國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
63
第五章 結論與建議
本研究試圖探討市場參與者對於公司自願性採用 Clawback 條款之反應。作 為一內部監督機制，Clawback 條款不僅允許公司於發生財務報表重編時，向經 理人追回先前基於不實財報所額外支付之獎酬，亦能夠事前嚇阻經理人從事盈餘 操弄的動機，進而改善公司之財務報導品質。因此，本研究預期，資本市場將因 所承受之資訊風險不同，而針對有採用及未採用 Clawback 條款之公司做出不同 的回應。以 2007 至 2011 年間納入 Russel 3000 指數之公司(不含金融服務與保險 業)為樣本，本研究發現，與未採用 Clawback 條款之公司相比，自願性採用 Clawback 條款之公司，其權益資金成本較低，且信用評等較佳。上述結果說明，
自願性採用 Clawback 條款之公司，能夠降低其與市場間之資訊不對稱，投資人 將因所承受之資訊風險較低，而願意降低其要求報酬。此外，專業之資訊使用者 如信用評等機構，亦會將 Clawback 條款對於財務報導品質及公司治理結構之正 面影響納入考量，而給予自願性採用 Clawback 條款之公司較佳的信用評等。
本研究進一步以 Dechow et al. (2011)所建立之 F-score 衡量公司的事前舞弊 風險，並將樣本區分為高舞弊風險組與低舞弊風險組。實證結果發現，Clawback 條款僅在低舞弊風險組與權益資金成本呈顯著負相關，顯示財務品質較佳之公司 確實會透過自願性採用 Clawback 條款來向資本市場彰顯其信心，而投資人亦會 以較低之資金成本做出回應。另一方面，事前舞弊風險較高之公司，則仍需透過 外部監督機制如四大會計師事務所查核，方能有效降低資本市場對於其財務報導 品質之疑慮。然而，本研究亦發現，Clawback 條款僅在高舞弊風險組與信用評 等呈顯著正相關。上述結果說明，專業的信用評等機構能夠區別 Clawback 條款 對於高舞弊風險公司及低舞弊風險公司的效益，並針對尋求實質改善之公司做出 正面回應。綜合上述結論，本研究認為，不論公司之財務報導品質優劣與否，自 願性採用 Clawback 條款皆能使其受惠。
此外，本研究使用機構投資人持股比例，將樣本區分為高外部監督與低外部
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
64
監督(亦即低代理問題與高代理問題)兩組。實證結果顯示，Clawback 條款僅在低 外部監督組與權益資金成本呈顯著負相關，並與信用評等呈顯著正相關。上述結 果說明，當公司之外部監督程度較低，採用 Clawback 條款做為強化內部監督的 機制，將能彌補外部監督之不足，進而降低資本市場所承受之資訊風險。
本研究之主要貢獻有二。首先，本研究選擇以權益資金成本，而非過去研究 所採用之盈餘反應係數、股價報酬、買賣價差(如：Chan et al. 2012a; Dehaan et al.
2011; Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013)，來衡量資本市場對於公司盈餘資訊之信賴程度。
由於權益資金成本反映的是投資人按照其所承擔之風險程度，所要求之相對報酬，
故若投資人認為公司採用 Clawback 條款能夠降低其資訊風險，則此一事實應直 接反映在其要求報酬上。基於上述原因，本研究之結果應能提供在邏輯上較為直 觀之證據，而使相關研究更趨完善。其二，除了一般投資人，本研究亦試圖探討 專業之信用評等機構，是否會考量公司是否採用 Clawback 條款，而給予不同的 信用評等。由於信用評等將大幅影響公司於資本市場籌資之難易度及其成本，本 研究之結果應可供實務界作為相關決策之參考。
最後，本研究之結果亦有其限制。在 Dodd-Frank Act Section 954 之要求下，
美國所有公開發行公司皆必須強制採用 Clawback 條款，而本研究之對象為自願 性採用 Clawback 條款之公司，故其結果在強制採用 Clawback 條款之環境下是否 仍然成立，尚待後續研究釐清。
‧
Addy, N., X. Chu, and T. Yoder. 2011. Recovering bonuses after restated financials:
adopting clawback provisions. Working paper. Mississippi State University, Louisiana State Tech University, and University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Ang, J., Y. Cheng, and S. Fulmer. 2013. Clawing back executive compensation.
Working paper. Florida State University.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, and R. LaFond. 2006. The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42:
203–243.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, W. R. Kinney, and R. LaFond. 2009. The effect of SOX internal control deficiencies on firm risk and cost of equity. Journal
of Accounting Research 47 (1): 1-43.
Attig, N., S. E. Ghoul, and O. Guedhami. 2013. Corporate social responsibility and credit ratings. Journal of Business Ethics 117:679–694.
Babenko, I., B. Bennett, J. Bizjak, J. L. Coles. 2012. Clawback provisions. Working
paper. Arizona State University, and Texas Christian University.
Beneish, M. D. and M. E. Vargus. 2002. Insider trading, earnings quality, and accrual mispricing. The Accounting Review 77(4): 755-791.
Bhojraj, S., and P. Sengupta. 2003. Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: The role of institutional investors and outside directors. Journal of
Business 76 (3): 455–475.
Blume, M. E., F. Lim, and A. C. Mackinlay. 1998. The declining credit quality of U.S. corporate debt: Myth or reality. Journal of Finance 53 (4): 1389–1413.
Botosan, C. A. 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting
Review 72 (3): 323–349.
Botosan, C. A., and M. A. Plumlee. 2002. A re-examination of disclosure level and the expected cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (1): 21–
40.
Brown, A., P. Davis-Friday, and L. Guler. 2011. Economic determinants of the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts.
Working paper. Baruch College.
‧
voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts. Working paper. Idaho State University, City University of New York-Baruch College, and Koç University.Burns, N., and S. Kedia. 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1): 35–67.
Chan, L. H., K. Chen, T. Y. Chen, and Y. Yu. 2012a. The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on earnings quality and auditor behavior. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 54: 180–196.
Chan, L. H., K. Chen, T. Y. Chen, and Y. Yu. 2012b. Substitution between real and accrual-based earnings management after voluntary adoption of compensation clawback provisions. Working paper. Hong Kong University of Science and provisions in CEO compensation. Working paper. Georgia State University.
Cheng, Q., and T. D. Warfield. 2005. Equity incentives and earnings management,
The Accounting Review 80: 441-476.
Dhaliwal, D. S., S. Heitzman, and O. Z. Li. 2006. Taxes, leverage, and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (4): 691–723.
Dhaliwal, D. S., O. Z. Li, A. Tsang, and Y. G. Young. 2011. Voluntary nonfinancial disclosure and the cost of equity capital: The initiation of corporate social responsibility reporting. The Accounting Review 86 (1): 59-100.
Dechow, P., W. Ge, C. Larson, and R. G. Sloan. 2011. Predicting material accounting misstatements. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (1): 17–82.
Dehaan, E., F. Hodge, and T. Shevlin. 2011. Does voluntary adoption of a clawback provision improve financial reporting quality? Contemporary Accounting
Research 30 (3): 1027-1062
Denis, D. 2012. Mandatory clawback provisions, information disclosure, and the regulation of securities markets. Journal of Accounting and Economics 54: 197–
200.
‧
capital. The Journal of Finance 45 (4): 1325–1359.Easton, P. 2004. PE ratios, PEG ratios, and estimating the implied expected rate of return on equity capital. The Accounting Review 79 (1): 73–95.
Equilar. 2009. Clawback policy report. Redwood City, CA: Equilar.
Equilar. 2010. Clawback policy report. Redwod City, CA: Equilar.
Equilar. 2011a. Clawback policy report. Redwood City, CA: Equilar.
Equilar. 2011b. Clawbacks are here to stay. C-Suite Insight, July 11.
Fama, E., and K. French. 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns. The
Journal of Finance 47 (2): 427–465.
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French. 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial
Economics 43: 153–194.
Fernando, G. D., A. M. Abdel-Meguid, and R. J. Elder. 2010. Audit quality attributes, client size and cost of equity capital. Review of Accounting and Finance 9 (4):
363-381.
Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olsson, and K. Schipper. 2005. Cost of capital and earnings attributes. The Accounting Review 79 (4): 976–1010.
Fried, J., N. Shilon. 2011. Excess-pay Clawbacks. Working Paper. Harvard Law School.
Gao, X., M. Iskandar-Datta, and Y. Jia. 2011. Piercing the corporate veil: The case for clawback provisions. Working paper. Wayne State University.
Gebhardt, W., C. Lee, and B. Swaminathan. 2001. Toward an implied cost of capital.
Journal of Accounting Research 39 (1): 135–176.
Guidry, F., A. J. Leone, and S. Rock. 1999. Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business-unit managers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 26 (1–3): 113–42.
Gode, D., and P. Mohanram. 2003. Inferring the cost of capital using the Ohlson-Juettner model. Review of Accounting Studies 8: 399–431.
Heckman, J. 1979. The sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47: 153–162.
Hirsch, B., B. E. Reichert, and M. Sohn. 2013. Can clawback provisions in management incentive contracts backfire and lead to more risk taking? Working
paper. Bundeswehr University, and Drexel University.
‧
Hribar, P., and N. T. Jenkins. 2004. The effect of accounting restatements on earnings revisions and the estimated cost of capital. Review of Accounting Studies 9:
337–356.
Iskandar-Datta, M., and Y. Jia. 2013. Valuation consequences of clawback provisions.
The Accounting Review 88 (1): 171–198.
Kaplan, R., and G. Urwitz. 1979. Statistical models of bond ratings: A methodological inquiry. Journal of Business 52 (2): 231–261.
Khurana, I. K., and K. K. Raman. 2004. Litigation risk and the financial reporting credibility of big 4 versus non-big 4 audits: Evidence from Anglo-Amerian countires. The Accounting Review 79 (2): 473-495.
Kothari, S. P., X. Li, and J. E. Short. 2009. The effect of disclosures by management, analysts, and business press on cost of capital, return volatility, and analyst forecasts: A Study Using Content Analysis. The Accounting Review 84 (5):
1639-1670.
Kutner, M. H., C. J. Nachtsheim, and J. Neter. 2004. Applied linear regression models. 4th edition. McGraw-Hill Irwin.
Lennox, C. S., J. R. Francis, and Z. Wang. 2012. Selection models in accounting research. The Accounting Review 87 (2): 589–616.
Levine, C. B., and M. J. Smith. 2010. The relative efficiency of clawback provisions in compensation contracts. Working paper. Rutgers University, and Boston University.
Mansi, S., M. Maxwell, and D. Millser. 2004. Does auditor quality and tenure matter to investors? Evidence from the bond market. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (4): 755–793.
McInnis, J. 2010. Earnings smoothness, average returns, and implied cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review 85 (1): 315-341.
Ogneva, M., K. R. Subramanyam, and K. Raghunandan. 2007. Internal control weakness and cost of equity: Evidence from SOX section 404 disclosures.
The Accounting Review 82 (5): 1255-1297.
Pyzoha, J. S. 2013. Why do restatements decrease in a clawback environment? An investigation into financial reporting executives’ decision-making during the restatement process. Working paper. Case Western Reserve University.
Salehi, N. H., E. A. Marino. 2008. Section 304 of SOX: New tool for disgorgement?
New York Law Journal: 239.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
69
Standard & Poor’s. 2002. Standard & Poor’s Corporate Governance Scores: Criteria, Methodology and Definitions. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., New York.
U.S. House of Representatives. 2002. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Public Law No. 107-204. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.
U.S. Congress. 2009. American recovery and reinvestment act of 2009. Public Law No. 111-5. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
U.S. Congress. 2010. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
Public Law No. 111-203. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.
Ziebart, D., and S. Reiter. 1992. Bond ratings, bond yields and financial information.
Contemporary Accounting Research 9 (1): 252–282.
‧
Recovering bonuses after restated financials:
adopting clawback provisions Working paper
一、當公司之經理人影響力較低、有較多董事同時於其他有
(2013) Clawing back executive compensation Working paper
一、儘管 Dodd-Frank Act Section 954 的適用範圍較 SOX Section 304 廣，其所能追回之薪酬卻相當有限。這是因 為經理人所增加的財富，絕大部分係來自於出售持股或 履行認股權，而這些利得並不包含在 Dodd-Frank Act Section 954 之適用範圍內。
Babenko et al.
(2012) Clawback provisions Working paper
一、當公司的經理人過去曾從事舞弊或其他不當行為，或是
Economic determinants of the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts
Working paper
一、公司規模愈大，其採用 Clawback 條款之可能性較高。
二、當 CEO 的影響力愈大(任期愈長，或公司支付其過高之 併購紅利)，則公司採用 Clawback 的可能性較低。
‧
M&A performance and the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions in executive compensation contracts
Working paper
一、當公司宣告併購消息時，若資本市場反映之股價報酬為
The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on earnings quality and auditor behavior
Journal of Accounting and
Finance
Substitution between real and accruals- based earnings management after voluntary adoption of compensation clawback provisions
Working paper
一、相 較 於未 採用 Clawback 條款之 公司 ，公 司於 採用 Clawback 條 款 後 ， 雖 然 應 計 項 目 盈 餘 管 理 (Accrual management)的情形減少，實際盈餘管理(Real earning management)的情形卻反而增加，導致盈餘管理的總額 不僅沒有降低，反而微幅上升。
二、上述替代效果，最主要發生在有採用 Clawback 條款，
且具有高度成長潛力的公司。
三、採用 Clawback 條款之公司，若透過實際盈餘管理代替
‧
The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on bank loan contracting
Journal of Financial
provisions in CEO compensation Working paper
一、當公司採用 Clawback 條款後，
1. 重編情形減少，且異常應計(Abnormal accrual)降 低； provision improve financial reporting quality?
‧
Denis (2012)
Mandatory clawback provisions, information disclosure, and the regulation of securities markets
Journal of Accounting and
Economics
clawback provisions Working paper
一、公司在採用 Clawback 條款後，其股價報酬明顯增加；
Can clawback provisions in management
incentive contracts backfire and lead to more Working paper 一、採用 Clawback 條款對於經理人風險趨避程度的影響，
將取決於公司當時的財務狀況。若公司為獲利狀態，且
‧
Valuation consequences of clawback provisions
The Accounting Review
Pyzoha (2013)
Why do restatements decrease in a clawback environment? An investigation into financial reporting executives’ decision-making during the restatement process
Working paper
一、當經理人的績效獎酬佔總薪酬的比重較高時，其同意重