第五章 結論與建議
第二節 建議
‧
‧
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
73
（三） 加入深度訪談
本研究以問卷調查方式取得分析數據，進行量化研究，以曾申請都市 更新概要計畫之實施者為研究對象，並未控制實施者之規模、成立時間…
等因素，建議可加入相關控制因素，增加不同條件背景實施者之比較，並 建議加入深度訪談，進一步了解較具規模之實施者其與土地權利人之合作 經驗。
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
74
參考文獻
一、中文參考文獻
張友怡，1998，「私部門辦理都市更新問題之研究」，國立中興大學都市計 劃研究所碩士論文：台北。
李金桂，2009，「運用社會資本自組都市更新會實施更新之研究」，國立政 治大學地政學系碩士在職專班論文：台北。
吳明隆，2009，「結構方程模式: SIMPLIS 的應用」，五南文化事業機構。
邱皓政，2011，「結構方程模式」，雙葉書廊。
黃泳涵，2010，「信任與都市更新參與整合意願之研究」，國立政治大學地 政學系碩士班論文：台北。
張陳基，2010，「Perceived Social Loafing and Community Cohesion in Virtual Communities: a Perspective of Social Capital」，國立中央大學資訊管理 學系博士論文。
卓輝華，2010，「都市更新權利變換制度的委託代理、產權結構與契約關係 之研究」，國立政治大學地政學系博士班論文：台北。
羅浚杰，2008，「以賽局理論探討民間土地整合開發之地主拿翹行為」，國 立臺北大學不動產與城鄉環境學系碩士班論文：台北。
楊松齡、卓輝華，2011，「從產權分離探討都市更新之激勵機制」，台灣土 地研究，第 14 卷第 1 期。
內政部營建署，2008，都市更新作業手冊。http://twur.cpami.gov.tw/，取用 日期：2012 年 12 月 7 日。
二、英文參考文獻
Axelrod, R., 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
‧
experiments”,Public Econ,37(3):291-304.Aguirre, B. E., Wenger, D. and Vigo, G., 1998, ”A Test of the Emergent Norm Theory of Collective Behavior”, Sociological Forum,13(2): 301-320.
Adams, D., Leishman, C. and Watkins, C., 2012, “Housebuilder Networks and Residential Land Markets”,Urban Study, 49(4):705-720.
Afzal, H., Khan, M. A., Rehman, K. U., Ali, I. and Wajahat, S., 2010,
“Consumer’s Trust in the Brand: Can it Be Built through Brand Reputation, Brand Competence and Brand Predictability”, International
Business Research, 3(1):43-51.
Berkowitz, L. and Daniels, L. R., 1963, “Responsibility and dependency”,
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66(4):29-36.
Bergquist, W. H., Betwee, J. and Meuel, D., 1995, Building Strategic
Relationships: How to Extend Your Organization's Reach Through Partnerships, Alliances, and Joint Ventures. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Publishers.Bagozzi, R. P. and Yi, Y., 1988, “On the Evalution of Structural Equation Models”, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 16(1): 74-94.
Boxmeer, B. V. and Beckhoven, E. V., 2005, “Public-Private Partnership in Urban Regeneration: A Comparison of Dutch and Spanish PPPs,”
European Journal of Housing Policy, 5(1):1-16.
Burstein, P. and Sausner, S., 2005 “The Incidence and Impact of Policy-Oriented Collective Action: Competing Views”, Sociological
Forum, 20(3): 403-419.
Barbara Y. P. Leung and Eddie, C. M. Hui, 2005, “Evaluation approach on public‐private partnership (PPP) urban redevelopments”, International
Journal of Strategic Property Management, 9(1): 1-16.
Baumard, N., 2010, ”Has punishment played a role in the evolution of
‧
cooperation? A critical review”, Mind & Society, 9(2):171–192.
Beck, M. R. and Franke, J., 2008, “Designing reputation and trust management systems”, Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 6(4):8-29.
Bruni, L., Gilli, M., Pelligra, V., 2008, “Reciprocity: theory and facts”,Int. Rev.
Econ,55:1-11.
Blount, S., 1995, “When social outcomes aren’t fair: The effect of causal attributions on preferences.”, Organizational Behavior &
Human Decision Processes, 63: 131-144.
Boster, F. J., Fediuk, T. and Kotowski, M. R., 2001, “The effectiveness of an altruistic appeal in the presence and absence of favors.” Communication
Monographs, 68: 340-346.
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. and Mccabe, K., 1995, ”Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History.”,Game and Economic Behavior,10: 122-142.
Coleman, J. S., 1990, “Rational action, social networks, and the emergence of norms,” pp. 91-112 in Structure of power and constraint: Papers in honor
of Peter M. Blau., edited by Calhoun C., Myers, M. W. and Scott, W. R.,
New York: Cambridge University Press.Castelfranchi, C. and Falcone, R., 1998, “Principles of Trust for MAS:
Cognitive Anatomy, Social Importance, and Quantification.”,Third International Conference on Multi Agent Systems., Paris, Jul 3-Jul 7.
Cox, J. C.,2004, “How to identify trust and reciprocity”, Games and Economic
Behavior,46: 260-281.
Charness, G., 2004, “Attribution and reciprocity in an experimental labor market”, Journal of Labor Economics, 22(3): 665-688.
Crawford, S. and Ostrom, E., 2005, “A Grammar of Institutions,” in
Understanding Institutional Diversity. edited by Ostrom E, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Castelfranchi, C., 2008, ”Trust and reciprocity: misunderstandings.”, Int. Rev.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
77
Econ,55:45-63.
Doney, P. M. and Cannon, J. P., 1997, “An Examination of the Nature of Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships”, Journal of Marketing, April:35–51.
Dietz T., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P., 2003, “The struggle to govern the commons”,
Science. 302(5652): 1907-1912.
Dodman, D., 2008, “Developers in the public interest? The role of urban development corporations in the Anglophone Caribbean”, The
Geographical Journal, 174(1):30–44.
Fukuyama, F., 1995, Trust：The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York：Free Press.
Frey, B. S., 1997, Not Just for The Money. An Economic Theory of Personal
Motivation, USA: Edward Elgar.
Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T. and Dennis, T., 1993, “Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?”,Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(2):159–171.
Frank, R. H., 2003 “Commitment problems in the theory of rational choice”,
Texas Law Review, 81(7): 1789 -1804.
Fowler, J. H. and Christakis, N. A., 2010, “Cooperative behaviour cascades in human social networks.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 107: 5334–5338.
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter, 2000, “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments”, The American Economic Review, 90(4): 980-994.
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U. and Gächter, S., 2002, “Strong Reciprocity , human cooperation,and the enforcement of social norms.”, Human Nature, 13(1):1-25.
Fuller, M. A., Serva, M. A. and Benamati, J., 2007, “Seeing Is Believing: The Transitory Influence of Reputation Information on E-Commerce Trust and Decision Making.”, Decision Sciences, 38(4):675-699.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
78
Gould, R. V., 1993, “Collective Action and Network Structure”, American
Sociological Review, 58(2): 182-196.
Gintis, H., 2000, “Beyond homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics.”, Ecol Econ, 35:311–322.
Gouldner, A. W., 1960, “The Norm of Reciprocity：A Preliminary Statement.”,
American Sociological Review, 25(2):161-178.
Gomez, M. B. and Muntaner, C., 2005, “Urban redevelopment and neighborhood health in East Baltimore, Maryland: The role of communitarian and institutional social capital.”, Critical Public Health, 15(2):83-102.
Gouldner, A. W., 1960, “The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement.”,
American Sociological Review, 25:161 -78.
Hardin, G., 1968, “The Tragedy of the Commons.”, Science, 162:1243–1248.
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R., Tatham, R. L. and Black, W. C., 1995, Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings, 4th Edition, N. J.: Prentice Hall International Editions.
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E. and Tatham, R. L., 2006, Multivariate data analysis (6th ed.). New Jersey : Prentice-Hall.
Hu, L. and Bentler, P. M., 1999, ”Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: conventional criteria versus new alternatives.”
Structural Equation Modeling, 6(1): 1-55.
Kikuchi, M., Watanabe, Y. and Yamagishi, T., 1996, “Accuracy in the Prediction of Others' Trustworthiness and General Trust: An Experimental Study”, Japanese Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37(1):
23-36.
Kiyonari, T., Tanida, S., and Yamagishi, T., 2000, “Social exchange and reciprocity: confusion or a heuristic?”, Evolution and Human Behavior, 21:
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
79
411–427.
Kahan, D. M., 2003, “The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law.”, Michigan Law Review, 102(1):71-103.
Komorita, S. S., Hilty, J. A. and Parks, C. D., 1991, “Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas.”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(3):494-518.
Kim, P. M., Sboner, A., Xia, Y. and Gerstein, M., 2008 “The role of disorder in interaction networks: a structural analysis”, Molecular Systems Biology, 4(179): 1-8.
Kisner, M. J., 2009, “Spinoza’s Benevolence: The Rational Basis for Acting to the Benefit of Others.”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 47(4):549–67.
Krebs, D. L., 1975, ”Empathy and altruism.”, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 32(11):34-46.
Kelley, H. H. and Stahelski, A. J., 1970, “Social interaction basis on cooperators' and competitors' beliefs about others.”, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 16:66-91.
Komorita, S. S., 1965, “Cooperative choice in a prisoner's dilemma game.”,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,2(7):41-45.
Livnat, Y., 2003, “Benevolence and Justice.”, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 37(4):507-515.
Lubell, M. and Scholz, J. T., 2001, “Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic.”, American Journal of Political Science, 45(1):160-178.
Lebra, T. S., 1975, “An Alternative Approach to Reciprocity.”, American
Anthropologist, 77(3):550-565.
Lehmann, L., Foster, K. R., Borenstein, E. and Feldman, M. W., 2008, “Social
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
80
and individuals learning of helping in humans and other species.”, Trends
in Ecology and Evolution, 23:664–671.
Leung, Barbara Y. P.and Hui, Eddie C. M., 2005, ”Evaluation approach on public‐private partnership (PPP) urban redevelopments.”, International
Journal of Strategic Property Management, 9(1):1-16.
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H. and Schoorman, F. D., 1995, “An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust.”,
Academy of Management Review,
20(3):709-734.Morgan, R. M. and Hunt, S. D., 1994, “The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing.”, Journal of Marketing,58:20-38.
Olson, M., 1971, “The Logic of Collective Action.”, Cambridge: Harvard University.
Ostrom, E., 1998, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association.”, The American Political Science Review, 92(1):1-22.
Ostrom, E. and Ahn, T. K., 2003,”Introduction,”pp.xi-xxxix in Foundations of Social Capital, edited by Ostrom, E. and Ahn, T. K., Massachusetts:
Edward Elgar Publishing,Inc.
Plassmann, F. and Tideman, T., 2007, ”Efficient Urban Renewal Without Takings: Two Solutions to the Land Assembly Problem.”, Journal of
Economic Literature Classification, Codes: K11,R52.
Pruitt, D. G., 1967, “Reward structure and cooperation:The decomposed prisoner's dilemma game.”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7:21-27.
Ryan, S. and Hoff, A., 2010, “Transforming Blight and the People Who Live There: A Study of Redevelopment Planning and Neighborhood Change.”,
Planning Practice and Research, 25(5):543-561.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
81
Ruming, K. J., 2010, “Developer Typologies in Urban Renewal in Sydney:
Recognising the Role of Informal Associations between Developers and Local Government.”, Urban Policy and Research, 28(1):65–83.
Rabin, M., 1993, ”Incorporating Faimess into Game Theory and Economics.”,
The American Economic Review,83(5):1281-1302.
Segal, U. and Sobel, J., 2008, “A Characterization of Intrinsic Reciprocity.”, Int
J Game Theory,36:571-585.
Saavedra, S., Smith, D. and Reed-Tsochas, F., 2010, “Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity and Imitative Trust.", PLoS One, 5(10): e13475.
Simpson, B. and Macy, M. W., 2001, “Collective Action and Power Inequality:
Coalitions in Exchange Networks.”, Social Psychology Quarterly, 64(1):88-100.
Salganik, M. J., Dodds, P. S. and Watts, D. J., 2006, “Experimental study of inequality and unpredictability in an artificial cultural market.”,
Science,311,:854–856.
Stiff, C., 2008, “Are They Bothered? How the Opportunity to Damage a Partner’s Reputation Influences Giving Behavior in a Trust Game?”, The
Journal of Social Psychology, 148(5) , 609-629.
Riolo, R. L., Cohen, M. D. and Axelrod, R., 2001, “Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity.”,NATURE, 414:441-443.
Thibaut, J. W., and Kelley, H. H., 1959, The social psychology of groups, The social psychology of groups: New York: Wiley.
Yamagishi, T. and Yamagishi, M., 1998,”Trust and commitment as alternative responses to social uncertainty”, Networks, Markets, and the Pacific Rim,Oxford University,New York.
Yudelson, J., 2012, “How the Deal Goes Down:The Role of Trust and Reciprocity in Movie Deals“, International Journal of Academic Research
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
82
in Business and Social Sciences,2(1):470-486
三、網頁參考文獻
營建署都市更新入口網，2011，http://twur.cpami.gov.tw/invest/i-index.aspx，
取用日期：2011 年 11 月 1 日。
聯合新聞網，2012，http://udn.com/NEWS/mainpage.shtml，取用日期：2012 年 12 月 7 日。
蘋果日報，2012，http://www.appledaily.com.tw，取用日期：2012 年 12 月 7 日。
台北市政府都市更新處，2011，http://www.uro.taipei.gov.tw，取用日期：2011 年 11 月 1 日。
新北市政府城鄉發展局，2011，http://www.planning.ntpc.gov.tw，取用日期：
2011 年 11 月 1 日。
‧
電話：(02)29393091#50609 傳真：(02)29369227 信箱：99257011@nccu.edu.tw‧
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
85
定 □如土地權利人之利益與公司本身利益無衝突時，則同意
4、與土地權利人進行協商，遇有不同意見時，通常花多少時間進行溝通?
□一周內完成 □一個月內完成 □待時間緊迫時，才密集溝通
□待土地權利人主動詢問時溝通 □盡量不溝通 第五部分：實施者本身資訊
1、貴公司之經營行業屬性?
□建設公司 □開發公司 □營造公司 □其他組織 2、貴公司是否為上市(櫃)公司?
□上市公司 □籌備上市中 □上櫃公司 □籌備上櫃中 □非上市(櫃)公司 3、貴公司過去建築個案之獲獎經歷如何
（包括國家建築金質獎、國家卓越建設獎…等，請以最近一次獲獎經驗回答）?
□近一年內有獲獎紀錄 □近 2~3 年內有獲獎紀錄 □近 5 年內有獲獎紀錄
□近 10 年內有獲獎紀錄 □未曾獲獎
～本問卷到此結束，謝謝您的寶貴意見！～
本問卷已附上回郵，請折疊裝訂後投擲郵筒即可，非常非常感謝
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
86
附錄二、SEM 結果之 t 檢定值
利用最大概似值法（Maximum Likelihood, ML）進行參數估算的結果，
第一行值為標準化參數值，第二行括弧內數值為標準誤（standard error），
第三行為t值。若t值大於1.645，表此估計參數達到α=0.1之顯著水準；若t 值大於1.96，表此估計參數達到α=0.05的顯著水準；若t值大於2.575，俵此 估計參數達到α=0.01之顯著水準。
一、測量模式(Measurement Equations)
Trust2 = 0.72*信任, Errorvar.= 0.86 , R2 = 0.37 (0.11) (0.13)
6.61 6.75
Trust5 = 0.75*信任, Errorvar.= 0.56, R2 = 0.50 (0.094) (0.088)
8.03 6.39
Trust6 = 0.76*信任, Errorvar.= 0.78 , R2 = 0.43 (0.11) (0.12)
7.19 6.62
Trust7 = 0.87*信任, Errorvar.= 0.23 , R2 = 0.77 (0.080) (0.052)
10.98 4.35
Trust8 = 0.86*信任, Errorvar.= 0.44 , R2 = 0.62 (0.092) (0.076)
9.35 5.81
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
87
Recip3 = 0.79*互惠, Errorvar.= 0.33, R2= 0.66 (0.060)
5.41
Recip4 = 0.76*互惠, Errorvar.= 0.34, R2 = 0.63 (0.087) (0.061)
8.73 5.63 Recip7 = 0.58*互惠, Errorvar.= 0.30, R2 = 0.53 (0.073) (0.048)
7.84 6.18
Recip8 = 0.71*互惠, Errorvar.= 0.42, R2 = 0.55 (0.089) (0.068)
8.03 6.09
Coo2 = 0.93*Coop, Errorvar.= 0.34, R2 = 0.72 (0.080)
4.22
Coo3 = 0.90*合作, Errorvar.= 0.32, R2 = 0.72 (0.097) (0.075)
9.28 4.21 Coo4 = 0.87*合作, Errorvar.= 0.56 , R2 = 0.58 (0.10) (0.097) 8.37 5.73
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
88
二、結構模式（Structural Equations）
互惠 = 0.82*信任, Errorvar.= 0.33, R2 = 0.67 (0.11) (0.092)
7.68 3.54
合作 = 0.56*互惠, Errorvar.= 0.68 , R2 = 0.32 (0.11) (0.15)
5.10 4.66 三、模型估計值（Estimates）
四、模型估計值（T-values）
‧
Degrees of Freedom = 52
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 77.95 (P = 0.011)
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 78.72 (P = 0.0098) Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 26.72
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (6.73 ; 54.67) Minimum Fit Function Value = 0.74
Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0) = 0.25 90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0 = (0.064 ; 0.52) Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.070 90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.035 ; 0.10) P-Value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.15 Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 1.24 90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (1.05 ; 1.51) ECVI for Saturated Model = 1.49
ECVI for Independence Model = 13.88
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 66 Degrees of Freedom = 1433.37 Independence AIC = 1457.37
Model AIC = 130.72 Saturated AIC = 156.00 Independence CAIC = 1501.33 Model CAIC = 225.97
Saturated CAIC = 441.75 Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.95 Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.98 Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.75 Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.98 Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.98 Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.93 Critical N (CN) = 106.89
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.056 Standardized RMR = 0.051
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 0.89
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.83 Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.59