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Chapter 4: Theoretical Considerations
The most relevant theories to this analysis are realism and constructivism. While realism assumes state behavior is driven by a rational desire for power, constructivism argues that behavior is instead determined by constructed images and norms. Though realism and
constructivism provide differing perspectives as to why states desire nuclear weapons, both make relevant insights as to what makes nuclear deterrence effective.
4.1. Realism
Realists argue that states make strategic decisions based on the following assumptions:
states are the central actors in international politics, the international political system is anarchic, states are rational actors, and that all states desire power. Based on these assumptions, structural realism (or Neorealism), contends that it is the constraints or opportunities available in the international environment that will ultimately determine a state’s behavior.100 Since states are motivated to take opportunities that will increase power, realism considers power to be the driving factor of international relations. Nye asserts that there are two kinds of power: hard power and soft power. Hard power employs material resources, such as population, territory, economic power, and most importantly, military capabilities, to influence state policy. In contrast, soft power uses persuasion and attraction, such as diplomacy, to influence other states.
Nye claims that “smart power,” or a combination of “hard power” coercion and “soft power”
persuasion, is the best strategy for addressing strategic decisions.101 Therefore, it makes sense that US foreign policy towards North Korea would require both compellent and deterrent components to be successful.
Nuclear proliferation issues are usually considered within the context of realism. At this time, nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapon known to man, instantaneously causing widespread, indiscriminate destruction on a massive scale. With the most powerful weapon, a state can guarantee its national security, regardless of its population size, economic power, or military strength. By increasing a state’s bargaining power and access to opportunities, nuclear
100 Charles Glaser, “Realism,” in Contemporary Security Studies, 3rd ed., ed. Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 14.
101 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2011), 4-24.
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weapons are extremely desirable to states. To counter this tendency, “liberal institutionalists”
argue that multilateral policies can engage non-democratic states in dialogue, and use political pressure and sanctions to address security concerns through a “rule-based liberal world order.”
This approach not only curbs nuclear proliferation tendencies, but also lowers the overall
likelihood of war.102 In response, structural realists contend that international agreements are not strong enough to prevent competition and alleviate perceptions of insecurity, both of which drives states to pursue nuclear weapons development. The UN, as led by the US, has created a strong “global nuclear nonproliferation regime” that condemns the clandestine development and accumulation of nuclear weapons.103 However, self-interested states, such as North Korea, who do not adhere to international norms and standards, will continue to acquire nuclear weapons and illicit technology beyond the control of the UN. As demonstrated by North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and its ensuing nuclear weapons development, liberal institutions and international agreements may not be strong enough to prevent nuclear proliferation or war. As long as nuclear weapons exist, states will use them to gain or maintain power within the international system.
4.2. Constructivism
On the contrary, constructivism provides a different perspective on what drives states to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. Constructivism is a theory in which certain aspects of international relations are considered to be socially constructed. Therefore, social interaction and shared ideas play a far more influential role in shaping interests and identities than by human nature or the international structure.104 As such, Wendt claims that shared ideas create the
structures of human association, including anarchy itself, stating “whether a system is conflictual or peaceful is a function not of anarchy and power but of the shared culture created through discursive social practices.”105 Therefore, anarchy is a product of “cultural instantiations,” and that states can gradually reshape structures through processes, developing new gestures, interests,
102 Heinz Gaertner, “North Korea, Deterrence, and Engagement,” Defense & Security Analysis 30, no. 4 (2014): 336.
103 International Institutions and Global Governance Program, “The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 21, 2012, accessed May 20, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime.
104 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.
105 Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism,” International Security 25, no.
2 (Autumn 2000): 187-188.
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and identities to gradually move towards peaceful resolutions of conflict.106 In this way, constructivism offers an interesting alternative to realist thought.
Scholars of constructivism argue that following World War II, nuclear weapons were given a new meaning. In other words, nuclear weapons are now considered to be a means of
“total, non-discriminate devastation,” a source of enduring insecurity, an opportunity for power and prestige, and a new taboo.107 Therefore, the formulation and institutionalization of new norms and standards, such as the NPT, are a product of changing perceptions of nuclear weapons. Another application of constructivism is the “norms model,” which considers the symbolic functions of nuclear weapons, the identity of the state, and global norms to be the major motivating factors for states to acquire nuclear weapons. 108 In Iran’s case, Ashley argues that its nuclear weapons development was popularly supported because of a constructed sense of national pride, not because of strategic appeal.109 Thus, despite the existing taboo against nuclear proliferation, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program serves a symbolic purpose, promoting animosity against Western powers, fostering national pride, and constructing a narrative in which nuclear weapons are essential to regime survival.
4.3. Theoretical Applications to Deterrence
Realism and constructivism provide different perspectives regarding North Korea’s relationship with nuclear weapons. In a broader sense, these theories specify which factors are responsible for influencing a state’s behavior. From a security-based perspective, realism argues that power is the strongest source of influence, forcing states to seek out “hard power” and “soft power” capabilities. On the contrary, constructivism argues that shared ideas and constructed norms mainly influence how states behave. By doing so, these theories also provide some insight into what makes deterrence effective. “Hard power” military capabilities will surely be required to ensure that threats are credible. However, “soft power” capabilities are also necessary to influence perceptions and convince adversaries of threat credibility. In addition, constructivism
106 Ibid.
107 Jo-Ansie van Wyk, “The International Politics of Nuclear Weapons: A Constructivist Analysis,”
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies 35, no.1 (2007): 23-31.
108 Yewon Ji, “Three Paradigms of North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions,” Journal of Political Inquiry 2 (2009): 1-11.
109 Sean Paul Ashley, “The Iranian Nuclear Program: Realist vs. Constructivist Models,” (PhD Diss., Princeton University, 2012).
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considers how symbolism and identity can influence a state’s perceptions and political will.
Thus, constructed norms influence state behavior by dictating which behaviors are legitimate.
With this in mind, realism and constructivism can both provide a fuller understanding of the factors that influence state behavior. Theory can explain what motivates states to obtain nuclear weapons, and in doing so, expose how states can influence one another to deter a nuclear attack.
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