實力為和平之母: 以美國的嚇阻戰略與北韓核武危機為例 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 政治 Strength: Peace Through 大立 U.S. Deterrence Strategy and the North Korea Nuclear Crisis 實⼒為和平之母： Nat. y. sit. n. al. er. io. 以美國的嚇阻戰略與北韓核武危機為例 Ch. engchi. i n U. v. JOEY L. CHING Advisor: PROFESSOR ARIEL HUI-MIN KO. June 08, 2018. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(2) Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................I Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... II Acronyms ................................................................................................................................. III Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Research Motivation and Purpose..................................................................................... 2 1.2. Research Question ............................................................................................................ 4 1.3. Research Methods and Objects ......................................................................................... 4 Chapter 2: Background .............................................................................................................. 6. 政治大 2.2. The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy................................................................... 10 立 2.1. North Korea’s Foreign Policy: Principles, Ideology, and Goals ....................................... 6. 2.3. The Battle Over North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program ............................................ 11. ‧ 國. 學. 2.4. Conceptualizations and US Applications of Deterrence ................................................. 15 Chapter 3: Literature Review .................................................................................................... 20. ‧. 3.1. US Policy Options .......................................................................................................... 20 3.2. Is Deterrence the Answer to the North Korea Problem? .................................................. 23. y. Nat. sit. Chapter 4: Theoretical Considerations....................................................................................... 28. al. er. io. 4.1. Realism .......................................................................................................................... 28. n. 4.2. Constructivism ............................................................................................................... 29. Ch. i n U. v. 4.3. Theoretical Applications to Deterrence ........................................................................... 30. engchi. Chapter 5: Analytical Framework ............................................................................................. 32 5.1. Coercion, Compellence, and Deterrence ......................................................................... 32 5.2. The Relevance of Deterrence in US-North Korea Relations ............................................ 35 Chapter 6: Criteria for Deterrence ............................................................................................. 39 Chapter 7: Military Capabilities ................................................................................................ 41 7.1. The US Nuclear Arsenal and Deterrence Capabilities ..................................................... 43 7.2. Underprepared for Overmatch? ...................................................................................... 47 7.3. Quantifying North Korea’s Military Capabilities ............................................................ 50 7.4. Chapter Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 55. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(3) Chapter 8: Political Will............................................................................................................ 57 8.1. The US Political System and the Power of the President ................................................. 61 8.2. Donald Trump: A New Kind of American President ....................................................... 64 8.3. “Groupthink” in the White House? ................................................................................. 71 8.4. The Role of Congress and Public Opinion ...................................................................... 76 8.5. Kim Jong-un: Friendly Force or Fearsome Fiend? .......................................................... 78 8.6. Chapter Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 81 Chapter 9: Perceptions .............................................................................................................. 83 9.1. Exchanging Messages with the Enemy ........................................................................... 86 9.2. Signaling Through the Smoke: US Messages to North Korea ......................................... 87. 政治大 9.4. North Korea’s Enemy Image .......................................................................................... 91 立 9.3. The Strength of the Enemy Image: Lessons from the Iraq War ....................................... 88. 9.5. Perceiving Uncertainty Within the Trump Administration .............................................. 93. ‧ 國. 學. 9.6. North Korea’s Smoke and Signals .................................................................................. 97 9.7. Chapter Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 102. ‧. Chapter 10: Legitimacy ........................................................................................................... 104 10.1. The Case for Nuclear Modernization .......................................................................... 109. y. Nat. sit. 10.2. The Legitimizing Power of the UN and US Extended Deterrence ............................... 111. al. er. io. 10.3. Chapter Conclusion .................................................................................................... 113. n. Chapter 11: Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 115. Ch. i n U. v. References .............................................................................................................................. 119. engchi. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(4) Abstract This research seeks to answer the following question: What conditions are necessary for US deterrence strategies to be effective against North Korea? The 2017-2018 North Korea nuclear crisis has revived the importance of deterrence within US national strategy. Given North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests, and the escalating tensions between the Trump Administration and Kim Jong-un’s regime, it appears that for the first time since the Cold War, nuclear war is a valid possibility. As North Korea’s nuclear capabilities became increasingly viable, scholars have encouraged the Trump Administration to shift its focus away from compelling denuclearization to deterring nuclear attack. Therefore, this paper serves two. 政治大 that increase threat credibility: military capability, political will, perception, and legitimacy. 立. purposes. First, this paper proposes a criterion for effective deterrence comprised of four factors. Administration, and its influence on US-North Korea relations.. 學. ‧ 國. Second, this criterion is used to evaluate US strategic deterrence under the Trump. ‧. 這篇論⽂研究旨在尋求下列問題的答案：美國如何有效完成不與北韓互相攻擊的策略︖從. y. Nat. er. io. sit. ⼆零⼀七到⼆零⼀八年，北韓的核武危機喚起美國政府重新認識到核武對國家安全的重要性。北韓的核武及導彈試驗，提升了川普與⾦正恩之間的緊張局勢。也是⾸次再現⾃冷戰. al. n. iv n C hengchi U 後，發⽣核⼦戰爭的可能性。當北韓的核武能⼒⽇益增強的同時，專家們建議川普當局應該改弦易轍，以嚇阻核武攻擊代替解除北韓的核武⼒量。. 因此，本論⽂有兩個⽬的：第⼀：⽂章中提出四個有效對北韓提⾼核武威脅的策略。它們是軍事能⼒，政府執⾏承諾的意願，認知能⼒，國際法令。第⼆：⽤上述四項準則以分析川普當局對北韓的策略，同時如何印象到兩國之間的關係。 I. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(5) Acknowledgements There are several individuals I would like to recognize whose contributions made this thesis possible. My deepest appreciation goes to Professor Ariel Ko, my wonderful thesis advisor, for her guidance, patience, and encouragement throughout this process. It was a long journey to this point, and I am fortunate to have had her support every step of the way. I am especially grateful to Professor Allen Yuan, Professor Alexander Chen, and Professor YehChung Lu, for their participation in my thesis committee. By recommending resources, sharing their insights, and providing invaluable feedback, these professors all showed me how to find my academic voice. Your contributions are sincerely appreciated and gratefully acknowledged.. 政治大 International Studies (IMPIS) and National Chengchi University (NCCU) for providing the tools 立 I would like to express my gratitude to the International Master’s Program of. and resources necessary to undertake this venture. IMPIS has furthered my academic. ‧ 國. 學. development in more ways than one, and I have deeply enjoyed my participation in this program. I am endlessly indebted to Dr. William Vocke, Fulbright Taiwan, and the American. ‧. Institute in Taiwan, for providing the invaluable opportunity to pursue a master’s degree in Taiwan. I am beyond grateful to the Fulbright Taiwan staff for assisting me throughout the. y. Nat. sit. duration of my scholarship, and for going above and beyond to ensure I was cared for. Moreover,. al. er. io. I am thankful to have been brought into contact with countless individuals whose experiences. n. have enriched my own. I am honored to consider myself a member of the Fulbright community.. Ch. i n U. v. Additionally, I would like to express my appreciation to those who have facilitated my. engchi. pursuit of Mandarin Chinese language learning, including the instructors and staff at the NCCU Chinese Language Center and Chinese Associate Academy. I am especially grateful to my Chinese instructor, Clare Hang, for her enduring support and for helping me bridge the gap between academic research and language learning. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my friends and family. To my IMPIS classmates, Fulbright colleagues, and the many friends I have made over the past two years, thank you for making this experience worthwhile. Most importantly, thanks to Mom, Dad, and Casey, for their constant support and making me who I am today. I am extremely fortunate and humbled to have this opportunity, and I am sincerely thankful to everyone who has helped me along the way. Mahalo nui loa, and until we meet again. II. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(6) Acronyms Air-Launched Cruise Missiles Central Intelligence Agency (United States) Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Denuclearization Dual Capable Aircraft Department of Defense (United States) Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States) Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence Gross Domestic Product International Atomic Energy Agency Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Korean Central News Agency (North Korea) Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (South Korea) Korean People’s Army (North Korea) Long-Range Stand-Off Mutually Assured Destruction Medium-Range Ballistic Missile North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (United States) Nuclear Posture Review (United States) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons National Security Council (United States) National Security Strategy (United States) Offensive Cyber Operations Republic of Korea (South Korea) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Special Operations Forces Short-Range Ballistic Missile Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines Terminal High Altitude Area Defense United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Security Council United States Soviet Union United States Agency for International Development Weapons of Mass Destruction. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. ALCM CIA CPTPP CVID DCA DoD DPRK FBI GBSD GDP IAEA ICBM ISR KCNA KMPR KPA LRSO MAD MRBM NATO NC3 NPR NPT NSC NSS OCO ROK SLBM SLCM SOF SRBM SSBN THAAD UK UN UNSC US USSR USAID WMD. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. III. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(7) Chapter 1: Introduction The year 2016 saw two unlikely men rise to an unprecedented level of influence within the international system. The first was US President Donald Trump, whose victory in the 2016 US presidential election was not only controversial, but also quite unexpected. The morning of the election, The New York Times predicted that Hillary Clinton, a seasoned veteran of American politics and the Democratic Party’s nominee for president, had an 85% chance of winning the election.1 It initially appeared that Donald Trump, a businessman and television personality without prior government experience, would have little chance of success. While his bellicose and brash approach to politics and international affairs drew sharp criticism among liberal. 政治大 leadership mobilized the American public in a way Clinton could not, and ultimately won him 立 groups, it strongly resonated with conservative audiences. In the end, his charismatic style of the presidency.. ‧ 國. 學. What happened next proved to be even more disruptive to the international balance of power. During the final year of the Obama Administration, Kim Jong-un suddenly resumed. ‧. nuclear testing, conducting North Korea’s fourth and fifth nuclear tests on January 6, 2016 and September 9, 2016. North Korea then provoked international outrage by threatening to launch. y. Nat. sit. nuclear attacks against the US and South Korea as an act of self-defense.2 Although experts were. al. er. io. initially skeptical of North Korea’s threats, its sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017, quickly. n. confirmed these fears. With the latest test, North Korea claimed to have successfully tested a. Ch. i n U. v. miniaturized hydrogen bomb that could be affixed to a long-range missile capable of reaching. engchi. the US. Furthermore, seismic readings indicate the test was an estimated ten times larger than the previous nuclear test.3 By doing so, Kim Jong-un, who was once considered a rogue, lone-wolf outsider to the international community, became the center of international attention, presenting the most significant nuclear threat to international security and US national security since the Cold War.. 1 Josh Katz, “Who Will Be President,” New York Times, November 8, 2016, accessed May 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/upshot/presidential-polls-forecast.html. 2 Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, May 24, 2018, accessed May 22, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. 3 “North Korea nuclear tests: What did they achieve?” BBC News, September 3, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17823706.. 1. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(8) The ensuing North Korea nuclear crisis reveals the unique and unprecedented nature of international relations today, the circumstances of which defy conventional wisdom. As the de facto hegemonic power and perceived caretaker of the international system, the US plays a leading role in international conflict resolution. As follows, conventional wisdom assumes that the US could easily subdue any threat presented by North Korea, a rogue state and outcast of the international system. But despite overwhelming “hard-power” advantages, including economic power, military strength, and the support of international bodies, such as the United Nations (UN), the US has failed on numerous occasions to negotiate a lasting peace with North Korea that results in meaningful steps towards nuclear disarmament. This stark reality begs the question: How is it that North Korea, a state who appears so disadvantaged relative to the US, is. 政治大 can the US do to stop them? This paper seeks to address this question by analyzing US-North 立. able to wield such a strong influence over the international system, and more importantly, what Korea relations within the context of deterrence theory.. ‧ 國. 學. 1.1. Research Motivation and Purpose. ‧. Although the international community has been aware of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions for some time, the most recent round of nuclear tests has triggered a renewed sense of. y. Nat. sit. alarm. As tensions rose between the US and North Korea, experts, scholars, and reporters have. al. er. io. taken the opportunity to weigh in on the subject, analyzing the foreign policy decisions of both. n. countries and discussing various policy options. One strongly advocated policy is strengthening. Ch. i n U. v. deterrence. Simply put, the objective of deterrence “is to persuade an adversary not to take an. engchi. action that it otherwise would take.”4 Though authors claim that deterrence is the best option to deal with North Korea’s nuclear threat, many of these authors fail to clearly define deterrence and articulate how effective deterrence can be achieved. Existing literature also applies “deterrence” to a range of contexts. Although these concepts share similar core ideas, the means and applications of deterrence tends to vary. Therefore, without a clear definition, it is difficult to know exactly what an author means by “deterrence” in relation to other works. An abundance of new terms, such as “strategic deterrence,” “active deterrence,” and “proactive deterrence” further complicates the issue. Finally, by flooding the media with vague and aggressive headlines, such. 4. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Perceptions, Deterrence, and Terrorism,” in Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences, and Perceptions (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), 321.. 2. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(9) as, “To Stop North Korea, Deterrence Will Beat War Every Time,” news sources obfuscate the relationship between deterrence and foreign policy.5 By doing so, the media not only makes it difficult to differentiate the ends and means at work, but also leads the public to incorrect conclusions about the role of deterrence in US-North Korea relations. This research serves three functions. The first is to clarify the US approach towards the North Korea nuclear crisis by separating it into “compellent” and “deterrent” components. Compellent actions, which include diplomacy and sanctions, are applied with the purpose of halting North Korea’s nuclear development and denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. Deterrent actions, which rely primarily upon a comprehensive nuclear capability, aims to prevent nuclear war. Though recent developments involving the US, North Korea, and South Korea, suggest that. 政治大 program thus far. As North Korea’s behavior became more aggressive, and its nuclear weapons 立 diplomacy may have a chance of success, compellence has failed to halt North Korea’s nuclear. became more viable, the need to prevent nuclear war through effective deterrence was perceived. ‧ 國. 學. to outweigh the call for denuclearization through compellence. It is important to note that the US does not intend to use its nuclear weapons in a compellent manner. Although it may successfully. ‧. avert nuclear war and even prevent future acts of aggression, deterrence alone is not enough to force North Korea to denuclearize. Nevertheless, a deeper understanding of deterrence as a. y. Nat. sit. theory and adequate coordination of compellent and deterrent efforts may allow for more. al. er. io. effective deterrence in the future.. n. This leads to the second function of this research: to build on existing theory to create a. Ch. i n U. v. criterion for effective US deterrence of North Korea. The development of this criterion requires. engchi. an analysis of deterrence theory and the synthesis of key arguments across security-based literature. This research attempts to articulate the theoretical expectations concerning the conditions necessary for effective deterrence. It also takes into consideration additional factors, such as the goals and interests of participating states, the means of conducting deterrence, and the role of perception. Due to various constraints, there are some outside factors that are less relevant to the US perspective and will not be discussed in this research. Even so, these factors may still exert some influence on the success of US deterrence strategies and might be explored. 5. Doug Bandow, “To Stop North Korea, Deterrence Will Beat War Every Time,” National Interest, December 23, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/stop-north-korea-deterrence-will-beat-war-everytime-23777.. 3. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(10) in future works. Although this case is focused specifically on US-North Korea relations, this criterion should be generally applicable to other cases of deterrence. Finally, the third function of this research is to use this criterion to evaluate current US applications of deterrence and make policy suggestions based on these findings. Most importantly, this research attempts to explore potential gaps between the ideal conditions specified by deterrence theory and the practical applications of US deterrence strategy. Policy options focus on addressing identified weaknesses and assessing future opportunities. This research shows that an understanding of theoretical deterrence principles exposes the factors that most directly influence the potential success of US deterrence strategies. Based on this understanding, the US can focus its applications of deterrence to be more consistent and effective. 政治大 The US regards deterrence a means of “preserving peace through strength.” From this 立. in the future.. 6. perspective, strong military capabilities coupled with effective deterrence can ensure national. ‧ 國. 學. security while discouraging conflict. The North Korea nuclear crisis demonstrates that it has never been more necessary to guarantee deterrence is successful. With this in mind, this research. ‧. proposes a criterion for effective deterrence comprised of four factors that increase threat credibility: military capability, political will, perception, and legitimacy. Although this research. y. Nat. sit. ultimately concludes that US deterrence will be successful towards North Korea, there are clear. al. er. io. weaknesses that could influence its effectiveness in the future. Therefore, this research analyzes. n. US applications of deterrence to locate potential weaknesses, improve the effectiveness of. Ch. i n U. v. deterrence strategies, and ultimately maintain peace within the international system.. engchi. 1.2. Research Question This research seeks to answer the following question: What conditions are necessary for US deterrence strategies to be effective against North Korea? 1.3. Research Methods and Objects This paper uses qualitative methods to analyze the foreign policy of US-North Korea relations throughout the 2017-2018 North Korea nuclear crisis and up to the Trump-Kim Summit 6. United States, and Donald Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: The White House, 2017), 25.. 4. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(11) on June 12, 2018. More specifically, it focuses on US applications of deterrence, government leadership, and foreign and domestic policy under the Trump Administration (2017 - Present). This includes President Trump’s policy perspectives as expressed throughout his campaign and policies enacted since taking office on January 20, 2017. This paper also discusses North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and foreign policy under Kim Jong-un’s rule (2012 - Present), but focuses more specifically on North Korea’s actions throughout the nuclear crisis. Therefore, this analysis will cover over a year of US-North Korea relations, from 2017 to June 12, 2018. By employing case-study and process tracing methods, this research formulates a criterion for effective deterrence, and then evaluates US deterrence strategies towards North Korea according to this criterion. This case study analysis is primarily focused on the US. 政治大 but to a lesser extent. This case study accounts for various factors which might influence 立. perspective and its approach towards North Korea. North Korea’s perspective is also considered, decision-making processes and subsequently, the effectiveness of deterrence strategies, including. ‧ 國. 學. leadership, personality, regime type, public opinion, and the international community. Process tracing is also used to understand the origins of foreign policy decisions. Moreover, this method. ‧. will be used to gain a general sense of US-North Korea relations and identify recurring themes and trends in behavior. To do so, this paper draws information from White House publications,. y. Nat. sit. statements, and internet resources, as well as US-based academic publications, think-tanks, and. al. er. io. news outlets. North Korea’s state-controlled news sources are also used to understand North. n. Korea’s impressions of the US and how North Korea interprets US policy decisions.. Ch. i n U. v. This paper proposes a consolidated means of evaluating deterrence through the. engchi. perspective of the North Korea nuclear crisis. Despite its short time frame, the unconventional and unpredictable nature of this situation poses clear research challenges. As an ongoing and volatile issue, there will inevitably be new developments and extraneous factors that will not be considered in this work. North Korea’s seclusion from the international community also poses an obstacle to definitively determining its intentions or capabilities. Nevertheless, this analysis hopes to contribute to academic literature by providing an in-depth analysis of US-North Korea relations throughout the nuclear crisis and determine how US deterrence strategies can be more effectively applied towards North Korea in the future.. 5. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(12) Chapter 2: Background Due to North Korea’s insular nature, it is difficult to gather information beyond what the regime chooses to reveal to the general public. Nevertheless, it is possible to see how history and ideology influences North Korea’s perceptions. North Korea considers nuclear weapons to be essential to national security and foreign policy. Though North Korea has yet to achieve its foreign policy goals, nuclear weapons provide the bargaining power necessary to take deliberate steps towards achieving them. On the other hand, the US has made numerous diplomatic attempts to curb North Korea’s nuclear program, but none have had any lasting success. Though the Trump Administration’s “America First” foreign policy strategy prioritizes US interests, it. 政治大 hopes to succeed where previous administrations have failed through his policy of “maximum 立. does continue to support the international principle of nuclear nonproliferation. President Trump power and maximum engagement.” Though the US continues to practice both general and. ‧ 國. 學. extended deterrence, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions will test the US nuclear umbrella and its ability to fulfill its extended deterrence commitments, especially those to South Korea and Japan.. ‧. 2.1. North Korea’s Foreign Policy: Principles, Ideology, and Goals. y. Nat. sit. In a broad sense, North Korea’s foreign policy and ideology is shaped by its historical. al. er. io. ties to Communism and its animosity towards Western democratic countries. Since the formal. n. division of North and South Korea, anti-Western and anti-American sentiment have become. Ch. i n U. v. synonymous with North Korean identity. After its founding in 1948, the Democratic People’s. engchi. Republic of Korea (DPRK) received diplomatic recognition only from Communist Eastern bloc countries, including the Soviet Union (USSR), China, and Vietnam. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, North Korea competed with South Korea for diplomatic recognition and legitimacy.7 However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea not only lost its Communist role model, but also its primary benefactor. Out of necessity, the DPRK gradually increased its diplomatic contact with capitalist countries, including the US, Japan, and the European states, to further economic development.8 The DPRK also gained admission to a number of international. 7. The National Committee on North Korea, Issue Brief: DPRK Diplomatic Relations, by Daniel Wertz, JJ Oh, and Kim Insung, August 2016, 1. 8 Ibid, 3-4.. 6. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(13) organizations, including the World Health Organization. The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the DPRK were simultaneously admitted to the United Nations in 1991. Despite its perceived isolation, as of August 2016, 164 countries have established formal diplomatic relations with North Korea.9 Due to acts of terrorism, human rights abuses, and nuclear proliferation, North Korea has since become increasingly isolated in foreign policy arenas. Nevertheless, North Korea’s approach to foreign policy remains consistent with the values articulated within the Constitution and the DPRK’s state ideology. The Constitution of the DPRK formally establishes North Korea’s overall approach to foreign policy. Article 17 outlines the DPRK’s foreign policy principles, including, “independence, peace, and solidarity.” According to these principles, “the State shall establish. 政治大 only under conditions of equality and respect for state sovereignty. 立. diplomatic, as well as political, economic, and cultural relations with all friendly countries,” but 10. The DPRK will also. “promote unity with the world public defending peoples who oppose…interference and fight for. ‧ 國. 學. their countries’ independence.”11 Finally, Article 9 establishes Korean unification as a top priority, stating that “the DPRK shall strive to achieve the complete victory of socialism…and. ‧. reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity.”12 Thus, North Korea’s desire to engage with “friendly countries” demonstrates its. y. Nat. sit. openness to increased international relations, but also reveals the limited scope of individuals. al. er. io. who support the Kim regime and share similar ideologies. Moreover, the Constitution directly. n. alludes to the DPRK’s opposition to the US for its perceived infringement on state sovereignty,. Ch. i n U. v. and reaffirms the DPRK’s enduring commitment to reunification with South Korea.. engchi. North Korea’s foreign policy decisions are driven by the DPRK’s state ideology of Juche, which means “self-reliance,” and is also enshrined in the Constitution of the DPRK. Article 3 proclaims, “The DPRK is guided in its activities by the Juche idea, a world outlook centered on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses.”13 Juche was introduced to the DPRK by Kim Il-sung in a speech on December 28, 1955, describing it as “the sole guiding idea of the Government of the Republic.” In that speech, Kim Il-sung stated that. 9. Ibid, 1. Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of)’s Constitution of 1972, ch. 1, art. 17. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid, ch. 1, art. 9. 13 Ibid, ch. 1, art. 3. 10. 7. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(14) “independence, self-reliance and self-defense are the guiding principles of our revolution.”14 There does not appear to be a clear, singular definition of Juche. As such, its flexible application has been criticized as a propaganda tool used to justify the existing totalitarian regime and validate the struggles of North Korean people.15 By emphasizing economic, political, and military “independence,” it makes sense that Juche would lead North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. The Kim regime would naturally be attracted to the guaranteed security and independence a nuclear weapons program could provide. Thus, Juche is a realist approach to foreign policy, forcing North Korea to develop nuclear weapons out of a desire for “independence” from powerful allies and the international community. The DPRK’s foreign policy agenda ultimately aims to protect and maintain regime. 政治大 expense of Kim Jong-un’s power. Under this assumption, DPRK leadership has focused its 立. stability under Kim Jong-un. Therefore, any foreign policy objectives must not be pursued at the efforts on the policy areas it considers necessary to maintaining power and stability, namely. ‧ 國. 學. economic development and national security. Not only does economic development improve standards of living and hedge against domestic instability, but it also defrays the effects of. ‧. sanctions and creates opportunities for international engagement through foreign investment. Despite heavy sanctions and being cut off from international trade, North Korea has sustained. y. Nat. sit. some economic growth via trade with China and domestic economic reforms.16 Nevertheless,. al. er. io. condemnation of North Korea’s human rights abuses and nuclear proliferation, coupled with. n. international sanctions, has deterred foreign investment. In this way, it appears that North Korea. Ch. i n U. v. will not be able to achieve the economic prosperity it desires until its security issues are resolved.. engchi. North Korea’s highest priority is survival and regime preservation. To support this goal, North Korea has three national security objectives: The reunification of North and South Korea, the removal of US forces from the Korean Peninsula, and the international recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapon state.17 Despite international condemnation, North Korea believes that nuclear weapons are “essential for its national identity and security, and for achieving power 14. Tom Dixon, “Assessing the Success of Self-Reliance: North Korea’s Juche Ideology,” (PhD Diss., Newcastle University, 2010). 15 Ibid. 16 Christine Kim and Jane Chung, “North Korea 2016 economic growth at 17-year high despite sanctions: South Korea,” Reuters, July 21, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-economy-gdp/north-korea2016-economic-growth-at-17-year-high-despite-sanctions-south-korea-idUSKBN1A607Z. 17 Sue Mi Terry, “North Korea’s Strategic Goals and Policy towards the United States and South Korea,” International Journal of Korean Studies 17, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 63.. 8. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(15) and prestige on the international stage.”18 By referring to nuclear weapons as a “deterrent force,” North Korea implies that its nuclear weapons program is only meant for defensive purposes, allegedly against the US. Therefore, US-South Korea joint military operations, the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea, and the Trump Administration’s threats against North Korea only serve to validate the Kim regime’s logic. At this point in time, it seems that the complete removal of US forces from the Korean peninsula is not a feasible goal. Despites perceived tensions between US President Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, the US has continued to demonstrate its commitment to South Korea’s defense through its enduring military presence on the Korean peninsula.19 Amid multilateral UN sanctions against North Korea for its nuclear weapons programs and ballistic missile testing, it. 政治大 other hand, the historic summit between North and South Korea, which culminated in the signing 立 also seems unlikely that the UN will recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. On the. of the “Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity, and Unification of the Korean Peninsula”. ‧ 國. 學. on April 27, 2018, shows that denuclearization and Korean reunification could be a future possibility.20 Though the Trump-Kim summit demonstrated North Korea’s willingness to discuss. ‧. denuclearization with the US, scholars are now concerned that President Trump’s pledge to suspend US military exercises with South Korea would not only erode the US-South Korea. y. Nat. sit. alliance structure, but also lead to the withdrawal of nuclear protection from South Korea and. al. er. io. possibly Japan.21 The US cannot expect North Korea to sacrifice one of its national security. n. goals without making progress on another. Even though North Korea has yet to definitively. Ch. i n U. v. achieve its national security goals for the time being, without an effective response from the US. engchi. and its allies, this may not be the case for long.. When Kim Jong-un succeeded his father as supreme leader in 2011, there were hopes that his international exposure would provide a more benign influence on the totalitarian state. Instead, Kim Jong-un’s regime saw the rapid acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear program.22 18. Ibid, 68. Scott Neuman, “U.S., South Korea Begin Massive Military Exercises,” National Public Radio, December 4, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/04/568263780/u-s-south-korea-beginmassive-military-exercises. 20 Choe Sang-Hun, “North and South Korea Set Bold Goals: A Final Peace and No Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, April 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/world/asia/north-korea-south-kim-jong-un.html. 21 Anna Fifield, “North Korea’s definition of ‘denuclearization’ is very different from Trump’s,” Washington Post, April 9, 2018, https://wapo.st/2qjao97?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.8f8fbb52fc5a. 22 Eleanor Albert, “North Korea’s Military Capabilities,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 20, 2018, accessed May 20, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities. 19. 9. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(16) Characterized as “overconfident and unpredictable,” scholars agree that Kim Jong-un perceives the nuclear program as necessary to sustaining his regime.23 As such, “[the] DPRK has demonstrated a willingness to use military provocation” to protect its nuclear program.24 This is because North Korea’s foreign policy approach is characterized by its perceptions of the DPRK and its role in the international system. From this perspective, the DPRK is the victim of US aggression and requires nuclear weapons to protect its sovereignty and national security. The DPRK hopes to eventually reunify with North Korea and become an internationally-recognized nuclear weapon state, but sees the United States as the primary barrier to realizing these goals. Driven by Juche ideology and the desire to maintain power, Kim Jong-un is willing to use any means necessary, including military force, to sustain and protect his regime.. 政治大 2.2. The Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy 立. Within the United States government, the Department of State is primarily responsible. ‧ 國. 學. for overseeing the development and implementation of foreign policy. As administrations change, the general thrust of US foreign policy has remained the same. Most recently, foreign. ‧. policy under the “Obama Doctrine” was characterized by multilateralism, emphasizing negotiation and collaboration over confrontation and unilateralism.25 Since taking office,. y. Nat. sit. President Trump has profoundly diverged from previous administrations through his “America. al. er. io. First” approach, promising to prioritize the US in all areas of foreign policy. On May 30, 2017,. n. former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster characterized this strategy as “the restoration. Ch. i n U. v. of American leadership… to enhance American security, promote American prosperity, and. engchi. extend American influence around the world.”26 This statement also confirms that the “America First” strategy is a highly unilateral approach, one that believes “the world is not a ‘global community’ but an arena where nations…engage and compete.”27 Such a characterization not only reveals a strongly realist perspective, but also an inward shift in foreign affairs. By 23. Claudia Rosett, “Our Nagging North Korea Problem,” The Journal of International Security Affairs no. 27 (Fall/Winter 2014): 47. 24 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 2015. 25 Alan Philps, “The Obama doctrine,” Chatham House (April & May 2016), accessed November 1, 2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/obama-doctrine. 26 H.R. McMaster and Gary D. Cohn, “America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone,” The Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-first-doesnt-mean-america-alone-1496187426. 27 Ibid.. 10. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(17) withdrawing US participation from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, after the withdrawal of the US), the Paris Climate Accords, and most recently, the Iran Nuclear Deal, President Trump has demonstrated that the US will no longer participate in “bad deals” that fail to sufficiently benefit the US.28 These policy decisions indicate that the US may be stepping away from its long-time role as the steward of the international system, and will instead focus exclusively on prioritizing and protecting US interests.29 2.3. The Battle Over North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program Since the Korean War, US-North Korea relations have been debilitated by North Korea’s. 政治大 clashed with North Korea’s desire to flout the international system. As a result, the United States 立 illicit development of nuclear weapons. US commitment to international security has regularly. considers North Korea to be a hostile power, diplomatically recognizing South Korea as the de. ‧ 國. 學. jure government of all of Korea.30 There are no formal diplomatic relations between the DPRK and the US. Even though there is no formal embassy of North Korea, there are North Korean. ‧. representatives serving the United Nations within the US.31 On the other hand, the US State Department has reaffirmed its support for the “peaceful reunification of Korea on terms. y. Nat. sit. acceptable to the Korean people,” claiming that it is “primarily a matter for [the Korean people]. al. er. io. to decide.”32 Although it is not explicitly stated, it would be within US interests to facilitate. n. unification under the democratic governance of South Korea, a longtime US ally. Beyond strictly. Ch. i n U. v. humanitarian assistance, the US does not participate in any economic exchange with North. engchi. Korea. After imposing a near total economic embargo on North Korea during the Korean War, the US has levied several rounds of sanctions on North Korea, usually in response to its nuclear weapons development or human rights abuses. As a result, the majority of US engagements with North Korea were in response to the DPRK’s illicit development of nuclear weapons. 28. Donald Trump, “President Donald J. Trump is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal,” The White House, May 8, 2018, accessed May 24, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/. 29 Constanze Stelzenmuller, “At last: The Trump Doctrine, revealed,” Brookings Institute, June 5, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/06/05/at-last-the-trump-doctrine-revealed/. 30 Gregory Henderson, “Korea,” in Divided Nations in a Divided World, ed. Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger (New York: David McKay Co., 1974), 52-54. 31 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Relations with North Korea: Fact Sheet, October 18, 2016. 32 Ibid.. 11. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(18) The United States, acting in coordination with the UN, has engaged in negotiations with North Korea since the 1980s. Thus far, these negotiations have yet to achieve any lasting success, as most agreements end with North Korea extracting all potential benefits before reneging on its part of the agreement.33 This cycle began during the First Nuclear Crisis, when US spy satellites first detected construction projects related to nuclear weapons development in the 1980s. Facing pressure from the Soviet Union, North Korea signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985. In 1992, North and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In doing so, North and South Korea also agreed to inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA inspectors noticed discrepancies in North Korea’s nuclear activities in February. 政治大 announced its withdrawal from the NPT, but “suspended” this decision after beginning bilateral 立 1993, calling for “special inspections” of suspected facilities. In response, North Korea. negotiations with the US. These talks stalled until President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang in. ‧ 國. 學. October 1994, and concluded with the signing of an Agreed Framework. Under this agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze nuclear operations and comply with IAEA obligations, and in. ‧. exchange, the US agreed to supply heavy fuel oil shipments and construct two proliferationresistant light-water nuclear reactors.34. y. Nat. sit. As its missile development program grew, North Korea began exporting missiles abroad. al. er. io. and covertly acquiring technology for uranium enrichment. Amid fears of North Korea’s missile. n. program and suspicions of nuclear development, the Clinton administration ordered a. Ch. i n U. v. comprehensive review of US policy towards North Korea, resulting in the “Perry Report.”. engchi. Despite some progress, missile talks remained generally inconclusive by the end of the Clinton administration. It was not until the Bush administration that the US directly confronted North Korea about its nuclear capabilities, forcing North Korea to admit to its nuclear development and enrichment programs. The US then declared that North Korea had violated the Agreed Framework and stopped heavy fuel oil shipments. In response, North Korea declared the Agreed Framework was nullified and formally withdrew from the NPT in January 2003. On September 19, 2015, after two years of negotiations, the Six Party Talks between the US, North Korea,. 33. Terry, “North Korea’s Strategic Goals and Policy towards the United States and South Korea,” 63-64. The National Committee on North Korea, A History of U.S.-DPRK Relations, by Daniel Wertz and Chelsea Gannon, November 2015. 34. 12. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(19) China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea, produced a “Joint Statement,” which declares that North Korea will abandon its nuclear program and return to the NPT in exchange for food and energy assistance. When North Korea violated this statement by testing an array of ballistic missiles in July 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemned the action and called for the resumption of the Six Party Talks. In October 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. Negotiations continued off and on until 2008 when the Six Party Talks collapsed. Amidst the failure of the Six Party Talks, the Obama Administration adopted a policy of “strategic patience,” towards North Korea. This policy is “centered on the continued application of economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea while articulating a conditional willingness to return to dialogue.”35 In July and October 2011, the Obama Administration conducted bilateral. 政治大 February 29, 2012, the US and the DPRK debuted the “Leap Day Agreement.” Under this 立. talks with North Korea in the hopes of restarting negotiations towards denuclearization. By agreement, the US would provide North Korea with 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance. ‧ 國. 學. in exchange for a moratorium on long-range missile launches, nuclear tests, and uranium enrichment. In addition, North Korea must allow IAEA inspections of nuclear sites. Within a few. ‧. months, the launch attempts of North Korean satellites, followed by additional nuclear and missile tests, signaled the failure of the deal. President Obama did not return to negotiations for. y. Nat. sit. the remainder of his presidency.. al. er. io. This ongoing behavior demonstrates North Korea’s strategy of brinksmanship. Its. n. interactions with the international community tend to follow the same predictable formula:. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Provoke when Washington or Seoul seem distracted, up the ante in the face of international condemnation, and pivot back to some sort of peace offensive, which usually ends with dialogue and negotiation, culminating finally, in concessions for the North.36 Terry observes that the US and South Korea have both been willing to make concessions to North Korea in pursuit of peaceful conflict resolution, essentially rewarding North Korea’s bad behavior. South Korea also seldom retaliates against North Korean acts of aggression. This way, North Korea makes serious threats and provocations in the hopes that the US or South. 35 36. Ibid. Terry, “North Korea’s Strategic Goals and Policy towards the United States and South Korea,” 63.. 13. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(20) Korea will make some concessions to stop them.37 By attempting to appease North Korea, the Obama Administration fell victim to this trap. Since the US could not count on North Korea to keep its promises, previous administrations have hesitated to act, facing criticism for choosing to “settle for half measures that do little or nothing to end North Korea’s nuclear program” and “create only the appearance of progress.”38 Hence, the United States’ longtime pursuit of the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID)” of North Korea has failed to achieve any lasting success thus far.39 The Trump Administration hopes to succeed where previous administrations have failed. President Trump’s policy towards North Korea has evolved from an aggressive military approach to a more balanced strategy. Although the initial “military-centric approach” was. 政治大 This not only unnerved friends and allies, but also failed to intimidate Kim 立. meant to intimidate North Korean leadership, it only gave the impression that Washington was preparing for war.40. Jong-un’s regime. After weighing various options, the Trump Administration announced a new. ‧ 國. 學. policy of “maximum pressure and engagement” in April 2017. This policy combines “tough rhetoric, increased sanctions, and a willingness to talk.”41 It also emphasizes the multilateral. ‧. application of “powerful and comprehensive measures” to pressure the DPRK into sacrificing its nuclear program and engaging in “meaningful” negotiations. Such measures include diplomatic. y. Nat. sit. and financial isolation and the threat of military force.. al. er. io. Following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in September 2017, the Trump Administration. n. proposed a UN resolution for increased multilateral sanctions on North Korea. These sanctions. Ch. i n U. v. seek to limit North Korea’s oil imports, ban textile exports, end additional overseas labor. engchi. contracts, suppress smuggling, stop joint ventures with other nations, and sanction North Korean government entities.42 The resolution won the support of all fifteen members of the UNSC, but. 37. Ibid. Evans J.R. Revere, “The Trump administration’s North Korea policy: Headed for success or failure?” Brookings Institute, July 10, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/10/the-trumpadministrations-north-korea-policy-headed-for-success-or-failure/. 39 Nicholas D. Anderson, “Explaining North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions: Power and Position on the Korean Peninsula,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 71, no. 6 (2017): 621. 40 Revere, “The Trump administration’s North Korea policy: Headed for success or failure?” 41 Ibid. 42 Zachary Cohen and Richard Roth, “UN passes fresh sanctions on North Korea,” CNN Politics, September 12, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/11/politics/north-korea-un-security-council-vote/index.html. 38. 14. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(21) only after significant reductions at the hands of China and Russia.43 Dissatisfied with the weakened language of the resolution, the Trump Administration has since widened US sanctions, targeting international banks and blacklisting specific North Korean individuals and enterprises.44 The strongest of these measures came in the form of an executive order, which penalized “any country or person doing business with North Korea by either cutting off their access to the U.S. financial system or freezing their assets – or potentially both.”45 Even though the Trump Administration claims that the “maximum pressure” policy has worked, as evidenced by the Trump-Kim summit, it is difficult to know for sure. Though North Korea has recently expressed its willingness to denuclearize, it is unclear who or what motivated North Korea to change its stance, and if the Trump Administration can rightfully take credit for doing so.. 政治大 2.4. Conceptualizations and US Applications of Deterrence 立. Since the advent of the nuclear age, deterrence has played an ever-present role in security. ‧ 國. 學. policy. Nuclear weapons provide a foundation for national security from which states can readily engage in foreign policy. Within security policy, terms such as “deterrence,” “nuclear. ‧. deterrence,” and “strategic deterrence,” are often used interchangeably. Although this connection is not unwarranted, it is important to differentiate between these concepts. At a fundamental. y. Nat. sit. level, the primary objective of deterrence “is to persuade an adversary not to take an action that it. al. er. io. otherwise would take.”46 Deterrence is meant to show the punishment an aggressor may expect. n. to receive if they proceed in a certain behavior. A state may threaten to use a wide variety of. Ch. i n U. v. “hard power” deterrents, such as military force or sanctions, to bring about the desired behavior.. engchi. As such, deterrence is not necessarily limited to the nuclear variety. States regularly negotiate and engage in minor deterrent behaviors without resorting to military force. Nevertheless, as the most powerful weapon known to mankind at this time, nuclear weapons are still considered the strongest deterrent a state may possess. The impact of sanctions and other deterrents seem insignificant when compared to the potential damage of a nuclear war. Though nuclear weapons 43. Somini Sengupta, “After U.S. Compromise, Security Council Strengthens North Korea Sanctions,” New York Times, September 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/world/asia/us-security-council-northkorea.html?mcubz=1. 44 Peter Baker and Somini Sengupta, “Trump Moves to Widen U.S. Sanctions on North Korea,” New York Times, September 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/world/asia/trump-korea-japan.html. 45 Donna Borak, “North Korea sanctions: Here’s what Trump did,” CNN Money, September 21, 2017, http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/21/news/economy/us-north-korea-sanctions-explainer/index.html. 46 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Perceptions, Deterrence, and Terrorism,” 321.. 15. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(22) may be considered the strongest deterrent, the broader view of US strategic deterrence seeks to integrate “all capabilities in all domains across all the combatant commands, government organizations, and alongside U.S. allies.”47 Hence, US strategic deterrence is an allencompassing concept that is not limited to nuclear capabilities alone. Deterrence comes in two forms: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment is when “potential aggressors are deterred by the prospect of having to endure unacceptable punishment in response to an aggressive act.”48 This kind of deterrence depends on fear that the costs inflicted by the initiating state will outweigh the gains the target state hopes to achieve through aggression.49 According to McDevitt, deterrence by punishment is only effective when the threat is credible, which requires political will and sufficient military. 政治大 defenses are so good that the aggressor concludes that it could not achieve its political and 立. capabilities.50 Deterrence by denial is when “the potential aggressor is deterred because the. military objectives through the use of force.”51 This makes it physically difficult for a target state. ‧ 國. 學. to achieve its objective, while also raising the costs of aggression by making the target’s objective “harder to take, harder to keep, or both.”52 Both kinds of deterrence seek to convince. ‧. the target state that undertaking a certain action would not be worth the incurred costs and the action itself would be unlikely to succeed.. y. Nat. sit. Throughout history, the US has applied nuclear deterrence to its foreign policy in two key. al. er. io. ways. The first is through general deterrence, which is practiced between two nations.53 The US. n. maintains its nuclear capabilities to deter potential adversaries and reduce the possibility of. Ch. i n U. v. “strategic nuclear exchange” with another nuclear-armed state.54 General deterrence. engchi. characterized the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. World War II triggered an international race for nuclear capabilities. The US enjoyed a “nuclear monopoly” 47 Terri Moon Cronk, “Strategic Deterrence More than Nuclear, Stratcom Commander Says,” DoD News, Defense Media Activity, April 4, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1140561/strategic-deterrencemore-than-nuclear-stratcom-commander-says/. 48 Michael McDevitt, “Deterring North Korean Provocations,” Brookings Institute, February 7, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/research/deterring-north-korean-provocations/. 49 A. Wess Mitchell, “The Case for Deterrence by Denial,” American Interest, August 12, 2015, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/12/the-case-for-deterrence-by-denial/. 50 McDevitt, “Deterring North Korean Provocations.” 51 Ibid. 52 Mitchell, “The Case for Deterrence by Denial.” 53 Bueno de Mesquita, “Perceptions, Deterrence, and Terrorism,” 321. 54 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, “Chapter 1: Nuclear Deterrence – U.S. Policy and Strategy,” in Nuclear Matters Handbook 2016, 1.. 16. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(23) until the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test in 1949. As the Soviet Union emerged as the primary threat to national security, the US conducted general deterrence against the Soviet Union based on deterrence by punishment. Once the US and the Soviet Union possessed enough nuclear weapons for second-strike capabilities, “meaning both sides would be capable of massive retaliation even after absorbing an all-out first strike,” both assumed a posture of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD).55 MAD doctrine assumes that if one state launches a nuclear attack against the other, both sides would incur unacceptable losses. Assuming both states are rational, neither state would willingly launch a nuclear attack. The US and the USSR relied upon MAD doctrine to preserve an unsteady peace while fighting proxy wars around the world (including Korea) to maintain their spheres of influence. However, crises, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. 政治大 international audiences that deterrence does have the ability to fail. 立. and the Berlin Crisis, brought the US and USSR extremely close to nuclear war, reminding 56. Thus, general deterrence. was prevalent during the Cold War as the US and the USSR both relied on MAD doctrine to. ‧ 國. 學. deter by punishment.. The second US application of nuclear deterrence is through extended deterrence, or when. ‧. one nation convinces another not to threaten a third party.57 In this case, US nuclear forces provide a nuclear “umbrella” of protection for allied nations. This kind of defense commitment. y. Nat. sit. not only reassures smaller non-weapons states, but also hedges against nuclear proliferation.58. al. er. io. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US, in collaboration with. n. the UN, aimed to use its overwhelming power to maintain peace and manage the international. Ch. i n U. v. system. As a result, the NPT was created to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and decrease. engchi. the likelihood of nuclear war. The US seeks to maintain the status quo and support nuclear nonproliferation by extending the US nuclear umbrella and providing the means to protect allies. In doing so, the US uses deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial to threaten potential aggressors and protect allies. US extended deterrence has focused on defending allies in NATO Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 as a 55. Ibid. Steven Pifer et al., “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges,” Brookings Institute no. 3 (May 2010): 1, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf. 57 Bueno de Mesquita, “Perceptions, Deterrence, and Terrorism,” 321. 58 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, “Chapter 1: Nuclear Deterrence,” 2. 56. 17. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(24) collective security measure against the Soviet Union. NATO’s twenty-nine members, including the United States, are committed to collective defense, democratic values, and peaceful conflict resolution.59 The most salient aspect of the North Atlantic Treaty itself is Article 5, which states that “an armed attack against one or more... shall be considered an attack against them all.”60 Hence, this arrangement placed the whole of Western Europe under the United States’ “nuclear umbrella.”61 Although the collapse of the USSR dissolved NATO’s primary threat, NATO is still in effect today, and its members continue to receive protection from the US and other member nuclear weapons states. In the Middle East, the US has extended its nuclear umbrella to “major non-NATO allies,” including Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. During the Cold War, the US sought to secure. 政治大 the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the “Carter 立. access to the Middle East’s oil supplies, which risked falling under control of the USSR. After. Doctrine” was announced, stating the US “would use force to prevent any power from. ‧ 國. 學. conquering the oil fields of the Persian Gulf.” 62 With this gesture, the US extended deterrence capabilities to US allies in the region.. ‧. In East Asia, the US also applies extended deterrence towards Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan. Although each of these states have once considered nuclear weapons. y. Nat. sit. acquisition or development, the US has attempted to counter such tendencies and hedge against. al. er. io. nuclear proliferation by offering extended deterrence as a viable alternative. However, there are. n. no US nuclear weapons based in East Asia. Beyond nuclear protection, the US has committed to. Ch. i n U. v. the defense of its East Asian allies by maintaining a military presence in the region and providing. engchi. defensive measures through arms sales.63 At this time, China’s growing power and North Korea’s nuclear threat are the most salient threat to US allies in the region. Since there are no multilateral alliance structures binding US commitments to East Asia, extended deterrence is based on bilateral relationships and agreements. On October 1, 1953, the US and South Korea signed a mutual defense treaty, stating that “the Parties will maintain and. 59. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, Washington, D.C. “A Political and Military Alliance,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed May 21, 2018, https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html#basic. 61 Steven Pifer et al., “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence,” 6. 62 Ibid, 37. 63 Ibid, 29. 60. 18. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(25) develop appropriate means to deter armed attack.”64 Hence, South Korea now falls under the US nuclear umbrella. US arms sales and military bases in South Korea also contribute to South Korea’s military defense. As of September 2017, President Trump agreed to sell South Korea “billions of dollars” in US arms.65 By November 2017, the two powers also agreed to lift warhead limits on South Korea’s ballistic missiles, as dictated in a bilateral agreement signed in 1979. This concession is meant to allow South Korea to develop its “deep precision-strike capable missiles” as part of South Korea’s deterrence strategy of “Korea Massive Punishment & Retaliation (KMPR).” This strategy “foresees precision strikes with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, air-launched missiles, and special operation forces against North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and the country’s military leadership in the event of a nuclear attack.”66 In this way, the. 政治大 umbrella to South Korea while simultaneously reinforcing its domestic defensive capabilities. 立 US practices deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial by extending its nuclear. Since the end of the Cold War, the US perspective has gradually shifted from a domestic. ‧ 國. 學. focus to an international focus, as evidenced by its general and extended deterrence strategies. The post-war era has been characterized by the growing scope of US extended deterrence. ‧. commitments. The US has expanded its nuclear umbrella throughout NATO Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, in the hopes of preventing non-proliferation and nuclear war. However,. y. Nat. sit. North Korea’s patterns of aggression and intimidation towards US allies in the region, namely. al. er. io. South Korea and Japan, will test the United States’ ability to effectively deploy extended. n. deterrence and challenge the US to fulfill its widespread commitments.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 64. U.S. Department of State, “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea,” October 1, 1953. 65 Jack Kim, “Trump agrees to sell South Korea arms worth billions of dollars as treat from North grows,” The Independent, September 2, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/america-agrees-salearms-military-billions-dollars-south-korea-seoul-donald-trump-president-moon-jae-a7925591.html. 66 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Trump, Moon Reach Final Agreement to Scrap Warhead Limits for Ballistic Missiles,” The Diplomat, November 8, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/trump-moon-reach-final-agreementto-scrap-warhead-limits-for-ballistic-missiles/.. 19. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(26) Chapter 3: Literature Review This chapter discusses two areas of literature that are relevant to this research. The first concerns US policy options for addressing the national security threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program. The second body of work discusses the perspectives of various scholars who believe that deterrence is the best policy option for addressing North Korea’s nuclear threat. These pieces of literature just skim the surface of some highly complex issues. But when considered together, these works shed some light on the US perspective and the necessary steps for deterrence to be successful.. 政治大 Since the end of the Cold War, the threat of global nuclear war has decreased, but the risk 立. 3.1. US Policy Options. of a nuclear attack has only continued to rise.67 As of 2014, US actions, ranging from “bribes and. ‧ 國. 學. sanctions, diplomacy and threats, [and] soft and hard approaches” have all failed to yield any lasting results.68 Morgan claims that neither deterrence nor compellence by the US has prevented. ‧. North Korea from furthering its nuclear weapons program, but interestingly enough, nuclear proliferation has not significantly improved North Korea’s national security thus far.69 Despite. y. Nat. sit. its bleak past performance, American scholars and experts continue to consider various policy. al. n. full-scale military intervention.. er. io. approaches for dealing with North Korea’s nuclear threat, ranging from passive acceptance to. Ch. i n U. v. Given North Korea’s commitment to its nuclear weapons program, some experts suggest. engchi. that the US adjust its current policy. Since CVID does not appear to be a feasible goal, the US should instead pursue a freeze or reductions in North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. 70 Though the suspension of US-ROK joint exercises or a drawdown of US troops in South Korea would send peace-making signals to North Korea, it would also weaken the US-ROK alliance and call into question US commitment to mutual defense. Moreover, such actions would legitimize the claim that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program is necessary to respond to 67 William Tobey, “Squaring the Nonproliferation Circle,” The Journal of International Security Affairs no. 26 (Spring/Summer 2014): 47. 68 Ibid, 49. 69 Patrick M. Morgan, “Deterrence and System Management: The Case of North Korea,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 23, no 2 (2006): 121. 70 Anderson, “Explaining North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,” 621.. 20. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.

(27) “hostile” actions from across the border. On the other hand, others claim that the denuclearization of North Korea is a “Western fantasy,” and that it is simply easier to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state.71 This would not only jeopardize US national security, but also undermine the faith of regional allies, such as Japan and South Korea, and embolden rising powers, such as China and Russia, to challenge US security efforts in the Asia Pacific region.72 Although experts have considered the use of military force to remove Kim Jong-un from power and facilitate reunification under South Korean leadership, such an outright military attack would inevitably risk nuclear war. Nevertheless, US leadership must recall that the DPRK claims that its nuclear arsenal has already deterred the US. Should the US give way to any major concessions, it will legitimize North Korea’s claims and make it that much more difficult to. 政治大 The most preferable option is a multilateral approach, under which the US cooperates 立. influence North Korea in the future.. with allies and adversaries to pressure North Korea into a “near-term verifiable freeze” on its. ‧ 國. 學. nuclear and missile programs. Even though Kim Jong-un has already announced the suspension of nuclear and missile tests, the state of these programs has yet to be verified by the IAEA.73. ‧. Though this is the best policy option in theory, it is far more difficult in practice, requiring complex negotiations, as well as “unprecedented policymaking capacity and coordination across. y. Nat. sit. the US government.”74 For this policy to succeed, it would require an overwhelming level of. al. er. io. pressure in political, economic, and military spheres, as well as the cooperation of all involved. n. states.75 However, realism predicts that states cooperate with the international community as long. Ch. i n U. v. as it serves their best interests. But when forced to choose, states will prioritize their wellbeing. engchi. above everything else. Thus, multilateral approaches risk being undermined by those who choose not to cooperate. This is especially true for sanctions, which may be undercut by third parties. 71. Clifton B. Parker, “Why nuclear deterrence can work on North Korea,” Center for International Security and Cooperation, November 14, 2017, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/why-nuclear-deterrence-can-work-northkorea. 72 Anderson, “Explaining North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,” 621. 73 Anna Fifield, “North Korea says it will suspend nuclear and missile tests, shut down test site,” Washington Post, April 20, 2018, https://wapo.st/2HjsSSj?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.61e5ea53e451. 74 John Allen et al., “Averting Catastrophe: US Policy Options for North Korea,” Brookings Institute (2017): 3-21. https://www.brookings.edu/wp content/uploads/2017/04/fp_201704_north_korea _avoiding_ catastrophe.pdf 75 Revere, “The Trump administration’s North Korea policy: Headed for success or failure?”. 21. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMPIS.003.2018.A06.