The Period 1989-2000: A new re-emergence of the ROC in Africa

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4.4 The Period 1989-2000: A new re-emergence of the ROC in Africa

Taipei’s re-emergence in Africa during the period from 1989 to 2000 has been linked to two main factors. The first is due to the unfavorable position of the PRC in the international arena in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, which was widely condemned and to some extent delegitimized its attempts to repress the ROC’s resurgence in the world affairs. The ROC leaders quickly realize that this was a new opportunity that should be exploited to the fullest, and initiated a new campaign to attract new diplomatic allies within a new foreign policy framework. This proactive approach was the second factor which allowed the ROC to break away from its continuing trend of isolation within the international system. Through the practice of “pragmatic diplomacy,” Taipei tried to maintain, strengthen, and expand its informal and substantive relations with other nations, restore its membership in international organizations under names distinct from the national title, and establish formal diplomatic ties with other nations regardless of whether the ROC is recognized as the sole legitimate government of China (Niou, 1998; Tseng, 2008;

Yehuda 1996).

In Africa, the first country to recognize the ROC in this period was Liberia when, on October of 1989, its government signed "The Joint Communiqué on the Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations" with Taipei authorities. This act was followed by other African countries: Lesotho and Guinea Bissau in 1990, the Central African Republic in 1991, Niger in 1992, Burkina Faso in 1994, Gambia in 1995, Senegal in 1996, Sao Tome e Principe in 1997 and Chad in 1998. Despite the fact that some of these countries had later sided with the PRC - among them South Africa which was one of the most important allies for Taipei since the early 1980s - overall the period ranging from 1989 to 2000 was very positive for the ROC in increasing its number of diplomatic allies (Tseng, 2008). In 1997 the number of African nations officially recognizing Taipei had reached 10, the highest since 1971. The ROC was also able to gain the confidence of several other nations across the continent who allowed it to set up special delegations in countries such as Madagascar, Angola, DRC and Nigeria (Tseng, 2008).

The expansion and consolidation of such relations with African allies (and also with the friendly nations in Latin America and South Pacific) has been said to be maintained

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through the provision of generous amounts of economic incentives and a broad range of development assistance (Larus, 2008; Taylor, 2002; Rich 2009; Payne & Veney, 2001). If development assistance has been one of the main instruments used by the ROC in conducting its foreign policy since the 1960s, the use of financial inducements in diplomacy has been a more recent practice whose results have been subject to some controversy.

4.4.1 The ROC in Africa: The ‘Checkbook Diplomacy’ Issue

Since 1971 the ROC has faced considerable limitations in shaping the international environment and influencing events that ultimately affect it. The issue of non-recognition led Taipei to engage in costly foreign policies that states would ordinarily avoid (Payne &

Veney, 2001). Thus, in order to raise its international profile the ROC’s government has adopted during the 1990s and early 2000s the so-called ‘dollar diplomacy’. Taipei’s “dollar diplomacy” was a strategy used for over a decade based on financial inducements whose goal was to persuade countries in entering into official diplomatic relations with the ROC rather than with the PRC. For Taipei, its main motivation to engage in this sort of policies was its need to break out of the international isolation that Beijing has managed to impose on the country. In this regard, given the PRC’s ability to persuade or coax the majority of the world nations to refrain from entering into official diplomatic relations with the ROC, Taipei has only been able to engage in relations with mainly small and poverty-stricken countries. With almost nonexistent economic interactions with Beijing and no aspirations to play any influential role in the world affairs, a number of small states in the South Pacific and Caribbean, Africa and Latin America have been willing to side with Taipei in the ‘two Chinas’ diplomatic competition (Taylor, 2002).

In Africa, the record is quite impressive. In 1992 Taipei provided Niger a US$50 million loan before recognition; the Gambia received an assistance package in 1995 worth US$35 million, exceeding the amount granted by all the other donors to the country combined that year (Rich, 2009); in 1996, Senegal had been provided a generous aid packages after having switched from Beijing to Taipei (Taylor, 2002); on the following year, the ROC provided Sao Tome e Principe US$30 million in aid also exceeding 50% of

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its total foreign aid commitments of US$57.3 million (Cheng and Shi, 2009). In the same year, Chadian president Idriss Déby obtained from Taipei quite a generous loan of US$125 million in exchange for recognition (Large & Chien, 2008).

In regards to development aid Taipei continued its agricultural, handicrafts and medical missions through the International Co-operation and Development Fund (ICDF) which has been the country’s main instrument in overseeing foreign aid¹⁸. Several Africa allies (e.g. Burkina Faso, Senegal, Malawi and Swaziland) have benefited from these programs a fact that helped the ROC increasing its international profile as a credible donor.

However, the generosity and vulnerability of Taipei has been used by many political leaders in an attempt to obtain the maximum amount of aid and financial rewards and strengthen their own political position. For instance, countries such as Senegal, Lesotho and Niger have switched recognition over time between Taipei and Beijing clearly aiming at drawing out extra money. In the Gambia, the tractor scandal is elucidative. In 2001, the Gambian president Yahya Jammeh, in order to bolster his political position among the population, claimed that he had provided dozens of tractors to Gambian farmers, without actually mentioning the real origin of the tractors; a similar situation happened when the ROC financed the presence of over one hundred Cuban doctors in Gambia (Taylor, 2002).

During this period, the ROC also supported other corrupt regimes such as the one in Liberia led by the infamous Charles Taylor. Although ostracized by most of the international community, Monrovia received substantial support from Taipei since 1997, when official relations between the two countries were established. Facing threats from Liberian officials to switch relations to Beijing, Taipei did not hesitate in provide roughly US$20 million for several infrastructure projects and the political campaign of Charles Taylor (Taylor, 2002).

Despite the poverty, political insignificance and dubious nature of some regimes characterizing the ROC’s African allies, the reality is that during the 1990s, the leaders in Taipei seemed to tolerate this sort of actions so long as diplomatic recognition was conferred. One must not forget that, apart from the importance that the ROC attached to

18 Aims to boost socio-economic development enhance human resources and promoting economic relations in a range of developing partner countries. It also provides humanitarian assistance and aid in the event of natural disasters or international refugee crises. This body, which operates under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) since 1989, has been crucial in strengthening and expanding the ROC’s foreign relations.

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diplomatic recognition of the island nation, in 1993 president Lee Teng-hui initiated a new UN campaign aimed at establishing the ROC on Taiwan as a sovereign state next to the PRC (Winkler, 2012). It also sought to pursue a new participation in other international organizations requiring statehood such as the WHO and the UN. In this regard, despite their small size and weak economies, these countries are valuable allies for Taipei (Larus, 2008).

They can represent the ROC on Taiwan in these international organizations where its participations is not allowed and legitimize the ROC as a nation-state. Moreover, and more important, the vote of Taipei’s allies in the UN General Assembly is equal to that of a more powerful country (Payne & Veney, 2001). In this context, the leaders in Taipei believed that the number of diplomatic allies was more important than ever, a fact that might explain a certain degree of indifference regarding the nature of some of these regimes.

Money does matter in the ROC’s foreign policy as seen in the island’s foreign aid programs to diplomatic allies and economic incentives in Africa. But despite the initial success resultant of this policy in winning over new African diplomatic allies in the 1990s, the majority of African states eventually shifted back to Beijing (van Loon, 2012). This has led to a case where the ROC has been said to only be able to rent friends rather than that they are buying them (Taiwan Review, 1998).

4.5 The Period 2000-2008: the ROC’s New Diplomatic Decline: The African