經濟制裁成敗關鍵為何? 以歐洲聯盟委員會抵制亞洲七國之漁產品為例 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. What Contributes to the Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions? 治 European 政 the The Case of 大立 Commission’s Threats to Boycott Fishery Products from Seven Asian Countries y. Nat. sit. er. io. 經濟制裁成敗關鍵為何? al. n. iv n C 以歐洲聯盟委員會抵制亞洲七國之漁 hengchi U. 產品為例. Waratthapoom Buarapha Advisor: Professor Chien-wu Alex Hsueh. July 2020. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(2) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(3) Acknowledgement First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Professor Chien-Wu Hsueh, for helping me overcome all the challenges I faced during these past two years. Secondly, I am really thankful to the staff at the IMPIS office and ICDF who have provided me with their great support throughout this wonderful academic journey. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends who have always. 政治大. encouraged me to work hard every day to achieve my goals and enjoy myself in the process.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. i DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(4) Abstract In 2008, the European Commission developed the so-called “carding system” to fight against the issue of illegal fishing. Through this system, the EC has continuously encouraged major coastal states to take more part in the international fight against the issue of illegal fishing by threatening to boycott fish imports from targeted countries whose vessels conducted illegal fishing activities. Since the carding system was developed, seven countries in Asia have received official sanction warnings from the EC. Out of the seven, four chose to comply with demands from the EC during the threat stage of their sanction episodes (South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan), two chose not to comply. 政治大. (Cambodia and Sri Lanka), and one is still on the EC’s list of warned countries. 立. (Vietnam). This is a puzzle worthy of further investigation since the important. ‧ 國. 學. factors that were mentioned by the sanction literature do not provide a satisfying explanation to explain this variation. The goal of this thesis is to find the factors. ‧. that contributed to the countries’ different responses to the EC’s sanctions threats. By exploring the cases of the seven countries, I argue that if states are. y. Nat. sit. democracies, they are more likely to comply with senders’ demands during the. er. io. threat stage of the sanctions episode because democracies generally have more. n. a l to demands from democratic political incentives to concede i v senders and they also C. n. h e the issue tend to be more well-prepared to address h i inUdispute. Instead, if the ngc. targets are autocracies, dependency on the senders’ market is not a sufficient factor for them to comply. In this situation, an involvement of a second superpower like the US is another important reason for them to comply because the interference will put more economic pressure on the targets. My findings supplement the sanction literature by pointing out new causal mechanisms of the political and economic factors. Keywords: IUU Fishing, Economic Sanctions, Sanctions Threat, Fisheries Sector, European Commission, East and Southeast Asia. ii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(5) Table of Contents Acknowledgement ................................................................................................... i Abstract ................................................................................................................... ii Table of Contents ................................................................................................... iii List of Tables ......................................................................................................... iv List of Figures ..........................................................................................................v List of Acronyms ................................................................................................... vi Chapter 1 Introduction .............................................................................................1 1.1 Research Motivation ..................................................................................... 1 1.2 The Purpose of the Research ......................................................................... 6 1.3 Argument in Brief and Hypothesis................................................................ 9. 政治大 1.5 Organization of Thesis Chapters ................................................................. 17 立 Chapter 2 Literature Review ..................................................................................21 1.4 Methodology ............................................................................................... 14. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1 The Basics of Economic Sanctions ............................................................. 21 2.2 The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions .................................................. 27. ‧. 2.3 The Determinants of Sanctions Success and Failure .................................. 30. sit. y. Nat. Chapter 3 Factors that Contributed to the Success and Failure of the EC’s Sanctions Threats ...................................................................................................35. n. l. er. io. Chapter 4 Cases of Countries Which Did Not Complied with the EU’s Demands ................................................................................................................51 a. iv. 4.1 The Case of Cambodia ................................................................................ 51 C Un. hen. hi. gc 4.2 The Case of Sri Lanka ................................................................................. 61 4.3 Conclusion................................................................................................... 73 Chapter 5 Cases of Countries Which Complied with the EU’s Demands .............75 5.1 The Case of South Korea ............................................................................ 75 5.2 The Case of the Philippines ......................................................................... 85 5.3 The Case of Thailand .................................................................................. 96 5.4 The Case of Taiwan................................................................................... 111 5.5 Conclusion................................................................................................. 121 Chapter 6: Conclusion..........................................................................................123 Bibliography ........................................................................................................135. iii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(6) List of Tables Table 1.1 Timeline of the European Union’s Carding Decision for Countries in Asia from 2012-2019……………………………………………………………...8 Table 1.2 Preconditions for the EC’ Threat to Become Effective that Were Present in the Case of Each Country …………………………………………………….12 Table 3.1 Polity Score by Country from 2013 to 2018…………………………..38 Table 3.2 Political Rights Score by Country from 2013 to 2019………………...39 Table 3.3 Each Country’s Total Value of Fish Exports to the Global Market as Percentage of Its GDP in the Respective Year that It Received the Yellow Card from the EC………………………………………………………………………44 Table 3.4 Each Country’s Total Value of Fish Exports to the EU as Percentage of the Country’s Total Value of Fish Exports to the Global Market in the Respective Year that It Received the Yellow Card from the EC…………………………….45. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Table 5.1 Each Country’s Total Value of Fish Exports to the EU as Percentage of Its GDP in the Year that It Received the Yellow Card from the EC…………….92. ‧. Table 5.2: Each Country’s Total Value of Fish Exports to the Global Market as Percentage of Its GDP in the Respective Year that It Received the Yellow Card from the EC……………………………………………………………………..109. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. iv DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(7) List of Figures Graph 4.1 Cambodia’s Value of Fish Exports from 1976 to 2017………………55 Graph 4.2 Cambodia’s Value of Fish Exports to the EU from 2000 to 2018……56 Graph 4.3 Sri Lanka’s Value of Fish Exports from 2000 to 2018……………….65 Graph 4.4 Sri Lanka’s Value of Fish Exports to the EU from 2000 to 2018…….66 Graph 4.5 Sri Lanka’s Amount of Unreported Fish Catch from 2000 to 2014….69. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. v DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(8) List of Acronyms AP = Associated Press APFFI = Alliance of Philippine Fishing Federations Inc. BFAR = Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (Philippines) CCAMLR = Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources CCCIF = Command Center for Combatting Illegal Fishing CDCO = Import Export and Civil Development Construction Company. 政治大. CMPA = Crisis Management Participation Agreement. 立. CP Foods = Charoen Pokphand Foods. ‧ 國. 學. DFAR = Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (Sri Lanka). ‧. DWF = Distant Water Fleet. sit. y. Nat. DWFD Act = Distant Water Fisheries Development Act (South Korea) EC = European Commission. er. io. n. a ECOFISH Project = Ecosystems Improved for Sustainable v Fisheries Project i l C n U h EEZ = Exclusive Economic Zonee n g c h i EJF = Environmental Justice Foundation EU = European Union FA = Fisheries Agency (Taiwan) FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization FARA = Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Act (Sri Lanka) FCF = Fong Chun Formosa Fishery Company FDI = Foreign Direct Investment vi DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(9) FMC = Fisheries Monitoring Center FTA = Free Trade Agreement GDP = Gross Domestic Product GSP+ = Generalized Scheme of Preferences plus HACCP = Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point HSE = Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot IATTC = Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission ICCAT = International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna. 政治大. IOTC = Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. 立. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. 學. ‧ 國. IPOA-IUU = International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate. ‧. IPOA-UN = International Plan of Action against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of the United Nations. y. Nat. er. io. sit. IUU Fishing = Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. al. KAMFIMEX = Kampuchea Fish Import and Export Company. n. iv n C U h eForestry MAFF = Ministry of Agriculture, (Cambodia) n g c handi Fisheries MCS = Monitoring, Control and Surveillance MOF = Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (South Korea) NARA = National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency (Sri Lanka) NOAA = National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NPOA-IUU = National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing PSMA = Agreement on Port State Measures vii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(10) RA8850 = Republic Act 8850 (Philippines) RFMO = Regional Fisheries Management Organization TIP Report = Trafficking in Persons Report TPP = Trans-Pacific Partnership UNCLOS = United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea USAID = United States Agency for International Development VMS = Vessel Monitoring System WCPFC = Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. 政治大. WHO = World Health Organization. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. viii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(11) Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Research Motivation In 2014-2015, several world’s leading news agencies, such as the Guardian, Reuters and the New York Times started publishing stories about cases of labor exploitation found in the Thai seafood industry and they brought the issue of modern slavery, once again, into the world’s spotlight (Hodal et al. 2014; Whiting, 2015; Urbina, 2015). Since then, the issue of forced labor in Thailand’s seafood industry has gained an ever-growing attention from the press. The case of labor abuse found in the supply chain linked to Charoen Pokphand Foods, Thailand’s biggest food conglomerate, was probably the most. 政治大. notable case of modern slavery in 2014. According to an article published on the. 立. Guardian’s website by Hodal et al. (2014), a large number of men were. 學. ‧ 國. discovered to be held against their own will on fishing vessels off the coasts of Thailand during sometime in June 2014. These men were being forced to work in. ‧. harsh conditions for more than 20 hours a day to provide fishmeal to CP Foods,. y. Nat. which was the biggest supplier of shrimp to big supermarkets and food retailers in. io. sit. the United States. The men, after their successful escape from the boats, reported. er. to the Guardian that many of them had regularly experienced physical abuse and. n. a l while they were working some had even witnessed killings i v on the fleet. This n. C. incident sparked a lot of interest inhthe i U labor and illegal fishing e issues n g cofhforced among international non-profit organizations such as Environmental Justice Foundation, Greenpeace and Human Rights Watch. After the incident, many NGOs conducted in-depth investigations on several more cases of forced labor in the fishing industry in Thailand and published a number of publications on the issue to raise more awareness among the public (EJF, 2015; Greenpeace, 2015). But, before the situation in the Thai seafood industry gets to this point, how did the issue of forced labor come into existence in the industry in the first place? It actually began when the world’s consumption of seafood started to massively increase during the second half of the 20th century. Due to the rise in global wealth and the world’s population, the annual global consumption of 1 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(12) seafood products per capita had doubled from 10 kg in 1960 to almost 20 kg in 2014 (Guillen et al., 2019, p. 111). As the demand for fishery products in wealthy countries around the world increases, major fish exporters like Thailand need to produce more fishery products so that they can satisfy the demand from the global market and ensure food security for the world population. However, despite this ever-growing demand, most fish exporters cannot keep up with their production needs. As for Thailand, the exploited fish stocks have been forcing fishing vessels to stay at sea longer and sometimes operate illegally in other nations’ territorial waters to bring in diminishing catch (EJF, 2015, p. 4). Meanwhile, the. 治政大Laos and Cambodia to migrants from neighboring countries such as Myanmar, 立 work for cheap wages on their boats. The EJF (2015, p. 4) claimed that the use of lack of adequate fisheries law has also facilitated boat captains to hire illegal. ‧ 國. 學. bonded labor on these fishing vessels allows fishing companies in Thailand to cut their labor costs and provide cheap fishery products to the west. Thus, fishing. ‧. companies in Thailand have much incentive to continue using forced labor in their. sit. y. Nat. supply chains to fish illegally for them and provide consumers around the world with more products from the work of slaves and pirate fishing vessels.. er. io. Meanwhile, Taiwan,aanother world’s major seafood exporter, has also. n. iv l C n been seeing similar issues during the decades. Taiwan is the second largest h epast hi U n c g tuna fishing country in the world after Japan (Haward and Bergin, 2000, p. 33). The country began developing its fishing industry in the late 1950s, but it turned to distant water fishing and focused more on high seas fisheries in the late 1960s as fish population in coastal water shrank due to overfishing (Hsu and Southerland, 2015, p. 3). By the year 2018, Taiwan became a country with one of the world’s largest distant water fleets (Mundy, 2018, p. 67). Distant water fleet (also known as DWF) is a fleet of fishing vessels that operates outside the country’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Victoria Mundy (2018, p. 67) stated in her report that she wrote for Oceana that, in 2018, there were about 1850 Taiwanese fishing vessels sailing in the EEZs of more than 30 countries and 2 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(13) all major oceans of the world. Since the fishing vessels in the fleet do not operate in Taiwan’s territorial waters, Taiwanese authorities often find it difficult to inspect the fleet. This makes it easy for captains of vessels in the fleet to hire illegal migrants without work permits from Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines to fish illegally for them. These workers often become the victims of labor abuse on the fleet. The most well-known case of labor abuse in the Taiwanese seafood industry was the case of forced labor on shipping vessels linked to Fong Chun Formosa Fishery Company (FCF) that was reported by Greenpeace in 2018. In its report named “Misery at Sea”, Greenpeace (2018, p. 41-42) claimed that its team. 治政 fishing vessel that sailed from the Kaohsiung port in 大 Taiwan towards fishing 立 grounds in the Central Pacific on May 7, 2016. The letter informed the. of investigators had received a letter from the crew of Tunago No.61; a longline. ‧ 國. 學. investigators that the crew, which consisted mostly of Vietnamese, Filipino, and Indonesian men, had experienced violent physical abuse, regular verbal abuse,. ‧. and threats of killing from the captain of the fishing vessel. The men also reported. sit. y. Nat. to Greenpeace via the letter that their passports were being held by the captain of the boat and they were not paid in accordance with their signed contracts. io. n. a. er. (Greenpeace, 2018, p. 38). After an investigation, Greenpeace (2018, p. 14) was. v. able to identify links betweenl Tunago No.61 and FCF,na igiant fishing company. Ch. U. i of other fish annually to n g c htons that supplies 520,000 tons of tuna ande100,000 markets in North America, Europe and Asia.. From the situation in both countries, we can see that the issue of labor exploitation on fishing vessels is strongly linked with illegal fishing. Since unregistered fishing vessels that operate in international waters are rarely being inspected by state authorities of any country, many of the captains on these ships see this as an opportunity to conduct misdeeds or illegal acts like hiring unlicensed workers for their crew, using violence on their employees, forcing employees to work overtime extensively, and using their ships to smuggle illegal drugs into other countries. Basically, most cases of labor abuse are found on ships 3 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(14) that operate illegally without being known by the state they belong to. Thus, if we would like to address the issue of forced labor on fishing vessels in a particular state, we should first address the issue of illegal unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. What is IUU fishing? IUU or illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, according to the FAO (2001, p. 2-3), is a broad term which may include 1) fishing activities conducted by stateless vessels, 2) fishing activities that are in violation of national laws or international obligations, 3) fishing activities that have not been reported or misreported to the relevant national authority, and 4) fishing activities that are conducted in waters under the jurisdiction of a state without the. 政治大 The issue of IUU fishing 立 does not only exist in Thailand and Taiwan, but. permission of that state.. ‧ 國. 學. it has been a major issue for many countries in Asia during the past two decades. South Korea is an example of Asian countries that fought seriously against the. ‧. issue of IUU fishing long before Thailand and Taiwan. In 2013, Greenpeace (2013, p. 2) reported that there were 34 vessels owned by 20 South Korean. Nat. sit. y. companies that had been identified as being involved in IUU fishing activities. er. io. internationally. According to the report, some of these fishing vessels, namely the Insung 2 and Inusng 7, wereacaught fishing more than their allowed quotas in a. n. iv l C n sub-area of the Ross Sea (Greenpeace, p. 3). Furthermore, Greenpeace h e 2013, hi U n c g (2013, p. 4-5) also found that a number of vessels owned by Sajo Group, one of the biggest fishing companies in South Korea, had repeatedly abused human rights of their foreign crew. According to Greenpeace (2013, p. 4-5), foreign crew working on the vessels called Oyang 70 and Oyang 75 were reported to be often beaten by blunt instruments like steel pipes and had experienced sexual harassment, violation and insult while they were working as fishermen on the ships. These incidents demonstrate that the South Korean government, at that time, failed to regulate its fishing industry and did not have enough resolve to fix the issue of IUU fishing in its fishing industry. Since then, the international. 4 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(15) community has been pressuring South Korea to strengthen its legislation against IUU fishing and take a more serious action to resolve the issue. Fortunately, international organizations such as the European Union have not been ignorant about the issue. In 2008, the European Union adopted a legislation called the EU IUU Regulation in a bid to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing from the global community (EJF, Pew & WWF, 2016, p. 2). Under the said regulation, the EU may issue official warnings (also known as “yellow cards”) to non-EU countries that do not have adequate measures to prevent and deter IUU fishing. Those that receive yellow cards from the EU will need to go through an evaluation period of at least six months. During this period, the. 治政 shortcomings in line with an action plan proposed by大 the EU” (EJF, Oceana, The 立 Pew Charitable Trusts & WWF, 2016, p. 6). If the countries could improve the countries are expected to “undertake substantial reforms to address the identified. ‧ 國. 學. situation in their fishing industry, the yellow cards can be removed by the EU. However, if the countries fail to address the problems, the EU can identify them. ‧. as non-cooperating, issue them “red cards”, and boycott all fishery products. y. Nat. caught by fishing vessels flying the flags of those countries. This process created. er. io. sit. by the EU to tackle IUU fishing is widely known as the “carding system”. Contrary to the belief a that economic sanctions are inefficient tools of. n. iv l C n foreign policy, the EU has actuallyhbeen quite successful e n g c h i U in persuading non-EU countries to take more actions to address the issue of IUU fishing through the carding system in the past decade. Since the EU adopted the IUU Regulation, there have already been seven countries in Asia that received yellow and red cards from the EU. Out of these seven countries, four have complied with demands from the EU and took adequate measures to eliminate IUU fishing activities from their territorial water since the threat stage of the sanctions episodes. What are the factors that contributed to the success of the sanctions threats that the EU made against seven countries in Asia for their lack of action against illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing during the period of nine years from 2010-2019? This thesis will guide readers to the answer to this question. 5 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(16) 1.2 The Purpose of the Research Since the European Commission adopted the carding system in 2010, the commission has given yellow and red cards to a total of seven countries in Asia. Those countries were Sri Lanka (issued in 2012), Cambodia (issued in 2012), South Korea (issued in 2013), the Philippines (issued in 2014), Thailand (issued in 2015), Taiwan (issued in 2015), and Vietnam (issued in 2017) (European Commission, 2012; 2013a; 2014b; 2015; 2015, April 21; 2017a). Among all these countries, four countries managed to have their yellow cards revoked by the EC during the threat stage of the sanctions episode, one country was able to get its red card revoked, one country still got sanctioned by the EU up until today and has. 政治大. not yet been removed from the list of countries that are red-carded, and one still possesses a yellow card but has yet to receive a red card.. 立. Cambodia and Sri Lanka were the first two countries in Asia to receive. ‧ 國. 學. official warnings (yellow cards) from the EC. Both countries got their cards in November 2012 (European Commission, 2012). However, after the yellow cards. ‧. were given, the EC saw that the two countries had not taken enough action in. sit. y. Nat. fighting against IUU fishing, therefore, the commission decided to identify both. io. er. countries as non-cooperating and issued Cambodia and Sri Lanka red cards in November 2013 and October 2014, respectively (European Commission 2013b;. n. a. v. i improved the situation l C 2014c). Sri Lanka, after having been sanctioned by thenEC,. i U. he. g c h in June 2016 (European in its country and finally got its red cardnrevoked. Commission, 2017b). Cambodia, however, is still on the list of countries that are red-carded by the EC up until today. South Korea and the Philippines were the next group of Asian countries that received yellow cards from the European Commission. South Korea was the first to receive the warning in November 2013 (European Commission, 2013a). Then, following South Korea, the Philippines got its yellow card in June 2014 (European Commission, 2014b). Fortunately, the two countries performed excellently in addressing the issue of IUU fishing and both got their yellow cards. 6 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(17) revoked by the EC at the same time, in April 2015 (European Commission, 2015, April 21). Thailand and Taiwan received their yellow cards in the same year and it took them the same amount of time to adopt adequate measures to prevent and deter IUU fishing that could satisfy the EC’s suggestion. Thailand got its yellow card in April 2015 and the card was revoked in January 2019 (European Commission, 2015, April 21; 2019, January 8). Meanwhile, the card was given to Taiwan in October 2015 and it got revoked in June 2019 (European Commission, 2015; 2019, June 27). Finally, Vietnam was the latest country in Asia to receive a yellow card. 政治大 today and it has not yet been 立given a red card (European Commission, 2017a).. from the EC in October 2017. The country still possesses the yellow card up until. ‧. ‧ 國. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. Asia.. 學. Table 1.1 in the next page shows the timeline of the carding process in. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 7 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(18) Table 1.1 Timeline of the European Union’s Carding Decision for Countries in Asia from 2012-2019 Country. Yellow Card. Yellow Card. received. revoked. Red Card received. Duration of the. Red Card revoked. Sanctions Episode. Sri Lanka. November 2012. -. October 2014. June 2016. 43 Months. Cambodia. November 2012. -. November 2013. -. 85 Months (ongoing). South Korea. November 2013. April 2015. -. -. 17 Months. -. -. 10 Months. -. 45 Months. -. -. 44 Months. -. -. 26 Months (ongoing). 立. y. sit. June 2019. io. October 2015. -. Nat. Taiwan. January 2019. n. al. er. April 2015. ‧ 國. Thailand. April 2015. Vietnam. October 2017. ‧. June 2014. 學. The Philippines. 政治大. Ch -. n engchi U. iv. Source: Mundy, V. (2018). The Impact of the EU IUU Regulation on Seafood Trade Flows: Identification of Intra-EU Shifts in Import Trends Related to the Catch Certification Scheme and Third Country Carding Process. Overview of third country authorizations to export seafood products to the EU (p. 10). Belgium, Brussels: Environmental Justice Foundation, Oceana, The Pew Charitable Trusts, WWF. Note: Re-organized by the author.. 8 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(19) According to the information in Table 1.1, it is clear that the sanctions threats that the EU made against seven Asian countries were quite effective. Out of the seven cases, the EU has seen success in four cases overall. The goal of this thesis is to find an answer to one particular question; what are the factors that contributed to the success and failure of the sanctions threats that the EU made against seven countries in Asia for their lack of commitment in the international fight against the issue of IUU fishing? In a bid to achieve this goal, I will conduct a comparative case study across the seven cases by employing Mill’s method of agreement and Mill’s method of difference, which I will explain in detail in part 1.4 of this chapter.. 政治大 In the 1990s, there has been a major debate among scholars in the field of 立. 1.3 Argument in Brief and Hypothesis. international political economy on whether economic sanctions are an effective. ‧ 國. 學. tool of economic statecraft. Scholars like Hufbauer et al. (1990), for example, believed that economic sanctions can be used effectively by sender states to. ‧. coerce target states into changing their policies. Meanwhile, there was also a. sit. y. Nat. scholar like Pape (1997) who did not have much faith in the effectiveness of economic sanctions.. er. io. n. However, the focus a of the studies of scholars in this v field completely. l. ni. C h Morgan and Schwebach changed in the early 2000s. In 1997, (1997) published a i U e ngch. work in which they encouraged scholars in the field of international political economy to focus more on finding when economic sanctions work instead of finding if sanctions work at all. Aside from this, they also claimed in the paper that sanctions will have a higher chance of producing favorable outcomes if target states are expecting to bear a high economic cost from the imposed sanctions. Since then, many scholars have published more works to discuss the determinants of sanctions success and failure. Drezner (1999), for example, published his work in 1999 which stated that allies are more likely to comply with demands from sender states than adversaries. After that, in 2002, Morgan and Miers (2002) claimed that sender states will be more likely to succeed in using economic 9 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(20) sanctions to coerce target states into complying with their demands if there is an involvement of an intergovernmental organization in the sanctions episode. In 2005, Allen (2005) found that leaders in democratic states are more likely to concede to demands from senders than those in autocratic states. Finally, in 2007, Ang and Peksen (2007) argued that economic sanctions will be more effective if the states perceive the issue in dispute as highly salient. Based on the aforementioned works of scholars in this field, I assume that there are four variables that could determine the success and failure of economic sanctions; the involvement of an intergovernmental organization, the target’s dependency on the sender’s market, the target’s political regime type and the. 治政大 episodes of the seven factor that caused the difference in outcomes of the sanction 立 Asian countries as those countries were being sanctioned by the same IO, which saliency of the issue in dispute. However, the involvement of an IO cannot be a. ‧ 國. 學. was the EC. Thus, this leaves me with only the other three variables.. ‧. In order to determine the regime type of each target state, I have looked into the Polity and Political rights scores of that country. Aside from this, I have. Nat. sit. y. also looked into each country’s fish exports data to determine its degree of. er. io. dependency on the EU’s fish market (this will be further discussed in the third chapter). According to my findings, there were three countries that can be a. n. iv l C n considered as democracies when their episode started; Taiwan, South h esanctions hi U n c g Korea and the Philippines. Meanwhile, there were three countries whose fisheries sectors depended a lot on the EU market; Thailand, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. As for the saliency of the issue (as perceived by the target), I have looked into each country’s level of preparedness to address the issue in dispute at the time that the threat was received and determined that there were three countries that perceived the issue as significant and were well-prepared to fight illegal fishing; South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan. Aside from these three variables, I would also like to add one more variable to the study, which is the involvement of the US in the sanctions episode. The reason for adding this variable to the study is because I have found that the 10 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(21) US had gotten involved in three countries’ sanctions episodes during the 2010s and this may be a factor that leads the countries to their compliance. Those countries were; Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea. Table 1.2 in the next page shows the variables present in each case.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 11 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(22) Table 1.2 Preconditions for the EC’s Threat to Become Effective that Were Present in the Case of Each Country. Country. Y/M that the card was received. Time spent to get the yellow card revoked. The country was a democracy. The country was highly dependent on the EU fish market. There was an involvement of the US in the episode. The country was well prepared to address the issue. Countries that did not comply during the threat stage Cambodia. Nov-12. N/A. Sri Lanka. Nov-12. N/A. Wave 1. 立. 政治大 ✓. ‧ 國. 學. Countries that complied during the threat stage. The Philippines. Jun-14. 10 months. Thailand. Apr-15. 45 months. Taiwan. Oct-15. 44 months. io. ✓. al. n. Wave 3. ✓. ✓. ✓. ✓. y. Nat. Wave 2. ✓ △. sit. 17 months. er. Nov-13. ‧. South Korea. Ch. v n✓i U engchi. ✓. ✓. ✓. Countries that are still caught in the threat stage Wave 4. Vietnam. Oct-17. ✓. N/A. Note: Table created by the author.. 12 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(23) Based on the information in Table 1.2, it can be clearly seen that the country’s level of preparedness was actually correlated to the country’s degree of democracy. A democratic country was interestingly more well prepared to address the issue of IUU fishing than an autocratic state. Thus, the country’s level of preparedness cannot be considered as an “independent variable” that contributed to the success or failure of the EC’s sanctions threat in the case of each country. This variable is more like a dependent variable in the causal chain that links between each country’s level of democracy and the outcome of the sanctions episode. Thus, this leaves me with only three independent variables that might be the determinants of the outcome of each case; the country’s regime type, the country’s dependency on the EU market and the involvement of the United States.. 治政大of the research, I would Based on all the findings from this initial phase 立 like to construct my hypothesis that “democratic states are more likely to comply ‧ 國. 學. with demands from the sender during the threat stage of the sanction episode than autocratic states. However, there is also a high chance that autocratic states will. ‧. comply with demands from the sender during the threat stage if their economy. sit. y. Nat. depends a lot on the sender’s market and if there is an involvement of another superpower in the sanction episode”. In a bid to support my hypothesis, I argue. io. n. a. er. that if states are democracies, they are more likely to comply with demands. v. l more political benefits sooner because they would receive n i from doing so and. Ch. U. e well-prepared n g c h i to address the issue in democracies are also more likely to be. dispute at the time when it receives the threat from the sender. Instead, if the targets are autocracies, dependency on the sender’s market is not a sufficient concern for them to comply with demands from the sender during the threat stage. In this situation, the involvement of another superpower like the US is an important condition for them to comply. This is because the country will receive more pressure if it is being threatened by two parties simultaneously and the involvement of another superpower will increase the damage of the sanctions to the country’s economy.. 13 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(24) 1.4 Methodology This research will be conducted in a bid to find an answer to one particular question; what are the factors that contributed to the success and failure of economic sanctions threats that the European Commission used against seven countries in Asia during the course of nine years from 2010-2019? In this study, I will employ two research methods to find the answer to the said question; the comparative methods and the case study methods, mainly process tracing. However, before we dive into the details on the research design, I would first like to introduce readers to the cases that I will examine in this study. There are seven cases in total. The first case (Case 1) is the case of economic sanctions. 政治大. that the EU imposed on Sri Lanka for its lack of commitment in addressing the. 立. issue of IUU fishing that began in November 2012 and ended in June 2016. The. ‧ 國. 學. second case (Case 2) is the case of economic sanctions that the EU imposed on Cambodia for its lack of commitment in addressing the issue of IUU fishing that. ‧. began in November 2012 and has yet to end. The third case (Case 3) is the case of an economic sanctions threat that the EU made against South Korea for its lack of. y. Nat. sit. commitment in addressing the issue of IUU fishing that began in November 2013. er. io. and ended in April 2015. The fourth case (Case 4) is the case of an economic. n. sanctions threat that the EUamade against the Philippinesi for v its lack of. l C n U commitment in addressing the issue that began in June 2014 and hofe IUU i h n g fishing c. ended in April 2015. The fifth case (Case 5) is the case of an economic sanctions threat that the EU made against Thailand for its lack of commitment in addressing the issue of IUU fishing that began in April 2015 and ended in January 2019. The sixth case (Case 6) is the case of an economic sanctions threat that the EU made against Taiwan for its lack of commitment in addressing the issue of IUU fishing that began in October 2015 and ended in June 2019. Finally, the seventh case (Case 7) is the case of an economic sanctions threat that the EU made against Vietnam for its lack of commitment in addressing the issue of IUU fishing that began in October 2017 and has yet to end.. 14 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(25) These seven cases will be divided into three different groups. The first group shall be called Group A. This group consists of cases in which the target states did not comply with the EC’s demands during the threat stage of their sanctions episodes and were later given red cards by the EC. There are two cases that belong in this group; the case of Cambodia and the case of Sri Lanka. The second group shall be called Group B. This group consists of cases in which the target states chose to comply with the EC’s demands in the threat stage of their sanctions episodes. There are four cases that belong in this group; the cases of South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan. Finally, the last group, which shall not be given a name, consists of the case in which the sanction episode has yet to end. There is only one case in this group, which is the case of Vietnam. The. 政治大. case of Vietnam will not be discussed in detail in the following four chapters of. 立. the thesis. However, the case of Vietnam will still be briefly discussed in the last. ‧ 國. 學. chapter; the conclusion of the research.. Now that all the cases are given, I shall explain my research design. In this. ‧. comparative case study, I will use Mill’s method of agreement and Mill’s method. sit. y. Nat. of difference to find all variables that may be associated with the success and. io. er. failure of economic sanctions threats that were made by the EU against seven countries in Asia. According to George and Bennett (2005, p. 153), the method of. n. al. iv. agreement is generally used to identify C the independentnvariables associated with. i U. he. n gIncthehmethod of agreement, the a common outcome in two or more cases.. investigator will employ the logic of elimination to exclude the candidate causes (independent variables) that are not present in all cases with similar outcome. Any cause (independent variable) that can survive this elimination can be considered as possibly associated with those cases’ common outcome (dependent variable) (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 155). Meanwhile, the method of difference allows the investigator to identify the independent variables that contribute to the difference in outcomes of all the cases under examination. In the method of difference, the investigator uses the logic of elimination to exclude candidate causes (independent variables) that are 15 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(26) present in all cases that are being compared (two or more) (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 156). According to George and Bennett (2005, p. 156), a condition present in all cases cannot “account for the difference in case outcomes”. Thus, only conditions (independent variables) that survive the elimination process and are not present in all cases that are being compared can be regarded as possibly associated with the variance in the outcomes of the cases. In the first phase of the study, I will compare the cases in Group B against each other via the method of agreement. Since all cases in Group B share a common outcome (the success of sanction threats), I will use the logic of elimination to exclude all the conditions (independent variables) that are not. 政治大 cases. All the conditions that are present in all cases in group B can then be 立. present in all cases in group B and single out only those that are present in all. regarded as the independent variables that may be associated with the success of. ‧ 國. 學. sanction threats. For example, if all countries in Group B are democracies, I may be able to conclude that “a high degree of democracy in the target state” may be. ‧. one of the factors that contribute to the success of sanction threats.. y. Nat. sit. Then, I will use a tool for within-case analysis called “process tracing” to. er. io. seek for explanations why those independent variables lead to the outcome shared. n. by all the cases in Group A.aAccording George and Bennett i v (2005, p. 206), l. n. C. process tracing is a method which h “attempts i U the intervening causal e n g ctohidentify process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable”. I can use process tracing to either 1) develop a new hypothesis to why a certain independent variable caused the outcome to occur or 2) test an existing hypothesis by seeing whether there is any alternative causal path that links the independent variable to the outcome (aside from the path that has been given by the scholar who came up with that particular hypothesis). Next, in the second phase of the study, I will use the method of agreement to find all the independent variables that lead to the failure of the sanction threats.. 16 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(27) For this second phase, I will do the same process all over again, except with the cases in Group A instead of Group B. Basically, I will compare the two cases in group A against each other to find the independent variables that are present in all cases. Those independent variables will be identified as the factors that contribute to the failure of sanction threats. Then I will use process tracing to find the causal chains/causal mechanisms that link those independent variables with the outcome shared by all cases in Group A. Finally, in the last and final phase of the study, I will conduct a case comparison between Group A and group B to find the factors that caused the two groups to act differently in response to the sanctions threats from the EU. In this. 政治大 and the variables that are not present in both cases can be regarded as the possible 立 phase of the study, the variables that are present in both groups can be discarded. factors that contribute to the difference in outcomes between the two groups.. ‧ 國. 學. In conclusion, this study will be divided into three phases. In the first. ‧. phase of the study, I will employ “Mill’s method of agreement” to compare all the. y. Nat. cases in Group B against each other to find the variables that are associated with. sit. the “success” of the EU’s sanction threats. In the second phase of the study, I will,. er. io. again, employ “Mill’s method of agreement” to compare all the cases in Group A. n. a lvariables that are associatedi vwith the “failure” of the against each other to find the n. C. h e nofgthec study EU’s sanction threats. After each phase h i Uis finished, I will also use. process tracing to find the causal chains and mechanisms that link the variables to the outcomes of the cases. Finally, in the final phase of the study, I will employ “Mill’s method of difference” to find the factors that contributed to the difference in outcomes between the two groups.. 1.5 Organization of Thesis Chapters The purpose of the thesis is to find factors which contributed to the success and failure of the sanction threats that the EU decided to put on seven countries in Asia for their lack of commitment in its international fight against IUU fishing. The thesis will be organized into six chapters as follows. 17 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(28) Chapter 1 (this chapter) serves as an introduction to the research. The first part of the chapter provides a brief background of the issue of IUU fishing in Asia and explains my motivation for conducting this research. Apart from the background of the issue, the chapter also describes the significance of the research, the research question, the objective of the research, the hypothesis of the research, and the research design. Chapter 2 is the literature review. The chapter is divided into three parts; 1) the basics of economic sanctions, 2) the scholars’ debate on the effectiveness of economic sanctions, and 3) the determinants of sanctions success and failure. The first part of the chapter (the basics of economic sanctions) reviews the definitions. 政治大 sanctions episode, and the different motives behind the use of economic 立. of economic sanctions, the types of economic sanctions, the components of a. sanctions. In the second part, the chapter discusses different opinions of modern. ‧ 國. 學. scholars on how effective are economic sanctions as tools of statecraft. In the third part, the chapter provides different ideas and arguments of modern scholars. ‧. on what contributes to the success and failure of economic sanctions.. y. Nat. sit. Chapter 3 contains details on how I arrive at my main argument that the. er. io. target’s regime type is the determinant of the success and failure of sanction. n. a lto find the major factors that threats. In this chapter, I seek i v contributed to the n. C. heng success and failure of the EU’s economic sanctions threats by looking into chi U. different circumstances of the six cases under examination. The comparative method will be used to single out the variables that may be associated with the outcomes of the cases and the hypothesis will be constructed based on the findings. Chapter 4 is the study of the cases in which the target states chose to not comply with demands from the EC in the threat stage of their sanctions episode. The two cases that will be examined in this chapter are the cases of Cambodia and Sri Lanka. By examining these two cases, I wish to demonstrate how the. 18 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(29) undemocratic nature of the states contributed to their decision to not comply with demands from the EC. Chapter 5 is the study of the cases in which the target states chose to comply with the EC’s demands in the threat stage of their sanctions episode. The four cases that will be examined in this chapter are the cases of South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Taiwan. In this chapter, I will explore the circumstances that prompt these countries to increase their attempts to eliminate IUU fishing activities conducted by vessels flying their flags both within and outside their jurisdictional waters. By the end of this chapter, I wish to be able to demonstrate how factors like the level of democracy in each state, the country’ reliance on the. 政治大 fishing and the involvement of another superpower such as the United States in 立 EU as a fish export market, the country’s preparedness in fighting against IUU. the sanction episode, could possibly affect each country’s response to the EU’s. ‧ 國. 學. demands.. ‧. Finally, Chapter 6 is the conclusion. It provides a brief summary of. y. Nat. everything I discovered through this research. In this chapter, the case of Vietnam. sit. will also be briefly discussed. I will use what I have learnt from the research thus. er. io. far to make a prediction on how the Vietnamese government will respond to the. n. EU’s threat in the future anda whether Vietnam will be able i v to get its yellow card l revoked.. Ch. n engchi U. 19 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(30) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 20 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(31) Chapter 2 Literature Review In this second chapter, I will provide readers with a review of well-known literature on economic sanctions that have been well read and praised by scholars in the academic community from the mid-1970s to the present. This literature review consists of three different parts. In the first part of the chapter, I will review the basics of economic sanctions, including the definition of the term, different types of sanctions that can be employed by states, components of a sanctions episode, ways to evaluate the success of a sanctions episode, and different motives that drive states to use economic sanctions against allies or adversaries. In the second part, I will examine the debate among scholars on the. 政治大 this review, I will discuss the factors that can possibly contribute to the success 立. effectiveness of sanctions as instruments of statecraft. Finally, in the last part of. and failure of economic sanctions.. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1 The Basics of Economic Sanctions. ‧. 2.1.1 The Definition of Economic Sanctions. sit. y. Nat. Up until today, there is still an ongoing debate among scholars on what. io. er. constitutes economic sanctions. Thus, to clearly define the term “economic sanctions” is a challenging task. However, it is quite essential for us to first and. n. al. iv. foremost find a precise definition sanctions will not n Cfor this term so that economic. i U. he. h when we discuss them later n g cpolicy be confused with other instruments of foreign on in this thesis.. Baldwin (1985) is a scholar whose writing is widely read by researchers of economic sanctions, therefore, we will start by looking at the definition of the term from his perspective. Baldwin (1985, p. 35-36) claimed that the definition of economic sanctions corresponds to his concept of economic statecraft, therefore, the two terms can be used interchangeably. To Baldwin (1985), the concept of economic statecraft encompasses all economic means by which policymakers use to influence other international actors. Thus, his definition of economic sanctions is rather quite broad compared to the definitions that were given by other scholars. 21 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(32) Economic sanctions, according to him, include the use of economic instruments to pursue any kind of policy goals, whether it’s to weaken another state’s economic potential, to weaken another state’s military power, or just to simply demonstrate one state’s resolve that it will not tolerate the behavior of the targeted state. Moreover, Baldwin (1985, p. 40) also categorized the techniques of economic statecraft into two types; negative sanctions and positive sanctions. Negative sanctions include economic or financial penalties that one group of states applied on another group of states such as embargo, boycott, or tariff increase, while positive sanctions include economic rewards that one group of states may give to another as incentives such as financial aid or MFN grant. 政治大 Baldwin contradicts the belief of most modern-day scholars who see that 立. (Baldwin, 1985, p. 41-42). It should be noted that this categorization proposed by. economic sanctions should only include the use of commercial or financial. ‧ 國. 學. penalties to coerce targets into particular responses.. ‧. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (also widely known as HSE), are another. y. Nat. group of scholars that is well known in this academic field. To HSE (1990, p. 10),. sit. economic sanctions are tools that states use in order to coerce target governments. er. io. into changing their behavior or policy which is not appreciated by the. n. international community orathe l sender state. In their mosti vnotable work,. n. C. h eHufbauer “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered”, n g c heti al.U(1990, p. 2) defined economic sanctions as “the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations”. Unlike Baldwin, according to HSE’s view, economic sanctions do not include the use of positive economic incentives (such as financial aid) to encourage target states to change their policy or behavior (Hufbauer et al., 1990, p. 2). Thus, cases in which such techniques of statecraft are used by sender states were left out from the study conducted by the three scholars. Basically, for HSE (1990), economic sanctions refer to only the use of “negative sanctions” to coerce target governments into particular responses that are deemed favorable by sender states.. 22 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(33) Pape (1997, p. 95) was another scholar who argued that the definition of economic sanctions given by Baldwin is too broad, making it “conceptually unwieldy” and confusing for policymakers. Pape (1997, p. 93) noted that there are three main strategies of economic pressure: economic sanctions, trade war, and economic warfare. Each of these strategies should be clearly distinguished by its policy goal and should not be confused with one another. According to Pape (1997, p. 94), a trade war occurs when a sender state inflicts economic harm on a target state in order to “persuade the target state to agree to a term of trade that is more favorable to the sender”, while economic warfare occurs when a sender state seeks to inflict harm to adversary’s economy in order to “weaken its military capabilities”. However, economic sanctions, unlike the other two strategies, “seek. 政治大. to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing international. 立. trade in order to coerce the target government to change its political behavior”. ‧ 國. 學. (Pape, 1997, p.94). To put this simply, Pape’s definition of economic sanctions does not include the use of economic coercion to pursue any other goals aside. ‧. from the political ones.. sit. y. Nat. As for myself, I think that the definitions of economic sanctions given by. io. er. Pape and HSE are most compatible with the case study in this thesis. Thus, based on the definitions given by the two groups of scholars, I would like to redefine. n. al. iv. economic sanctions as “commercial n that a group of states C or financial penalties. i U. he. c h into changing its political imposed on its target in a bid to coerce n thegtarget. behavior”. This will be the definition that should be referred to when I discuss economic sanctions throughout this literature review. 2.1.2 The Types of Economic Sanctions According to Hufbauer et al. (1990, p. 36), economic sanctions can be categorized into two types: trade sanctions and financial sanctions. Trade sanctions are generally employed by a sender with the purpose of obstructing its trade with a target country. When facing trade sanctions, the target country’s economy is expected to be damaged by its severed trade ties with the sender country. The most applied measures of trade sanctions include: 1) prohibiting 23 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(34) exports to target countries (embargo), 2) prohibiting imports from target countries (boycott), and 3) raising the country’s import/export tariffs (Hufbauer et al., 1990, p. 36). Hufbauer et al. (1990, p. 36) also noted that when a sender country decides to employ trade sanctions, an export control is more likely to be used than an import control because it is rather more difficult for target countries to find alternative import markets than to find alternative export markets. However, contrary to HSE’s belief, in this thesis, we will be studying the case in which the EU boycotts fishery products from seven countries in Asia to prove that “an import control can also be an effective measure of trade sanctions, as much as an. 政治大. export control is”.. 立. Financial sanctions, meanwhile, are seen by Hufbauer et al. (1990, p. 37). ‧ 國. 學. as the more severe form of economic sanctions. Financial sanctions could be employed by 1) suspending aid to the target country, 2) freezing the target. ‧. country’s assets, 3) controlling the import of capital from the target country, and. y. Nat. 4) controlling the export of capital to the target country. According to Hufbauer et. sit. al. (1990, p. 37), when facing financial sanctions, the target country could be. er. io. severely hurt through the interruption of commercial and official financing from. n. a lor commercial financing goti vsuspended, the target the sender country. If official n. C. U higher interest rates to he country may need to find alternative creditors h i pay n g cand them (Hufbauer et al., 1990, p. 37). However, even if financial sanctions are. believed to be extremely effective, it should be noted that we will mainly focus on studying the use of trade sanctions in this thesis, not financial sanctions. 2.1.3 The Components of a Sanctions Episode When one group of states threatens to put an economic sanction on another group of states, and declares it formally, it is considered as the start of “a sanctions episode”. According to HSE (1990, p. 35), there are always two parties involved in a sanctions episode: the target and the sender. HSE (1990, p. 35) defined the sender as “the country or an international organization that is the 24 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(35) principal author of the episode”. The target is, meanwhile, defined by HSE (1990, p. 36) as “the country that is the immediate object of the episode”. Please note that there can be one or more countries on both the target and sender parties. An episode of economic sanctions can be divided into two stages: the threat stage and the imposition stage. It is possible for the target to comply with the demand of the sender at any point during these two stages. According to Drezner (1999), the decision making process in the threat stage can be divided into three sequences. First, the sender needs to decide whether to keep the situation as it is or to make a demand to the target state, attached with a threat of economic sanctions. If the sender decides to not threaten a sanction, the episode. 政治大 will then be the target’s turn to make a decision. In the second sequence, the 立. ends, but if the sender decides to threaten the target with an economic sanction, it. target needs to decide whether it will change its behaviors in accordance with the. ‧ 國. 學. demand of the sender to avoid the costs of sanction (acquiescence), or to stand firm with its action. If the target chooses the latter, the sender will then need to. ‧. make a decision once more. In the third and final sequence, the sender needs to. sit. y. Nat. decide whether it will impose a sanction or back down. If it chooses to impose a. io. er. sanction on the target, the sanctions episode will then proceed to the imposition stage, and both the sender and the target will be caught in a deadlock.. n. al. i n U. Ch. v. The next question that we need answer e to ng c h iis; how can we know whether the sanction threats/imposed sanctions are successful? Each scholar in the field has his/her own different ways and criteria for determining the success of economic sanctions. For Pape (1997, p. 97), economic sanctions could be considered as successful if these three criteria are met: 1) “the target state concede to a significant part of the coercer’s demands”, 2) “economic sanctions were threatened or applied before the target change its behavior” and 3) there is no other explanation for the target’s change of behavior. Bapat et al. (2013) have similar criteria for determining the success of economic sanctions. Bapat et al. (2013, p. 86) noted that imposed sanctions can be. 25 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(36) considered as successful if the sanctions episode ends with target’s complete or partial acquiescence, or negotiated settlement. As for sanction threats, they can be considered as successful only if the episode ends with the target's partial or complete acquiescence before sanctions are imposed (Bapat et al., 2013, p. 86). 2.1.4 The Motives Behind the Use of Sanctions There are quite a few explanations to why a sender state decides to impose economic sanctions or threaten to impose sanctions against a target state. Firstly, the sender state might want to use economic sanctions as substitutes for other coercive measures (Hufbauer et al, 1990; Drezner, 1999). Sometimes, when a sender state is not satisfied with the behavior or a particular policy of a target. 政治大. state, the use of military intervention to punish the target state or to coerce the. 立. target state into changing its policy might be too extreme. Military intervention is. ‧ 國. 學. not only costly and expensive, but it can also raise some concerns and discontent among the citizens of the sender state as well. Thus, this is where economic. ‧. sanctions come into play. Economic sanctions are not only cheaper to deploy, but they are also considered by many as a more peaceful way to coerce the adversary. y. Nat. sit. of a state into modifying its policy. Due to this particular reason, economic intervention, even though they a are not as effective.. er. io. sanctions are seen by leaders of many states as a good surrogate of military. n. iv l C n h e n(1999, g c hp. i11),Uthe government of the Secondly, according to Drezner. sender country might feel compelled to initiate sanctions against targets due to the domestic pressure from within the country. Drezner (1999, p. 11) claimed that, generally, when the behavior of a target country violates the international norms, the citizens within the sender country (which is likely to be democratic) will pressure their government to do something about the situation. Thus, the government will need to impose sanctions or threaten to impose sanctions against the target in a bid to send a signal to the target government and its own citizens that it disapproves the behavior of the target regime. If the government of the sender country fails to do so, it might be perceived by its own citizens as weak and indecisive. Thus, even though the sanctions themselves might be ineffective, 26 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(37) the sender government will initiate the sanctions anyway to avoid being accused as ignorant leaders by its own citizens. As long as sanctions serve well as an effective signal and a symbol of disapproval, their effectiveness is of secondary concern (Drezner, 1999, p. 12). Lastly, sanctions can be used by a sender state to dissuade a target from implementing an undesirable policy or repeating an unfavorable action in the future. According to Lindsay (1986, p. 115), sanctions function as deterrents by “demonstrating the initiator’s willingness to act and its ability to inflict economic pain, which presumably it can reapply in the future”.. 政治大 Scholars in the field of international political economy have long been 立. 2.2 The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions. debating about the effectiveness of economic sanctions since the economic. ‧ 國. 學. techniques of statecraft regained attention from the academic community in the mid-1970s. Basically, there are two camps of scholars that hold dramatically. ‧. opposed views on this matter; those who claim that economic sanctions are great. sit. y. Nat. tools that can be effectively used to coerce target states into complying to political. io. er. demands from sender states and those who have negative views on the usefulness of economic sanctions. In a bid to gain a better understanding of the notions and. n. al. iv. works of important scholars from Cthese two camps, wenshould first have a look at. i U. he. c heconomic sanctions that was first g of the study of HSE (1990) on the successn rate published in their book called “Economic Sanctions Reconsidered” as recent. debates on the successfulness of sanctions seem to mainly stemmed from the said research. In 1990, Hufbauer and his fellow scholars conducted an empirical study on 115 cases of economic sanctions that were imposed during the period of 75 years from 1915 to 1990. From their study, HSE (1990, p. 93) found that economic sanctions have been successful in 40 cases or 34% of total. Although their research findings suggested that economic sanctions have a higher chance of failure than success, the success rate that HSE presented in the book was still a lot 27 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(38) better than what previous scholars before them expected out of economic sanctions. Thus, HSE are in neither of the two camps. Even though the three scholars viewed economic sanctions as tools of foreign policy that have limited usage, they still accepted that economic sanctions are not entirely useless and states that utilize these tools can sometimes expect favorable results. Since HSE published their findings in 1990, the database created by them has often been used and referred to by many scholars who study the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Some said that the study has contributed to the optimism about the effectiveness of sanctions while some claimed that the success rate HSE presented in their book was far too generous. Pape (1997, p. 93), for example, has. 政治大 studied in 1990, only 5 cases can really be considered as successes. Pape (1997, p. 立 reexamined the HSE database and claimed that out of the 115 cases that HSE. 93) argued that the HSE study is seriously flawed because of three main reasons:. ‧ 國. 學. 1) some of the cases were actually settled by direct or indirect use of force, not economic sanctions 2) some cases cannot be qualified as instances of economic. ‧. sanctions in Pape’s point of view and 3) the targets in some of the cases did not. sit. y. Nat. made meaningful concessions.. er. io. On the other hand, Drezner (2003) stated that HSE may have actually. n. a l of economic sanctions. iAccording v underestimated the effectiveness to Drezner n. C. (2003, p. 644), both the sender andhthe e target h i U have incentive to solve n g cgenerally. their disputes before sanctions are deployed because sanctions could inflict huge costs on both parties. Thus, a successful sanction episode is more likely to end at the threat stage, not the imposition stage. Drezner (2003, p. 655) argued that the success rate of economic sanctions presented by HSE in 1990 may be understated because the three scholars only observed sanctions that have already been imposed. They did not include the cases in which sanctions have been threatened but not implemented. If HSE had included those cases in their study, they might have seen a higher success rate of economic sanctions (Drezner, 2003, p. 655). Simply put, Drezner believed that economic sanctions are actually effective tools. 28 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(39) of economic statecraft. HSE just failed to realize this because of a selection bias in their study. Drezner’s work brought a new light to the study on economic sanctions effectiveness. However, not every scholar agrees with him. Drury and Li (2006), for example, wrote an article to prove that economic sanctions do not always work better at the threat stage. They have conducted a case study to examine the effectiveness of the U.S. threats to revoke China’s most favored nation status during the 90s. At that time, Washington was trying to coerce the Chinese government into respecting its citizens’ human rights following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. As a result of the study, the two scholars found that. 政治大 severity of repression in China was unaffected by Washington’s threats (Drury & 立 Washington’s threats were not only ineffective but also counterproductive. The. Li, 2006).. ‧ 國. 學. Morgan and Schwebach (1997) are another group of scholars who, like. ‧. Pape (1997), do not have much faith in the effectiveness of economic sanctions as. y. Nat. foreign policy tools. However, unlike Pape, they did not entirely reject the. sit. usefulness of economic sanctions but they believed that sanctions can be effective. er. io. if imposed under fairly restrictive conditions. For example, if the sanctions are. n. a l the effectiveness of thei vsanctions will largely extremely costly for target states, n. C. h e np. g45).c h increase (Morgan & Schwebach, 1997, They i Uthus suggested scholars who study economic statecraft to focus more on seeking to determine when sanctions work rather than asking if sanctions work at all (Morgan & Schwebach, 1997, p. 46). This work published by the two has altered the research interests of many scholars in the academic community. Scholars who published their works on economic sanctions after Morgan and Schwebach have been focusing more on finding the factors that can possibly affect the outcome of economic sanctions instead of assessing the effectiveness of economic sanctions. I would like to call these works that were published after Morgan and Schwebach wrote their article in 1997 as the “Second Wave” of research on economic sanctions.. 29 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(40) This thesis will be written with an aim to contribute to this second wave of works on economic sanctions. Basically, I will conduct a case study to find the factors that contribute to the success/failure of sanctions imposed by an international organization on a group of countries in Asia.. 2.3 The Determinants of Sanctions Success and Failure There were quite a number of scholars who wrote articles and books on the factors that determine the success and failure of imposed sanctions and sanction threats. The work by Drezner that was published in 1999, for example, clearly explains how high expectations of future conflicts between two states can affect their decisions to impose or acquiescence to economic sanctions. According. 政治大. to Drezner (1999, p. 4), if two states that are not allies but adversaries engage in. 立. political disputes, they will be concerned about their relative gains and their. ‧ 國. 學. bargaining positions in future conflicts. For the target state, if it foresees that there will be frequent disputes with the sender, the state will be concerned that any. ‧. concession made in the present dispute will undercut its bargaining position in the future. Thus, if the sender is an adversary, the target will be more reluctant to. y. Nat. sit. concede to a demand. As for the sender state, if the target state is an adversary,. er. io. not an ally, the concern for relative gains will increase and the sender will. n. eventually attempt to coerceaas it prefers a deadlock or stalemate outcome of iv. l C n 1999, p. 4). U disrupted economic exchange to the (Drezner, h status i e n gquo h c. Thus, Drezner (1999, p. 4) claimed that, a robust anticipation of future disputes between two adversaries makes the sender more eager to threaten economic sanctions but makes the target less willing to concede to the sender’s demand. On the other hand, if the relationship between the two states is amicable, the sender will be less willing to impose sanctions, but it will likely obtain more concessions from the target if it still insists to threaten or impose sanctions (Drezner, 1999, p. 53-54). Drezner was not the only scholar who tried to find the factors that contribute to the success or failure of economic sanctions. Morgan and Miers, in 30 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.

(41) 2002, wrote an article to discuss whether unilateral or multilateral sanctions are more likely to be successful in changing a targeted state’s behavior. The two scholars claimed that, in general, multilateral sanctions are less effective than unilateral sanctions. They provide two main arguments to support this claim. Firstly, a multilateral sanctioning coalition generally consists of many states, thus, it creates a “public goods problem” for its members (Morgan & Miers, 2002, p. 119). Basically, Morgan and Miers (2002, p. 119) claimed that if each country in the coalition contributes only little to the sanctions, some of them will want to free ride. They might continue to trade secretly with the target while the others are severing their trade ties with the targeted state. Secondly, Morgan and Miers (2002, p. 119) claimed that multilateral sanctions are more effective than. 政治大. unilateral sanctions only when there is one issue in dispute. When there are many. 立. countries taking part in a sanctioning coalition, it will be difficult for the coalition. ‧ 國. 學. to maintain a stable demand. The target country will need to deal with many issues in dispute and various demands from different members of the coalition,. ‧. making the sanctions become less effective.. sit. y. Nat. However, Morgan and Miers (2002, p. 130) also stated that multilateral. io. er. sanctions can also be effective if there is an international organization involved in coordinating the coalition’s efforts. The two scholars claimed that the. n. al. iv. involvement of an IO can makeC multilateral sanctions become more effective due n. i U. he. n gorganization ch to two main reasons. First, an international can provide leadership for the coalition and “help solve the collective action problems” (Morgan & Miers, 2002, p. 131). Second, an international organization can monitor the. contributions made for the sanctions by member states, reducing their tendency to cheat. Aside from the two groups of scholars mentioned above, Ang and Peksen (2007, p. 135) have conducted an empirical study to examine “the perceptions of the salience of the issue under dispute by both sender and target states and their impact on sanction outcomes”. Ang and Peksen (2007, p. 135) stated that the salience of issues under dispute (as perceived by the two states involved in a 31 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001152.