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Chapter 11: Conclusion
When President Trump announced his intention to meet with Kim Jong-un in a summit to discuss denuclearization, it gave hope to a world on edge. Building on the success of North Korea and South Korea’s historic meeting, it seemed that for the first time, a peaceful,
diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis was a tangible possibility. But the road to the Trump-Kim summit was a rocky one, with North Korea threatening to cancel the summit over joint military drills between the US and South Korea, and President Trump cancelling the summit in an official letter to Kim Jong-un, citing “tremendous anger and open hostility” regarding US demands for denuclearization.” To add insult to injury, a few hours before President Trump cancelled the summit, North Korea blew up tunnels at the Pyunggye-ri nuclear test site, as “proof of its commitment to end nuclear testing.”424 Within a day of its cancellation, the summit was quickly salvaged by US and North Korean diplomatic efforts.
On September 12, 2018, the Trump-Kim summit was finally held to much pomp and circumstance. But after the handshakes and photo opportunities, the joint statement signed by President Trump and Kim Jong-un left international audiences underwhelmed. The four-point joint statement pledged to establish new US-DPRK relations, “build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” reaffirm the DPRK’s commitment to denuclearization, and recover the remains of American soldiers killed during the Korean War.425 Kim Jong-un’s moment in the international spotlight only cost him his pledge “to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” essentially restating his previous commitments from the Panmunjom Declaration. In exchange, President Trump not only gave Kim Jong-un the recognition he desired, but also decided to suspend joint military exercises between the US and South Korea.426 The joint statement has also been highly criticized for lacking details regarding the timeline and terms of North Korea’s “denuclearization” efforts. Nevertheless, others argue
424 David Brunnstrom, Matt Spetalnick, Christine Kim, “Trump cancels summit with North Korea’s Kim, warns that military ready,” Reuters, May 24, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/north-korea-blows-up-nuclear-test-site-amid-doubts-over-summit-idUSKCN1IP1RY.
425 Donald Trump, “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” The White House, June 12, 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.
426 “Trump to Suspend Military Exercises on Korean Peninsula,” New York Times, June 11, 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/world/asia/trump-kim-live-updates.html.
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that President Trump’s attempt to cultivate positive relations with North Korea is historically groundbreaking, and at the very least, a step in the right direction for future US-North Korea relations.
The morning after the summit, President Trump made the following statement on Twitter: “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.”427 In comments to the press, President Trump called the nuclear crisis “largely solved.”428 Even though the President has the right to be optimistic, the North Korea nuclear crisis is far from over. The President cannot claim that he has achieved his goal of denuclearization when in reality, these efforts have hardly begun.
Even though the destruction of the Pyunggye-ri test site was meant to be a positive and symbolic gesture, there is still no confirmation as to what the blast actually destroyed, and which nuclear capabilities North Korea continues to possess. Simply put, the US has no way of knowing whether North Korea is honoring its commitments, and has created few preconditions to ensure that it does so. At this point in time, the US must still assume that North Korea possesses nuclear capabilities and other WMD. Until full CVID can be accomplished, US deterrence will continue to be an applicable strategy towards North Korea.
As argued in this paper, effective deterrence requires consideration of the factors that make threats credible, including military capabilities, political will, perception, and legitimacy.
The US clearly has sufficient military capabilities to credibly threaten North Korea. Existing capabilities seek to effectively execute deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial.
However, these capabilities are in desperate need of modernization, making it that much more difficult to achieve “overmatch” among competition from growing powers. With this in mind, the US should continue to prioritize modernization efforts and ensure military capabilities are effective in every scenario. At the same time, military and political leadership cannot focus solely on military strength and disregard the importance of “soft power” in deterrence strategies.
US leadership has strong political will to retaliate in the event of a nuclear strike.
President Trump’s narcissistic tendencies and charismatic leadership strengthens political will by rallying public support against North Korea. Moreover, President Trump’s inner circle reinforces political will through their “hawkish” approaches to foreign policy. On the other hand, such
427 Mark Landler, “The Trump-Kim Summit Was Unprecedented, but the Statement Was Vague,” New York Times, June 12, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/world/asia/north-korea-summit.html.
428 Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle,” The White House, June 15, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-gaggle/.
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aggressive rhetoric can also backfire, agitating North Korea and risking the provocation of conflict, which is exactly what deterrence aims to prevent. In the letter to Kim Jong-un initially cancelling the summit, President Trump states, “You talk about your nuclear capabilities, but ours are so massive and powerful that I pray to God they will never have to be used.”429 Though this statement strongly expresses President Trump’s political will to retaliate against a nuclear attack, it also risks unnecessarily incensing North Korea to test this claim. It is possible to take a hardline stance and clearly state objectives without being intentionally provocative. Although Kim Jong-un and President Trump’s personality profiles indicate they may work well together, the Trump Administration needs to be conscious of how language can incite conflict rather than deter it.
The Trump Administration has used public communications, policy and strategy
documents, and “costly signals,” to formulate what the US considers to be honest perceptions of its military capabilities and political will. Though the US has a strong, historically-based “enemy image” of North Korea, the US must be careful not to formulate perceptions based exclusively on existing biases. Furthermore, the Trump Administration must be careful not to “miss the forest for the trees.” In attempting to prove his credibility by delivering on various campaign promises, President Trump has been blind to the consequences of his actions. By uprooting
“predictable” aspects of foreign policy in pursuit of an “unpredictable” strategy, President Trump risks destabilizing alliances and international structures that rely on credibility, such as extended deterrence. Thus, the Trump Administration needs to stay open to new perceptions of North Korea and avoid jumping to the worst-case scenario. Moreover, the Trump Administration needs to combat “groupthink” in the White House by being open to outside opinions from scholars, experts, and think tanks (regardless of party affiliation) who may have more knowledge and experience on specific issues. Thus, the Trump Administration must be aware of how words and actions influence North Korea’s perceptions, and how these perceptions subsequently influence effective deterrence.
Finally, the legitimizing power of the UN prevents both the US and North Korea from hastily launching a nuclear attack. Since the US is perceived to be a legitimate member of the international community, its concerns are seen as more credible than those of North Korea. Thus,
429 Donald Trump, “Letter to Chairman Kim Jong Un,” The White House, May 24, 2018.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/letter-chairman-kim-jong-un/.
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when the US proposed resolutions against North Korea’s nuclear program, the United Nations was generally supportive. Since North Korea is not considered to be a legitimate power due to blatant violations of international law, its complaints against the US are largely unheeded.
Nevertheless, both states value legitimacy. Though deterrence is somewhat legal, and is
generally preferable to war, the US and North Korea may use deterrence as a means of justifying a defensive nuclear attack. But since the US is also legally obliged to protect its allies, the US could attempt to justify a preemptive strike on the basis of mutual defense. In a general sense, the Trump Administration needs to consider how the international community will judge US actions and how this judgement will reflect on US credibility and legitimacy. Hence, the Trump
Administration must balance its hardline approach with softer means of encouraging North Korea’s compliance, so as to produce a better outcome for all parties involved.
The North Korea nuclear crisis is an ongoing, volatile, and uniquely complex issue, one that can be examined from numerous angles and encompass countless perspectives. As such, there are inevitably additional elements that are not discussed in this research. By defying conventional wisdom, this case cannot be easily examined through a single lens. Nonetheless, this case study serves to illustrate the complex and intertwined relationship between foreign policy and national security.
This criterion was created to provide a foundational understanding of what makes deterrence successful. Based on this criterion, it appears that US deterrence strategies will ultimately be effective against North Korea. However, there are factors at work that could weaken deterrence capabilities unless adequately addressed. Though overt weaknesses, such as aging capabilities, can be addressed in a tangible way, others are far subtler, requiring nuance, tact, and a sophisticated understanding of the multidimensional issue at hand. Whether President Trump is the man for the job has yet to be determined. In any case, both government and military leadership must work together and do their part to ensure deterrence is successful.
The Trump-Kim summit may be a victory for diplomacy, but despite what President Trump may believe, there will be no quick fixes to the North Korea nuclear problem. The systematic dismantling of a state’s nuclear program does not happen overnight. The US and North Korea must both be willing to commit time and energy to bridging the gap between words and action. But until then, the best option is to pursue “peace through strength,” and hope that as long as deterrence is necessary, it will continue to be successful.
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