, after recording its first year of positive economic growth since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was forced to default on its sovereign debt, devalue the ruble, and declare a suspension of payments by commercial banks to foreign creditors. Russia ended 1998 with a decrease in real output of 4.9 percent for the year instead of the small growth that was expected. The collapse of the ruble created an increase in Russia’s exports while imports remained low. Since then, direct investments into Russia have been inconsistent at best. Summarized best by Shleifer and Treisman (2000), “the crisis of August 1998 did not only undermine Russia’s currency and force the last reformers from office…it also seemed to erase any remaining Western hope that Russia could successfully reform its economy.”.

(23) 14. 2.1.1 Sino-Soviet Relations (“honeymoon” – “divorce”) According to Sutter (2010), Czarist Russia’s expansion into the Far East came largely at the expenses of the declining Qin Empire (1636-1912). According to the 19th century treaties (Treaty of Aigun 13 ; Convention of Peking 14 ) large parts of Chinese territories became parts of Russia. China’s weakness and political chaos during the first half of the 20th century provided opportunities for Lenin and Stalin to seek allies and foster revolutionary movements favorable to the Soviet Union (p.271). On October 1, 1949 Mao Zedong proclaimed the official establishment of the People’s Republic of China. As Nathan and Scobell (2012) state, there were four major motives, why Mao decided to lean to the Soviet side. First was to consolidate his shaky regime. The Soviet Union provided the most obvious model and useful advice for dealing. 政治大 Party of China (CCP) leaders 立had looked to Moscow for inspiration since the founding of. with such a wide range of domestic political challenges, all the more so as the Communist. ‧ 國. 學. their party in 1921.. Second was the need to defence against an American strategy of “containment and isolation”15 that had begun to take shape even before the end of the Chinese civil war16. ‧. (1927-1950). China’s mutual defence pact with Moscow called for the USSR to provide. y. sit. allied with her.”. Nat. “military and other assistance” to China should it be attacked by Japan or “any other state. al. er. io. Third, the Soviet alliance helped China economically. The new regime had to. n. v i n C on Fourth was the need to be with a potentially threatening neighbor. h egood n gterms chi U. repair an economy devastated by years of invasions and civil war.. Russia had a long history of involving itself in Chinese affairs and a leader, Josef Stalin, known for his ruthlessness (p.67-71).. Such things as Soviet aid, advisers and guidelines were crucial for China. They helped it to start changing and growing. Yu (2007) says that this period in the relations between the USSR and China can be characterized as “honeymoon” (1949-1959), which was later followed by the so called “divorce” (p.47). 13. The Treaty of Aigun was signed in 1858 between the Russian Empire and the empire of the Qing Dynasty. According to this treaty, Russia received over 600,000 square kilometers from China. 14 The Convention of Peking is an agreement comprising three distinct treaties concluded between the Qing Empire and the United Kingdom, France, and Russia in 1860. The agreement ceded parts of Outer Manchuria to the Russian Empire. 15 Policy aimed at preventing the spread of communism abroad. 16 The Chinese civil war was a civil war fought from 1927 to 1950 between the Communist (Chinese Communist Party) and the Nationalist (Kuomintang (KMT))..

(24) 15. Since Stalin’s death in 1953 things started changing. The relations between two countries were not as close as before. The new leader the USSR Nikita Khrushchev carried on softer policy than his predecessor. He even started denouncing Stalin's cult of personality as inconsistent with communist and Party ideology. Of course Mao did not appreciate that move. He was afraid that it somehow could also harm his own authority in his country. Among other reasons Sutter (2010) names differences over strategy towards the United States and international affairs, the proper ideological path to development and the appropriate leadership roles of Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev in the world communist movement (p.272). Growing distrust had eventually led to the armed dispute over the Damanskii Island (Zhenbao Island). That was the peak of confrontation between the sides and could have led to the full-scale military conflict. Fortunately, two sides. 治政 In 1970s the U.S. started to change its attitude大 towards China. In 1971, the PRC 立 replaced the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the United Nations. In 1972, U.S. President resolved it by agreeing to demarcate the borders.. ‧ 國. 學. Richard Nixon visited China.. In 1976 Mao Zedong died. With his death the Sino-Soviet ideological disputes. ‧. gradually came to naught. However, there were still problems in the relations. China countered Soviet-backed Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia by launching a military. y. Nat. sit. incursion into Vietnam. The U.S.SR responded with warnings and large-scale military. al. er. io. exercises in along China’s northern border. China also denounced the Soviet invasion of. n. Afghanistan in 1979 and sided with the U.S.-backed anticommunist guerillas in. Ch. Afghanistan (Sutter, 2010; p. 272).. engchi. i n U. v. The period between 1982 and 1989 can be described as “normalization in relations between Moscow and Beijing”. However, the real progress was seen only after Mikhail Gorbachev took office in 1985. In 1989 he met with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing. That meeting was seen as a breakthrough in stabilizing the relations between the two sides. The decades of confrontation between two neighbors finally ended. The ideological illusions about cooperation based on the ideology disappeared. The countries now were ready to continue developing their relations on the basis of neighborhood (Kosyrev, 2009)17. For China the visit of Gorbachev was overshadowed because of the Tiananmen. 17. Косырев, Д. 20 лет назад Горбачев и Дэн изменили мир [Электронный ресурс] / Д. Косырев // РИА Новости. – 2009. – 15 Мая. – Режим доступа: http://ria.ru/analytics/20090515/171122262.html.

(25) 16. protests18. Very soon the whole Europe was covered with a revolutionary wave of protest against communist regimes. On December 25, 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed.. 2.1.2 1990s (normalization, “strategic partnership”) The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the long-lasting concerns of the CCP about the potential military threat. However, now Chinese were afraid that the Soviet Union’s today might become their tomorrow. That's why they had to make some adjustments to prevent the negative outcome. According to Meisels (2012), Those adjustments included China’s replacement of the Soviet model of multinational statebuilding with its “one nation with diversity” policy, and its institution of the patriotic education campaign to try to shore up CCP legitimacy; increased development of social. 治政大 of the West. of the PRC as an alternative model to the unbridled capitalism Speaking about the立 Sino-Russian relations, as it has already been mentioned they welfare policies etc. all these measures were intended to strengthen the “socialist” claims. ‧ 國. 學. had already started to be improved in Gorbachev's time. In 1992 president of Russia Boris Yeltsin made his first official visit to China. That visit made the bilateral relations much. ‧. closer to an alliance and further away from the animosity of the 1960s and 1970s. The both sides signed more than 20 documents, among them the Joint Declaration on the. Nat. sit. y. Foundation of Relations between the Peoples Republic of China and the Russian. io. er. Federation. According bro this document, both Russia and China would not enter into unions and alliances aimed at harming each other. Both countries also agreed not to. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. permit territories to be used by third parties to undermine the security of the other. This. engchi. declaration was designed to provide a solid legal framework for bilateral relations, leaving behind the legacy of mutual confrontation (Wang, 1998: p. 271). In September, 1994, Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Russia during which the two countries signed a lot of important documents, among them the Second Sino-Russian Joint Statement, declaring the establishment of constructive partnership featuring good neighborliness and mutually beneficial cooperation; Joint Declaration of the President of the PRC and the President of the Russian Federation on Mutually No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapon and Mutually No-Targeting the Opposite Side with Strategic Nuclear 18. Tiananmen protests – a series of student-led popular demonstrations protests which took place in spring 1989 in Beijing .The protests were forcibly suppressed by leaders who ordered the military to enforce martial law in the country's capital. The crackdown that initiated on June 3–4 became known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre as troops with assault rifles and tanks inflicted casualties on unarmed civilians trying to block the military's advance towards Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing..

(26) 17. Weapon; the Agreement between the PRC and the Russian Federation on the Western Sections of the Sino-Russian Border etc (People's Daily, 2000). China and Russia also started to improve relations in such fields as economic, military and energy cooperation. According to Sutter (2010), China became the largest consumer for Russian arms. Speaking about trade, it grew substantially from a low base. In 1985, Sino-Soviet trade was $300 million. In 1995, Sino-Russian trade reached $7 billion. China became Russia's second largest partner after Germany. In 1996, Russia and China proclaimed a "strategic partnership" between both sides, which brought the bilateral relations on the higher step. Throughout the 1990s, Russia and China held annual meetings between high officials. During these years, President Boris Yeltsin visited China four times. Jiang. 政治大. Zemin also visited Russia four times. On December 31, 1999 Yeltsin resigned. The era of Putin's Russia began.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1.3 2000- 2015 (“Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation”, new “honeymoon”). ‧. The relations between China and Russia in the new Millennium continued to. y. Nat. strengthen. As Kuhrt (2007) states, under Putin’s administration Russian East policy. sit. became more predictable and routine. The relations reached a certain level of maturity,. al. er. io. allowing sustaining small setbacks without developing into big troubles (p.137).. n. v i n Ch year strategic Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation. e n g cFriendship hi U After 9/11 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded. In 2001, President Vladimir Putin and President Jiang Zemin signed a twenty19. , both. Russia and China are the permanent members of the organization. The SCO holds annual meetings between its members where they discuss various significant issues. During Putin’s first and second terms and his successor Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, both sides not only improved relations in economic, military, energy and security spheres, but also encourage cultural exchange. 2006 was marked as The Year of Russia in China, 2007 was The Year of China in Russia. 2009 and 2010 were the years of Russian language in China and the Chinese language in Russia, respectively. 2012 and. 19. Before 9/11 this organization existed in the form of so called Shanghai Five (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan). Later Uzbekistan also became a member. The main activities of the organization are the cooperation in security, military, economic and cultural fields..

(27) 18. 2013 are known as the years of Russian tourism in China and of Chinese tourism in Russia. Cooperation in the energy field is the significant sector in the Sino-Russian relation. Russia is one of the largest energy-producing countries in the world, so it needs a stable and reliable market for its rich resources. China is one the largest energyconsumers, it has quite a lot of money and needs a reliable and stable energy supplier. Geographical advantages of Russia and China, as well as strong political relations are also good conditions to guarantee large-scale cooperation in the energy sector (Xinhua, 2014)20. Russian President Vladimir Putin sees China as a “reliable partner”. According to him, Moscow sees the "readiness of the Chinese people and the Chinese leadership to. 治政大 cooperation. Sutter (2010) There are possible scenarios of future Sino-Russian 立 argues that two countries might become closer in the event of harder U.S. policy towards build friendly, neighborly relations" with Russia (China Daily, 2011).. ‧ 國. 學. them (p.285). The relations between these free powers are not easy. However, one of the core principals of Chinese foreign relations is not to form alliances. To this must be added. ‧. that Moscow and Beijing already have a bitter experience of their failed alliance. Thus, even though they can continue to cooperate closely, it is very unlikely that they would. y. Nat. sit. form a kind of anti-Western military pact (Sutter, 2010).. al. er. io. It is often argued that Russia is strengthening ties with China because it is afraid. n. of the great potential and rapid growing of its neighbor. Russian concerns are more. Ch. i n U. v. associated with China’s capabilities, rather than any threats. However, some scholars see. engchi. at least one potential threat that the PRC could pose to the Russian Federation: reclaim of Siberia. Siberia has vast territories and is full of natural resources which Chinese are already exploiting today. There is a concern that one day Beijing could possibly want to take these territories under its own rule, thus leaving Moscow in a very pitiable position. There is a famous saying “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer”. Russia’s good intentions and interest to develop closer relations with the Eastern world, especially with China might be dictated by fear, rather than interest. However, both of these might be the driven force of Moscow’s new shift to the East policy. Both Russian and China are saying that right now their relations could be described as “the best in history”. For now,. 『中俄能源合作提速前行』，新華社， 2014 http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-10/11/c_127085658.htm. 20. 年. 10. 月. 11. 日，.

(28) 19. the second “honeymoon” seems to be more lasting than the previous one. However, it is difficult to predict the future, especially in terms of international relations and order which face various challenges and changes. Right now Moscow and Beijing are close friends and good neighbors who enjoy this win to win cooperation in many fields. Another famous saying states that “One man is no man”. After the Ukrainian crisis21 the relations between Russia and the European Union and the U.S. worsened, so Moscow had to change its foreign policy dimension. And building strong relations with China seems to be a good alternative. It would be a good thing for Russia if this situation continues for a long period of time if not forever.. 2.2. Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy. 政治大 Institute in Russia, particularly in Moscow. Thus, it is crucial to understand the relations 立 between these two countries in terms of soft power. But first of all a deeper understanding This study deals with the development of the Chinese initiative of the Confucius. ‧ 國. 學. of this term and what stands behind it is needed.. 2.2.1 Soft Power. ‧. As it has already been mentioned in the Introduction part the term “soft power”. y. Nat. sit. was introduced by the American scholar Joseph S. Nye in 1990. According to Nye (1990),. al. er. io. soft power can be used as a very important political tool, if the power of one state is seen. n. as legitimate by others; they would be less resistant to the wishes of that state. If it can. Ch. i n U. v. offer attractive ideology and culture, others would be happy to follow its lead. “Soft. engchi. power arises in large part from our values. These values are expressed in our culture, in the policies we follow inside our country, and in the way we handle ourselves internationally” (Nye, 2002). In Soft Power: The means to success in world politics (2004) Nye explained in greater detail what a term “soft power” is, gave various examples (e.g. described the American, Russian, Chinese soft power etc.), used historical research, and explored the 21. A prolonged crisis in Ukraine began on 21 November 2013, when then President Viktor Yanukovych suspended preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union. This decision resulted in mass protests by its opponents, known as the "Euromaidan". Yanukovych was ousted by the protesters on 22 February 2014, when he fled the Ukrainian capital city of Kiev. Following his ousting, unrest enveloped the largely Russophone eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, from where he had drawn most of his support. An ensuing political crisis in Ukrainian autonomous region of Crimea resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia on 18 March. Subsequently, unrest in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine evolved into a war between the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and pro-Russian insurgents..

(29) 20. implications and limits of soft power. “Soft power is a means of obtaining desired outcomes” (Nye, 2004: p.129). It is a product of culture, domestic values and policies and also of foreign policy (p.142). Nye explained, that “there are three major ways to get someone to do what you want. One is to threaten with sticks; the second is to pay that someone with carrots; the third is to attract with them or co-opt them. If you can get others to be attracted with what you want, it costs you much less than carrots and sticks”. Nye also used the example of the Iraq War to show how fragile the American soft power became. To briefly sum up things stated above, soft power is an ability of a country to use its attraction rather than force to make others like it. However, Nye (2006) also says, that soft power like any other power has its own disadvantages and limits. No one likes when. 治政大 cons of soft power, Nye gives someone else is using the soft power tools. Speaking about 立 the following example: “If I want to steal your money, I can threaten you with a gun, or I someone else is trying to make him do something, to manipulate him, even if that. ‧ 國. 學. can persuade you with a false claim that I will save the world. The second means depends upon attraction or soft power, but the result remains theft in both instances”. As we can. ‧. see here, it is not necessary that someone will use soft power to make good things. It depends on the person and on his/her intentions. Of course, it is always better to be. y. Nat. sit. attracted to something than being forced to do something, and here soft power seems to. al. er. io. be really appealing, as no one wants to face with others use of hard power. But it should. n. be kept in mind that we are talking here about a very complicated thing: the international. Ch. i n U. v. relations and the interaction between states. Thus, everyone should try to avoid getting. engchi. fooled by the other and always remember to deeper analyze what stands behind any attractive offer. Nye’s works and research about soft power are mostly concentrated on the U.S. However, he also writes about other countries and analyzes the situation there. For example, when speaking about Russia and China he says that there are still many things which both of these countries do not understand when they try to deal with soft power. We are going to speak about it in more detail later in this Chapter.. 2.2.2 Cultural Diplomacy When we are speaking about soft power we cannot ignore the mentioning of another term – cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is an integral part of soft power, one of its most powerful means and tools. Cultural diplomacy possesses great influence.

(30) 21. which might be very helpful to this or that country when it is spreading its soft power to others. Culture has been a part of countries’ foreign policies since ancient times. Ancient Greece, Persia, the Roman Empire regarded culture as an important means in wars or in foreign expansions. However, only in the 19th century the term “cultural diplomacy” started to being used in the way we understand it now. France was the first country to develop its cultural diplomacy through religion, education and charity. Very soon other European countries followed its lead (Dai, 2013: p.2). Cultural diplomacy represents creative engagement between various countries and societies, and the ways in which government can use culture as a way of building bridges (Szántó, 2011). Cultural diplomacy can be viewed in two dimensions: one is cultural. 治政大 art institutions to advance a specifically deploying cultural exchanges, artists, and 立 nation’s political agenda on the world stage. The second is a wider array of cultural diplomacy in the strictest sense, meaning the use of arts and culture as a tool of statecraft,. ‧ 國. 學. relationships, not necessarily under the direct control of government agencies, but constantly happening between cultural institutions, which, in turn, can be promoted or. ‧. supported in various ways by states (ibid.). According to the report of the Advisory Committee about cultural diplomacy. Nat. sit. y. (2005), Cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy 22 ; for it is in cultural. er. io. activities that a nation’s idea of itself is best represented. As Cummings (2003) states, cultural diplomacy has been defined as “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understandings”.. engchi. According to Chinese scholar Li Zhi (2005)23, cultural diplomacy can be regarded as an activity of a country’s foreign policy, which aims to achieve a specific strategic purpose. Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)24 Professor Eugene Astakhov (2008) 25 states that dialogue between civilizations cannot be done without. 22. According to Alan K. Henrikson, Professor of Diplomatic History at Tufts University, Massachusetts, public diplomacy can be defined as “the conduct of international relations by governments through public communications media and through dealings with a wide range of nongovernmental entities (political parties, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, educational institutions, religious organizations, ethnic groups, and so on including influential individuals) for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments.” 23. 李智：《文化外交: 一種傳播學的解讀》，北京大学出版社 2005 年版，第 24 頁。.

(31) 22. implementing cultural diplomacy in it. All civilized nations, realizing their national targets, make all necessary efforts to promote their cultural diplomacy, and no expense is spared. This direction has already become an important state mission. When most of the states operate with cultural diplomacy, their motives are simple and pragmatic: they want to promote cultural heritage, spread their languages, and popularize their achievements and way of life. However, this form of soft power is also used for achieving more significant goals: for strengthening geopolitical positions, and dealing with challenges in foreign policy and economy.. 2.3. China’s Perception towards Soft Power Various countries might have different points of views on soft power. Their soft. 政治大 power can vary. In this part of the thesis we are going to speak about China’s point of 立 view towards soft power and look how the country is using this tool of building power tools might also differ from one another. Even the models of implementing soft. ‧ 國. 學. relationship with others.. Since Hu Jintao became the paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China. ‧. in 2002, the idea of Chinese soft power has been heard more and more often. Like any other country the PRC needs to promote its image on the international arena and it is well. y. Nat. sit. aware of the fact, that culture could be used as one of the tools of improving its image.. al. er. io. Joseph Nye was the first to create the term called soft power. However, according. n. to Ding (2008) and Hunter (2009), the idea of attraction and agenda-setting has been on. Ch. i n U. v. Chinese mind since ancient times. When ancient Chinese leaders had to deal with some. engchi. external relations, they preferred to Use diplomatic maneuvering instead of military confrontation (Ding, 2008, p.24). “Generations of Chinese leaders have adopted the stratagems and long-term planning elegantly stated in Sunzi’s Art of War” (Hunter, 2009: p.378). Sun Zi (孫子) was a Chinese military general, strategist, and philosopher who. 24. MGIMO is a university that belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. It is the oldest and the most renowned school in Russia for preparing students for careers in international relations and diplomacy. Several of the current professors of MGIMO were ambassadors or ministers. 25 Астахов, Е.М., «Мировая практика культурной дипломатии», Диалог культур и партнерство цивилизаций. VIII Международные Лихачевские научные чтения, (СПб.: Изд-во СПБГУП, 22-23 мая, 2008), http://www.mgimo.ru/files/34255/34255.pdf.

(32) 23. lived in the Spring and Autumn period26 of ancient China. He is very well-known for his strategy of defeating an enemy by attacking the enemy’s strategy. The following is Sun Zi’s quotation: “To gain a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; to subjugate the enemy’s army without doing battle is the highest of excellence. Therefore, the best warfare strategy is to attack the enemy’s plans, next is to attack alliances, next is to attack the army, and the worst is to attack a walled city” (Sun Tzu's the Art of War, translated by Sonshi group). As Ding (2008) states, the sources of Sun Zi’s “highest excellence” resemble modern soft power resources – people’s rationality, morality, values and aspirations. All these things have been an integral part of Chinese traditions and culture “through which Chinese people defined their own ethnicity” (p.25).. 治政大an isolated closed country. It was Great changes began to occur in China. It stopped being 立 ready to change, to communicate with the rest of the world. From what we see now it is. In the late 1970s Deng Xiaoping proclaimed the reform and opening up policy.. ‧ 國. 學. obvious that this policy became a miracle to the country, it helped the PRC to develop from a poor agrarian country with a hostile communist regime led by one of the world’s. ‧. greatest dictators – Mao Zedong – to the today’s number one economy in the world (in terms of size), removing the U.S. from this post (Carter, 2014). However, there is still a. y. Nat. sit. lot to be done and Chinese leadership clearly understands that. Such rapid growth attracts. al. er. io. the attention all over the world. And of course other countries might fear what China. n. could do next, whether it will try to change the U.S.-dominated world into China-. Ch. i n U. v. dominated world or it will seek a new bipolar international order like it used to be in. engchi. Soviet times. To reassure all who are concerned, China proclaimed the so called peaceful rise （和平崛起 heping jueqi）. That means that China’s rise “will not come at the cost of any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor pose a threat to any other country,” – said Chinese former Premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao in one his 2004 speeches (Pan, 2006). As Kurlantzick (2007) states, Beijing really needed to change its international image and reassure the others that there were no and would not be any Chinese threat. “With this change, Beijing would diminish fears of China’s future. Spring and Autumn period （春秋時代 chunqiu shidai） - (770–476 bc), in Chinese history, the period during the Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BC)—specifically the first portion of the Dong (Eastern) Zhou—when many vassal states fought and competed for supremacy. 26.