Chapter V - What Are the Possible Factors Prompting Sub-Saharan African States to
5.1 Ideology, Natural Resource Rics, Pariah States, Countries with International Ambitions,
5.5.1 Politically Unstable Countries
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attempts from Taipei to retain its major diplomatic ally, the fact is that Beijing’s assertiveness regarding the ‘one China’ policy and its economic and political weight were the reasons behind Pretoria's decision in breaking its ties with Taipei and subsequently enter into official relations with Beijing.
Despite the ROC’s important role in South Africa’s foreign policy and economic development during the 1980s and 1990s, the latter’s regime change and consequent reformulation of its economic and foreign policy agenda required more than what the ROC could provide. South Africa’s decision in siding with the PRC, not only meant that the ROC had only a few African allies left, but it also became clear that the ROC needed more South Africa than South Africa the ROC. Having to decide between the ROC and the PRC, South Africa’s ultimate move in favor of the PRC, evidenced the ROC’s lack of capacity to advance its allies political and economic interests when they aspire to become more prominent actors in world affairs.
5.5.1 Politically Unstable Countries
Africa has had an impressive record of civil wars, coup d’état, and other social-political tensions over time, factors which have significantly contributed to the continent’s low level of economic development and social progress. There have been a number of complex reasons explaining this reality, including conflicts over basic resources such as water, access and control over rich minerals and other resources as well as different political agendas (Global Issues, 2010).
Within the ‘two Chinas’ diplomatic competition context, the political instability and social unrest taking place in some sub-Saharan African states, has had a profound impact in determining these countries’ decision to either side with the ROC or the PRC. In this study, it is argued that states in conflict or on the verge of a serious political crisis and social unrest have tended to cut their ties with the ROC and subsequently entered into official diplomatic relations with the PRC. The ROC’s lack of political power in the international arena, and the PRC’s determination in blocking any sort of resolutions in the UNSC aimed at providing assistance and security to states enjoying diplomatic ties with the ROC, has been an important factor which has ultimately led these countries to withdraw their
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recognition of Taipei. That is in line with van Loon’s statement that ‘a deficiency of ROC’s diplomatic relations is that it is apparently unable to provide military security, making dollar incentives their only possible support for the countries undergoing domestic conflicts’
(van Loon, 2012).
The most recent cases in this regard have been the ones of Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic and Liberia. Chad has been an unstable state for years, a factor which made it difficult for Taipei to maintain solid relations with Ndjamena. Dollar diplomacy was crucial when Chad shifted recognition to the ROC, but not with the shift to the PRC (van Loon, 2012). The PRC’s controversial role in the Darfur conflict, and its support to the Khartoum-backed rebels with military equipment was able to pressure Chad into breaking ties with the ROC. According to Large and Chien (2008) van Loon (2012) and the Taipei Times (2006), the seriousness of the Darfur conflict and the negative impact that it could have within the Chadian territory, coupled with the PRC’s promises of offering security in exchange for diplomatic recognition, prompted President Deby to make compromises with Beijing ‘for the survival of Chad’.
The same has reportedly happened with CAR and Guinea-Bissau, both undergoing serious political and social turmoil in 1997 and 1998 respectively. In 1997, amid heightened ethnic tensions, a PRC’s representative to the UN, as the rotating chair of the Security Council, visited the CAR from 1997, causing the CAR to switch its recognition to the PRC (Tseng, 2008). Lately, a UN peacekeeping force (MINURCA) was sent to the country.
As for Guinea-Bissau, despite the absence of credible sources explaining the exact reasons behind its decision for the move, the civil war taking place in the country by the time this diplomatic decision happened, might have been related to Bissau's expectations that Beijing could finally approve a UNSC resolution to send a UN Peace building Support Mission to Guinea-Bissau.
The ROC has undeniably been unable to secure its allies whose domestic conditions are more subject to political and social turmoil. Under these circumstances, sub-Saharan states have tended to switch sides, in an attempt to guarantee the normalization of the socio-political environment of their countries, as the socio-political support they need, can barely be provided by the ROC. The case of Liberia is paradigmatic in this respect.
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Liberia has had formal diplomatic relationship with the ROC in three separate time periods (1957-1977, 1989-1993, and 1997-2003) over the last 55 years, making it one of the African nations whose allegiance has been most transitory between the PRC and ROC.
The case of Liberia serves as an example of the ROC’s tenacity in aiming to win over African allies. Following Liberia’s switch to sole recognition of the PRC in 1993 the ROC refused to sever diplomatic relations and maintained its embassy in the capital of Monrovia concurrently with the operation of the PRC’s embassy from 1993 through 1997.
The circumstances surrounding the most recent term of relations between the ROC and Liberia has become a controversial topic that has made the ROC more cautious in how it does dollar diplomacy. In 1997, former warlord Charles Taylor won the presidential election in Liberia, purportedly with US$ 1 million backing for his campaign from Taipei (van Loon, 2012). Repudiated by most of the international community, Charles Taylor paid a visit to Taipei in anticipation for further financial support. Despite the ROC’s government reluctance in committing substantial aid because of the chaotic nature of the country and heightened corruption within the government, threats by officials from Monrovia to switch relations to Beijing have meant that the ROC money would be secured (Taylor, 2002).
Following his victory, Taylor’s government proclaimed to recognize “two Chinas,” leading the PRC to promptly sever its diplomatic ties (van Loon, 2012). For Taylor (2002), Liberia did quite well out of this process. During the period between 1997 and 2002, Taipei provided around US$1.5 million for the rehabilitation of the Monrovia’s port facilities;
spent US$400.000 in navigational aid for the port; committed US$2.8 million for the repair of several generators to the Liberian Electricity Corporation; and also spent roughly US$10 million in the rehabilitation of the Monrovia international airport (Taylor, 2002). An extra US$4.5 million was provided to the Taylor’s regime for the printing of new banknotes.
Taking into consideration that by the late 1990s Monrovia’s regime was being shunned by the international community due to its war crimes, human rights violations and undemocratic practices, economic support of this amount, was remarkably generous and extremely welcomed. According to Taylor (2002) such actions can only be explained by the
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perceived need of the ROC to secure as many diplomatic allies—seemingly at any cost—as possible.
It was not long before Charles Taylor came under fire with accusations of war crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to his participation in the Sierra Leone Civil war. In 2003, through the combined efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the international community, Taylor was forced to resign, paving the way for a political transition and presidential elections in 2005 (Moumouni, 2014).
After Taylor fled, Liberia’s transitional government once again shifted recognition back to the PRC, a decision that was influenced by the PRC’s threat to vote down a US$250 million budget for the dispatch of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (van Loon, 2012; Tseng, 2008, Moumouni, 2014). Under these circumstances, Monrovia had to make a decision regarding the ‘two ‘Chinas’ issue. Liberia’s transitional government was surely aware that the continuation of its official relations with the ROC would be very harmful for the country’s stability, as the PRC’s threats were not merely rhetoric. In fact, the PRC has used its veto in the Security Council eight times since 1971, of which two were aimed at punishing the ROC’s diplomatic allies (Holland, 2012). In 1997, the PRC vetoed a resolution which would have sent peacekeepers to aid Guatemala’s peace process.
The PRC’s UN Ambassador Qin Hua-sun justified the veto on the basis of Guatemala’s diplomatic alliance with the ROC, stating that Taiwan was “a major question of principle”
bearing upon the PRC’s sovereignty, and that “no state’s peace process should be at the expense of another state’s sovereignty” (IPS, 1997). In 1999, Beijing vetoed the extension of UN observers to Macedonia and closed its embassy in the country, as Macedonia had entered into official relations with the ROC after an alleged promise of a US$1 billion in investments (Holland, 2012). In this respect, it is not difficult to understand Liberia’s decision to side with the PRC. For Monrovia it was clear that any attempt aimed at maintaining its relations with the ROC could have had disastrous consequences. The need of approval by the PRC in the UNSC regarding the dispatch of the UNMIL became a matter of national concern. Peace and security had become more relevant issues for the country’s future than the money being provided by the ROC, whose recipients had often been Liberia’s corrupt political elite interested in using this money in dubious personal and political activities. For instance, upon investigation into Charles Taylor’s bank accounts at
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the Special Court for Sierra Leone at The Hague, it was revealed the ROC had transferred over US$20 million into Taylor’s personal account which were officially designated for medical and social aid programs, but conversely were used for arms deals. Coming under fire following these revelations, the ROC responded that it was under tremendous pressure from Taylor to provide such financing in order to maintain diplomatic relations, and that it accordingly ended dollar diplomacy (van Loon, 2012).
Monrovia’s decision to cut its ties with Taipei in 2003 upon Charles Taylor departure has also been linked to the support provided by the PRC to opposition factions in Liberia. According to Richard Lin, Executive Director of the Africa-Taiwan Economic Forum, by the time Charles Taylor fled to Nigeria, the PRC was already strongly supporting politically and financially Liberia’s transitional government and lately the Unity Party, whose presidential candidate,Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, came to power in 2005. Thus, it was with no surprise that, following the presidential elections in 2005, the Liberian Senate and House of Representatives each passed the Resolution No. 001 of the 52nd Legislature, which ‘confirms and reaffirms its total commitment to the ‘one China’ policy (Moumouni, 2014). This resolution made the new policy extremely strict, so much so that on the following year, when former house speaker Edwin Melvin Snowe suggested a possible severance of Monrovia’s diplomatic relations with Beijing, the newly elected President Johnson-Sirleaf promptly denied the allegation and Snowe was eventually forced to resign (Moumouni, 2014).
For Liberia, the PRC’s position as a permanent member of the UNSC made it vital in the approval of the UN resolutions aimed at promoting the normalization of the socio-political environment in the country. Beijing’s status as an emerging power and its outstanding growing levels of investment and development aid to other developing countries, were additional incentives that the country’s new administration could no longer ignore (Moumouni, 2014).
In fact, since the normalization of the Liberia-PRC relations, the PRC’s development aid to Liberia has been rather significant, covering several socio-economic sectors such as education, infrastructure, debt cancellation, agriculture and health care.
Additionally, the number of exchange of high level visits grew significantly. In 2006, the newly elected President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf paid a state visit to the PRC. In the same year
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the PRC’s foreign minister Li Zhao-xing visited Liberia, and Liberia’s Foreign Minister, Thomas Yaya Nimely, visited Beijing in the end of 2006. In 2007, President Hu Jin-tao paid a historic state visit to Liberia reciprocating President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's state visit to the PRC in 2006, the first visit to Liberia by a head of state from the PRC (Embassy of the PRC in Liberia, n.d). In 2010, the vice Minister of Commerce in charge of Foreign Aid and Foreign Economic Relations of the PRC, Mr. Fu Zi-ying visited Liberia, and in 2011, Liberia’s Foreign Minister paid an official visit to Beijing (Liberia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).
. The trade volume between the two countries has also witnessed impressive growth rates. In 2001, when Liberia was still recognizing the ROC, trade with the PRC was US$
141.5 million. However, upon the establishment of official relations with Beijing at the expense of Taipei, two-way trade grew exponentially and by 2011 it had reached US$ 5 billion (Moumouni, 2014). These numbers make the PRC Liberia’s major trading partner followed by the EU, the US and Ivory Coast (MOCI, 2013). They are also an indicator that apart from the political factors which primarily motivated the transitional governments to cut ties with the ROC and enter into official relations with the PRC, economic factors have also weighed in the decision. One must not ignore the fact that during the period Liberia maintained relations with the ROC, despite the money provided by the later to the former in order to secure diplomatic recognition, trade between the two countries was rather insignificant. On the other hand, perspectives of an increase in trade and investments by the PRC if relations between the two countries were established, proved to be an important incentive, which coupled with the political dimension, further legitimized Liberia’s transitional government decision to break ties with the ROC and consequently siding with the PRC.
5.5.3 Conclusion
Liberia enjoyed diplomatic relations with the ROC in three different time periods in the last five decades. Its back-and-forth movement between the ‘two Chinas’ started in 1977, when Monrovia cut off its ties with Taipei in favor of Beijing. Relations have come
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to an end in 2003 when Liberia’s transitional government signed a Joint Declaration and a Memorandum of Understanding in which it once again recognized the PRC.
The circumstances surrounding the most recent term of relations between the ROC and Liberia have highlighted the ROC’s lack of political clout, especially when one of its allies is in need of strong political support. It also revealed that the dollar diplomacy practiced by the ROC during the mid 1990s and early 2000s had its limitations as it does not guarantee a state’s allegiance permanently.
Dollar diplomacy represented a very effective instrument for obtaining diplomatic standing in Liberia for a certain period of time. In this regard, both the ROC and PRC were willing to provide financial incentives to Liberia while other donor countries withdrew or were standing aside. However, political instability proved to be an insurmountable obstacle that the ROC’s financial backing alone could not resolve and finally resulted in a necessary shift of allegiance to the PRC in order to achieve peace following the decline of Charles Taylor. In this case, Beijing’s position as a permanent member of the UNSC could help Monrovia to provide what Taipei could hardly offer: social-political stability through the approval of the US$250 million budget for the dispatch of the UNMIL. Moreover, the economic benefits that could arise from the normalization of relations with the PRC were an additional incentive which should more than ever be taken seriously.
So far, taking into account Liberia’s current stable domestic situation, significant bilateral trade volume, as well as stable political relations with the PRC reflected by the sound development of the exchange of high level visits , Monrovia’s decision to side with Beijing at the expense of Taipei, has apparently met the country’s most vital interests. For the ROC, it became clear that ‘money diplomacy’ has its own limitations, especially when the recipient country is facing a socio-political crisis which requires strong political backing.
In this respect, Liberia’s awareness of the ROC’s lack of political clout in the international arena, and its urgent need to solve its domestic problems, prompted Monrovia to ultimately side with Beijing, which not only had the capacity to help bringing back peace and security to the country, but also to become influential actor in the restoration of Liberia’s weak socio-economic structures.
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101 CHAPTER VI
6. Conclusion
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the relations between the ROC and Africa, and in particular, to try to bring new insight on the possible reasons shaping sub-Saharan states decisions to withdraw or refrain from recognizing the ROC. As it has been indicated throughout this project, the ROC has been facing fierce competition from the PRC over time. As an emerging political and economic power and with a growing regional presence in Africa, the PRC’s capacity to advance sub-Saharan countries’ interests has motivated a great majority of these states to side with Beijing at the expense of Taipei. For the ROC, this fact has put its diplomatic presence in Africa at risk. The current number of its diplomatic allies on the continent has reached its lowest since 1988, when it was also recognized by only three African countries.
The end of the civil war in 1949 and the ROC’s government relocation to the island of Taiwan marked the beginning of the diplomatic ‘tug of war’ between the two Chinas. In its pursuit for international recognition to assert its legitimate status in the international community, and desire to maintain its seat in the UN, the ROC tried its utmost to secure diplomatic recognition throughout the globe. It was in this context that Africa had, by the early 1960s, become a new battlefield for Chinese diplomatic competition due to the growing number of newly independent states. During this period, it is undeniable that the ROC performed quite well in Africa, as the majority of African countries regarded the ROC as the sole legitimate representative of China. Yet, the situation changed drastically after 1971 when the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of China in the UN and expelled the ROC representatives from the organization. From 1971 onwards, Taipei has seen its number of diplomatic allies drastically reduced, a situation which was further exacerbated upon Washington's decision to enter into official diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979.
As the numbers have shown in this study, African countries have actively participated in this process. While in 1969 the ROC was recognized by 22 African states, currently this number has been reduced to only three. Under the Beijing’s so-called ‘One
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China’ policy, states had to make a choice to either side with the ROC or the PRC. With regard to the effects of this policy, this thesis applied the Neorealist theory and its
‘bandwagon behavior’ to better explain the possible reasons prompting sub-Saharan states to withdraw or refrain from recognizing the ROC over time. In this context, an examination
‘bandwagon behavior’ to better explain the possible reasons prompting sub-Saharan states to withdraw or refrain from recognizing the ROC over time. In this context, an examination