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第五章 結論與建議
本研究試圖探討公司自願性採用Clawback條款在不同啟動要件下(Trigger)，
對公司財務報表重編及盈餘品質之影響。Clawback條款制度之設計，讓公司得以 事後追回其依據不實財務資訊所支付予經理人之獎酬，此機制不僅成為一個有效 的事後解決方案，亦能夠事前嚇阻經理人從事盈餘操弄的動機。因此，本研究預 期，針對公司各種不同之盈餘管理手段，若能選擇正確的Clawback條款啟動要件，
將對於該盈餘管理手段發揮最大之Clawback條款監督效果。本研究樣本選擇以 2007至2010年間列於Russel 3000指數之公司(不含金融服務與保險業)為樣本，實 證結果發現， Clawback條款Tigger之選擇與公司有無發生財務報表重編之間並 無明顯之連結。然而，當公司進行應計項目盈餘管理之行為時，將可透過以 General Catch-All (Trigger3)作為Clawback條款之啟動要件來加以抑止。而此實證 結果亦可以從法律經濟學之角度加以解釋，亦即，當法規之訂定越不明確時，人 們在無法明確預期判決結果之不確定心理下，為了降低其從事不法行為所需付出 之成本，將盡可能避免違反法令之規定。此外，當公司之盈餘管理從應計項目盈 餘管理轉換到實際盈餘管理時，亦可利用以Performance Based(Trigger4)作為 Clawback條款之啟動要件來減少此實際活動盈餘管理行為。而此實證結果恰好支 持Dodd-Frank Act Section 954之規定，以財務報表之所有重編情形做為啟動 Clawback條款之要件。因此本研究預期Dodd-Frank Act Section 954將能達成其立 法之目的，提升公司財務報導之品質。
值得注意的是，雖然本研究結果並無法證實Clawback條款之Tigger與公司財 務報表重編間具有顯著之連結，但根據本研究其他結論可發現，公司之盈餘管理 行為得以透 過 Clawback 條款之不 同啟動要 件 (General Catch-All (Trigger3)及 Performance Based(Trigger4))達到抑制之效果，進而提升公司財務報表之品質。
早期研究結果顯示盈餘管理與重編之間有一定程度之相關性，當公司經理人從事 盈餘管理行為時，將降低公司財務報表之盈餘品質，進而提升公司財務報表發生
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重編之可能性(Richardson et al.2002；Doyle et al.2007a；Efendi et al.2007)。由此 可見，盈餘管理之現象發生於財務報表重編之前，若公司之盈餘管理行為已在財 務報表發生重編前被Clawback條款之不同啟動要件加以有效遏止，公司將不易發 生財務報表重編之情況。是故本研究所得到之有發生財務報表重編之樣本量遠小 於公司未發生財務報表重編之樣本量，而此小樣本將不足以顯著呈現Clawback 條款對於公司財務報表重編情形之影響。
本研究之貢獻主要在於將公司對於是否採用Clawback條款之問題進一步延 伸到公司應於何種情況下採用Clawback條款最能發揮其監理功效。公司自願性採 用Clawback條款得以自行決定其啟動Clawback條款之時機，然而，在不同情況下 選用錯誤之啟動要件將無法真正發揮Clawback條款之功能。而本研究提供公司在 經理人在利用兩種手段進行盈餘管理時，相對應之Clawback條款啟動要件。而 Clawback條款在此最適啟動要件下將得以最大化其效果，確實消弭公司盈餘管理 之行為，進一步提升公司之盈餘品質，降低財務報表重編之可能性，而達到其根 本之設立目的。
最後，本研究結果亦有其限制。在Dodd-Frank Act Section 954之規定下，美 國所有公開發行公司皆須強制採用Clawback條款，而本研究之樣本對象為自願性 採用Clawback條款之公司，是故本研究在強制採用Clawback條款後是否仍然成立，
將有待後續作進一步之探討。此外，本研究之Heckman兩階段模型尚未能完全消 除公司自願性採用Clawback條款所產生之自我選擇偏誤之內生性問題，建議以 Difference in difference方法或再進一步修正Heckman第一階段模型來試圖改善此 一問題。
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