U.S. Dual-Use Export Controls: What Taiwan Traders and Trade Facilitators Need to Know

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U.S. Dual-Use Export Controls:

What Taiwan Traders and Trade Facilitators Need to Know

Charles G. Wall

Regional Export Control Officer U.S. Department of Commerce,

Hong Kong

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Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

U.S. Department of Commerce

Export Enforcement Export Administration

See http://www.osec.doc.gov/opog/dmp/doos/doo10_16.html

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Enforcement Administration BIS has approximately 350 Employees

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BIS regulates dual-use items: Items with both

commercial and military or proliferation applications.

Use of Concern Legitimate Use

Machine Tools Gas centrifuge,

Fabrication of WMD

Parts & components of various machinery

Carbon Fibers

Missile Components Golf club shafts,

Fishing rods

Thiodiglycol

Mustard Gas Plastics, Dyes, Inks

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Other trade control agencies

• Department of State – regulates munitions list items

• Department of the Treasury – regulates transactions with certain sanctioned countries

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission – regulates nuclear items

• Department of Energy – regulates nuclear materials

• Patent and Trademark Office – regulates certain technology exports

• Department of Defense – regulates Foreign Military Sales

See EAR Sec. 734.3 – Items subject to the EAR

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Identify sensitive items

(mostly from control lists described in international nonproliferation regimes)

Identify end-uses of concern

(e.g., proliferation of WMD)

Exports of sensitive items or exports to sensitive end-uses require licenses

The basic concept of strategic trade controls:

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Exception for low-risk destinations

Identify sensitive items Identify end-uses of concern

Exports to low-risk destinations may not require a license

The U.S. tries to tailor its system to target only the

most sensitive transactions (1):

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Identify end-uses of concern

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Exception for low-risk shipments Exception for low-risk destinations Identify sensitive items

Some low risk exports, like temporary exports or exports of replacement parts, may not require licenses

The U.S. tries to tailor its system to target only the

most sensitive transactions (2):

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Identify end-uses of concern Exception for low-risk shipments

Exception for low-risk destinations Identify sensitive items

Identify end-users of concern

Some persons/companies are known to be engaged in end-uses of concern, and all exports to these persons may require a license

The U.S. tries to tailor its system to target only the

most sensitive transactions (3):

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Apply for License

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Identify end-uses of concern Exception for low-risk shipments

Exception for low-risk destinations Identify sensitive items

Identify end-users of concern

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Export Administration Regulations (EAR)

Title 15, Code of Federal Regulations

www.ecfr.gov or www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

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Jurisdiction

“the territory or sphere of activity over which the legal authority of a court or other institution extends”

“Subject to the EAR”

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Apply for License

Jurisdiction: licenses only required for items and

transactions under our jurisdiction

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Basic Jurisdiction (Items)

Items “Subject to the EAR” do NOT include:

• Items subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of other agencies.

• Literary publications, such as newspapers or literary works (non-technical in nature)

• Publicly available technology and software (excluding encryption)

See Part 734—Scope of the Export Administration Regulations

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Basic Jurisdiction (Items)

Items “Subject to the EAR” include:

• Items located in the United States

• U.S.-origin items, wherever located

• Certain foreign-made items abroad

– More than de minimis amount of controlled U.S. content

– Foreign-made direct products of certain U.S.

technology or software

See Part 734—Scope of the Export Administration Regulations

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Export: an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR out of the United States

Reexport: an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country. . . .

[T]

he export or reexport of items subject to the EAR that will transit through a country or countries, or be transshipped in a country or countries to a new country, or are intended for reexport to the new country, are deemed to be exports to the new country.

Basic Jurisdiction (Transactions)

See Part 772—Definitions of terms as used in the Export Administration Regulations

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“Catch-All” Controls

• End-Use: prohibited end uses include chemical, biological, or nuclear end uses and facilities

• End-User: prohibited end-users include persons and companies that . . .

• impose a risk of diverting items into programs related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or

• are contrary to national security and/or foreign policy interests.

See Part 744—Control Policy: End-User and End-Use Based

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http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_023148.asp

End-Users—Lists to Check

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Trade Sanctions

• Additional license requirements if destined to Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria

• Additional requirements for certain Russian industry sectors, or for the Crimea region of Ukraine.

• Affects most items subject to the EAR

See Part 746—Embargoes and Other Special Controls

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Export: an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR out of the United States

Reexport: an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country. . . .

[T]

he export or reexport of items subject to the EAR that will transit through a country or countries, or be transshipped in a country or countries to a new country, or are intended for reexport to the new country, are deemed to be exports to the new country.

Basic Jurisdiction (Transactions)

See Part 772—Definitions of terms as used in the Export Administration Regulations

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The United States maintains a control list derived from the multilateral export control regime lists, with some additional items that are controlled unilaterally.

• Used to determine Export Control Classification Number (ECCN)

• Used to determine license requirements

The Commerce Control List (the CCL)

See Part 774—The Commerce Control List

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2B230 所有‘壓力轉換器’能夠量測絕 對壓力且具下列所有特性:

a. 壓力感測元件以鋁、鋁合金、氧化

鋁 ( 礬土或藍寶石 ) 、鎳、含鎳重量 百分比超過 60 % 之鎳合金,或全氟 化烴聚合物製造或保護;及

b. 密封件,其必須使用密封性壓力感

測元件,且與處理之介質直接接 觸,

以鋁、鋁合金、氧化鋁 ( 礬土或藍寶 石 ) 、鎳、含鎳重量百分比超 過

60% 之鎳合金,或全氟化烴聚合物製

造或保護者;及

c. 具下列任一特性: 1. 滿刻度小於 13 kPa ,且‘準確度’優於滿刻度之 ± 1 % ;或 2. 滿刻度為 13 kPa 或以 上,當在 13 kPa 量測時且‘準確度’

優於滿刻 度 ± 130 Pa 。

Control List Examples

2B230 All types of “pressure transducers” capable of measuring absolute pressures and having all of the characteristics described in this ECCN (see List of Items Controlled)..*****

a.Pressure sensing elements made of or protected by aluminum, aluminum alloy, aluminum oxide (alumina or sapphire), nickel, nickel alloy with more than 60% nickel by weight, or fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers;

b. Seals, if any, essential for sealing the pressure sensing element, and in direct contact with the process medium, made of or protected by aluminum, aluminum alloy, aluminum oxide (alumina or sapphire), nickel, nickel alloy with more than 60% nickel by weight, or fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers; and

c. Either of the following characteristics:

c.1. A full scale of less 13 kPa and an “accuracy” of better than ± 1% of full scale; or

c.2. A full scale of 13 kPa or greater and an “accuracy” of better than ± 130 Pa when measuring at 13 kPa

台灣 United States

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3B002 如下特別設計為測試已完 成或未完成之半導體元件之測試設 備,及其特 別設計之零件及配件

a. 為測試頻率超過 31.8 GHz 之 電晶體元件之 S- 參數者;

b. 刪除;

c. 為測試 3A001.b.2. 所述之微 波積體電路者。

Control List Examples

3B002 “Test equipment “specially designed” for testing finished or

unfinished semiconductor devices as follows (see List of Items Controlled) and

“specially designed” “components” and

“accessories” therefor.*****

a. For testing S-parameters of transistor devices at frequencies exceeding 31.8 GHz;

b. [Reserved]

c. For testing microwave integrated circuits controlled by 3A001.b.2.

台灣 United States

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3C001 以下列任一材料堆疊磊晶 生長多層膜之“基板”所構成之異質 磊晶材料:

a. 矽 (Si) ; b. 鍺 (Ge) ;

c. 碳化矽 (SiC) ;或

d. 鎵或銦之 III/V 族化合物。

Control List Examples

3C001 Hetero-epitaxial materials consisting of a

“substrate” having stacked epitaxially grown multiple layers of any of the following (see List of Items Controlled).*****

a. Silicon (Si);

b. Germanium (Ge);

c. Silicon Carbide (SiC); or

d. “III/V compounds” of gallium or indium.

Note: 3C001.d does not apply to a “substrate” having one or more P-type epitaxial layers of GaN, InGaN, AlGaN, InAlN, InAlGaN, GaP, InGaP, AlInP or InGaAlP, independent of the sequence of the elements, except if the P-type epitaxial layer is between N-type layers.

台灣 United States

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The Commerce Control List

(the CCL)

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The Commerce Control List (the CCL)

AT = Anti-Terrorism

CB = Chemical & Biological Weapons

CC = Crime Control

CW= Chemical Weapons Convention

EI = Encryption Item FC = Firearms Control MT = Missile Technology

NP = Nuclear Nonproliferation

NS = National Security RS = Regional Stability SI = Significant Item SL = Surreptitious Listening

SS = Short Supply

UN = United Nations Embargo

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License Exceptions

• An authorization that takes the place of a license

• In most instances exporter does not require anything in writing from BIS

• Identified by symbol (e.g. GBS, TSR, BAG)

See Part 740—License Exceptions

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License Exceptions

Examples:

• Certain Temporary Exports & Reexports (TMP)

• Limited Value Shipments (LVS)

• Service & Replacement of Parts &

Equipment (RPL)

See Part 740—License Exceptions

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License Exceptions

Examples of when no license exception is available (15 C.F.R. 740.2):

• Certain items like Surreptitious Interception Devices, Crime control items to most

destinations, and most Missile Technology control items

• Prohibited End-User or embargoed destinations, in most instances

See Part 740—License Exceptions

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Violations

(a) Engaging in Prohibited conduct

(b) Causing, aiding, or abetting a violation (c) Solicitation and attempt

(d) Conspiracy

(e) Acting with knowledge of a violation

(f) Possession with intent to export illegally

(g) Misrepresentation and concealment of facts (h) Evasion

(i) Failure to comply with reporting, recordkeeping requirements

(j) License alteration

(k) Acting contrary to the terms of a denial order

See Part 764—Enforcement and Protective Measures

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Potential Consequences of a Violation

•Consequences of violations may include:

• A Warning Letter

• Civil Enforcement

• Fine

• Denial of export privileges

• Exclusion from practice

• Referral to Criminal Prosecution

• Placement on the Entity List

• The type of enforcement action depends

primarily on the natures and scope of the

violations

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 Criminal Penalties may be imposed for “willful violations”

- Individuals: $1 million fine and/or 20 years imprisonment - Corporations: $1 million fine

- Forfeitures of the proceeds of export violations

 Administrative Penalties follow a “strict liability” standard

- The higher of: $250,000 or twice the value of the transaction - Corporations: $1 million fine

 Denial of Export Privileges

- Prohibition on participating in any export activity

- Temporary: Up to 180 days to halt imminent violations

- Standard: Terms of 10 years or longer, in addition to criminal penalties

 Public Screening Lists

- U.S. and Foreign Persons: Denied Persons List

- Foreign Persons Only: Entity List and Unverified List

Deterrent Effect of Robust Enforcement

“Those who comply with the rules benefit from strong enforcement

because lax enforcement permits violators to

flourish.”

Eric L. Hirschhorn, Under Secretary for Industry and Security

See International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1705 -- Penalties

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Thank You

Charles G. Wall

Regional Export Control Officer

U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong & Macau Tel: +852 2521-6515

Fax: +852 5429-5952 charles.wall@trade.gov

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