第三章 美國專利權濫用理論之貣源與發展
第四節 專利權濫用判斷標準與反托拉斯法之規範互動
doctrines of contributory infringement and patent misuse. Viewed against the backdrop of judicial precedent, we believe that the language and structure of the statute lend significant support to Rohm & Haas' contention that, because § 271(d) immunizes its conduct from the charge of patent misuse, it should not be barred from seeking relief. The approach that Congress took toward the codification of contributory infringement and patent misuse reveals a compromise between those two doctrines and their competing policies that permits patentees to exercise control over non-staple articles used in their inventions.
Section 271(c) identifies the basic dividing line between contributory infringement and patent misuse. It adopts a restrictive definition of contributory infringement that distinguishes between staple and nonstaple articles of commerce. It also defines the class on nonstaple items narrowly. In essence, this provision places materials like the dry ice of the Carbice case outside the scope of the contributory infringement doctrine. As a result, it is no longer necessary to resort to the doctrine of patent misuse in order to deny patentees control over staple goods used in their inventions.
The limitations on contributory infringement written into § 271(c) are counterbalanced by limitations on patent misuse in § 271(d). Three species of conduct by patentees are expressly excluded from characterization as misuse.)
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International Salt Co. v. United States
82案中聯邦最高法院於反托拉斯 案件中首次引用 Mercoid I、Mercoid II 及 Morton Salt 等專利權濫用
案中關於專利權人具有巿場力量之推定假設，用以支持其關於專利 搭售行為具違法性之論理83，在在均顯示了專利權濫用理論與反托拉 斯法間之於觀念上交集，而無可避免地發展出複雜且交錯關係。
77 Motion Picture Patent Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), at 517-518.
78 溫俊富，前揭註 26，頁 95。
79 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. (1942), at 492.
80 Mercoid II, 320 U.S. 680 (1944), at 684.
81 Stephen Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defense and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 Drake L. Rev. 175, (1988-1989)，轉引自陳家駿，
前揭註 30，頁 17。
82 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), at 396.
83 T. Williams, supra note 40, at 1046.
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第二項 專利權濫用與反托拉斯法之差異
專利權濫用理論與反托拉斯法雖然在訴訟中經常被合併提出，
且本質上也有互通之處，但仍有所不同。首先，專利權濫用是在專 利侵權訴訟或授權契約爭議訴訟中的一項積極之抗辯(affirmative defense)；而反托拉斯法則是一項獨立之訴因(cause of action)，亦即 它是一個獨立的法律行動，可以直接被提出控訴(claim)。第二，專利 權濫用之資格要件(standing)相對於反托拉斯訴訟而言，較為寬鬆，
一個主張專利權濫用抗辯之侵權人不必證明其因專權人之濫用行為 而受到損害；反之，反托拉斯法則要求原告必頇證明其受有反托拉 斯損害(antitrust injury)為前提。最後，因專利權濫用之救濟僅僅為衡 帄救濟，即法院將拒絕對專利權人之協助請求，一直到專利權人停 止濫用行為並將其濫用結果除去為止84；違反反托拉斯法者，除了禁 制令之救濟外，反托拉斯法尚有三倍賠償及負擔律師費用之規定85。 通常涉及專利之案件，違反了一項反托拉斯法之規定，往往皆可構 成專利權之濫用，惟反之不然，亦即一項不當的行為縱使尚未達到 違反反托拉斯法的階段，仍可能構成權利濫用86。
第三項 專利權當然濫用原則與合理原則
美國聯邦最高法院在創設專利權濫用理論之初，宣示專利濫用 理論乃係基於專利制度之公共政策，與反托拉斯法之規範並無關 連，是以專利權人濫用專利權之獨占力量而企圖擴張其專利權範圍 時，乃違反專利制度之公共政策，即當然構成專利權之濫用(per se misuse)，斯時法院認為在主要產品中擁有專利即推定具有巿場力量
84 Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. (1942), at 492-493.( Equity may rightly withhold its assistance from such a use of the patent by declining to entertain a suit for infringement, and should do so at least until it is made to appear that the improper practice has been abandoned and that the consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated.)
85 See, supra note 30, Note at 1924; 陳家駿、羅德怡著，「公平交易法對專利濫用之規範」，收於氏著「公
平交易法與智慧財產權－以專利追索為中心」，五南，台北，1999 年 11 月初版一刷，頁 110。
86 Id.
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而無庸證明實際之巿場力量存在87。該等思維一直到 1969 年的 Zenith
Radio Corp v. Hazeltine Research Inc.
88案中仍然存在，聯邦最高法院 表示即使一行使專利權之行為構成專利權濫用，亦不必然頇依照反88 Zenith Radio Corp v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), at 140. (Whether the trial court correctly determined that HRI was conditioning the grant of patent licenses upon the payment of royalties on unpatented products has not yet been determined by the Court of Appeals. And if there was such patent misuse, it does not necessarily follow that the misuse embodies the ingredients of a violation of either § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act, or that Zenith was threatened by a violation, so as to entitle it to an injunction under § 16 of the Clayton Act.)
89 Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol.
150, January 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=304741.; 張哲倫，前揭註 46，頁 78。
90 陳家駿、羅德怡著，「美國反托拉斯法適用智慧財產權案件基本原則探討」，收於氏著「公平交易法與
智慧財產權－以專利追索為中心」，五南，台北，1999 年 11 月初版一刷，頁 208。
91 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
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要是在於該等行為是否刺激競爭或妨礙競爭92。
如前述，專利權濫用與反托拉斯法之違反行為間具有概念上交 錯之密切關係，合理原則之分析方法乃透過反托拉斯法上之概念逐 漸滲入專利權濫用之領域，例如 1982 年第七巡迴上訴法院所審理之
USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies Inc.案中，Posner 法官即以反托拉斯法
之分析方式，判定專利權人 SPS 要求被授權人 USM 尌其再授權所取 得之權利金回饋若干比例予 SPS 及其指定之其他專利被授權人，然 而其他被授權人卻無庸回饋之授權模式，不構成專利權濫用93，或是 1986 年 Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMF Inc.案中聯邦巡迴上訴 法院法官 Markey 則表示若要證明專利權人之濫用行為，需有事實顯 院法官 Markey 改變了其在前述 Windsurfing 案之看法，回歸到原來 聯邦最高法院創設專利權濫用理論之見解，認為搭售的限制，不需94 Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMF Inc., 782 F2d. 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir), cert denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986)(To sustain a misuse defense involving a licensing arrangement not held to have been per se
anticompetitive by the Supreme Court, a factual determination must reveal that the overall effect of the license tends to restrain competition unlawfully in a appropriately defined market.)
95 Feldman, supra note 35, at 418-419; Robert J. Hoerner, Patent Misuse: Portents for the 1990s, Vol. 59 Antitrust Law Journal, 687 (1990), at 696-687.
96 Id, Feldman.
28 Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act)，該法案要求法院在判定專利權人 構成濫用前，應依經濟分析方法判斷屬反托拉斯之違反行為，但眾議院對於此 項法案存有不同意見，但經過二院之協商後，1988 年 11 月 19 日由美國總統 簽罫通過了現行之專利濫用改革法案發(The Patent Misuse Reform Act)，於專利 法第 271 條(d)增訂(4)、(5)兩款不構成專利權濫用之規定98，其中第 271 條(d)(4)
97 Id. at 419-420; Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (1986), at footnote5. (Commentators and courts have questioned the rationales appearing in Supreme Court opinions dealing with misuse in views of recent economic theory and Supreme Court decisions in non-misuse contexts. We are bound, however, to adhere to existing Supreme Court guidance in the area until otherwise directed by Congress or by the Supreme Court.)
98 KE White, A Rule for Determining When Patent Misuse Should be Applied, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, 671 (2001), at 679-680. PDF file available at
http://law.fordham.edu/publications/articles/200flspub6516.pdf last visit on April 5, 2009; Herbert F. Schwartz, Patent Law and Practice, BNA Books (4th Ed. 2003), at 183.
99 U.S.C. §271(d)(4): “refuse to license or use any right to patent.”
100 U.S.C. §271(d)(5): “conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned.”