Chapter IV – The ROC and Africa
4.7 Conclusion
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difficult for these swing countries to make profits from playing both sides" (Global Times, 2013).
However, I would argue that this ‘truce’ has not been a good policy in solidifying relations between the ROC and its allies as since 2008, some states have expressed their wishes in switching sides. This has been the case of El Salvador, Panama and Honduras in Central America who’s requests to establish official ties with PRC have reportedly been refused by Beijing (The Economist, 2009; The Diplomat, 2013). In Africa, Sao Tome and Principe President Manuel Pinto da Costa’s trip to Beijing in 2014 raised concerns in Taipei as it was speculated in media outlets that this trip was aimed at preparing an eventual move towards officially recognizing Beijing.
So far, no major changes have occurred, and the number of Taipei's diplomatic allies is not expected to change, at least until the presidential elections in 2016. One thing is clear, this ‘diplomatic truce’ has helped the ROC in simply maintaining its official relations, without clearly promoting or solidifying them. Changes in cross-strait relations upon the 2016 presidential election (especially if the DPP wins), might result in the end of the
‘diplomatic truce’ and the number of the ROC’s diplomatic allies may be reduced to a historical minimum. Whether or not this will happen remains to be seen, but if the ROC is willing to keep its foreign relations and expand its international space, new foreign policy strategies should be formulated in order to better address possible future changes.
4.7 Conclusion
Africa has been central in the ROC’s quest for diplomatic recognition. However its presence on the African continent has gradually deteriorated. The emergence of dozens of newly independent African states in the 1960s were seen by the KMT authorities on the island of Taiwan as crucial for the Nationalist government to legitimize the ROC as the sole Chinese representative in the world. Thus, Taipei, within its own limitations, initiated a fairly ambitious “Operation Vanguard” whose main goal lay in gaining the support and vote of the new African states in the China representation issue in the UN. The result of this operation during the 1960s was positive, since the ROC managed to secure its seat in the UN.
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However, changes in world politics altered this scenario and in 1971 the ROC lost its seat in the UN. This major blow for Taipei was further accentuated with Washington’s decision to switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing, at the expense of Taipei. This resulted in an accelerated process of derecognition of the ROC in which Africa also took part. By the end of 1980s Taipei had only three diplomatic allies in Africa.
This scenario changed again in favor of the ROC during the 1990s due to the new flexible diplomacy approach adopted by President Lee Teng-hui and the international condemnation of the PRC in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident. During this period, Taipei, while accepting the existence of two Chinas, sought again to actively court African states through the continuation of aid provision and economic inducements. In 1997 there were ten African countries officially recognizing the ROC.
Yet, the achievements obtained in Africa during the Lee Teng-hui era were not followed by his successor, Chen Shui-bian, whose presidency was marked by the loss of four African diplomatic allies and a decrease in the overall number of nations having diplomatic ties with the ROC. But this decline in Africa does not mean that Chen’s administrations had ignored the continent’s importance for the ROC’s international ambitions. In fact, Africa’s significance was several times reiterated by president Chen and this can be proven by his two visits to the continent in 2000 and 2002 which made him the first ROC president to have ever visited West Africa, as well as the first ever Taiwan-Africa Heads of State Summit held in 2007.
With the election of KMT presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, Taipei relations with Beijing entered a new era. Since 2008, President Ma has sought to improve cross-strait relations and accorded with Beijing an informal “diplomatic truce” aimed at put an end on the ‘two Chinas’ global competition for diplomatic allies. However this ‘truce’ has not impeded to loss of the Gambia, neither the desire of some other states (possibly including the African island state of Sao Tome and Principe) in switching sides.
Currently, the ROC enjoys diplomatic relations with only three African states, all of them located in sub-Saharan Africa. In the past fifty years the ROC has concentrated its diplomatic efforts mainly in the sub-Saharan region. This is mainly due to the fact that since 1949 most of North African states showed little interest in establishing close ties with
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Taipei20. However, the success of these endeavors has been limited and the majority of the 49 countries composing the sub-Saharan region have refused to recognize or withdraw their recognition from the ROC over time.
20 The only exception was Libya. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in 1959 and would last until 1978, when Tripoli decided to recognize the PRC.
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CHAPTER V
5. What Are the Possible Factors Prompting Sub-Saharan African States to Withdraw or Refrain from Recognizing the ROC?
5.1 Ideology, Natural Resources Rich Countries, Pariah States, Countries with International Ambitions and Politically Unstable Countries
The diversity and impact of each sub-Saharan state’s national interests regarding the ROC-PRC competition for diplomatic recognition is undeniable. Recognizing either the PRC or the ROC has both advantages and disadvantages and therefore each African state must decide between the two in accordance with their own national interests. The PRC has increased its position and influence on the continent and this has almost eclipsed the ROC’s presence in Africa. Currently the PRC enjoys official diplomatic relations with fifty African countries, whereas the ROC on Taiwan is recognized by only three states.
Therefore, by analyzing the possible reasons why sub-Saharan African countries do not or have switched recognition from Taipei over time, one must not ignore Beijing’s role.
In fact, I would argue that the underlying reason for countries shifting their recognition from Taipei in the last fifty decades has been Beijing’s capacity to advance their national interests.
Because of the diversity that characterizes the sub-Saharan African states, this thesis proposes a layout which groups together countries with similar national interests and foreign policy goals. This study contains five groups of sub-Saharan states which have been categorized together based on how their national interests may be put at stake, if relations with the ROC were to be established. In other words, I will argue that a set of five different key national interests in Africa have been an important driving force in hampering the success of the ROC on the continent, as these national interests have had a decisive role in prompting sub-Saharan states, to ‘bandwagon’ towards the PRC. This structure is possible since several sub-Saharan nations share some commonalities regarding their foreign policy goals. From each group I’ll select one country to be used as a case study in order to simplify this analysis, which otherwise would be extremely extensive. This approach, I believe, provides a broad and structured understanding of the potential reasons shaping
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these countries’ decisions in refusing or switching from Taipei to Beijing over the last decades. The five groups and respective case studies are as follows:
1. Political affinity: Countries identified with the same ideology as the PRC and therefore wanted to foster close ties with it. The case of Tanzania.
2. Countries with international ambitions: Nations aspiring to become more prominent in the international arena hence need Beijing’s support. The case of South Africa.
3. Resource rich countries: Nations abundant in natural resources see the PRC as a key player in exploiting their full potential. The case of Angola.
4. Pariah States: Beijing usually supports states being subject to international sanctions and therefore African pariah states see it as an indispensable ally. The case of Zimbabwe.
5. Politically unstable countries: They need the PRC which, as a member of the Security Council, can play a significant role in solving their problems. The case of Liberia.
Table 6. Possible Factors Prompting Sub-Saharan African States to Withdraw or Refrain from Recognizing the ROC
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Since the 1960s, the ‘two Chinas’ diplomatic rivalry in Africa created a new momentum; gaining the support of the newly independent African nations was seen by both, the communists in Beijing and the nationalists in Taipei, as a crucial step in their competition for the China seat at the UN. From this period onwards, the ROC faced a fierce competition from the Communist China who aspired to impose its leadership on the continent. In order to attain this goal, the PRC strived to gain an equal voice within the Communist bloc in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and obtain greater international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China (Yu, 1963).
By the late 1950s and early 1960s several states in sub-Saharan Africa began to show signs of an inclination towards socialism. In this regard, one aspect in which the socialist world had considerable influence was ideology. The unifying effect and mobilizing appeal of socialism was adopted by some leaders for the purpose of solidifying fragile new states in the face of ethnic tensions and social divisions. African nationalists also resorted to socialism to denounce Western colonialism and raise awareness in the West about the needs of African countries (Thiam and Mulira, 1999; Snow, 1995).
However, there were several reasons for the adoption of socialism by the African leaders. For instance, whereas the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, believed that Socialism was already rooted within the African way of life: “We, in Africa, have no more need of being 'converted' to socialism than we have of being 'taught' democracy. Both are rooted in our past -- in the traditional society which produced us” (Nyerere, 1967), others seemed to have followed the socialist path due to economic and political considerations.
Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah and Somalia’s President Siad Barre, for example, reportedly adopted the socialist ideology in order to get political and material support from the socialist bloc, as they were being rejected by the Western nations. Guinean President Sekóu Touré socialist inclinations had to do with national survival as well since Western aid to the country had been cut; Ethiopia’s Colonel Mengistu sought to adopt the socialist model of development in order to unify his country upon the overthrow of the pro-Western emperor Haile Selassie (Thiam and Mulira, 1999).
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In the two Chinas competition, sub-Saharan states with socialist leanings tended to side with Beijing. Unlike Taipei, Beijing’s role in Africa from the 1960s until the mid 1970s was essentially ideologically motivated, although national interests were also a matter of concern (Taylor, 2011). According to Thiam and Mulira (1999), Africa’s relevance to Beijing lay in three main considerations. First, the continent’s liberation struggle was seen as an important stage in the world revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against capitalism, and therefore socialist China had the duty to support those struggles; second, the PRC’s ambitions to raise its global stature, demanded that it should be present in Africa in order to compete with American imperialists and the Soviet revisionists, as well as to find support for its diplomatic aspirations. Finally, the PRC’s common experience in combating colonialism in the past, placed it in a very good position to understand Africa’s colonial issues and to help the continent through its process of decolonization
Thus, despite the achievements that characterized the ROC’s diplomacy in this period, this did not necessarily mean a loss for the PRC (Lin, 1990). In fact, by the early 1960s the ROC had already seen several socialist sub-Saharan states such as Guinea (1959), Ghana (1960), Mali (1960), Somalia (1960), Tanzania (1964) and Congo Brazzaville (1964) siding with Beijing. In addition to diplomatic recognition, the exchange of missions and the provision of aid and military support21, Beijing also sought to strengthen its ties with African states through the establishment of “friendship treaties” and trade agreements.
Three good examples are the Sino-Guinea Friendship Treaty signed in 1960 and the Friendship Treaty with Ghana signed in the following year. In the same year, a trade and payments agreement was signed with Mali. These treaties included provisions whereby both Beijing and African states agreed to develop economic and cultural relations, and laid down principles guiding the relations between the two parties (Yu, 1963; Prybyla, 1964).
The ROC’s overall success in Africa during the 1960s is undisputable. However in the group of countries displaying socialist leanings, Taipei had very little success. In this case, these group of states soon tended to side with Beijing in the ‘two Chinas’ diplomatic
21 The reason of Chinese aid to Africa had apparently had apparently been to reduce both the US and the Soviet influence in Africa, while at the same time obtain support of the African countries in international organisations. In the Maoist period China became the only aid donor in the world whose foreign aid would often be provided to states with a higher per capita gross national product (GNP). Between 1956 and 1977 China’s aid to Africa had reached the impressive US$1.4 billion.
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competition. Individually or collectively, the methods of armed struggle to achieve liberation from colonial rule, the injection of a martial spirit among the masses, political and social mobilization and regimentation, and planned economic development had been acknowledged by some African elites as viable techniques for nation building (Yu, 1966).
Thus, although it might not fully explain their decision to recognize Beijing in the ‘two Chinas’ tug of war, these states’ adherence to socialism had certainly weighed in their decision. In this regard, the Tanzanian case is paradigmatic.
5.1.2 The Case of Tanzania
Official relations between Tanzania (former Tanganyika) and the PRC, date back to 1961, shortly following the former’s independence. For the ROC, this relationship meant that from the beginning its aspirations in obtaining support from Dar es Salaam to legitimize itself as the sole representative of China were unlikely to be realized.
Tanzania’s interactions with the PRC, although minor in the early 1960s, gained a new momentum in the mid 1960s, and by the 1970s Tanzania had become one of the PRC’s most important allies on the continent. The explanation for such development lies in the fact that political elites on both sides had converging interests when the two states began engaging with each other (Arsene, 2009). For Tanzania, political, military and economic interests made President Nyerere look favorably toward establishing official diplomatic relations with the PRC. A supporter of the African independence movements, Nyerere sought to increase foreign military assistance in order to be able to better deal with the heavily armed neighboring states of Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa, still under white imperialist rule. This was in line with the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle which characterized the PRC’s foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, by 1964, the PRC had already become Tanzania’s main source of military support (Arsene, 2009;
Bailey, 1975).
Development aid provided by the PRC during the 1960s also played an important role in strengthening the ties between the two sides. The deterioration of the Tanzanian relations with Western donors in 1965 resulted in the loss of considerable amounts of aid which were compensated by Beijing’s generous offers. In addition, the construction of
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TAZARA railway, a project financed and supported by the PRC, not only helped both Zambia and Tanzania in their struggle against the white-controlled states of southern Africa, but it also gave the Tanzanian administration confidence in the PRC as a credible ally.
However, it was Tanzania’s socialist agenda throughout the 1960s and 1970s that further encouraged its alignment with the PRC. At the time of independence, President Nyerere was already a staunch critique of assumptions that the Western models would not exactly be compatible with the conditions of Tanzania. In his 1962 address entitled
“Ujamaa-The Basis of African Socialism”, he expressed his aversion to the individualism of Western capitalist society and that a more desirable alternative would be the one of socialism (Nugent, 2004; Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003). In his words, "no underdeveloped country can afford to be anything but socialist" (Nyerere, 1961). In this early stage, Nyerere was working through his ideas solely at an intellectual level (Nugent, 2004).
However, by the mid 1960s, Tanzania’s policies had become more radical, a fact that resulted in a switch of direction in 1967. These changes were a combination of both internal and external factors. Externally, President’s Nyerere was quite disappointed with his Western partners22; internally the country's economic and social conditions were deteriorating. Thus, it was this combination of reasons - some nationalist and some egalitarian in conception - that prompted Nyerere to publish the Arusha Declaration and TANU’s Policy on Socialism and Self Reliance. One of the major themes of this Declaration was the emphasis on self-reliance. The principle of self-reliance was given particular attention as the Tanzanian Government urged the country to rely on the efforts of its own people rather than be excessively dependent on external aid (Nugent, 2004). .
In the Arusha Declaration, it was also proposed that the rural society should remain essentially communal in nature. Nyerere contended that farming individually was incompatible with socialism and that wealth should be collectively created and shared among everyone. To this end, peasants were encouraged to live together in villages and collectively farm and assume joint responsibility of social services - thereby becoming true ujamaa villages (Nugent, 2004).
22 In 1965 West Germany cut its assistance to Tanzania due to the latter’s willingness to have an Eastern German representation in Dar es Salaam; in December of the same year relations with the UK were severed because of the lack of London’s response regarding Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence;
political support from the US also declined due to the uprisings taking place in Congo.
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The Leadership Code was another item included in the Arusha Declaration. The Code was aimed at preventing TANU members from becoming part of a privileged group that exploited people through hiring labor or renting property. It was an attempt to put an end on the growing gap between the rich and the poorer in the country. According to the Code, TANU members and government leaders could not own shares in any company, earn more than one salary, rent out property or run business in a private capacity (Nugent, 2004).
The Leadership Code reflected Nyerere’s desire for social equality which he sought to further consolidate through the provision of education for all. In the “Education for Self-Reliance”, Nyerere urged a reform of the education system where everyone would have access to education and where the collective values and respect for manual labor would be highlighted (Nugent, 2004) .
President Nyerere visited the PRC five times during his presidency. Since 1965 when he first visited Beijing, Nyerere had become a key supporter of the PRC’s model of
President Nyerere visited the PRC five times during his presidency. Since 1965 when he first visited Beijing, Nyerere had become a key supporter of the PRC’s model of