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Chapter 1: Introduction
The year 2016 saw two unlikely men rise to an unprecedented level of influence within the international system. The first was US President Donald Trump, whose victory in the 2016 US presidential election was not only controversial, but also quite unexpected. The morning of the election, The New York Times predicted that Hillary Clinton, a seasoned veteran of American politics and the Democratic Party’s nominee for president, had an 85% chance of winning the election.1 It initially appeared that Donald Trump, a businessman and television personality without prior government experience, would have little chance of success. While his bellicose and brash approach to politics and international affairs drew sharp criticism among liberal groups, it strongly resonated with conservative audiences. In the end, his charismatic style of leadership mobilized the American public in a way Clinton could not, and ultimately won him the presidency.
What happened next proved to be even more disruptive to the international balance of power. During the final year of the Obama Administration, Kim Jong-un suddenly resumed nuclear testing, conducting North Korea’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests on January 6, 2016 and September 9, 2016. North Korea then provoked international outrage by threatening to launch nuclear attacks against the US and South Korea as an act of self-defense.2 Although experts were initially skeptical of North Korea’s threats, its sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017, quickly confirmed these fears. With the latest test, North Korea claimed to have successfully tested a miniaturized hydrogen bomb that could be affixed to a long-range missile capable of reaching the US. Furthermore, seismic readings indicate the test was an estimated ten times larger than the previous nuclear test.3 By doing so, Kim Jong-un, who was once considered a rogue, lone-wolf outsider to the international community, became the center of international attention, presenting the most significant nuclear threat to international security and US national security since the Cold War.
1 Josh Katz, “Who Will Be President,” New York Times, November 8, 2016, accessed May 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/upshot/presidential-polls-forecast.html.
2 Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, May 24, 2018, accessed May 22, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.
3 “North Korea nuclear tests: What did they achieve?” BBC News, September 3, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17823706.
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The ensuing North Korea nuclear crisis reveals the unique and unprecedented nature of international relations today, the circumstances of which defy conventional wisdom. As the de facto hegemonic power and perceived caretaker of the international system, the US plays a leading role in international conflict resolution. As follows, conventional wisdom assumes that the US could easily subdue any threat presented by North Korea, a rogue state and outcast of the international system. But despite overwhelming “hard-power” advantages, including economic power, military strength, and the support of international bodies, such as the United Nations (UN), the US has failed on numerous occasions to negotiate a lasting peace with North Korea that results in meaningful steps towards nuclear disarmament. This stark reality begs the
question: How is it that North Korea, a state who appears so disadvantaged relative to the US, is able to wield such a strong influence over the international system, and more importantly, what can the US do to stop them? This paper seeks to address this question by analyzing US-North Korea relations within the context of deterrence theory.
1.1. Research Motivation and Purpose
Although the international community has been aware of North Korea’s nuclear
ambitions for some time, the most recent round of nuclear tests has triggered a renewed sense of alarm. As tensions rose between the US and North Korea, experts, scholars, and reporters have taken the opportunity to weigh in on the subject, analyzing the foreign policy decisions of both countries and discussing various policy options. One strongly advocated policy is strengthening deterrence. Simply put, the objective of deterrence “is to persuade an adversary not to take an action that it otherwise would take.”4 Though authors claim that deterrence is the best option to deal with North Korea’s nuclear threat, many of these authors fail to clearly define deterrence and articulate how effective deterrence can be achieved. Existing literature also applies
“deterrence” to a range of contexts. Although these concepts share similar core ideas, the means and applications of deterrence tends to vary. Therefore, without a clear definition, it is difficult to know exactly what an author means by “deterrence” in relation to other works. An abundance of new terms, such as “strategic deterrence,” “active deterrence,” and “proactive deterrence” further complicates the issue. Finally, by flooding the media with vague and aggressive headlines, such
4 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Perceptions, Deterrence, and Terrorism,” in Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences, and Perceptions (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), 321.
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as, “To Stop North Korea, Deterrence Will Beat War Every Time,” news sources obfuscate the relationship between deterrence and foreign policy.5 By doing so, the media not only makes it difficult to differentiate the ends and means at work, but also leads the public to incorrect conclusions about the role of deterrence in US-North Korea relations.
This research serves three functions. The first is to clarify the US approach towards the North Korea nuclear crisis by separating it into “compellent” and “deterrent” components.
Compellent actions, which include diplomacy and sanctions, are applied with the purpose of halting North Korea’s nuclear development and denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. Deterrent actions, which rely primarily upon a comprehensive nuclear capability, aims to prevent nuclear war. Though recent developments involving the US, North Korea, and South Korea, suggest that diplomacy may have a chance of success, compellence has failed to halt North Korea’s nuclear program thus far. As North Korea’s behavior became more aggressive, and its nuclear weapons became more viable, the need to prevent nuclear war through effective deterrence was perceived to outweigh the call for denuclearization through compellence. It is important to note that the US does not intend to use its nuclear weapons in a compellent manner. Although it may successfully avert nuclear war and even prevent future acts of aggression, deterrence alone is not enough to force North Korea to denuclearize. Nevertheless, a deeper understanding of deterrence as a theory and adequate coordination of compellent and deterrent efforts may allow for more effective deterrence in the future.
This leads to the second function of this research: to build on existing theory to create a criterion for effective US deterrence of North Korea. The development of this criterion requires an analysis of deterrence theory and the synthesis of key arguments across security-based literature. This research attempts to articulate the theoretical expectations concerning the conditions necessary for effective deterrence. It also takes into consideration additional factors, such as the goals and interests of participating states, the means of conducting deterrence, and the role of perception. Due to various constraints, there are some outside factors that are less relevant to the US perspective and will not be discussed in this research. Even so, these factors may still exert some influence on the success of US deterrence strategies and might be explored
5 Doug Bandow, “To Stop North Korea, Deterrence Will Beat War Every Time,” National Interest, December 23, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/stop-north-korea-deterrence-will-beat-war-every-time-23777.
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in future works. Although this case is focused specifically on US-North Korea relations, this criterion should be generally applicable to other cases of deterrence.
Finally, the third function of this research is to use this criterion to evaluate current US applications of deterrence and make policy suggestions based on these findings. Most
importantly, this research attempts to explore potential gaps between the ideal conditions specified by deterrence theory and the practical applications of US deterrence strategy. Policy options focus on addressing identified weaknesses and assessing future opportunities. This research shows that an understanding of theoretical deterrence principles exposes the factors that most directly influence the potential success of US deterrence strategies. Based on this
understanding, the US can focus its applications of deterrence to be more consistent and effective in the future.
The US regards deterrence a means of “preserving peace through strength.”6 From this perspective, strong military capabilities coupled with effective deterrence can ensure national security while discouraging conflict. The North Korea nuclear crisis demonstrates that it has never been more necessary to guarantee deterrence is successful. With this in mind, this research proposes a criterion for effective deterrence comprised of four factors that increase threat
credibility: military capability, political will, perception, and legitimacy. Although this research ultimately concludes that US deterrence will be successful towards North Korea, there are clear weaknesses that could influence its effectiveness in the future. Therefore, this research analyzes US applications of deterrence to locate potential weaknesses, improve the effectiveness of deterrence strategies, and ultimately maintain peace within the international system.
1.2. Research Question
This research seeks to answer the following question: What conditions are necessary for US deterrence strategies to be effective against North Korea?
1.3. Research Methods and Objects
This paper uses qualitative methods to analyze the foreign policy of US-North Korea relations throughout the 2017-2018 North Korea nuclear crisis and up to the Trump-Kim Summit
6United States, and Donald Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, 2017), 25.
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on June 12, 2018. More specifically, it focuses on US applications of deterrence, government leadership, and foreign and domestic policy under the Trump Administration (2017 - Present).
This includes President Trump’s policy perspectives as expressed throughout his campaign and policies enacted since taking office on January 20, 2017. This paper also discusses North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and foreign policy under Kim Jong-un’s rule (2012 - Present), but focuses more specifically on North Korea’s actions throughout the nuclear crisis. Therefore, this analysis will cover over a year of US-North Korea relations, from 2017 to June 12, 2018.
By employing case-study and process tracing methods, this research formulates a criterion for effective deterrence, and then evaluates US deterrence strategies towards North Korea according to this criterion. This case study analysis is primarily focused on the US
perspective and its approach towards North Korea. North Korea’s perspective is also considered, but to a lesser extent. This case study accounts for various factors which might influence
decision-making processes and subsequently, the effectiveness of deterrence strategies, including leadership, personality, regime type, public opinion, and the international community. Process tracing is also used to understand the origins of foreign policy decisions. Moreover, this method will be used to gain a general sense of US-North Korea relations and identify recurring themes and trends in behavior. To do so, this paper draws information from White House publications, statements, and internet resources, as well as US-based academic publications, think-tanks, and news outlets. North Korea’s state-controlled news sources are also used to understand North Korea’s impressions of the US and how North Korea interprets US policy decisions.
This paper proposes a consolidated means of evaluating deterrence through the
perspective of the North Korea nuclear crisis. Despite its short time frame, the unconventional and unpredictable nature of this situation poses clear research challenges. As an ongoing and volatile issue, there will inevitably be new developments and extraneous factors that will not be considered in this work. North Korea’s seclusion from the international community also poses an obstacle to definitively determining its intentions or capabilities. Nevertheless, this analysis hopes to contribute to academic literature by providing an in-depth analysis of US-North Korea relations throughout the nuclear crisis and determine how US deterrence strategies can be more effectively applied towards North Korea in the future.
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