The Case of Tanzania

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competition. Individually or collectively, the methods of armed struggle to achieve liberation from colonial rule, the injection of a martial spirit among the masses, political and social mobilization and regimentation, and planned economic development had been acknowledged by some African elites as viable techniques for nation building (Yu, 1966).

Thus, although it might not fully explain their decision to recognize Beijing in the ‘two Chinas’ tug of war, these states’ adherence to socialism had certainly weighed in their decision. In this regard, the Tanzanian case is paradigmatic.

5.1.2 The Case of Tanzania

Official relations between Tanzania (former Tanganyika) and the PRC, date back to 1961, shortly following the former’s independence. For the ROC, this relationship meant that from the beginning its aspirations in obtaining support from Dar es Salaam to legitimize itself as the sole representative of China were unlikely to be realized.

Tanzania’s interactions with the PRC, although minor in the early 1960s, gained a new momentum in the mid 1960s, and by the 1970s Tanzania had become one of the PRC’s most important allies on the continent. The explanation for such development lies in the fact that political elites on both sides had converging interests when the two states began engaging with each other (Arsene, 2009). For Tanzania, political, military and economic interests made President Nyerere look favorably toward establishing official diplomatic relations with the PRC. A supporter of the African independence movements, Nyerere sought to increase foreign military assistance in order to be able to better deal with the heavily armed neighboring states of Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa, still under white imperialist rule. This was in line with the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle which characterized the PRC’s foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, by 1964, the PRC had already become Tanzania’s main source of military support (Arsene, 2009;

Bailey, 1975).

Development aid provided by the PRC during the 1960s also played an important role in strengthening the ties between the two sides. The deterioration of the Tanzanian relations with Western donors in 1965 resulted in the loss of considerable amounts of aid which were compensated by Beijing’s generous offers. In addition, the construction of

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TAZARA railway, a project financed and supported by the PRC, not only helped both Zambia and Tanzania in their struggle against the white-controlled states of southern Africa, but it also gave the Tanzanian administration confidence in the PRC as a credible ally.

However, it was Tanzania’s socialist agenda throughout the 1960s and 1970s that further encouraged its alignment with the PRC. At the time of independence, President Nyerere was already a staunch critique of assumptions that the Western models would not exactly be compatible with the conditions of Tanzania. In his 1962 address entitled

“Ujamaa-The Basis of African Socialism”, he expressed his aversion to the individualism of Western capitalist society and that a more desirable alternative would be the one of socialism (Nugent, 2004; Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003). In his words, "no underdeveloped country can afford to be anything but socialist" (Nyerere, 1961). In this early stage, Nyerere was working through his ideas solely at an intellectual level (Nugent, 2004).

However, by the mid 1960s, Tanzania’s policies had become more radical, a fact that resulted in a switch of direction in 1967. These changes were a combination of both internal and external factors. Externally, President’s Nyerere was quite disappointed with his Western partners²²; internally the country's economic and social conditions were deteriorating. Thus, it was this combination of reasons - some nationalist and some egalitarian in conception - that prompted Nyerere to publish the Arusha Declaration and TANU’s Policy on Socialism and Self Reliance. One of the major themes of this Declaration was the emphasis on self-reliance. The principle of self-reliance was given particular attention as the Tanzanian Government urged the country to rely on the efforts of its own people rather than be excessively dependent on external aid (Nugent, 2004). .

In the Arusha Declaration, it was also proposed that the rural society should remain essentially communal in nature. Nyerere contended that farming individually was incompatible with socialism and that wealth should be collectively created and shared among everyone. To this end, peasants were encouraged to live together in villages and collectively farm and assume joint responsibility of social services - thereby becoming true ujamaa villages (Nugent, 2004).

22 In 1965 West Germany cut its assistance to Tanzania due to the latter’s willingness to have an Eastern German representation in Dar es Salaam; in December of the same year relations with the UK were severed because of the lack of London’s response regarding Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence;

political support from the US also declined due to the uprisings taking place in Congo.

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The Leadership Code was another item included in the Arusha Declaration. The Code was aimed at preventing TANU members from becoming part of a privileged group that exploited people through hiring labor or renting property. It was an attempt to put an end on the growing gap between the rich and the poorer in the country. According to the Code, TANU members and government leaders could not own shares in any company, earn more than one salary, rent out property or run business in a private capacity (Nugent, 2004).

The Leadership Code reflected Nyerere’s desire for social equality which he sought to further consolidate through the provision of education for all. In the “Education for Self-Reliance”, Nyerere urged a reform of the education system where everyone would have access to education and where the collective values and respect for manual labor would be highlighted (Nugent, 2004) .

President Nyerere visited the PRC five times during his presidency. Since 1965 when he first visited Beijing, Nyerere had become a key supporter of the PRC’s model of development which he regarded as a credible alternative model to the development system inherited from the colonial period (Bailey, 1975). Therefore, the launching of the socialist development policies by Nyerere in 1967 was in many aspects similar with the ones practiced by the Chinese. For instance, like in the PRC, Nyerere wanted to adopt a type of leadership focused on serving the people rather than being self-serving elite (Nugent, 2004).

Moreover, the importance of relying on people and local cadres rather than on the State bureaucracy was also stressed.

In addition, two major parallels between the Chinese and Tanzanian policies exacerbating these similarities are worth noting. The first is the emphasis on self-reliance which had been one of the most celebrated concepts of Mao Tse-tung and highly advocated by Nyerere. The second, is the one relating to rural development. The idea of ujamaa villages which sought to communalize the way of life and production of the peasantry, partly owes its inspiration to the people’s communes in rural areas of the PRC (Bailey, 1975).

Naturally, the similarities of Nyerere’s social ideas to those operating in the PRC itself were highly approved by Beijing. The PRC’s speeches and articles on Tanzania following the Arusha Declaration consistently approved of Tanzania’s national development along the constructs of the Arusha Declaration (Armstrong, 1977).

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Thus, as the Tanzanian state initiated its experiments of socialism, the PRC clearly became a true model for Nyerere’s administration and a great supporter of his policies.

What is interesting to note is the PRC’s great influence in encouraging Nyerere to follow the socialist path, somewhat demonstrating Beijing’s increasingly important role in international politics. Nyerere's speech in 1974 upon his arrival in Beijing to meet his counterpart Mao Tse-tung, testifies this affirmation:

“Two things convince me that socialism can be built in Africa (...) for capitalism is ultimately incompatible with the real independence of African states. The second thing which encourages me is China. China is providing an encouragement and an inspiration for younger and smaller nations seeking to build socialist societies” (Beijing Review, 1974).

Sino-Tanzania relations positively evolved during the 1960s and by the 1970s Tanzania had become the PRC’s key ally on the continent. Thus, it was with no surprise that regarding the ‘two Chinas issue’, Tanzania actively supported the PRC’s efforts to gain entry into the UN. At the 26th General Assembly of the UN in 1971, Tanzania was among the sponsoring countries of the resolution supporting the restoration of all China's legitimate rights in the world body (China.Org, 2006).

The solid relations between these two countries have been maintained up to now.

Yet, the nature of these relations has shown a different pattern when compared to the ones of the 1960s and 1970s. While during this period they were essentially defined by ideological and political motives, more emphasis has been placed on trade. It is often said that Dodoma is a strategically important partner for Beijing due its location as an Indian Ocean gateway to the mineral-rich southern Africa. The economic impulse is arguably dominant (Jansson, Burke and Hon, 2009). These relations have been solidified through FOCAC, where Beijing has pledged the construction of several infrastructural development projects, the partial cancellation of Tanzania’s debt, and a number of other trade incentives.

During the PRC President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Tanzania in February 2009, he announced a donation of US$ 22 million and inaugurated a US$ 56 million, 60,000 seat stadium financed by the Chinese government as to testify to these commitments. Currently,

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Tanzania has become the PRC’s leading trade partner in East Africa, with around $3.7 billion in business in 2013 and had reached USD 2.5 billion in investments in Tanzania by the end of that same year(with nearly 500 Chinese companies doing business in the country) (The New York Times, 2014; Tanzaniainvest, 2014). This is in sharp contrast with the ROC’s trade with Tanzania that in the same year only amounted roughly US$ 133 million and US$ 128 million in 2014 (Bureau of Foreign Trade, 2013).

In addition, this relationship has been strengthened through the exchange of official bilateral visits since 2000. In 2006, the then Prime Minister Wen Jia-bao paid a visit to Tanzania which was followed by Hu Jin-tao’s state visit to the country in 2009. In 2013, Tanzania was the first country to be visited by President Xi Jin-ping during his three-nation African tour. These visits have also been reciprocated by the Tanzanian government, which has regularly paid several high level visits to the PRC. In 2000, President Benjamin Mkapa visited Beijing accompanied by his government’s prime-minister, Frederick Sumaye. In 2002, Zanzibar President Karume paid an official visit to Beijing. Upon his election, President Jakaya Kikwete paid two state visits to Beijing, one in 2008 and another in 2014 (Shi and Hoebink, 2012; The Telegraph, 2013; IPPMedia, 2014).

5.1.3 Conclusion

It is hard to say that the ideological affinity between Tanzania and the PRC might have been the only factor inhibiting the former to establish relations with the ROC.

However the launch of socialist policies by the Nyerere’s administration in the late 1960s was certainly a major factor cementing Tanzania’s alignment with the PRC. In this regard, Nyerere’s belief that the PRC’s model of development would be the one benefitting Tanzania’s society definitely had an important impact in promoting these relations. On the other hand, the socialist leanings evidenced by President Nyerere, coupled with his desire to support the liberation movements of southern Africa, and his aversion to Western capitalism, were very well seen by Beijing, which soon showed its willingness to support the Tanzanian government.

In this context of convergence of interests between the PRC and Tanzania, the latter's support of the ROC in the ‘two Chinas’ diplomatic competition became very

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unlikely. Thus, having to decide between the PRC and the ROC, Tanzania’s decision in siding with its chief supporter, the PRC, came with no surprise.

The nature of relations between Tanzania and the PRC has evolved over time.

Current Sino-Tanzania relations have been characterized by significant economic interactions, in contrast with the 1960s and 1970s period which was essentially defined by ideological and political alignment between the two states. Today, Tanzania is the PRC’s biggest trading partner in East Africa and the number of business between the two countries continues to flourish. Through FOCAC and the intensification of high level official visits, Beijing has pledged the construction of several infrastructure projects, trade incentives, and to partially cut Dodoma’s debt, thus further strengthening Sino-Tanzania ties. Therefore, although the nature of this union might have changed considerably, Tanzania relations with the PRC seem to have maintained its significance.

Tanzania has never established relations with the ROC and the chances for a shift in the foreseeable future are near impossible. Apart from the Tanzania’s natural inclination in siding with Beijing evidenced since its independence, another possible aspect further explaining this fact might also lie in Beijing’s capacity to promote Dodoma's interests.

During Nyerere’s presidency, the PRC highly approved and supported the socialist path being adopted by the Tanzanian leadership. Presently, the considerable amount of trade between the two states and the benefits arising for Tanzania from its participation in FOCAC, have made this relationship even more valuable to be put at stake by establishing relations with the ROC.