Chapter III - The Role of the PRC in the ROC-Africa Relations
3.2 Sub-Saharan Africa: A Brief Introduction
3.2.1 The Sino-Africa Relations: an Overview
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instead to minimize its international isolation. Today, with the end of the apartheid, South Africa became one of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) members and is seen as a leading country in Africa. There is no doubt that the changes occurred in South Africa during the 1990s have allowed Pretoria to pursue other goals internationally which were not possible before. On the other hand, we have countries such as Liberia that due to internal instability, places pursuit of economic, military and humanitarian support in the international arena as it main foreign policy aim.
3.2.1 The Sino-Africa Relations: an Overview
Although the economic interactions and cultural exchanges between China and Africa can be traced back to the fifteenth century, contemporary Sino-Africa relations began with the formal establishment of diplomatic ties with Egypt in 1956. Since then, relations between the parties have substantially evolved and nowadays the PRC is one of the main partners of the African states.
From 1954, with the adoption of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"11, disclosed by Zhou En-lai, the PRC’s relations with Africa began to be guided by these principles, whose goal was to upgrade its relations with newly independent countries emerging on the continent.
The Bandung Conference, 1955, provided Zhou En-lai a form of contact with several African leaders, allowing an expansion of relations between the PRC and these states. As a result of these interactions the PRC and Egypt established diplomatic relations in 1956, followed by other countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Sudan and Guinea. The PRC used solidarity with the “third world” to distinguish itself from the bipolar Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which the PRC considered hegemonic powers, and simultaneously assert a leading role within this group.
Throughout the 1960s, the diplomatic strategy adopted by Beijing was the struggle against the hegemony of the two superpowers. The disruption of Sino-Soviet relations, which caused a split in the socialist camp, was associated with the collapse of the colonial
11 The Five Principles: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non aggression, non interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence
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system and the first victories of the national liberation movements that triggered a movement of "non-alignment", proved to be of great importance in the international relations of this period. In this context, Mao Tse-tung produced the "strategy of the two buffer zones" (the first being the underdeveloped countries and the second the countries of Western Europe), in which he argued that the PRC should fight the two world superpowers, by supporting the intermediate zone and through "diplomatic achievement". Thus, throughout the 1960s the Chinese concern in Africa focused more on ideological issues and its fight against imperialism, colonialism and revisionism. Moreover, it was also during this period that the PRC formulated the guidelines for its foreign aid programs:
"Eight Principles." The principles were announced by Premier Zhou En-lai during his visit to Africa from the late 1963s to 1964s. The "Eight Principles" are: mutual benefit; no conditions attached; the no-interest or low-interest loans would not create a debt burden for the recipient country; to help the recipient nation develop its economy, not to create its dependence on the PRC; to help the recipient country with project that needs less capital and quick returns; the aid in kind must be of high quality at the world market price; to ensure that the technology can be learned and mastered by the locals; the Chinese experts and technicians working for the aid recipient country are treated equally as the local ones with no extra benefits for them. In this context, in addition to providing political and military support, Beijing built the TAZARA railway linking Zambia to Tanzania, helping free Zambia from its dependence on trade routes to the sea controlled by white-minority ruled Rhodesia (Chun, 2013). By the end of 1969, the PRC had already been able to expand to nineteen the number of diplomatic allies in Africa.
In the 1970s, the PRC made a shift in its foreign policy, changing the priority of national interests and adopting a pragmatic strategy. In this period, relations with the West improved and through the policy of the "three worlds", Beijing sought the support of Third World nations in its fight against Soviet hegemony. Over the decade, several national liberation movements in Africa received Chinese support, which were helpful in neutralizing some Soviet operations on the continent. In 1971, with significant support from African countries (accounting for 1/3 of the votes in favor of Beijing), the PRC took the China's seat at the UN, at the expense of the ROC. The status of permanent member,
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along with the situation that presented itself, allowed the PRC to broaden its diplomatic presence in Africa. By the end of 1970s the PRC had relations with 44 African states.
The early 1980s marked a new turning point in Chinese foreign policy, resultant of Deng Xiao-ping’s reforms. There was a redefinition of diplomatic strategy and policy for Africa, through the de-politicization of diplomacy and the Chinese approach of countries formerly neglected due to their alliance with the USSR. In 1982, the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Zi-yang, paid a visit to eleven African countries, and announced that the Chinese economic cooperation with Africa would be guided by four basic principles12, intended to show African countries, that the relationship between the PRC and Africa would be based on reciprocal basis, and not solely through economic assistance. Thanks to the PRC’s domestic situation, and its pursuit of economic development, there was a decrease in economic assistance and Chinese aid to Africa during this period (Li, n.d;
Brautigam, 2010). Moreover, with the proximity of the end of the Cold War and the subsequent Sino-Soviet rapprochement, Africa eventually lost importance strategic in the dispute between China, USA and USSR for areas of influence.
In the 1990s, however, Beijing’s attitude towards Africa suffered a new shift.
Politically, upon the Tiananmen Square incident, highly condemned internationally, Beijing sought African political support in order to minimize the impacts of sanctions imposed by the West. In addition to the support provided by several African countries, there was an understanding among Africans and Chinese that Western criticism was an attempt to destabilize the country’s growth. Moreover, Chinese leaders realized that African states could be reliable friends in international affairs. It is during this period that the then Chinese President Yang Shang-kun, during his visit to the continent, proposed six principles in order to strengthen the Sino-Africa relationship13. Furthermore, starting from
12 The four principles announced were: equality and mutual benefit; emphasis on practical results; diversity in form; and common development.
13 Support of African countries endeavors in maintaining state sovereignty, opposing foreign interference and developing the national economy; respect the African countries’ right to choose their own political system and development model in accordance with their own national features; it supports African states in their efforts to strengthen unity, cooperation and alliance, and solve state-to-state conflicts through negotiations;
support the Organization of African Unity (OAU); support to the African countries in their endeavors to positively take part in world affairs and establish a just and rational international political and economic new order as members of equal status; Beijing would continue to support the development of friendly exchanges and various types of economic cooperation with African nations based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence.
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1989, at the beginning of each year, Beijing’s Minister of Foreign Affairs first official trip has been to Africa, whose goal has been to emphasize Africa’s importance in the PRC’s foreign policy.
Economically, the country was experiencing a period of strong economic growth.
Africa’s natural resources and market potential were of extreme relevance for Beijing to maintain its economic expansion. In 1993, the PRC became a net importer of oil and Africa’s vast reserves gradually became an important energy source for Beijing (Yen, 2007). Thus, the decade of the 1990s showed a new momentum in Sino-African relations, with increased complexity and scope of the relations and cooperation. There was also a significant increase in Chinese aid to Africa, as well as an increase in the number of the PRC’s investments within the context of improved investment environment in Africa and the emergence of Chinese businesses (Chun, 2013).
By the end of the decade, close Sino-Africa relations witnessed a new development.
During his 1996 official visit to Africa, President Jiang Ze-min, in his speech at the Organization of African Union (OAU), put forward a five-point proposal for the development of the Sino-Africa diplomatic relations14; moreover, he also proposed a new mechanism aimed at promoting a long-term and stable Sino-African relationship of all-round cooperation and friendship geared towards the 21st century (MFA, 2014; Yen, 2007).
Following the logic of institutionalization of measures encouraging African economies, supporting the business community and the Chinese state-owned enterprises as well as government initiatives, FOCAC was established in 2000, aimed at increasing and coordinating the Sino-African cooperation, simultaneously guaranteeing a mutual beneficial relationship.
Although the FOCAC meetings have generally been mainly centered on economic topics, Beijing's engagement with the continent has also retained some of the political elements and motivations existent at the beginning of the relationship (CSS, 2012).
FOCAC was officially launched in 2000 at a ministerial conference held in Beijing.
It was attended by 44 African countries, private sector representatives and regional and
14 To promote a sincere friendship between the Africa and the PRC and become each other's reliable "all-weather friends"; treat each other as equals and respect each other's sovereignty and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs; to pursue a common development on the basis of mutual benefit; to improve consultation and cooperation in international affairs; to look into the future and create a more splendid world.
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international organizations as well as heads of state of Togo, Algeria, Zambia and Tanzania and the Secretary General of the African Union and ended with the adoption of the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Yen, 2007; CCS, 2010; FOCAC, 2004). As a result, in the following three years, the PRC cancelled RMB 10.9 billion of debts for 31 heavily indebted poor countries or least developed countries in Africa; set up the African Human Resources Development Fund, sponsored nearly 300 training courses and trained nearly 7,000 African professionals in fields such as diplomacy, economic management, national defense, agriculture, education, science and technology, culture and health (Embassy of the PRC in South Africa, 2012).
The second Conference of Ministers took place in Ethiopia in 2003, and was attended by the prime ministers of both the PRC and Ethiopia, six heads of state, three vice-presidents, two prime ministers, a president of the Senate, the President of the African Union Commission and a United Nations Secretary-General representative (FOCAC, 2004).
Despite the participation of relevant political actors, the decisions taken in the second FOCAC were not of great importance. Among them were the strengthening of cooperation in the development of human resources and the provision of training to 10,000 Africans in various sectors, the removal of trade barriers, and the increase of the number of Chinese peacekeeping forces on the continent (FOCAC, 2004).
The third summit held in 2006 marked the real institutionalization of the Forum.
Besides the participation of 41 heads of state and senior representatives of 48 African countries, FOCAC III brought together about 1,700 Chinese and African delegates. The decisions adopted in this summit clearly expressed the deepening of Sino-African relations.
Under President Hu Jin-tao’s leadership, Beijing had entered in a new ‘strategic partnership’
with Africa (CCS, 2010).
Among the new decisions made were the Chinese commitment to double its assistance to Africa between 2006 and 2009, the removal of tariffs of 440 products of Africa's least developed countries, the creation of up to five free-trade areas on the mainland and also the establishment of a development fund of US$5 billion, in order to encourage Chinese investment in Africa, sending professionals and Chinese volunteers to African countries, as well as promoting education through the training of professionals and the increase of the number of scholarships for African students (Yen, 2007; CCS, 2010)
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In the 2006 Summit, the PRC also published its white paper on African policy, entitled ’China’s African Policy’. The document openly promulgated Beijing’s policy objectives towards Africa, the measures to be implemented and proposals for cooperation in various sectors in the long run.
The fourth summit, held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, in 2009, was attended by the Chinese Premier Wen Jia-bao, the heads of state and government of 50 African countries and the chairman of the African Union Commission. The action plan drawn up at this summit was even more ambitious than before. Among the key decisions were the adoption of free tariff treatment to 95% of products from the least developed countries, providing
$10 billion in preferential loans, with the inclusion of $1 billion for small and medium-sized African companies, construction of 50 schools, the extension of 5500 scholarships from the Chinese government and the training of more than 6000 African professionals (Taylor, 2011).
The FOCAC summit of 2012 further evidenced Sino-Africa solid relationship and was attended by the PRC’s president Hu Jin-tao and ministers from 50 African countries.
By this time, Beijing had already surpassed the US as Africa’s biggest with trade reaching a record high of US$ 166.1 billion. This summit’s most impressive outcome was Beijing’s offer of US $20 billion credit line over the next three years. Moreover, Beijing’s 2012 declaration presented a six point proposal aimed at further strengthening relations between Africa and the PRC (The China Analyst, 2012): increasing political trust and strategic consensus between Africa and the PRC; enhancing and increasing cooperation between the two sides in operationalising African Union’s (AU) Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); strengthening Beijing’s cooperation with the AU and African sub-regional organizations; expanding mutually beneficial economic cooperation and balanced trade and adopting new methods in order to boost cooperation in trade, investment, poverty reduction and poverty reduction; continuing cultural exchanges between the two sides; and further strengthening cooperation between the two sides in international affairs.
Despite the similarity of these points to what has been promised in the previous summits, there are some facts emerging from FOCAC 2012 which should be mentioned.
For instance, it has been given a greater emphasis on non-economic factors and the importance on people-to-people and cultural exchanges between Africa and the PRC. It
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also highlighted the necessity of increasing the support to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and the need for capacity building and skills transfer (The China Analyst, 2012).
In March 2013, President Xi Jin-ping paid his first visit to Africa upon taking office.
This diplomatic journey was aimed at strengthening friendship and deepening overall cooperation between the PRC and Africa. During the visit, Xi Jin-ping delivered a speech titled “Trustworthy Friends and Sincere Partners Forever” (Li, 2013). In his speech, President Xi stated that the PRC and Africa should work together to promote peace and development in a new era. He also emphasized four main points which should guide the PRC’s engagement with Africa, namely the importance of genuineness, real results, affinity, and sincerity (Li, 2013).
Sino-Africa relations have evolved exponentially and the current state of this relationship is almost impossible to ignore. This relationship gained a new momentum with the establishment of FOCAC in 2000, which resulted in an outstanding increase in trade between the two sides. Currently, the PRC not only is Africa’s biggest trading partner, but also an important political ally of the continent. The establishment of FOCAC has helped to strengthen the political links between the two sides. Since its establishment, FOCAC has gradually become an important mechanism for collective political dialogue and a sound platform for enhancing practical cooperation between the PRC and African countries.
As the PRC becomes a global economic and political power, African states have been aware of the opportunities arising from this relationship. Beijing, as a source of lucrative investment, developmental aid and political support, helps African countries diminish their previous dependence on the West, while simultaneously promoting the continent's nation's interests. Thus, although ignoring Beijing might not necessarily determine a state’s future, apparently the majority of African countries are not willing to disregard the PRC’s engagement in Africa and the benefits arising from this relationship (Li, 2013).
Within the ‘two China’s’ quarrel context, FOCAC has also been part of the Beijing’s ongoing strategy to squeeze Taipei’s diplomatic space. This explains why Beijing invited Taipei’s eight African allies to attend the Forum in 2000 as “observers”15. Only
15 Only the African states officially recognizing the PRC are allowed to fully participate in FOCAC and enjoy the benefits arising from the outcomes of each summit.
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Liberia and Malawi accepted the invitation and interestingly, both countries would end up switching from Taipei to Beijing a few years later (Taylor, 2011). During the 2000s, the Gambia, Senegal and Chad would also cut off their ties with the ROC, all alleging that this would be a necessary move for each country’s national interests16.
The following section will focus on the ROC’s presence in Africa. A thorough understanding of the current situation is not possible without knowing the past of these interactions. In order to attain this aim, I decided to focus the time period of this study on the last five decades, from 1960-2014. To facilitate this analysis, I will divide it into five different periods: 1949-1971, a period of relative success of the ROC in Sub-Saharan Africa; 1971-1989, a harsh period for the ROC’s diplomacy; 1990-2000 a period when Taipei managed to increase its formal ties in the sub-Saharan Africa; 2000-2008, a new decline of Taipei’s diplomatic allies in sub-Saharan Africa; 2008-2015, period marking end (at least temporarily) of the diplomatic competition between Beijing and Taipei.
16 The Gambia president based its decision on “reasons of national strategic interest" (The Diplomat, 2013);
President Wade justified its decision stating that “Our nation has no friends and only interests” (The China Post); President Deby stated that he had to compromise with the Chinese was “for the survival of Chad”
(Taipei Times, 2006).
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CHAPTER IV
4. The ROC and Africa
4.1 The ROC after 1949: A Brief Contextualization
At the conclusion of the civil war in 1949, the nationalist government of the ROC, as a result of its defeat against the communists, moved its seat to Taipei from Nanjing where they established the new base of their ROC. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established a new regime in Beijing in October of the same year (Wang, 1990). Since then, China has found herself with two rival governments, each claiming to be the sole legal government of the entire nation. Moreover, both the nationalists and the communists agree that there is only “one China” and that the province of Taiwan is part of that China, thus opposing to the idea of an independent Taiwan (Wang, 1990).
By the end of 1949, the Communists had the territory of mainland under their control and were preparing to complete the victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist
By the end of 1949, the Communists had the territory of mainland under their control and were preparing to complete the victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist