Chapter 9: Perceptions
9.6. North Korea’s Smoke and Signals
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with North Korea may give him a different policy perspective than Bolton, it is clear that both Pompeo and Bolton are highly trusted by the President. With this in mind, the conditions that make “groupthink” possible also make it more difficult to perceive uncertainty within the Trump Administration.
DeWees argues that the best way for leaders to deal with uncertainty is to “seek to replace the uncertainty we perceive with knowledge of objective truth.”380 In other words, leaders need to be willing to look past existing perceptions and embrace uncertainty. They have to be willing to consider different perceptions and interpretations of messages to move steadily closer to the truth. To do so, such leaders must first be able to perceive uncertainty. President Trump’s ambitious personality drives him to combat ambiguity by delivering on promises. While this makes President Trump seem less capable of perceiving uncertainty, preferring the known over the unknown, his desire for an “unpredictable” foreign policy strategy may suggest he is actually more open to ambiguous situations. Unpredictability can increase uncertainty, but also destabilize structures that rely on credible commitments, such as deterrence. Since loyal
members of President Trump’s inner circle, namely Pompeo and Bolton, already share similar perspectives to President Trump, it is possible for “groupthink” to exist in the President’s inner circle, restricting perceptions of uncertainty and leading to premature conclusions based on pre-existing perceptions. Based on President Trump’s personality and the composition of his inner circle, the Trump Administration will struggle to perceive uncertainty and may fail to properly send and interpret messages until it embraces the uncertainty surrounding North Korea.
9.6. North Korea’s Smoke and Signals
North Korea has skillfully manipulated uncertainty and used signaling behavior to
formulate perceptions on its own terms. Outside audiences have little access to information about North Korea. Everything from military capabilities to the daily life of citizens seems to be
shrouded in mystery. What we do know is based on the information that North Korea chooses to release to public audiences. In the past, North Korea has manipulated uncertainty by feeding perceptions that increased its bargaining power and extracted significant concessions from the US and others. North Korea is able to do this because of the exclusive control it maintains over the formation of perceptions about itself.
380 DeWees, “The Psychology of Perceiving Uncertainty.”
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While democracies value openness and transparency, autocracies consider such concepts to be highly dangerous to regime stability and the power of the ruling party. Thus, restrictive autocratic regimes are less vulnerable to audience costs not just because citizens have little influence over government proceedings, but also because sources of dissent are highly suppressed. As a result, autocracies like North Korea exert almost exclusive control over the formulation of perceptions that is produced by their country. News and media outlets function as mouthpieces for the regime, conveying approved messages for the international community to receive. This exercise of control, along with the uncertainty surrounding the regime, is what allows North Korea to directly influence perceptions of its military capabilities and increase its bargaining power. Primary media sources include, Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the state news agency of North Korea. Through these trusted media channels, Kim Jong-un’s regime seeks to formulate perceptions within the US and the international community.
More importantly, its messages highlight how North Korea perceives itself relative to the
international community. Therefore, the following analysis, based on news released in November 2017, at the height of tensions between the US and North Korea, indicates some common themes regarding North Korea’s perceptions of itself, the United States, and the international sphere.
North Korea claims to be “a full-fledged nuclear weapons state and ICBM possessor,”
who is fully justified in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.381 Despite international condemnation, North Korea believes that nuclear weapons are “essential for its national identity and security, and for achieving power and prestige on the international stage.”382 The regime also argues that its pursuit of nuclear weapons is driven by US “nuclear blackmail,” a sentiment that has persisted since the Korean War.383 Today, North Korea continues to believe that the US presents an
existential threat to North Korean sovereignty. By referring to its nuclear weapons as a “nuclear deterrent force,” North Korea implies that its nuclear weapons development is only meant for defensive purposes, allegedly against the US. Through various nuclear and missile tests, North Korea has demonstrated its military capabilities through “costly signaling.” Though experts can
381 “U.S. Can Never Break Korean People’s Will: Swiss Bodies,” Rodong Sinmun, November 14, 2017, accessed May 10, 2018, http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2017-11-14-0010.
382 Terry, “North Korea’s Strategic Goals and Policy towards the United States and South Korea,” 68.
383 Edward Friedman, “Nuclear Blackmail and the End of the Korean War,” Modern China 1, no. 1 (Jan 1975): 75.
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confirm some aspects of these tests, the majority of analysis regarding North Korea’s military capabilities is still speculative. Despite North Korea’s claims that it can launch a nuclear-capable ICBM that reaches the continental US, American audiences are still skeptical of the perceived effectiveness of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.384 This may be partly due to the fact that North Korea is an autocracy, and signals less clearly and credibly than democracies do.385
Furthermore, North Korea has warned that any US attack or invasion of North Korea would be a mistake: “Those war maniacs should clearly understand that they can never invade the
DPRK.”386 Though it is unclear whether North Korea really has the military capabilities to carry out a nuclear strike, it certainly has the political will to try, stating “The U.S. can never break the will of the Korean people.”387 North Korea conveys the message that its nuclear weapons
program is intended to be used against the US, creating perceptions that justify its nuclear weapons program. As evidenced through public statements and signaling behavior, North Korea seeks to formulate perceptions that it has adequate military capabilities and political will to successfully deter the US.
One element of this strategy is North Korea’s development of the US “enemy image.” In North Korea’s perspective, the US is the source of aggression and instability within the
international system. Therefore, North Korea’s “enemy image” perceives the US to be a “war-monger,” interventionist state who abuses its power and position within the international
community. North Korea argues, “Situations which seriously affect world peace and security are caused by the U.S. who is abusing its privileged position as a ‘permanent member state of the UNSC’ as a political means for implementing its strategy of world dominance.”388 Joint military operations between the US and South Korea, as well as the deployment of THAAD to the Korean Peninsula, serve as evidence of this strategy. Following joint military exercises between the US, Japan, and South Korea in response to “threats from the north,” KCNA reported that such exercises “[create an] environment and conditions unfavorable for holding dialogue,” implying that military exercises decrease the chances of negotiations.389 Rodong Sinmun also published
384 “North Korea says new missile puts all of US in striking range,” BBC News.
385 Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” 577.
386 “U.S. Can Never Break Korean People’s Will: Swiss Bodies,” Rodong Sinmun.
387 Ibid.
388 “DPRK’s Stand on Reform of UNSC Clarified,” Rodong Sinmun, November 14, 2017.
389 “‘Denuclearization of North’ Can Not Be Condition for Dialogue: Federation of Koreans in U.S.,”
KCNA, November 16, 2017.
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articles asserting that the US is deploying THAAD to South Korea for self-serving reasons, most specifically “to contain big powers bordering the Korean peninsula and gain its unchallenged position in Asia-Pacific.”390 Following President Trump’s address to the UN general assembly, North Korea appealed to the UN Secretary-General in a letter that was later published on KCNA.
The letter read:
The U.S. flung the words of "total destruction" of a sovereign state at the UN General Assembly, the world largest official forum of diplomacy, and is now running amok for war exercises by introducing nuclear war equipment in and around the Korean peninsula.
This goes to prove that the U.S. itself is a chief offender of the escalation of tension and undermining of peace.391
These comments suggest that North Korea perceives itself to be a legitimate,
internationally-recognized state who engages responsibly with the international community, unlike the US. By appealing to the UN, it appears that North Korea is attempting to project its
“enemy image” of the US to an international scale. The UN serves as a powerful source of legitimacy, designating the norms and standards which govern the international community.
With this in mind, North Korea formulates perceptions that it behaves in compliance with the UN, while the US clearly does not. In appeals to the UNSC and to the UN Secretary-General, North Korea has been highly critical of the role of the US:
The fundamental principles of international relations on equality of sovereignty and mutual respect stipulated in the UN Charter are being wantonly violated and sovereign states are being openly subjected to interference, military invasion and massacre in the international arena.392
Despite this fact, the UN Security Council, whose mission is to ensure the world peace and security, keeps turning a blind eye to the nuclear war exercises of the U.S. which is hell-bent on bringing a catastrophic disaster to humanity, thereby giving rise to a serious concern on the double standard of the UNSC.393
By accusing the US of behavior contrary to the principles and standards condoned by the UN, North Korea seeks to rally international support against the US. As long as the US serves as
390 “Rodong Sinmun Dismisses U.S.-S. Korea Military Nexus Aggressive,” KCNA, November 16, 2017.
391 “Letter to UN Secretary-General,” KCNA, November 16, 2017.
392 “DPRK’s Stand on Reform of UNSC Clarified,” Rodong Sinmun.
393 “Letter to UN Secretary-General,” KCNA.
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a permanent member of the UNSC, North Korea will continue to perceive the UN as inherently biased in favor of the US. Nevertheless, the Trump Administration must be careful not to engage in behavior that could validate North Korea’s perceptions. Increased focus on military
capabilities and inflammatory language from President Trump could serve to reinforce North Korea’s perception that the US is the aggressor. President Trump’s announcement that he intends to withdraw from the Iran Nuclear Deal may also strengthen perceptions that the US cannot be trusted to follow through on commitments.394 Therefore, the Trump Administration must be aware of its “enemy image” and be careful not to engage in actions that support North Korea’s rhetoric.
Finally, besides the US, North Korea is also highly critical of US allies, including South Korea and Australia. By calling South Korean leaders “traitors” and “puppets,” North Korea condemns South Korea’s perceived subservience to the power of the US. North Korean media sources are also careful to point out cases of South Korean resistance to US policies. For example, Rodong Sinmun reported an expedition of South Korean citizens to stage an
anti-Trump, anti-US demonstration in the United Kingdom (UK) on November 9, 2017. According to this article, the expedition was made to condemn President Trump’s visit to South Korea and his
“war moves,” and “many citizens expressed support for the demonstration.”395 By pointing out cases of South Korean resistance against the US, North Korea seeks to widen the rift between the US and South Korea by appealing to anti-US factions. Formulating anti-American perceptions within South Korea could even bring the two countries closer together. North Korean media also attempts to humiliate those who criticize the regime and blindly support Western
“war-mongering.” Following the Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s comments on North Korea as a “criminal organization,” North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Choe Hui-chol fired back, stating:
It is not surprising that the prime minister is being ridiculed in the neighboring countries as "a paper cat hiding behind a paper tiger labelled Trump", "Trump's mouthpiece" and "a second class Western citizen" who would be shy to be the second in groveling to Trump...
The Australian prime minister had better mind the business within his own country rather than being a marionette of the U.S.396
394 Bennett, “How Talks with North Korea Convinced Trump to Scrap the Iran Deal.”
395 “S. Korean Expedition Stages Anti-Trump, Anti-U.S. Demo in UK,” Rodong Sinmun, November 14, 2017.
396 “DPRK Vice FM Blasts Australian PM's Insult to DPRK,” KCNA, November 16, 2017.
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Through these scathing comments, North Korea’s media outlets highlight pieces of news that encourage desired perceptions, while criticizing those who disagree. By targeting the US, humiliating its allies, and appealing to the UN for support, North Korea seeks to actively formulate perceptions that protect its interests. These perceptions clearly indicate how North Korea perceives itself and the messages it wants to convey to the international community, particularly regarding its nuclear weapons program and the “enemy image” of the US. However, North Korea’s language towards South Korea and the US has softened since North Korea participated in the 2018 Olympics, convened its historic summit with South Korea, and offered to meet with President Trump.
Although North Korea’s public criticism of the US has subsided for the time being, this does not immediately change North Korea’s perceptions of the US. Both parties must continue to make a conscious effort to understand the others’ perceptions without being too distracted by pre-existing impressions. Even though there is a chance that the US and North Korea’s “enemy images” are incorrect and diplomacy may be successful, the Trump Administration must be able to anticipate uncertainty and understand the key messages North Korea is trying to send.
9.7. Chapter Conclusion
The Trump Administration has distinguished itself from previous administrations in a number of ways. This could be in President Trump’s favor, given that leaders assess the credibility of an adversary based on the balance of capabilities and the interests at stake at a particular time.397 Since President Trump is entirely new to government, the credibility of his threats, promises, and actions is not contingent on his predecessors. The Trump Administration has the power to build or break US credibility. In doing so, effective deterrence will depend upon the relative power and interests of the US and North Korea. More specifically, psychologists would argue that credible deterrence actually relies on perceptions of power and interests. The Trump Administration has used public communications, policy and strategy documents, and
“costly signals” to formulate honest perceptions of its military capabilities and political will.
Despite efforts to create strong perceptions of the US-South Korea alliance structure, President Trump may have undermined these perceptions by suspending joint military exercises with South Korea. As evidenced by the Iraq War, the US must be careful not to rely too heavily on
397 Press, Calculating Credibility, 8-9.
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“enemy images” when interpreting messages, as this could lead to misperceptions and poor decision-making. Since there is already a substantial “enemy image” of North Korea, the Trump Administration must be careful not to fall victim to the same trap.
On the other hand, state leaders will work hard to preserve their own credibility.398 In this way, state leaders may choose to prioritize consistent behavior, even if other states will not assess threat credibility according to that metric. President Trump’s desire to demonstrate his credibility by following through on commitments also blinds him to potential sources of uncertainty. In contrast, President Trump’s “unpredictable” approach to foreign policy may increase his ability to detect uncertainty, but also undermine “predictable” aspects of foreign policy that rely on credibility, such as deterrence. Moreover, President Trump’s inner circle may limit perceptions of uncertainty by reinforcing existing “enemy images” and contributing to
“groupthink.” Therefore, if the Trump Administration is unable to detect uncertainty, then it will be unable to understand enemy perceptions and accurately interpret messages. This is especially important when considering North Korea’s perceptions of itself relative to others in the
international community. North Korea uses similar, but more extreme methods to shape US perceptions of its military capabilities and political will. However, North Korea perceives the US to be the primary aggressor of the international community. Despite the “enemy images” on both sides, an understanding of North Korea’s perceptions will allow the US to formulate perceptions and create messages that ensure deterrence is effective.
398 Ibid, 10.
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