聯邦巡迴上訴法院全院審理判決

第三章 Phillips v. AWH Corp.案

第三節聯邦巡迴上訴法院全院審理判決

第一項聯邦巡迴上訴法院全院審理七大議題

聯邦巡迴法院接受原告上訴，決定對此案全院重新審理，故巡迴上訴法院第一次判決廢棄，七大議題如下¹⁰²：

(1)就申請專利範圍的公示功能(public notice function)而言，在解釋申請專利範圍詞彙時主要應該參考一般用途的字典或相似來源的定

102 1. Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by referencing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar source to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the term in the specification? If both sources are to be consulted, in what order?

2. If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim interpretation, should the specification limit the full scope of claim language (as defined by the dictionaries) only when the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or when the specification reflects a clear disclaimer of claim scope? If so, what language in the specification will satisfy those conditions? What use should be made of general as opposed to technical dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same term? If the Dictionary provides multiple potentially applicable definitions for a term, is it appropriate to look to the specification to determine what definition or definitions should apply?

3. If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification , what use should be made of dictionaries? Should the range of the ordinary meaning of claim language be limited to the scope of the invention disclosed in the specification, for example, when only a single embodiment is disclosed and no other indications of breadth are disclosed?

4. Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the majority and dissent of the now-vacated panel decision as alternative, conflicting approaches, should the two approaches be treated as complementary methodologies such that there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a patentee must satisfy both limiting methodologies in order to establish the claim coverage it seeks?

5. When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §102, 103 and 112?

6. What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one of ordinary skill in the art play in determining the meaning of the disputed claim terms?

7 Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.

370 (1996), and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed.

Cir. 1998), is it appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?

典？字典對於申請專利範圍文字所提供的通常涵義的涵蓋範圍是否應透過說明書中揭露的範圍來限制？舉例來說，這個問題在只有一個實施例被揭露而欠缺其他更廣的指涉的情形應該如何處理？

(4)除了巡迴上訴法院目前被撤銷的判決理面的多數意見以及不同意見中，針對申請專利解釋範圍所使用的兩種途徑當成選擇性的對立方案，這兩種方案是否應該互作為補充方案，使得對於申請專利範圍產生雙限制，並藉此使得專利權人必須同時滿足此兩種限制方案，始能建立其所追尋的申請專利範圍？

(5)如果有需要的話，在何種情況下，申請專利範圍文字可以進行限縮解釋，以單純用於避免因為美國專立法第 102、第 103 條與第 112 條等所造成的專利無效？

(6)在判斷申請專利範圍的爭議名詞時候，答辯歷史以及熟習該項技藝者的專家證人證詞應該扮演何種角色？

(7)在最高法院 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc 判決(1996)與巡迴上訴法院在 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.全院審理的判決先例下，巡迴上訴法院是否宜尊重地院對於申請專利範圍的解讀？如果是的話，應該又是在何種觀點、何種情況以及何種限度下尊重地院的申請專利範圍解釋？

該上述七大議題，大致上分為兩大部分，第一類問題為在解釋申請專利範圍上，字典以及專利說明書適用順序之解釋申請專利範圍方法論的議題；第二類議題則為巡迴上訴法院應該如何看待地院對於申請專利範圍判決之上訴審理標準問題。

第二項法院之友意見書(amicus briefs)

因涉及解釋申請專利範圍核心議題，在聯邦巡迴上訴法院將七大議題拋出後，包含了本案雙方當事人，共計有三十六份法院之友意見書(amicus briefs)，在此整理其中與解釋申請專利範圍方法論相關之意見如下。

基本上在此三十六份法院之友意見書中，有共識的部分大約包含下列幾點：

(1)解釋申請專利範圍，從解釋申請專利範圍本身文字著手。

(2)公示效力對於維持解釋申請專利範圍的一致性與可預測性至為重要，不僅在對於專利訴訟，也對平常在理解申請專利範圍之時，為重要的前提。

(3)專利說明書本身，特別是當專利權人為自己的字典編纂者時，為解釋

申請專利範圍的重要來源。

但對於解釋申請範圍方法論的部分，究竟字典與專利說明書是否存有

適用上的順序，各自應該如何操作，或是兼採字典與專利說明書雙限制的方法，法院之友意見書基本上呈現下列四種狀況：

(1) 採用申請專利範圍通常涵義為優先之方法 (claim ordinary meaning-based)¹⁰³：

支持本方法的法院之友意見書共有五份，占 13.9%，為少數意見，

其中包含了原告 Phillips 的意見書，更值得注意的是，包含了 Wagner 之意見。

本方法認為解釋申請專利範圍，應從申請專利範圍通常涵義入手，且此通常涵義會構成假設，必須由更清楚的專利說明書內部證據之意才能推翻。主要支持理由來自於認為專利說明書事實上本身是無法提供清楚、準確、客觀的解釋來源，所以來自於一些具有公示效力的字典等證據，得推定構成申請專利範圍解釋的假設；又從最高法院的判例來說，跟隨著類比解釋申請專利範圍為解釋法令的思想，法院既常引用字典來解釋法令內的文字意思，那麼在解釋專利上，引用字典更是必然之舉，實應給與此類證據相當的分量。

本方法的兩個主要缺點：(1)字典種類繁多，甚至同一字有各種不同的解釋，實在難以適用，且會使得專利範圍無限制的過於寬廣，針對此缺點法院之友提出的意見為，此缺點可以藉由專利權人在撰寫專利之時，就在說明書之中註明所引用的字典出處，此舉雖然會導致撰寫專利的費用上升，但是與整體訴訟費用來說，此部分的增加實為值得；(2)美國專利局於審查專利以及專利審查基準中(MPEP)都並無引用字典為其主要釐清申請專利範圍的來源，針對此缺點，法院之友認為，

103 (1) En Banc Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant (stating quite predictably that “claims... should be read first, incorporating the parties' stipulated definitions when they exist, definitions from authoritative written sources for terms of art, and standard dictionary definitions for all other terms.”) (emphasis added); (2) Brief for Ass'n of Patent Law Firms as Amicus Curiae (“Dictionaries (technical and general) should be primary source to identify ordinary meaning, then go to spec.”); (3) Brief & Appendix for McShea Tecce, P.C., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal at 2 (proposing a method that “first determines the full range of possible definitions from standard English dictionaries or, if applicable, recognized technical publications”); (4) Brief for Parus Holdings Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 3 (“The dictionary approach to claim construction inherently provides uniformity and predictability because dictionaries provide only a few possible meanings for any given claim term.”) (5) Brief for Patent Law Professors R. Polk Wagner & Joseph Scott Miller as Amici Curiae at 1 (“The Public Notice Function of Claims Requires a Focus on, and a presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim

language.”).

專利的通過本身就代表了符合了新穎性、非顯而易見性、以及揭露充分性等要件，若法院解釋後發現該專利本身的專利申請範圍真的過廣，那麼判決無效就是他應得的懲罰。

(2) 採用專利說明書為優先的方法(Specification-based)¹⁰⁴：

104 (1) Brief for The Intellectual Property Law Ass'n of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 2-3(“Dictionaries should in general be subordinate to the patent specification and other intrinsic evidence when determining what is meant objectively by challenged claim terms.”); (2) Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 9 (“Reliance on the intrinsic evidence as the starting point for interpreting claims preserves established doctrines of patent law, does not upset settled expectations, and achieves a reading of patent claims that serves the public notice function of claiming while remaining fair to the patentee.”); (3) AIPLA Amicus Brief, supra note 70, at 2, 5 (applying a “balanced approach,” but ultimately determining that “materials in the intrinsic record must, throughout the inquiry be the ‘primary’ source for claim construction”); (4) Defendants-Cross Appellants' Additional Brief for Rehearing En Banc at 4 (“Reference to the patentee's use of the term in the specification, rather than to dictionaries, best serves the public notice function of patent claims.”); (5) Brief for Ad Hoc Committee of Patent Owners in the Wireless Industry as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 2 (“Presumptively construe claims to cover those specific embodiments reasonably disclosed in the specification”); (6) Brief for Ass'n of Corp. Council on Rehearing En Banc as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Side at 2, Phillips (“Public notice is best served by first looking to the intrinsic evidence, including the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Dictionaries and other extrinsic evidence are to be used only if the intrinsic evidence does not determine the meaning of the claim.”) (emphasis added); (7) Brief for The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 5 (“The public notice function of patent claims is better served by construing the claims with reference to the patent specification, including the drawings, as well as the file history.”); (8) Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 5 (“This public notice function is better served if claim construction proceeds first by

inspecting the specification. In those instances when the specification affirmatively establishes the construction of a claim, the claim construction task is at an end.”); (9) Brief of Boston Patent Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 11-12, (“A dictionary... defines a term in the abstract, outside its context.... The necessary context for the claimed invention can be found in the first instance in the specification and prosecution history.”); (10) Brief for Charles W. Bradley, Esq. as Amicus Curiae at 1, (“The mode of analysis that best serves the public notice function of patent claims clearly includes an analysis of the specification and prosecution history of the patent at issue.”); (11) Brief of Conejo Valley Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 3 (“Only after a review of the intrinsic record, the overall claim language, the specification and prosecution history, should a court define the words in a claim using extrinsic evidence, such as a dictionary or learned treatise.”);

(12) Brief of Connecticut Intellectual Property Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Regarding the Issue of Claim Construction at 3,(“The public notice function of patent claims is better served by referencing initially to the patentee's use of the term in the specification.”); (13) Brief of Federation Internationale des Conseils en Propriete Industrielle as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 4 (“The ordinary meaning of the claim term to one of ordinary skill in the art as used in the context of the patent shall apply; (14) Brief of Houston Intellectual Property Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Response to the Court's Order Inviting Briefs at 2 (“The intrinsic record - the claims, specification, and prosecution history (if in evidence) - should be referenced first.”); ; (15) Brief of Infineon Technologies North America Corp. as Amicus Curiae at 3 (suggesting an approach that “looks first and foremost to the specification to construe disputed claim terms”); see also IPLAC Webpage, supra, at 7 (“Look first and foremost to spec; no role for dictionaries in defining claim terms; claim terms are defined either explicitly or implicitly in spec'n [sic].”); (16) Brief for Intel Corp., IBM Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae. at 3 (“The more reasonable and predictable course is to rely in the first instance on the specification and the prosecution history.”) [hereinafter IBM Amicus Brief]; (17) Brief of Intellectual Property Owners Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 2 (“The primary evidence of claim meaning is found in the patent

specification and prosecution history, and no other evidence should be considered if the claims can be construed property from those sources alone.”); (18) Brief for Medrad, Inc. to Address the Questions Presented in this Court's July 21 2004 Order as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 2, (“Claim construction should be based upon the intrinsic evidence, including the specification, drawings, prior

art, and prosecution history.”); see also IPLAC Webpage, supra, at 8 (“The specand filed history should be used first.”); (19) Brief for New York Intellectual Property Law Ass'n Regarding the Issue of Claim Construction, in which the Tennessee Bar Ass'n, State Bar Michigan Law Section, & Los Angeles Intellectual Property Law Ass'n Join as Amici Curiae at 3 (“The primary source of claim construction should be the intrinsic evidence--namely the patent claims, patent specification and, if in evidence, the patent prosecution history.”); (20) Brief for Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. et al as Amici Curie at 2 (“Dictionaries are not preeminent, and should be used only as, and to the extent that, the skilled person would use them....”); (21) Brief for Oregon Patent Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Answering the Additional Questions Set Forth by the Court and by Circuit Judge Rader at 2 (“When construing claim terms, the patent statutes require courts to look primarily at a patentee's use of the term, thus requiring the courts to examine the context of the use of the claim term and not just isolated, generalized dictionary definitions.”); (22) Brief for San Diego Intellectual Property Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 2 (Nos. 03-1269,-1286) (“The review of the intrinsic evidence starts with the specification which is the best source for determining the proper context for claim terms.”); (23) Brief for Sughrue Mion, PLLC as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, (“The patent document provides notice of a claim term's meaning.... Only the patent specification and prosecution history can illustrate what the claimed invention is not;

whether because of disclaimer, disavowal or estoppel. A dictionary cannot.”); (24) Brief for Visa U.S.A. & Mental, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Judgment at 6 (“The public notice function is better served by looking primarily to the patentee's use of the term in the context of the claims, the

在文檔中論申請專利範圍解釋—以Phillips v. AWH Corp.案與其後案件發展為中心 (頁 42-51)

第三章 Phillips v. AWH Corp.案

第三節 聯邦巡迴上訴法院全院審理判決

第三節聯邦巡迴上訴法院全院審理判決