Chapter 3: Literature Review
3.1. US Policy Options
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
This chapter discusses two areas of literature that are relevant to this research. The first concerns US policy options for addressing the national security threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program. The second body of work discusses the perspectives of various scholars who believe that deterrence is the best policy option for addressing North Korea’s nuclear threat.
These pieces of literature just skim the surface of some highly complex issues. But when considered together, these works shed some light on the US perspective and the necessary steps for deterrence to be successful.
3.1. US Policy Options
Since the end of the Cold War, the threat of global nuclear war has decreased, but the risk of a nuclear attack has only continued to rise.67 As of 2014, US actions, ranging from “bribes and sanctions, diplomacy and threats, [and] soft and hard approaches” have all failed to yield any lasting results.68 Morgan claims that neither deterrence nor compellence by the US has prevented North Korea from furthering its nuclear weapons program, but interestingly enough, nuclear proliferation has not significantly improved North Korea’s national security thus far.69 Despite its bleak past performance, American scholars and experts continue to consider various policy approaches for dealing with North Korea’s nuclear threat, ranging from passive acceptance to full-scale military intervention.
Given North Korea’s commitment to its nuclear weapons program, some experts suggest that the US adjust its current policy. Since CVID does not appear to be a feasible goal, the US should instead pursue a freeze or reductions in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. 70 Though the suspension of US-ROK joint exercises or a drawdown of US troops in South Korea would send peace-making signals to North Korea, it would also weaken the US-ROK alliance and call into question US commitment to mutual defense. Moreover, such actions would legitimize the claim that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program is necessary to respond to
67 William Tobey, “Squaring the Nonproliferation Circle,” The Journal of International Security Affairs no.
26 (Spring/Summer 2014): 47.
68 Ibid, 49.
69 Patrick M. Morgan, “Deterrence and System Management: The Case of North Korea,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 23, no 2 (2006): 121.
70 Anderson, “Explaining North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,” 621.
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“hostile” actions from across the border. On the other hand, others claim that the
denuclearization of North Korea is a “Western fantasy,” and that it is simply easier to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state.71 This would not only jeopardize US national security, but also undermine the faith of regional allies, such as Japan and South Korea, and embolden rising powers, such as China and Russia, to challenge US security efforts in the Asia Pacific region.72 Although experts have considered the use of military force to remove Kim Jong-un from power and facilitate reunification under South Korean leadership, such an outright military attack would inevitably risk nuclear war. Nevertheless, US leadership must recall that the DPRK claims that its nuclear arsenal has already deterred the US. Should the US give way to any major concessions, it will legitimize North Korea’s claims and make it that much more difficult to influence North Korea in the future.
The most preferable option is a multilateral approach, under which the US cooperates with allies and adversaries to pressure North Korea into a “near-term verifiable freeze” on its nuclear and missile programs. Even though Kim Jong-un has already announced the suspension of nuclear and missile tests, the state of these programs has yet to be verified by the IAEA.73 Though this is the best policy option in theory, it is far more difficult in practice, requiring complex negotiations, as well as “unprecedented policymaking capacity and coordination across the US government.”74 For this policy to succeed, it would require an overwhelming level of pressure in political, economic, and military spheres, as well as the cooperation of all involved states.75 However, realism predicts that states cooperate with the international community as long as it serves their best interests. But when forced to choose, states will prioritize their wellbeing above everything else. Thus, multilateral approaches risk being undermined by those who choose not to cooperate. This is especially true for sanctions, which may be undercut by third parties
71 Clifton B. Parker, “Why nuclear deterrence can work on North Korea,” Center for International Security and Cooperation, November 14, 2017, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/why-nuclear-deterrence-can-work-north-korea.
72 Anderson, “Explaining North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,” 621.
73 Anna Fifield, “North Korea says it will suspend nuclear and missile tests, shut down test site,”
Washington Post, April 20, 2018, https://wapo.st/2HjsSSj?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.61e5ea53e451.
74 John Allen et al., “Averting Catastrophe: US Policy Options for North Korea,” Brookings Institute (2017): 3-21. https://www.brookings.edu/wp content/uploads/2017/04/fp_201704_north_korea _avoiding_
catastrophe.pdf
75 Revere, “The Trump administration’s North Korea policy: Headed for success or failure?”
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who engage with the sanctioned state and temper the negative effects.76 Powerful third party states are also incentivized to protect their weaker allies. In this way, third parties who have interests at stake will be motivated to intervene or even undermine multilateral efforts on behalf of an allied state.
In this case, the strongest third party influences on US-North Korea relations are China and Russia. For multilateral efforts against North Korea to be successful, China and Russia must both cooperate. To the frustration of the UN, their questionable record of compliance has
weakened the effects of sanctions. This is simply because it is within China and Russia’s interests to preserve Kim Jong-un’s regime. Although sanctions can pressure North Korea into entering negotiations, it also risks collapsing Kim Jong-un’s regime, which could lead to a refugee crisis, reunification under the democratic South Korean government, or possibly bring China into war. As the “chilled” relationship between China and North Korea continues to thaw, the US must consider the influence of third party actors on the overall success of policies.
Though sanctions have long been considered preferable to war, the US must be conscious of how effective sanctions will be as long as third parties persist.
Even though individual states and international institutions often use economic sanctions to influence state behavior without resorting to force, scholars doubt whether economic sanctions weaken a state’s economy to the point of changing its behavior.77 Economic sanctions theory argues that the mere threat of sanctions is more likely to change a state’s behavior than the implementation of sanctions. Sanctions that are likely to succeed in achieving the desired objective will do so before sanctions are levied, whereas sanctions that are unlikely to succeed are those that are imposed.78 Sanctions are often used as a mechanism for deterrence, but prove ineffective when deterrence fails. Since economic sanctions theory predicts that the imposition of sanctions will ultimately have a negligible effect on state behavior, the US should not count on sanctions alone to change North Korea’s behavior.
The policy option that is most relevant to deterrence is one that forces North Korea “to choose between nuclear weapons and survival,” an approach that Revere claims “has never been
76 Nikolay A. Kozhanov, “U.S. Economic Sanctions against Iran: Undermined by External Factors,” Middle East Policy Council 18, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 144
77 William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, “The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach,” The American Economic Review 78, no. 4 (September 1988): 786.
78 Dean Lacy and Emerson M.S. Niou, “A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats,” The Journal of Politics 66, no. 1 (February 2004): 25.
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tried.”79 Revere explains, “to change North Korea’s course, the United States must convince Kim Jong-un the stability of his regime may be at risk if he does not denuclearize.”80 By doing so, this approach threatens the primary objective of North Korea’s nuclear program: regime survival. If Kim Jong-un is a rational actor, he would naturally choose the path that preserves his regime over the prospect of “national suicide.” Therefore, US foreign policy needs to send a new message to the Kim regime: “If regime survival is your goal, nuclear weapons will prevent you from reaching your goal.”81 To convey this message, Revere calls for improved US and allied military capabilities on or around the Korean Peninsula and enhanced extended deterrence.
Furthermore, the US should also strengthen economic, financial, and trade measures to deprive North Korea of money and resources.82 Though this approach is not necessarily new, it is the only approach that considers North Korea’s perceptions of the US, and does not exclusively focus on military power or access to resources. Thus, the US needs to coordinate policy efforts to convey a specific message to the Kim regime. By considering the strengths and weaknesses of various policy options, it is clear that there is no easy solution to the North Korea nuclear crisis.