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2.高階管理者異動分類之限制
高階管理者是受迫性異動或自願性異動並無客觀的資訊可取得，本文依公開 資訊觀測站之重大訊息公告，對高階管理者異動公告進行判讀並予以分類，過程 涉及人為的主觀判斷，可能導致實證結果產生偏差。
三、研究建議
過去有關租稅規避與高階管理者異動的研究不多，以下整理出幾個研究方向，
供後續欲研究相關議題的研究者參考。
1.更深入的高階管理者異動資料
本文高階管理者異動資料取自公開資訊觀測站，源自各公司主動於平台公告 之資訊，其用詞多經過修飾，建議未來的研究者可以更客觀、真實的高階管理者 異動資訊，如權威的專業媒體報導資料進行研究，或是將研究的高階主管擴及財 務長、會計主管等與租稅相關的職位，進行更深入的研究。
2.不同股權型態對租稅規避的影響
不同的股權型態的企業，對租稅規避可能有不一樣的偏好，建議未來的研究 者更進一步分析企業的股權型態，如家族企業、公股主導的企業，對租稅規避造 成的影響。
3.以更長的時間來觀察高階管理者的稅務績效
本文以年度資料為基準，無法完整呈現管理者的績效，建議未來的研究者可 以更長的時間來觀察稅務績效對高階管理者異動的影響，如以高階管理者在職期 間內的累積稅務績效，作為判斷基礎，研究結果可能更貼近真實。
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