中華民國與撒哈拉以南非洲國家的關係探討:甚麼是可能促使撒哈拉以南非洲國家放棄或避諱承認中華民國的因素? - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 政治大中華民國與撒哈拉以南非洲國家的關係探討: 立 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 甚麼是可能促使撒哈拉以南非洲國家放棄或避諱承認中華民國的因素? The ROC and Its Relations with Sub-Saharan African Countries: What Are the Possible Factors Prompting Sub-Saharan African States to Withdraw or Refrain Recognition of the ROC?. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. n. v i n C h Maia 馬小科 Student: Francisco 102926023 engchi U Advisor: Yen Chen-shen 嚴震生中華民國 104 年 7 月 July, 2015.

(2) 中華民國與撒哈拉以南非洲國家的關係探討: 甚麼是可能促使撒哈拉以南非洲國家放棄或避諱承認中華民國的因素? The ROC and Its Relations with Sub-Saharan African Countries: What Are the Possible Factors Prompting Sub-Saharan African States to Withdraw or Refrain Recognition of the ROC? Student: Francisco Maia. 研究生: 馬小科. 治 Yen Chen-shen (PH. D.) 政 Advisor: 大. 指導教授: 嚴震生博士. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 國立政治大學. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧. 碩士論文. er. io. A Thesis. sit. y. Nat. al. n. v i n Submitted to International in Asia-Pacific Studies CMaster’s h e n g cProgram hi U National Chengchi University. In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement For the Degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國 104 年 7 月 July, 2015.

(3) Dedication. 政治大 This thesis 立 is dedicated to Victor Maia. ‧ 國. 學. You will always be an inspiration for me. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. I. i n U. v.

(4) Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor Yen Chen-shen, for his critical guidance and constructive advice on this project. I would also like to thank my thesis committee for all their valuable advice and suggestions as well as the support and cooperation provided by the IMAS office during these two years. The conclusion of this study would not be possible without the support of my family and friends. In this regard I would like to extend my especial thanks to my mom, Maria Cristina, my father, Manuel Maia and my sister Beatriz Maia. Their love, values and support made. 政治大. me who I am today. Many thanks also to Alyssa Johnson and David Ivo for their priceless. 立. encouragement and friendship.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. II. i n U. v.

(5) List of Acronyms and Abbreviations APSA Union’s Peace and Security Architecture ATEF Africa Taiwan Economic Forum AU African Union BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa CCP Chinese Communist Party CDB China Development Bank DFA Department of Foreign Affairs ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States. 政治大. EIA Energy Information Administration. 立. EU European Union. EXIM Export Import Bank of China. ‧ 國. 學. FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. ‧. ICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China ICDF International Co-operation and Development Fund. y. Nat. sit. IMF International Monetary Found. er. io. MINFIN Angolan Ministry of Finances. MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic. n. al. Ch. MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola NGO Non Governmental Organizations. engchi. i n U. OAU Organization of African Unity PRC People’s Republic of China ROC Republic of China SAA South African Airways SACP South Africa Communist Party SADC Southern African Development Community SME Small and Medium Enterprises TANU Tanganyika African National Union UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees III. v.

(6) UNIPEC China International United Petroleum & Chemicals Co., Ltd. UNITA Uniao Nacional para a Total Independencia de Angola UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States WB World Bank ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. IV. i n U. v.

(7) Abstract This thesis aims to analyze the possible reasons shaping the sub-Saharan African states’ decisions in withdrawing or refraining from recognizing the Republic of China (ROC). In the last decades the number of the ROC’s diplomatic allies has decreased drastically and the majority of states located south of the Sahara Desert have taken part in this process. For instance, at the peak of its success in Africa in 1964, Taipei was recognized by twenty two countries. Yet, today it is only recognized by three states. The research conducted is an attempt to provide a better understanding of this trend by focusing on the sub-Saharan African states’ motivations in not extending recognition to. 政治大 ROC’s quest for international recognition. In this regard, one should not disregard the role 立 of the People’s Republic of China. Within the “one China” principle, Beijing’s capacity in. Taipei. This is important because since the 1960s, Africa has become a potential area in the. ‧ 國. 學. advancing these states national interests has been an important driving force in diverting sub-Saharan countries’ allegiance from the ROC in the two China’s diplomatic competition. will be applied.. ‧. In order to explain this tendency, the Neo-realism theory and its “bandwagon” behavior. Nat. sit. y. The expected contributions from this work include a new perspective on the ROC-. er. io. Africa relations in which an evaluation of the African stance regarding this issue is proposed. The author hopes to bring new insights on the current vulnerable diplomatic. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. position of the ROC in Africa, thus further contributing to the scientific debate on the. engchi. relationships between African countries and the ROC.. Key Words: ROC-Africa; PRC-Africa; International Recognition; Diplomatic Competition;. V.

(8) 摘要. 本文主旨在分析構成撒哈拉以南的非洲國家決定中斷或抑制承認中華民國為主權國家原因。過去的幾十年來，中華民國的邦交國數目大幅下降，大部分位於撒哈拉沙漠以南的非洲國家都在其中。舉例來說，1964 年是中華民國在非洲地區外交上的峰期，台北獲得了 22 個國家的承認。然而，現今只剩下 3 個國家的承認。這個研究計劃，企圖藉由關注研究撒哈拉沙漠以南的非洲國家不繼續承認台北的動機，使這種趨勢能更加被瞭解。這點是非常重要的，因為自 1960 年以來，中華民國已經將非洲視為在其謀求國際承認最有潛力的區域。而在這個層面，便不能輕忽中. 政治大提昇這些國家的整體國家利益上所擁有的能力，對中華民國在撒哈拉沙漠以南的非立華人民共和國在其中所扮演的角色。驅使在“一個中國”的原則下，北京當局在推動. ‧ 國. 學. 洲友邦國家而言，是推動他們轉向，開啟兩個中國外交競爭的一股重要力量。為了解釋這一種傾向，本文應用了新現實主義理論和其中的“bandwagon behaviour”模說明。. ‧. 筆者預期本文能達到的目的包含了提供一個新的視角來看待中華民國與非洲的關係，用來評估非洲國家對於此問題所持有的立場。筆者希望能夠針對現今中華民國和非. Nat. sit. y. 洲國家間脆弱的外交地位，帶來新的見解，並進一步提供關於非洲各國和中華民國. n. al. er. io. 之間關係的科學論證。. Ch. i n U. v. Key Words: ROC-Africa; PRC-Africa; International Recognition; Diplomatic Competition;. engchi. VI.

(9) Table of Contents. Chapter I –Introduction…………………………………………………………………...1 1.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..…1 1.2 Research Questions……………………………………………………………………..3 1.3 Research Methodology………………………………………………………………….3 1.4. Limitations of the Study………………………………………………………………...4 1.5 Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………………….4. Chapter II - The ROC since 1971 and its Need for International Recognition………...7. 政治大 2.2 International Recognition and its Importance………………………………………….10 立 2.3 Withdrawal of recognition and Nonrecognition……………………………………….15 2.1. The ROC’s Quest for International Recognition……………………………………….7. ‧ 國. 學. 2.3.1 Withdrawal of Recognition…………………………………………………..15 2.3.2 The Act of Non-Recognition…………………………………………………16. ‧. 2.4 The ROC and Sub-Saharan Africa: Withdrawal of Recognition, Non-Recognition and the Neorealist Theory………………………………………………………………………17. y. Nat. sit. 2.4.1 The Withdrawal of Recognition in the ROC-Africa Relations……………...17. er. io. 2.4.2 The Act of Non-Recognition in the ROC-Africa Relations…………………18 2.4.3 The Neorealist Theory and its ‘Bandwagon Behavior’……………………...21. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Chapter III - The Role of the PRC in the ROC-Africa Relations……………………..24 3.1 The ROC’s Main Obstacle in Africa: the PRC………………………………………...24 3.2 Sub-Saharan Africa: A Brief Introduction…………………………………………….25 3.2.1 The Sino-Africa Relations: an Overview……………………………………27. Chapter IV – The ROC and Africa……………………………………………………...35 4.1 The ROC after 1949: A Brief Contextualization ……………………………………...35 4.2 The Period 1949-1971: Africa as a new battlefield for Chinese competition……….. 36 4.3 The Period 1971-1989: The ROC’s International Decline…………………………….41 4.4 The Period 1989-2000: A new re-emergence of the ROC in Africa…………………..43 VII.

(10) 4.4.1 The ROC in Africa: the ‘Checkbook Diplomacy’ Issue……………………44 4.5 The Period 2000-2008: the ROC’s New Diplomatic Decline: The African Case…….46 4.6 The Period 2008-2014: the Diplomatic Truce………………………………………...48 4.7Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...49. Chapter V - What Are the Possible Factors Prompting Sub-Saharan African States to Withdraw or Refrain from Recognizing the ROC?......................................................52 5.1 Ideology, Natural Resource Rics, Pariah States, Countries with International Ambitions, and Politically Unstable Countries………………………………………………………...52. 政治大 5.1.2 The Case of Tanzania………………………………………………………..56 立 5.1.3 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...60 5.1.1 Ideology……………………………………………………………………...54. ‧ 國. 學. 5.2.1 Resource Rich Countries…………………………………………………….61 5.2.2 The Case of Angola………………………………………………………….65. ‧. 5.2.3 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...74 5.3.1 Pariah States………………………………………………………………….76. y. Nat. sit. 5.3.2 The Case of Zimbabwe……………………………………………………...77. er. io. 5.3.3 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..83 5.4.1 Countries with International Ambitions…………………………………….85. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. 5.4.2 The Case of South Africa…………………………………………………...86. engchi. 5.4.3 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..93 5.5.1 Politically Unstable Countries………………………………………………94 5.5.2 The Case of Liberia………………………………………………………….96 5.5.3 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..99 Chapter VI – Conclusion………………………………………………………………..101 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………......106. VIII.

(11) List of Figures and Tables Figure 1. The ROC’s Remaining Diplomatic Allies Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Countries Figure 3. Sub-Saharan Africa’s Exports of Crude Oil by Destination in 2012 Figure 4. Angola’s Crude Oil Exports by Destination in 2014 Table 1. The ROC’s Diplomatic Allies, 1971-2015 Table 2. African States which Have Switched Sides Several Times Table 3. Countries with Relations with the PRC Table 4. The ‘China Issue’ in the UN - Three Major Groups in 1963. 治政 Table 6. Possible Factors Prompting Sub-Saharan African大 States to Withdraw or Refrain from Recognizing the ROC 立 Table 5. Sub-Saharan Countries Recognizing the ROC in 1975 and 1988. ‧ 國. 學. Table 7. The PRC’s Major ‘Resource for Infrastructure’ Loans in Angola (2002-2010) Table 8. Angola’s Exports by Destination Between 2000 and 2011. ‧. Table 9. Composition of Angola’s Exports to the PRC in 2011 Table 10. Imports Origin of Angola in 2014 - Top 5. sit. y. Nat. Table 11. PRC-Angola High Ranking Official Bilateral Exchanges (1988-2015). io. since 2000. n. al. er. Table 12. High Ranking Official Bilateral Exchanges between the PRC and Zimbabwe. Ch. engchi. IX. i n U. v.

(12) CHAPTER I 1.1 Introduction Since the early 1960s, the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China1 have been involved in a diplomatic tug of war aimed at obtaining international support towards claiming China’s seat of representation within the UN. In this regard, Africa has become one of the main battlegrounds for this dispute due to the fact that African representation comprises nearly 30% of all UN members, thus forming the largest regional. 政治大 It has been generally agreed that during the decade of 1960s the ROC 立 performed well in Africa, a fact that allowed it to maintain its seat in the United Nations. group by number of member states.. ‧ 國. 學. However, after the loss of its UN seat in 1971 and Washington's switching recognition towards the PRC in 1979, the process of de-recognition of the ROC accelerated leaving the. ‧. island state in a very complicated situation internationally. African states have participated in this process. At the peak of its success in Africa in 1964, Taipei was recognized by. Nat. sit. y. twenty two countries. However, today it is recognized by only three states.. io. er. In the majority of the analyses on the ROC and African relations, emphasis has been solely placed on how the ROC has been able to secure or obtain its diplomatic allies,. n. al. i n U. v. therefore failing to thoroughly analyze the factors influencing the considerations of African. Ch. engchi. nations towards relations with the ROC. In this study however, the author intends to approach these relations from a different perspective. That is, it will provide an analysis based not on the methods and reasons why the ROC has been able to secure its African allies, but rather why has the number of African states officially recognizing Taipei sharply decreased over time. This is because the author believes that the dynamic political reality in Africa plays an important role in shaping state’s decisions regarding the ‘two Chinas’ quarrel. Since the current literature on these relations is missing some important aspects in this regard, the author found that a study focusing on this issue could provide a better understanding of the current diplomatic situation the ROC is facing in Africa. 1. Throughout this study the term ROC will be employed as it is Taiwan’s constitutional name. The mainland of China is referred to as the PRC.. 1.

(13) Currently the ROC enjoys official diplomatic relations with 22 countries, of which only three of them are in Africa: Burkina Faso, Sao Tomé e Principe and Swaziland (MOFA, 2015). This means that the other forty five countries located in the Sub-Saharan region have diplomatic relations with the PRC2. In this context it is impossible to dismiss the role of the PRC. Although Taipei, with great efforts, had managed to maintain its seat in the UN until 1971, the Resolution 2578, which resulted in the recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of China to the United Nations, had a profound impact on the ROC’s political influence in Africa. From this period onwards, Beijing, along with its so-called “one China Policy” and its claims of being the Third World leader, has used its seat in the UN and the Security. 政治大 international arena that the island is an integral part of China. Moreover, the emergence of 立 the PRC as a key economic player has raised Beijing’s confidence and influence globally. Council to limit Taipei’s endeavors for international recognition and assert its claims in the. ‧ 國. 學. Beijing is nowadays the world’s second largest economy and Africa’s biggest trading partner. In 2000, Sino-Africa relations saw a new development with the launching of the. ‧. Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and relations between Beijing and the majority of African states have been upgraded since then.. y. Nat. sit. The two China’s diplomatic competition implies that states must decide to. er. io. recognize either the ROC or the PRC. Over time, the ROC has been losing this battle globally and the current low number of its diplomatic allies located in the sub-Saharan. al. n. region mirrors this reality.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. It is usually claimed that the decision to recognize a nation or not depends on political preferences rather than on the legal grounds drafted by international law. Therefore, when a state faces the decision of whether or not to recognize another state, it’ll first weigh the advantages against the disadvantages before deciding. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution of the relationship between the ROC and the Sub-Saharan African states over the last fifty years, and the possible factors explaining why these states have never entered into relations with the ROC or withdrawn their recognition over time. In doing so, in this study the author will also touch upon issues such as the importance of The Gambia which broke its ties with Taipei in 2013 has not been able to establish official diplomatic relations with the PRC as a result of the ‘diplomatic truce’ informally agreed between the ROC and the PRC since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008.. 2. 2.

(14) international recognition and the implications of its absence for the ROC on Taiwan. In addition, the neo-realist theory and its “bandwagon behavior” will be used to better explain the Sub-Saharan states act of non-recognition of the ROC. In this regard, it will be contended that a set of five different key national interests have been an important driving force in prompting sub-Saharan countries to side with the PRC at the expense of the ROC. By looking at the dynamic factors possibly determining sub-Saharan states’ decision to not recognize or withdraw recognition from ROC over time, this study hopes to further contribute to the scientific debate on the relationships between African countries and the ROC.. 政治大. 1.2 Research Questions. 立. The number of the ROC’s diplomatic allies in sub-Saharan Africa has shrunk. ‧ 國. 學. dramatically over time. This has implied that Taipei’s presence on the continent is nowadays minimal, as the majority of states located in this region have tended to side with. ‧. Beijing at the expense of Taipei. It is this current reality being faced by the ROC in this part of the world which has inspired the main question of this study: What are the possible. Nat. sit. io. er. the ROC?. y. factors prompting sub-Saharan African states to withdraw or refraining recognition from However, other questions can be asked in this context. A large number of scholars. n. al. i n U. v. working on the ROC-Africa relations have contended that the PRC’s determination in. Ch. engchi. limiting the ROC’s diplomatic overtures in the international arena has been highly successful overall. This reality is reflected on the African continent where only three states enjoy official diplomatic ties with Taipei, against fifty officially recognizing Beijing. In this regard, one can ask, is there any more space left in the sub-Saharan Africa for the ROC to be officially recognized as a sovereign state? Are there any states, apart from its current diplomatic allies, still willing to enter into official ties with Taipei? 1.3 Research Methodology Currently there are two main research approaches in the field of social sciences, namely quantitative and qualitative. For this study I decided to opt for the latter. 3.

(15) Qualitative research is multi-method in scope, involving interpretive and naturalistic approaches to its subject matter. This means that the qualitative researcher studies things in his natural environment, in an attempt to make sense or to better interpret the phenomena, according to the meaning attributed by others. The qualitative research allows us to develop explanations and generalizations that are close to concrete data and context but are more than simple generalizations (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). This method performs a careful analysis of content of the available primary and secondary sources such as speeches, academic studies, interviews, government reports speeches, press statements, etc (Costa, 2007).. 治政 is essentially information obtained from international 大 treaties, government reports and interviews. This has included立 government reports related to trade statistics (i.e. Bureau of For this study, both primary and secondary texts have been used. The primary data. ‧ 國. 學. Foreign Trade), and interviews I am expecting to conduct with the Africa Taiwan Economic Forum director-general, Dr. Richard Lin. Secondary sources have been obtained. ‧. from several sources such as books, academic journals, conference papers, master and doctoral thesis on related themes (the ROC’s foreign policy, the ROC relations with the. sit. y. Nat. African countries, the PRC’s foreign diplomacy, and the PRC’s political and economic. io. al. er. relations with Africa) and other internet publications.. n. 1.4 Limitations of the Study. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. For this study the author would have preferred to conduct the proposed research in Africa, namely in Angola, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Liberia in order be able to do interviews with officials and academics whose expertise is related to Sino-Africa relations. However due to limitations of funds and time, this study will only be undertaken based on the use of primary and secondary sources. 1.5 Theoretical Framework The ROC’s diplomatic interactions with the African states have deteriorated over time. This relationship has been characterized by an increasing number of countries whose decisions concerning the ‘two Chinas’ issue have largely contributed to the ROC’s current 4.

(16) weak diplomatic presence in Africa. In other words, the majority of the African states have tended to recognize the PRC at the expense of the ROC under the “one China” principle. Unlike Taipei, which since 1971 has seen its overall political clout being reduced as a result of its withdrawal of the UN and the loss of its main ally, the United States, Beijing has been able to gradually assert its influence in world affairs. This growing global influence has naturally been felt in Africa where the PRC’s presence is nowadays almost impossible to ignore. As mentioned above, China is today the world’s second largest economy and is Africa’s biggest trading partner. Moreover, through FOCAC, the PRC’s engagement with Africa has over the past decade grown to become a prominent feature in the international relations of the African continent. As a result, in the ‘two Chinas’ quarrel, African states,. 政治大 the continent and prompted to engage in official diplomatic relations with the PRC at the 立 expense of the ROC. In this study proposes the idea that sub-Saharan states have over time with few exceptions, have hardly ignored the leading position Beijing has been playing on. ‧ 國. 學. entered into official relations with the PRC due to its capacity to advance these countries’ domestic and foreign policy interests. In order to sustain this idea, the author has decided to. ‧. apply in this project the ‘Neorealist’ theory and its ‘bandwagon’ behavior. The Neorealist theory, which has become largely associated with Kenneth Waltz, is. y. Nat. sit. the foundational theory of international relations and tries to explain the behavior of states. er. io. and their interactions with one another in the world affairs. According to the neorealist theory, states anarchically compete for survival in the international arena, causing them to. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. behave rationally in order to insure survival. It is in this context of a desire for survival that. engchi. the neorealist theory establishes its concept of balance of power in which, unlike the classic realism, countries are not automatically inclined to align themselves against one another for survival because they can display a group behavior (bandwagon) which is also beneficial for their interests. This ‘bandwagon’ behavior is often visible when a state is characterized as leading all others tend to follow it, because they want to be aligned with the forces in power rather than against them. In analyzing the possible reasons refraining sub-Saharan African states to enter into official relations with the ROC, I would argue that these countries have tended to ‘bandwagon’ towards the PRC. Taking into account Taipei’s current diplomatic situation in Africa, and the aforementioned factors shaping the current relations between Beijing and 5.

(17) Africa, the decision of the sub-Saharan African States in siding with the PRC at the expense of the ROC, seems to display patterns a ‘bandwagon’ behavior, in which states in the pursuit of their interests tend to side with the leader. In this regard, this study proposes a layout grouping together countries with similar national interests and foreign policy goals which have been important factors prompting these states to ‘bandwagon’ towards the PRC, thus contributing to the ROC’s current diplomatic isolation in Africa. The nature of this study and the theory proposed will not only require an examination of the ROC’s relations with Africa in the last fifty years, but also a careful analysis of the African states domestic politics and their positions towards the ‘two Chinas’ diplomatic quarrel.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 6. i n U. v.

(18) CHAPTER II 2. The ROC since 1971 and its Need for International Recognition 2.1. The ROC’s Quest for International Recognition. Since the loss of its seat in the United Nations (UN) as the sole legal representative of the whole China in 1971, the ROC has been struggling to regain its international legitimacy as a sovereign state. From 1949 to 1970 the seat in the UN General Assembly and Security Council conferred the ROC wide international recognition and security, but. 治政大representative of the people of then on, the PRC began to be recognized as the only legal 立and the ROC delegation, under orders of Chiang Kai-shek, the mainland China in the U.N,. the crucial UN General Assembly 2758 resolution profoundly altered this scenario. From. ‧ 國. 學. walked out of the UN to prevent further humiliation (Winkler, 2012). This event coupled with efforts by the PRC to further isolate the ROC has resulted in an accelerated loss of. ‧. international recognition. This trend was further accentuated by the decision of the American government to switch recognition to Beijing, thus leaving the ROC without any. sit. y. Nat. world superpower defending its cause. Upon Washington’s' formal recognition of Beijing in 1979, most other holdouts followed suit, leaving only a few countries retaining official. io. n. al. er. recognition of Taipei (Rich, 2009).. i n U. v. Facing international isolation since the PRC admission to the UN in 1971 and the. Ch. engchi. establishment of the U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations in 1979, the ROC government on Taiwan has tried to ameliorate its international position. The 1973 declaration of ‘total diplomacy’ 3 by the then Premier Jiang Jing-guo became the foundation of ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ or ‘flexible diplomacy’ which would be launched by then President Lee Tenghui in 1988, that called for (Chan, 2003; Yahuda, 1996): 1. The advancement and reinforcement of formal diplomatic ties;. Diplomacy conducted not only by the central government but also by virtually all other actors who have contact with diplomatic circles: local governments, political parties, non-governmental organizations, parliamentarians, business people and ordinary folk. Such diplomacy is multi-directional. It sought to, promote the mobilization of all available resources in order to escape isolation. 3. 7.

(19) 2. The development of substantive relations with countries that do not maintain formal ties with the ROC on Taiwan; 3. Admission or readmission to international organizations and activities vital to the country’s national interest; The pursuit for international recognition of its sovereignty became the ROC's primary foreign policy goal. For decades since 1971, the ROC on Taiwan has engaged in multiple activities and adopted numerous policies in order to expand its international space (Larus, 2006). As mentioned above, President Jiang Jing-guo, initiated the aforementioned so-called “total diplomacy”; President Lee Teng-hui adopted a foreign policy of “pragmatic. 政治大 established diplomatic relations with the PRC, while also pursuing a more active diplomatic 立 and economic based relationship with the Southeast Asian countries under the “southward diplomacy” in which it sought to maintain unofficial relations with nations that had. ‧ 國. 學. policy” (Larus, 2006). Whereas President Chen Shui-bian continued to use flexible diplomacy to widen Taipei’s international space, the current Ma Ying- jeou's presidency. ‧. has adopted a flexible diplomacy policy of accommodation (Wang, n.d). That is, the ROC will pursue its diplomacy with the precondition of maintaining friendly and cooperative. Nat. sit. y. relations with the PRC4.. er. io. It is generally accepted that the resilience demonstrated over time by the ROC’s successive administrations and their creative and innovative foreign policy have brought. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. positive results in Taipei’s quest for diplomatic recognition. Despite the veracity of the. engchi. statement, especially when one takes into account certain periods of time5, I would argue that overall the success of this pursuit has been limited. Contributing to this is the role the PRC has been playing over time concerning Taipei's struggle for survival. For instance, although the ROC dropped its claim to the mainland and has been open to dual recognition since 1991, Beijing’s assertiveness regarding the “One China” policy has remained unchanged, a circumstance which has hampered the efforts of Taipei from attaining any The reasons for President’s Ma new approach: 1).Taipei realizes Beijing’s rising power and influence in the world. It will be difficult for it to develop diplomacy without reducing China’s suppression. 2).the ROC can avoid spending unnecessary resources in pursuing its diplomatic interests by bringing to an end the diplomatic battle with the PRC. The ROC can avoid being considered as an unstable actor in East Asia region by not taking a defiant diplomacy against the PRC. 5 the policies adopted during Lee Teng-hui’s presidency in the 1990s have achieved some success in fostering new diplomatic relations. 4. 8.

(20) significant progress in increasing formal recognition (Rich, 2009). Given the PRC’s growing influence in the world affairs, few nations dare to establish formal relations with the ROC on Taiwan and sacrifice their official diplomatic links with Beijing. The table 1 displays the decreasing number of the ROC’s diplomatic allies since 1971, a rapid decline which is hard to ignore.. Table.1 The ROC’s Diplomatic Allies, 1971-2015 1972. 1973. 1974. 1975. 1976. 1977. 1978. 1979. 1980. Number. 55. 42. 38. 31. 26. 26. 23. 22. 22. 22. Year. 1981. 1982. 1983. 治政 1984 1985 1986 大1987. 1988. 1989. 1990. Number. 24. 24. 25. 26. 23. 23. 23. 22. 26. 28. Year. 1991. 1992. 1993. 1994. 1995. 1996. 1997. 1998. 1999. 2000. Number. 29. 28. 27. 28. 29. 29. 30. 27. 29. 29. Year. 2001. 2002. 2003. 2004. 2005. 2006. 2007. 2008. 2013. 2015. Number. 28. 27. 26. 25. 24. 24. 23. 22. 22. Nat. sit. 27. y. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 1971. 學. Year. al. n. Wikipedia, 2015; MOFA, 2015;. er. io. Source: Elaborated by the author with data retrieved from: Where is Taiwan? 2012; Thinking Taiwan, 2013. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Despite the trend of derecognition that has been affecting the ROC on Taiwan since 1971, and the fierce opposition displayed by the PRC over the last decades, Taipei has not given up on its pursuit for the legitimization of its sovereignty and presence in international organizations. Diplomatic recognition matters for Taipei and Africa has become one of the arenas where the ROC has intensively conducted its foreign policy and tried to increase its presence. However, the current scenario is not ideal and the future doesn’t seem to be promising. Currently, the ROC enjoys official diplomatic relations with 22 countries, of which only three of them are in Africa (The Kingdom of Swaziland, Burkina Faso and Sao Tome and Principe) (MOFA, 2015).. 9.

(21) Fig.1 The ROC’s Remaining Diplomatic Allies. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Source: https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/taiwan-loses-diplomatic-ally. ‧. As the purpose of this thesis is to analyze the reasons behind the decisions of sub-. sit. y. Nat. Saharan African countries to break off their diplomatic ties with the ROC, I found that two questions should be answered in this context: what is diplomatic recognition and why is. io. n. al. er. this recognition important for the ROC on Taiwan? This analysis will be particularly. i n U. v. helpful for a better understanding of the need for the ROC to have diplomatic allies and the. Ch. engchi. consequences that the trend of derecognition may have in the future of the nation. 2.2 International Recognition and its Importance International recognition is defined in legal terms as a unilateral act by which a state expresses its readiness to enter into juridical relations with another state or entity under international law, and to conduct full diplomatic, consular or other relations with it. International recognition is seen as a voluntary declaration of intent and does not impose any obligation on the recognizing state (Akaba, 2011). There are essentially two theoretical models connected to the recognition of states: the constitutive theory and the declaratory theory (Carbonnier, n.d). The first one, the constitutive theory, considers that the act of 10.

(22) recognition by other states determines the existence of a new state and grants it an international legal personality. Its implications are that the new state is established as an international person by virtue of the will and consent of already existing states (Abdulrahim, 2009). The second one is the declaratory theory. According to the declaratory theory, a state must fulfill four criteria before it can be accepted as a state in the international community. This criterion is based on the Article 1 of the Montevideo Declaration which will be explained below. This type of recognition has no legal effects and it is purely a fact. Thus if the entity is able to properly comply with the requirements of a state , it is a state with all international rights and duties, and therefore other states have the obligation to treat. 政治大 In the past, the constitutive theory had its achievements. In the 19th Century, 立 international law was regarded as applying mainly between states within Europe it as such (Abdulrahim, 2011; Carbonnier, n.d; Yamali, 2009).. ‧ 國. 學. (Abdulrahim, 2011). Other nations would be admitted as states to this community only if they could attain recognition from those member states. Nowadays, recognition can. ‧. occasionally have a constitutive effect, although state practice is not always consistent. When the creation of a new state or government is not in accordance with international law,. y. Nat. sit. this state or government is most of the times considered as having no legal existence until it. er. io. is recognized (Abdulrahim, 2011).. Yet, currently the main view is that recognition is declaratory and does not create a state.. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. This view was laid down in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. engchi. of 1933. The Article 3 of the Convention states that: “The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence” (Montevideo Convention, 1933). In fact, the two theories provide little contribution in explaining recognition or determining the status of non-recognized entities in practice. Moreover, in my opinion the distinction between them is of little significance. According to the declaratory theory, deciding whether a new entity satisfies the criteria of statehood depends on the decision of other states, and the granting formal recognition to a new state (considered a unilateral act) is left to the political discretion of states. On the other hand, the importance of the constitutive theory has lost relevance due to the obligation imposed on states to treat an 11.

(23) entity that satisfies the criteria of statehood as a state. Moreover, since recognition has a political side, the state's practice regarding recognition shows that states prefer a middle way between the aforementioned theories (Yamali, 2009; Abdulrahim, 2011). According to Yamali (2009) International law is constituted by states and it is concerned with the activities and the transactions of states. However, if roughly 50 years ago the general consensus was that states were the only legal persons of the international law, nowadays this conception has broadened and participants can be regarded as: states, international organizations, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public enterprises, private companies and individuals (Yamali, 2009). According to international law an entity able to meet the international legal criteria. 政治大 the requirements for statehood in its well known Article 1. The criteria for statehood as 立 determined by the Convention are: (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3). of statehood is able to become a state. In this regard, The Montevideo Convention6 sets out. ‧ 國. 學. government (4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states (Aynete, 2011). .. ‧. 1. Permanent population: population is crucial for the existence of a state, as is indicated in Article 1; a permanent population does not mean that the population has. Nat. sit. y. to be static at one place. Rather, it takes into account pastoralists who move. er. io. seasonally from place to place. Additionally, the size of the population is not an essential requirement.. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. 2. Territory: the territory where the permanent population resides does not imply that. engchi. the boundaries have to be defined precisely. Thus a border dispute with another country does not cast doubt on the territorial status of a country. It is only important that a country has a clear core territory in order to be a state. 3. Government: A state requires a government functioning as a political body and in accordance with the law and the nation’s constitution. The government needs to exercise effective power over its territory and citizens. 4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states: defines the new entity’s recognition by other states so that they have the capacity to start relations (Aynete, 2011). The Montevideo Convention: treaty signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, on December 26, 1933. The Convention codified the declarative theory of statehood as accepted as part of customary international law. 6. 12.

(24) The ROC, and other disputed territories (e.g., Somaliland or the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), clearly meet these requirements for statehood (Rich, 2009). Yet, the recognition of a state internationally is rarely based on internal sovereignty, since sovereignty has both internal and external dimensions (Payen & Veney, 2001). Some authors such as Rich (2009) says that a political community claiming sovereignty, even if judged by outsiders as legitimate, cannot be called a state if in practice it cannot assert this right. In order to legitimize sovereignty claims, many entities attempt to mirror the actions of recognized states in order to be perceived as such (Rich, 2009). For instance, many disputed states (e.g. the ROC on Taiwan) declare their consent to international agreements. 政治大 to statehood. In 2007, Taipei, in its annual application for UN membership stated: 立 (Washington Times, 2007): and declarations of which they were not signatories as a means of legitimizing their claims. ‧ 國. 學. “We meet all of the attributes of statehood set forth in the 1933 Montevideo Convention —. ‧. a permanent population (with 23 million people, we’re larger than 60 percent of U.N. member states), a defined territory and the ability to enter into relations with other states.. Nat. sit. y. Article 4 of the convention provides, “The political existence of the state is independent of. io. n. al. er. recognition by other states.”. i n U. v. “We respect all of the rights enunciated in the 1948 U.N. Declaration of Human Rights,. Ch. engchi. which many U.N. member states routinely violate. Still, they’re members in good standing and we’re not.” Although there may be degrees of external sovereignty, a more precise indicator is diplomatic recognition (Rich, 2009). Other authors such as Newnham (2000) contend that the very definition of state sovereignty must include diplomatic recognition. In other words, sovereignty can be conceived not only as the recognition of internal actors but also attributed to the state by other states (Payne & Veney, 2001). The greater the number of states extending diplomatic recognition to a state, the greater is the sense of external legitimacy. Moreover, recognition. 13.

(25) is crucial to define a state's membership in the world community as well as to support its claim as an international person. Currently the ROC on Taiwan is in a difficult position, with only 22 nations formally recognizing its claims to sovereignty. This lack of external legitimacy leaves the ROC insecure against counter claims from Beijing, since the majority of states around the globe side with PRC due to its size, power and forcefulness on the Taiwan issue in order to avoid antagonizing Beijing (Fossen, 2007). During the first years of the 20th century, there were nearly fifty states in the world arena, right before World War II this number had grown to reach approximately seventyfive states and in 2005 there were almost 200 (Yamali, 2009). With the creation of each. 政治大 community. The ROC on Taiwan, due to its ambiguous international status, has been a 立 difficult case to solve. Recognition has become a matter of great importance essentially due new state the concept of recognition must be put on the agenda of the international. ‧ 國. 學. to its legal and political implications. Recognition of an entity not only confirms that this entity has met the required qualifications, but also that recognizing states are willing to. ‧. enter into relations with the recognized state. As a result the newly recognized state may benefit from privileges and immunities within the international legal order, such as making. y. Nat. er. io. states (Yamali, 2009).. sit. treaties with other entities and allowing the government to act free from the control of other Thus, it is usually claimed that, the decision to recognize a nation or not, depends. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. on political preferences rather than on the legal grounds drafted by international law. Chiu. engchi. (1992) argues that states should regard the determination of whether a new entity is a state as a legal decision and base their decisions of recognition on objective criteria prescribed by international law, however this decision is usually treated as a question of policy. This tendency of states to recognize other entities based on political preferences is understandable given that extending the benefits of recognition is intrinsically linked to the recognizing state’s interests. Therefore, when a state faces the decision of whether or not to recognize another state, they’ll first weigh the advantages against the disadvantages before deciding (Yamali, 2009; Carbonnier, n,d.). For instance, Spain contending with separatist pressures from Catalonia and Basque region on its own territory, refused to recognize the secession of the ethnic Albanian territory of Kosovo from Serbia in 2008, presumably 14.

(26) fearing a chain reaction within its own borders (Reuters, 2008). For the same reason, Beijing immediately opposed Kosovo independence, anxious to stop Taiwan and separatist movements in Tibet or Xinjiang from following the example. Other Asian governments that are battling against separatism in their own countries, such as Sri Lanka, have refused to recognize as well (Chan, 2008). The Kosovo case provides a good example as to why states may decide not to enter into relations with other nations as the disadvantages of this action outweigh the advantages. Similarly, the ROC-PRC struggle for international recognition has provided several examples of countries providing recognition to either Taipei or Beijing according to their own interests. In this case, impoverished nations, highly dependent on foreign aid have consciously made use of this diplomatic competition and profited from. 政治大 usually these nations are willing to establish relations with either Taipei or Beijing 立 depending on how much compensation is provided by either side. For example, in 1996. either Beijing or the ROC, both economically and politically (Taylor, 2002). In other words,. ‧ 國. 學. Senegal switched-for the third time-from Beijing to Taipei and in return was able to receive a generous aid package. In 1994, Gambia as a result of having recognized Taipei, received. ‧. funding amounting to US$35 million (Taylor, 2002). In 1998, Taipei accused Beijing of having had provided an assistance package of US$100 million to Guinea-Bissau in. y. Nat. er. io. al. sit. exchange for the country’s recognition (Rich, 2009).. n. 2.3 Withdrawal of Recognition and Non-Recognition. Ch. engchi. 2.3.1 Withdrawal of Recognition. i n U. v. Diplomatic recognition is crucial to the very definition of state sovereignty. The greater the number of states extending diplomatic recognition to a country, the greater the external legitimacy that country exhibits. In this case, withdrawal of recognition can be a huge setback for a nation’s aspirations of sovereignty. According to some authors (Yamali, 2009; Carbonnier, n.d.; Hillgruber, 1998) the withdrawal of granted recognition is possible under certain circumstances. It is especially. 15.

(27) easy when it comes to granting a de facto recognition7. De facto recognition is a simple acknowledgement that a government exists and wields effective control over people and territory (Essen, 2012). This means that de facto recognition is usually accompanied by disapproval of the recognizing state towards the new regime, or at least the expectancy of certain improvements before de jure recognition is granted (Essen, 2012). On the other hand, de jure recognition can only be withdrawn if the state is annexed or conquered by another state (Yamali, 2009; Essen, 2012). As mentioned above, withdrawal of recognition can happen regardless the type of recognition. Yet, this decision can be easily made when it comes to a de facto recognition, due to its temporary nature. De facto recognition intends to be a preliminary acceptance of. 政治大 recognized country. When a de facto government loses its effective control over the country, 立 the main reason for the act of recognition disappears and can subsequently be withdrawn. the political realities and can be withdrawn based on political changes taking place in the. ‧ 國. 學. Regarding de jure recognition, given the fact that it is a definitive act, its withdrawal can be more complex. If a de jure government is overthrown a new situation arises and the. ‧. question of recognition of a new government must be faced (Abdulrahim, 2009). In this case, withdrawal of recognition of the overthrown government is assumed and no. y. Nat. sit. declaration must be made.. er. io. Since recognition is essentially an act of political nature, no matter how circumscribed or conditioned by the law, a state possesses an unrestricted capacity to. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. determine whether a certain case justifies the withdrawal of recognition and to take such. engchi. action if it is in conformity with its own national interests.. 2.3.2 The Act of Non-Recognition Recognition can be attributed to an already existing state and withdrawn according to the national interests and events taking place within the recognized state. However the act of non-recognition is applied within a different context, when a new entity is believed to have emerged as a result of illegal actions, such as in case of aggression or the use of Recognition has been divided into de jure and de facto recognition. De jure recognition can be classified as a full type of recognition. De facto recognition is used to indicate a hesitance on the side of the recognizing state in according de jure recognition. 7. 16.

(28) threats. Hillgruber (1998) states that the act of non-recognition of an entity that is actually emerging as a state remains as an exception in state practice. This can be explained as ostracizing a regime internationally, other states not only deny the newly emerging entity rights under international law, but also lack the capability to call on the new entity to fulfill international obligations and responsibilities. Therefore, the decision not to recognize a state can only be considered if the unreliability of the new state as a partner in international relations appears to be so serious that the community of states refrains from integrating the new state and keeps it away from the international community (Hillgruber, 1998). Simply speaking, the act of non-recognition implies a lack of confidence on the part of the international community in the ability of a political entity to remain viable and the. 政治大 international acceptance (Payne & Veney, 2001). 立. conviction that the new entity lacks internal legitimacy and has failed to attain broad. ‧ 國. 學. 2.4 The ROC and Sub-Saharan Africa: Withdrawal of Recognition, Non-Recognition and the Neorealist Theory. ‧. 2.4.1 The Withdrawal of Recognition in the ROC-Africa Relations. sit. y. Nat. When we look at the case of the ROC on Taiwan and its relations with the African. io. n. al. er. countries two patterns should receive particular attention. The first one is due to the fact. i n U. v. that the ROC on Taiwan has maintained a de facto rule over the island since 1971, several. Ch. engchi. African states have conferred and withdrawn recognition from the country over the years. This is in line with the explanation provided above that the recognition of a de facto government can be easily withdrawn due to its temporary nature and the expectations of improvements before de jure recognition is conferred. Table 2 displays examples of some African states which, since the early 1960s, have switched and entered into diplomatic relations with the ROC several times. The most extreme cases are the Central African Republic, Liberia and Senegal which have established official relations with the ROC three times.. 17.

(29) Table 2. African States Which Have Switched Sides Several Times. Country. Number of times it has established official relations with the ROC. Benin (Formerly Dahomey). 2 Times: 1962-1964; 1966-1973. Chad. 2 Times: 1962-1972; 1997-2006. Liberia. 3 Times: 1957-1977; 1989-1993; 1997-2003. Lesotho Central African Republic. 2 Times: 1968-1974;1995-2013. y. Nat. 1 Time: 1990-1998. sit. Guinea-Bissau8. 3 Times: 1960-1964;1969-1972; 1996-2005. ‧. Gambia. ‧ 國. Senegal. 2 Times: 1963-1974; 1992-1996. 學. Niger. 立. 2 Times: 1955-1983; 1990-1993 治政 3 Times:大 1962-1964; 1968-1976; 1991-1998. er. al. n. 2008; Rich, 2009.. io. Source: Elaborated by the author with data retrieved from: Payne and Veney, 2001; Taylor, 2002; Tseng,. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2.4.2 The Act of Non-Recognition in the ROC-Africa Relations The second pattern is the one of non-recognition. Here we can include the states that have never recognized the ROC or maintained relations with ROC until the UN resolution 2578 was passed, which resulted in the transfer of China’s seat to the PRC. Since 1971, an increasing number of African nations have entered into relations with the PRC at the expense of ties with the ROC. Others have recognized the PRC since their independence; or as early as the late 1950s early 1960s, had already established steady relations with Beijing 8 Guinea-Bissau places a different case. Upon its independence established diplomatic relations with Beijing which came to an end when Bissau decided to formally recognize Taipei in 1990. However, official relations with Beijing were resumed in 1998 thus leading to the cut of official ties with the ROC.. 18.

(30) which have been maintained up to now. Although some of these countries have maintained some economic and cultural interactions with the ROC 9 , overall current relations with Taipei are minimal. Table 3. Countries with Relations with the PRC. Country. Year of the Establishment of Relations. Sudan. 1959. Guinea. 1959. Mali. al. n Congo Brazzaville Equatorial Guinea. Ch. 1964. engchi. sit. 1963. y. 1963. er. io. Burundi. 1961. Nat. Kenya. 1960. ‧. Tanzania. ‧ 國. Ghana. 1960. 學. Somalia. 立. 政治 1960 大. i n U. v. 1970. Ethiopia. 1970. Cameroon. 1971. Nigeria. 1971. In 1992 Taipei set up a special delegation in Luanda, Angola, as a result of an agreement signed between the ROC and the Deputy Minister of Oil of Angola. Mozambique has currently an Office in Taipei to promote trade and investments between the ROC and Mozambique. Nigeria and South Africa have also trade offices in the ROC on Taiwan whose mission is to promote economic and bilateral relations. 9. 19.

(31) Sierra Leone. 1971. Rwanda. 1971. Madagascar. 1972. Mauritius. 1972. Benin. 1972. Togo. 1972. DR Congo. 立. Gabon. n. al. 1976. Djibouti Zimbabwe. Ch. 1979. engchi 1979. Ivory Coast. 1983. Angola. 1983. Namibia. 1990. Eritrea. 1993. South Africa. 1998. 20. y. sit. 1976. er. io. Cape Verde. 1975. Nat. Seychelles. 1975. ‧. Comoro Islands. ‧ 國. Botswana. 1975. 學. Mozambique. 1972 政治大 1974. i n U. v.

(32) South Sudan. 2011. Source: Elaborated by the author with data retrieved from: Yu, 1963; Tseng, 2008; Wikipedia, 2015. What this chart shows us is that the position of the ROC in Africa is weak and that the process of derecognition accelerated after the UN Assembly Resolution of 1971. By not recognizing the ROC on Taiwan, the African states are depriving Taipei of international rights and immunities within the international legal order, such as making treaties with other entities and allowing the government to act free from the control of other states as well as limiting its participation in intergovernmental organizations. Although Taipei has consistently sought to affirm its commitments to international agreements and declarations. 政治大. of which is not a signatory in order to legitimize its claims to statehood, the reality is that. 立. the majority of sub-Saharan African states are not prepared to enter into official relations. ‧ 國. 學. with the ROC for reasons that can be explained by the neorealist theory. 2.4.3 The Neorealist Theory and its ‘Bandwagon Behavior’. ‧. y. Nat. Neorealism – or structural realism – is the foundational theory of International. sit. Relations. Starting from a simple set of assumptions, it seeks to explain the behavior of. er. 2013).. io. states as well as their interactions with one another in the international arena (Jakobsen,. al. n. v i n The theory became largely Waltz after publishing his C hassociated with Kenneth U i e h “Theory of International Politics” in 1979.n In g hiscwork, Waltz preaches that realism had the need to establish more solid and scientific bases. For this reason, realism can also be called structural realism. His work was primarily concerned with explaining the reasons for continuity and repetitions behind state's actions, rather than focusing on singular instances of unusual state behavior, using a way of thinking aimed at explaining the inevitability of change to explain the continuity. This has been called systemic theory. Waltz identifies anarchy as a basis for all existing wars in the international system, and argues that any explanations of such events at the state level are too reductionist, because they limit the scope of issues driving international conflict. He maintains that the structure is not only the sum of the parts that compose it, but are also determined by how the parties position 21.

(33) themselves towards each other and how the structure as a whole restrains, limits and guides the actions of the agents within the system through two mechanisms: socialization and competition. It is the structure that sets the standards of what is acceptable in terms of the agents' decision making. Socialization produces patterns that limit and shape the behavior expected by the actors within the structure, inducing states to avoid certain behaviors. Just as socialization causes actors to adopt certain behavior, competition also works accordingly. States compete for survival in the international arena, causing them to behave rationally in order to ensure survival. Sarfati (2005) view in this regard is that, in international relations, competition leads states to proceed rationally, so that those best adapted are able to survive. 政治大 According to Waltz, international political structures are determined by three main 立 factors: the ordering principle, functional differentiation, and distribution of capabilities. in the international system.. ‧ 國. 學. The principle of order is anarchy, meaning the absence of a world government; there is no higher authority above the main units composing the system – the states. The functions of. ‧. the units (states) are similar with respect to the other. That is because the units of the system closely resemble each other with regard to the functions they perform. Therefore,. y. Nat. sit. what matters is the third feature, which determines the power capacity of each unit. The. er. io. distribution of power is the characteristic that differentiates the units. Therefore, by analyzing the structure of international politics, we prescinded all the attributes of the states. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. with the exception of its power capacity. Thus, it can be said that the relations based on the. engchi. dimension of their capacity (power) stand out when compared to the intrinsic qualities of the units (Jakobsen, 2013). Taking the international system as anarchic and decentralized is the selfish and competitive sentiment of the actors that causes the system to be organized rationally. The desire for survival is a prerequisite for the rationality of States. For Waltz, states have the characteristic of being sovereign, deciding for themselves how to manage internal and external problems. Thus, the difference between the actors is given by variations in the ability to run and manage certain functions. In international politics, this ability must be analyzed compared to other states. This ability, especially in regard to national security, is the central element of relations between States.. 22.

(34) Finally, Waltz establishes the concept of balance of power in the neorealist theory, which is not unlike the balance defined in classical realism, because their requirements are the same: anarchic order and will to survive. However, contradictory to what happens in classical realism, in the neorealist theory, states are not automatically inclined to align themselves against one another for survival because they can display a group behavior (bandwagon) which is also beneficial for their interests. This bandwagon behavior is often visible when a state is characterized as leading and all others tend to follow him, because they want to be aligned with the forces in power rather than against them. This phenomenon is usually common at the end of a conflict when there is a clear victory from one of the competing sides. In the competition for leadership, the “bandwagon” concept is. 政治大 In the following section, the author will try explain what are the possible factors shaping 立 this group behavior and their contribution to sub-Saharan African states decision to. an important component to describe coalition formation around the leader. (Sarfati, 2005).. ‧ 國. 學. withdraw or refrain from recognizing the ROC over time. It will be contend that the PRC’s leadership position in Africa has motivated the majority of the sub-Saharan states’ to side. ‧. with Beijing in pursuit of their own domestic interests and foreign policy goals.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 23. i n U. v.

(35) CHAPTER III 3. The Role of the PRC in the ROC-Africa Relations 3.1 The ROC’s Main Obstacle in Africa: the PRC. Hillgruber (1998) argues that the decision of denying recognition of a state can be considered only if the unreliability of the new state as a partner in international relations appears to be so serious that states refrain from integrating the new state and prefer to keep it away from the international community. In fact, the majority of the African states refuse. 治政大 interests and that the best may have undesirable implications for a country’s national 立 with Taipei. But what are the implications and reasons decision is not to enter into relations to recognize the ROC on Taiwan. In doing so, one can assume that recognizing the ROC. ‧ 國. 學. causing African nations to refrain from establishing relations with the ROC, which is a respected democracy, which complies with all the statehood requirements defined by the. ‧. Montevideo Convention, which is ranked amongst the thirty most powerful economies in the world, and holds the world’s fifth largest foreign exchange reserves? That is the main. sit. y. Nat. goal of this thesis.. In this context it is impossible to dismiss the role of the PRC. Since, the early 1960s. io. n. al. er. a tug of war between Taipei and Beijing ensued in Africa in which both the PRC and the. i n U. v. ROC fiercely began competing for recognition from the newly independent nations. Ch. engchi. emerging on the continent. Although Taipei, with great efforts, had managed to maintain its seat in the UN until 1971, the Resolution 2578, which resulted in the recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of China to the United Nations, had a profound impact on the ROC’s political influence in Africa. From this period onwards Beijing, along with its so-called “one China Policy”10, and its claims of being the third world leader, has used its seat in the UN and the Security Council to limit Taipei’s endeavors for international recognition and assert its claims in the international arena that the island is an integral part of China. Moreover, the emergence of the PRC as a key economic player has raised Beijing’s confidence and influence globally. Beijing is nowadays the world’s second Implies that a country seeking diplomatic relations with the (PRC) must cut official relations with the ROC and vice-versa. 10. 24.

(36) largest economy and Africa’s biggest trading partner (The Economist, 2013). In 2000, Sino-Africa relations witnessed a new development with the launching of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (from now on to be referred to as FOCAC). As a result, relations between Beijing and the majority of African states have been upgraded since then. Taking into account the aforementioned factors shaping the relations between the PRC and Africa, it seems that the PRC has gained a position of leadership among the African states. In applying the neorealist theory and its “bandwagon” behavior I will argue that sub-Saharan African states in the pursuit of their national interests, have been more keen to side with Beijing within the two China’s quarrel context, due to the latter's strong political and economic regional position in Africa.. 政治大 more of a political than a legal act. In applying the neorealist theory and its “bandwagon” 立 behavior to the competition between Taipei and Beijing, we see that Beijing with its. The act of recognition reflects a nation’s national interests and therefore is much. ‧ 國. 學. outstanding growth in the international economy and its resulting influence over global affairs has put it in a position of leadership which sub-Saharan African states are not in a. ‧. position to ignore.. y. Nat. sit. 3.2 Sub-Saharan Africa: A Brief Introduction. er. io. Africa is composed by 54 states of which 49 are located in the sub-Saharan region.. n. al. i n Fig.C2. Sub-Saharan Countries hengchi U. v. Source: http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/region/1 sub-Saharan Africa. 25.

(37) This area is characterized by its enormous diversity in terms of cultures, religion, language, customs, traditions, history and landscape. Contrary to what most people think, the continent is not only a place marked by famine, wars, corruption and violations of human rights; it is also a continent full of potential and hope. Since 1995, Africa’s economic and social performance has been constant which has allowed the continent to become the second fastest growing region of the world. Its per capita income grew at 2.2 percent annually and the poverty rate fell by a total of 10 percentage points, by far the best performance in the last 40 years (Emerging Markets Forum, 2012). Simultaneously, Africa has made good progress in many, though not all, social indicators such as childhood. 政治大 the continent is also well endowed with natural resources, some of them of high strategic 立 and economic value (Tseng, 2008; UNCA, 2015). mortality and primary school enrollment (Emerging Markets Forum, 2012). Furthermore,. ‧ 國. 學. After years of exploitation and colonization by western nations which started in the early fifteenth century with the Portuguese sailors interactions in North and West Africa, 1970s.. ‧. the majority of the African nations had already attained their independence by the mid. Nat. sit. y. The period subsequent to independence was marked by instabilities such as military. er. io. coups, famine, civil wars, territorial disputes and dictatorial regimes in some cases (Sierra Leone, DRC, Gambia, Gabon, CAR, Somalia, etc.); but it also witnessed some successful. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. transitions where a fair degree of democracy and social stability have been responsible for. engchi. the absence of wars, extreme poverty, military coups or the emergence of dictatorships (Botswana, Namibia, Ghana, Cape Verde). The reasons determining the success or failures of regimes in Africa are complex and almost impossible to generalize. As mentioned before, the dynamics taking place within each country may differ from others and therefore each case should be independently analyzed. Like any other nations in the world, every African country has its own national interests and foreign policy goals which are determined by domestic and international factors. For instance, South Africa until the early 1990s, could not aspire to obtain international prominence due to its practice of apartheid. Its main foreign policy goal was 26.

(38) instead to minimize its international isolation. Today, with the end of the apartheid, South Africa became one of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) members and is seen as a leading country in Africa. There is no doubt that the changes occurred in South Africa during the 1990s have allowed Pretoria to pursue other goals internationally which were not possible before. On the other hand, we have countries such as Liberia that due to internal instability, places pursuit of economic, military and humanitarian support in the international arena as it main foreign policy aim.. 3.2.1 The Sino-Africa Relations: an Overview. 政治大 Africa can be traced back to the fifteenth century, contemporary Sino-Africa relations 立 began with the formal establishment of diplomatic ties with Egypt in 1956. Since then, Although the economic interactions and cultural exchanges between China and. ‧ 國. 學. relations between the parties have substantially evolved and nowadays the PRC is one of the main partners of the African states.. ‧. From 1954, with the adoption of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"11, disclosed by Zhou En-lai, the PRC’s relations with Africa began to be guided by these. y. Nat. sit. principles, whose goal was to upgrade its relations with newly independent countries. er. io. emerging on the continent.. The Bandung Conference, 1955, provided Zhou En-lai a form of contact with. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. several African leaders, allowing an expansion of relations between the PRC and these. engchi. states. As a result of these interactions the PRC and Egypt established diplomatic relations in 1956, followed by other countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Sudan and Guinea. The PRC used solidarity with the “third world” to distinguish itself from the bipolar Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which the PRC considered hegemonic powers, and simultaneously assert a leading role within this group. Throughout the 1960s, the diplomatic strategy adopted by Beijing was the struggle against the hegemony of the two superpowers. The disruption of Sino-Soviet relations, which caused a split in the socialist camp, was associated with the collapse of the colonial. 11 The Five Principles: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non aggression, non interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 27.