Chapter 7: Military Capabilities
7.1. The US Nuclear Arsenal and Deterrence Capabilities
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
military capabilities. These capabilities must be “enough” to inflict costs that outweigh the potential gains of the undesired action. The deterring state must also ensure military capabilities are able to prevent or survive an initial strike, and then effectively retaliate to the full extent of the threatened punishment. Even though nuclear weapons play a central role in deterrence, other non-nuclear capabilities also contribute to effective deterrence strategies.
7.1. The US Nuclear Arsenal and Deterrence Capabilities
The NSS claims to be a “strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes.”
“Principled realism” provides a moral underpinning to realist concepts, highlighting the “contests between those who value human dignity and freedom and those who oppress individuals and enforce uniformity.”151 To challenge the growing power and ideology of competitors, the Trump Administration has demonstrated its commitment to “principled realism” by “making historic investments in the United States military.”152 On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration released the proposed Federal Budget for 2019, contributing $686 billion to the Department of Defense (DoD). This would be an $80 billion, or a 13% increase, from the 2017 enacted level, and include a 2.6% military pay raise, which is largest increase in nine years.153 On March 23, 2018, President Trump also signed a $1.3 trillion spending bill for 2018 that includes $700 billion for defense spending.154 Upon agreeing to sign the bill, President Trump said, “My highest duty is to keep America safe. Nothing is more important.”155 In other public
engagements, such as the Easter Egg Roll Speech at the White House, the President has publicly affirmed his commitment to building up military capabilities, even at the expense of other areas of government.156 In this way, the Trump Administration consistently demonstrates its belief in realism and the importance of military capabilities through its allocation of resources.
151 United States, and Donald Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 1.
152Ibid, I.
153 United States, and Donald Trump, An American Budget: Budget of the U.S. Government (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 2018), 33.
154 Lisa Ferdinando, “Trump, Mattis Hail Spending Bill to Fund Strongest Military Ever,” DoD News, Defense Media Activity, March 23, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1474925/trump-mattis-hail-spending-bill-to-fund-strongest-military-ever/.
155 Ibid.
156 Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump at the 2018 White House Easter Egg Roll,” The White House, April 2, 2018, accessed April 26, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-2018-white-house-easter-egg-roll/.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
According to DoD, military capability is defined as “the ability of the force to achieve a wartime objective.”157 State military capability is assessed based on four “pillars”: readiness, sustainability, force structure, and modernization. These four pillars account for the size,
composition, endurance, and sophistication of weapon systems and equipment. It considers how effectively military forces are able to execute a designated task, as well as how efficiently a weapon system can fulfill its intended purpose. With these factors in mind, the US considers military capability to be a reflection of the effectiveness and efficiency of its manpower and weaponry.
In the NSS, President Trump claims, “America’s military remains the strongest in the world.”158 Since the Cold War, this statement has been unquestionably true. A 2018 study conducted by GlobalFirepower ranks 136 “modern military powers” based on over fifty-five different factors that contribute to “potential war-making capability.” By this metric, the US is currently the strongest military in the world.159 Regardless of whether this designation is completely accurate, the US still has more than enough military capabilities to produce a believable threat. Nonetheless, this same study also shows that North Korea has become the 18th most powerful military in the world. This is not an insignificant accomplishment. Although the US appears to have the upper hand, North Korea’s military strength and nuclear weapons
program makes it more difficult to deter. With nuclear war on the line, the US needs to carefully reassess the strength of its military capabilities to make certain that nuclear deterrence is
successful.
US nuclear deterrence strategy relies on the combined power of the “strategic nuclear triad,” non-strategic nuclear forces, and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems. The “strategic nuclear triad” consists of “nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and strategic bombers carrying gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).”160 The NPR explains, “the triad’s synergy and overlapping attributes help ensure the enduring survivability of our deterrence capabilities against attack and our capability to hold at
157 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Measures of Military Capability: A Discussion Of Their Merits, Limitations, And Interrelationships (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 1985), 1.
158 United States, and Donald Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 3
159 “2018 Military Strength Ranking,” GlobalFirepower.com, last modified 2018, accessed March 26, 2018, https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp.
160 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, IX.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
risk a range of adversary targets throughout a crisis or conflict.”161 As of February 2018, the United States’ nuclear triad maintains fourteen OHIO-class SSBNs, four hundred single-warhead minuteman III ICBMs, forty-six nuclear-capable B-52H bomber aircraft, twenty nuclear-capable B-2A “stealth” strategic bomber aircraft, and B83-1 and B6-11 gravity bombs. The current non-strategic nuclear force is comprised of F-15E fighter aircraft and allied dual capable aircraft (DCA) which carry B61 gravity bombs. Finally, the NC3 system is crucial for maintaining control over US nuclear forces at all times. NC3 capabilities “must assure the integrity of transmitted information and possess the resiliency to reliably overcome the effects of a nuclear attack.”162 Most importantly, this system is responsible for early detection, communication, and the deployment of forces and weapons systems. This strategy is then supported by “an effective, responsive, and resilient nuclear weapons infrastructure” that is designed to “adapt flexibly to shifting requirements.”163 The combined power of the nuclear triad, non-strategic nuclear forces, NC3 systems, and nuclear weapons infrastructure provide “diversity and flexibility as needed to tailor U.S. strategies,” which is subsequently used to deter adversaries, assure allies, hedge against uncertainty, and achieve objectives should deterrence fail.164 If deterrence does fail, the US maintains that it has sufficient military capabilities “to survive any potential adversary attack and endure throughout crises and conflict.”165 Extensive capabilities promise an overwhelming nuclear response should deterrence fail and provide adequate means for deterrence by
punishment to be effective.
Another important aspect of US deterrence strategy is missile defense. The US National Defense Strategy claims that future “investments will focus on layered missile defenses and disruptive capabilities for…North Korean ballistic missile threats.”166 These investments include the procurement of twenty new Ground-Based Interceptors to contribute to missile defense.167 In the NSS, President Trump also states, “the United States is deploying a layered missile defense system” that “includes the ability to defeat missile threats prior to launch.”168 This missile
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid, XIII.
163 Ibid, XIV.
164 Ibid, IX
165 Ibid, 43
166 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 6.
167 United States, and Donald Trump, An American Budget: Budget of the U.S. Government, 37.
168 United States, and Donald Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 8.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
defense system is said to have the “defensive and offensive capabilities to intercept and
otherwise defeat North Korea’s missile capabilities.”169 US missile defense systems also utilize
“early warning systems and strike capabilities [which are] necessary to degrade North Korean missile capabilities before launch.”170 Furthermore, since North Korea uses “underground facilities and natural terrain features” to protect military forces, command and control capabilities, and even North Korea’s top leadership, the US has developed a range of conventional and nuclear capabilities to “hold such targets at risk.”171 These documents all assume that missile defense capabilities are effective. By improving deterrence by denial through missile defense, the US is able to ensure that an attack by North Korea will always fail to yield the desired results.
The US has also developed adequate nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to provide proportionate responses and deny competitors potential advantages. “Supplements” to
modernization programs create more flexible nuclear options and provide credible deterrence against regional aggression.172 During the Cold War, MAD doctrine was criticized for promising an unreasonable, overwhelming military response to any degree of aggression. In the pursuit of more proportional nuclear responses, the DoD has started upgrading DCA with nuclear-capable F-35 aircraft. Additionally, the DoD has begun restoring retired nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) capabilities by modifying a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield nuclear option, while also starting development of a modern nuclear-armed SLCM.173 These kinds of “supplements” are aimed to tailor deterrence strategies, expand the range of credible deterrence options against nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attack, and signal to potential adversaries that limited nuclear escalation offers no potential advantage.
Nevertheless, the US also acknowledges that “many actors have become skilled at operating below the threshold of military conflict,” dissolving the immediate need for any military-based response.174 In response, the US has focused investments on maintaining space, cyberspace, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities. By doing so, the US seeks to deny competitors access to networks and exploitable information, and maintain advantages
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid, 33
171 Ibid.
172 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, XI-XIII.
173 Ibid.
174 United States, and Donald Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 3.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
across all “warfighting domains.”175 In this way, low-yield “supplements” to existing nuclear capabilities and US supremacy across multiple domains all contribute to successful deterrence.