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Chapter II - The ROC since 1971 and its Need for International Recognition

2.4 The ROC and Sub-Saharan Africa: Withdrawal of Recognition, Non-Recognition and

2.4.3 The Neorealist Theory and its ‘Bandwagon Behavior’

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South Sudan 2011

Source: Elaborated by the author with data retrieved from: Yu, 1963; Tseng, 2008; Wikipedia, 2015

What this chart shows us is that the position of the ROC in Africa is weak and that the process of derecognition accelerated after the UN Assembly Resolution of 1971. By not recognizing the ROC on Taiwan, the African states are depriving Taipei of international rights and immunities within the international legal order, such as making treaties with other entities and allowing the government to act free from the control of other states as well as limiting its participation in intergovernmental organizations. Although Taipei has consistently sought to affirm its commitments to international agreements and declarations of which is not a signatory in order to legitimize its claims to statehood, the reality is that the majority of sub-Saharan African states are not prepared to enter into official relations with the ROC for reasons that can be explained by the neorealist theory.

2.4.3 The Neorealist Theory and its ‘Bandwagon Behavior’

Neorealism – or structural realism – is the foundational theory of International Relations. Starting from a simple set of assumptions, it seeks to explain the behavior of states as well as their interactions with one another in the international arena (Jakobsen, 2013).

The theory became largely associated with Kenneth Waltz after publishing his

“Theory of International Politics” in 1979. In his work, Waltz preaches that realism had the need to establish more solid and scientific bases. For this reason, realism can also be called structural realism. His work was primarily concerned with explaining the reasons for continuity and repetitions behind state's actions, rather than focusing on singular instances of unusual state behavior, using a way of thinking aimed at explaining the inevitability of change to explain the continuity. This has been called systemic theory. Waltz identifies anarchy as a basis for all existing wars in the international system, and argues that any explanations of such events at the state level are too reductionist, because they limit the scope of issues driving international conflict. He maintains that the structure is not only the sum of the parts that compose it, but are also determined by how the parties position

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themselves towards each other and how the structure as a whole restrains, limits and guides the actions of the agents within the system through two mechanisms: socialization and competition.

It is the structure that sets the standards of what is acceptable in terms of the agents' decision making. Socialization produces patterns that limit and shape the behavior expected by the actors within the structure, inducing states to avoid certain behaviors. Just as socialization causes actors to adopt certain behavior, competition also works accordingly.

States compete for survival in the international arena, causing them to behave rationally in order to ensure survival. Sarfati (2005) view in this regard is that, in international relations, competition leads states to proceed rationally, so that those best adapted are able to survive in the international system.

According to Waltz, international political structures are determined by three main factors: the ordering principle, functional differentiation, and distribution of capabilities.

The principle of order is anarchy, meaning the absence of a world government; there is no higher authority above the main units composing the system – the states. The functions of the units (states) are similar with respect to the other. That is because the units of the system closely resemble each other with regard to the functions they perform. Therefore, what matters is the third feature, which determines the power capacity of each unit. The distribution of power is the characteristic that differentiates the units. Therefore, by analyzing the structure of international politics, we prescinded all the attributes of the states with the exception of its power capacity. Thus, it can be said that the relations based on the dimension of their capacity (power) stand out when compared to the intrinsic qualities of the units (Jakobsen, 2013). Taking the international system as anarchic and decentralized is the selfish and competitive sentiment of the actors that causes the system to be organized rationally. The desire for survival is a prerequisite for the rationality of States.

For Waltz, states have the characteristic of being sovereign, deciding for themselves how to manage internal and external problems. Thus, the difference between the actors is given by variations in the ability to run and manage certain functions. In international politics, this ability must be analyzed compared to other states. This ability, especially in regard to national security, is the central element of relations between States.

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Finally, Waltz establishes the concept of balance of power in the neorealist theory, which is not unlike the balance defined in classical realism, because their requirements are the same: anarchic order and will to survive. However, contradictory to what happens in classical realism, in the neorealist theory, states are not automatically inclined to align themselves against one another for survival because they can display a group behavior (bandwagon) which is also beneficial for their interests. This bandwagon behavior is often visible when a state is characterized as leading and all others tend to follow him, because they want to be aligned with the forces in power rather than against them. This phenomenon is usually common at the end of a conflict when there is a clear victory from one of the competing sides. In the competition for leadership, the “bandwagon” concept is an important component to describe coalition formation around the leader. (Sarfati, 2005).

In the following section, the author will try explain what are the possible factors shaping this group behavior and their contribution to sub-Saharan African states decision to withdraw or refrain from recognizing the ROC over time. It will be contend that the PRC’s leadership position in Africa has motivated the majority of the sub-Saharan states’ to side with Beijing in pursuit of their own domestic interests and foreign policy goals.

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CHAPTER III

3. The Role of the PRC in the ROC-Africa Relations

3.1 The ROC’s Main Obstacle in Africa: the PRC

Hillgruber (1998) argues that the decision of denying recognition of a state can be considered only if the unreliability of the new state as a partner in international relations appears to be so serious that states refrain from integrating the new state and prefer to keep it away from the international community. In fact, the majority of the African states refuse to recognize the ROC on Taiwan. In doing so, one can assume that recognizing the ROC may have undesirable implications for a country’s national interests and that the best decision is not to enter into relations with Taipei. But what are the implications and reasons causing African nations to refrain from establishing relations with the ROC, which is a respected democracy, which complies with all the statehood requirements defined by the Montevideo Convention, which is ranked amongst the thirty most powerful economies in the world, and holds the world’s fifth largest foreign exchange reserves? That is the main goal of this thesis.

In this context it is impossible to dismiss the role of the PRC. Since, the early 1960s a tug of war between Taipei and Beijing ensued in Africa in which both the PRC and the ROC fiercely began competing for recognition from the newly independent nations emerging on the continent. Although Taipei, with great efforts, had managed to maintain its seat in the UN until 1971, the Resolution 2578, which resulted in the recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of China to the United Nations, had a profound impact on the ROC’s political influence in Africa. From this period onwards Beijing, along with its so-called “one China Policy”10, and its claims of being the third world leader, has used its seat in the UN and the Security Council to limit Taipei’s endeavors for international recognition and assert its claims in the international arena that the island is an integral part of China. Moreover, the emergence of the PRC as a key economic player has raised Beijing’s confidence and influence globally. Beijing is nowadays the world’s second

10 Implies that a country seeking diplomatic relations with the (PRC) must cut official relations with the ROC and vice-versa.

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largest economy and Africa’s biggest trading partner (The Economist, 2013). In 2000, Sino-Africa relations witnessed a new development with the launching of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (from now on to be referred to as FOCAC). As a result, relations between Beijing and the majority of African states have been upgraded since then.

Taking into account the aforementioned factors shaping the relations between the PRC and Africa, it seems that the PRC has gained a position of leadership among the African states. In applying the neorealist theory and its “bandwagon” behavior I will argue that sub-Saharan African states in the pursuit of their national interests, have been more keen to side with Beijing within the two China’s quarrel context, due to the latter's strong political and economic regional position in Africa.

The act of recognition reflects a nation’s national interests and therefore is much more of a political than a legal act. In applying the neorealist theory and its “bandwagon”

behavior to the competition between Taipei and Beijing, we see that Beijing with its outstanding growth in the international economy and its resulting influence over global affairs has put it in a position of leadership which sub-Saharan African states are not in a position to ignore.

3.2 Sub-Saharan Africa: A Brief Introduction

Africa is composed by 54 states of which 49 are located in the sub-Saharan region.

Fig. 2. Sub-Saharan Countries

Source: http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/region/1 sub-Saharan Africa

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This area is characterized by its enormous diversity in terms of cultures, religion, language, customs, traditions, history and landscape. Contrary to what most people think, the continent is not only a place marked by famine, wars, corruption and violations of human rights; it is also a continent full of potential and hope. Since 1995, Africa’s economic and social performance has been constant which has allowed the continent to become the second fastest growing region of the world. Its per capita income grew at 2.2 percent annually and the poverty rate fell by a total of 10 percentage points, by far the best performance in the last 40 years (Emerging Markets Forum, 2012). Simultaneously, Africa has made good progress in many, though not all, social indicators such as childhood mortality and primary school enrollment (Emerging Markets Forum, 2012). Furthermore, the continent is also well endowed with natural resources, some of them of high strategic and economic value (Tseng, 2008; UNCA, 2015).

After years of exploitation and colonization by western nations which started in the early fifteenth century with the Portuguese sailors interactions in North and West Africa, the majority of the African nations had already attained their independence by the mid 1970s.

The period subsequent to independence was marked by instabilities such as military coups, famine, civil wars, territorial disputes and dictatorial regimes in some cases (Sierra Leone, DRC, Gambia, Gabon, CAR, Somalia, etc.); but it also witnessed some successful transitions where a fair degree of democracy and social stability have been responsible for the absence of wars, extreme poverty, military coups or the emergence of dictatorships (Botswana, Namibia, Ghana, Cape Verde).

The reasons determining the success or failures of regimes in Africa are complex and almost impossible to generalize. As mentioned before, the dynamics taking place within each country may differ from others and therefore each case should be independently analyzed.

Like any other nations in the world, every African country has its own national interests and foreign policy goals which are determined by domestic and international factors. For instance, South Africa until the early 1990s, could not aspire to obtain international prominence due to its practice of apartheid. Its main foreign policy goal was

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instead to minimize its international isolation. Today, with the end of the apartheid, South Africa became one of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) members and is seen as a leading country in Africa. There is no doubt that the changes occurred in South Africa during the 1990s have allowed Pretoria to pursue other goals internationally which were not possible before. On the other hand, we have countries such as Liberia that due to internal instability, places pursuit of economic, military and humanitarian support in the international arena as it main foreign policy aim.

3.2.1 The Sino-Africa Relations: an Overview

Although the economic interactions and cultural exchanges between China and Africa can be traced back to the fifteenth century, contemporary Sino-Africa relations began with the formal establishment of diplomatic ties with Egypt in 1956. Since then, relations between the parties have substantially evolved and nowadays the PRC is one of the main partners of the African states.

From 1954, with the adoption of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"11, disclosed by Zhou En-lai, the PRC’s relations with Africa began to be guided by these principles, whose goal was to upgrade its relations with newly independent countries emerging on the continent.

The Bandung Conference, 1955, provided Zhou En-lai a form of contact with several African leaders, allowing an expansion of relations between the PRC and these states. As a result of these interactions the PRC and Egypt established diplomatic relations in 1956, followed by other countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Sudan and Guinea. The PRC used solidarity with the “third world” to distinguish itself from the bipolar Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which the PRC considered hegemonic powers, and simultaneously assert a leading role within this group.

Throughout the 1960s, the diplomatic strategy adopted by Beijing was the struggle against the hegemony of the two superpowers. The disruption of Sino-Soviet relations, which caused a split in the socialist camp, was associated with the collapse of the colonial

11 The Five Principles: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non aggression, non interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence

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system and the first victories of the national liberation movements that triggered a movement of "non-alignment", proved to be of great importance in the international relations of this period. In this context, Mao Tse-tung produced the "strategy of the two buffer zones" (the first being the underdeveloped countries and the second the countries of Western Europe), in which he argued that the PRC should fight the two world superpowers, by supporting the intermediate zone and through "diplomatic achievement". Thus, throughout the 1960s the Chinese concern in Africa focused more on ideological issues and its fight against imperialism, colonialism and revisionism. Moreover, it was also during this period that the PRC formulated the guidelines for its foreign aid programs:

"Eight Principles." The principles were announced by Premier Zhou En-lai during his visit to Africa from the late 1963s to 1964s. The "Eight Principles" are: mutual benefit; no conditions attached; the no-interest or low-interest loans would not create a debt burden for the recipient country; to help the recipient nation develop its economy, not to create its dependence on the PRC; to help the recipient country with project that needs less capital and quick returns; the aid in kind must be of high quality at the world market price; to ensure that the technology can be learned and mastered by the locals; the Chinese experts and technicians working for the aid recipient country are treated equally as the local ones with no extra benefits for them. In this context, in addition to providing political and military support, Beijing built the TAZARA railway linking Zambia to Tanzania, helping free Zambia from its dependence on trade routes to the sea controlled by white-minority ruled Rhodesia (Chun, 2013). By the end of 1969, the PRC had already been able to expand to nineteen the number of diplomatic allies in Africa.

In the 1970s, the PRC made a shift in its foreign policy, changing the priority of national interests and adopting a pragmatic strategy. In this period, relations with the West improved and through the policy of the "three worlds", Beijing sought the support of Third World nations in its fight against Soviet hegemony. Over the decade, several national liberation movements in Africa received Chinese support, which were helpful in neutralizing some Soviet operations on the continent. In 1971, with significant support from African countries (accounting for 1/3 of the votes in favor of Beijing), the PRC took the China's seat at the UN, at the expense of the ROC. The status of permanent member,

along with the situation that presented itself, allowed the PRC to broaden its diplomatic presence in Africa. By the end of 1970s the PRC had relations with 44 African states.

The early 1980s marked a new turning point in Chinese foreign policy, resultant of Deng Xiao-ping’s reforms. There was a redefinition of diplomatic strategy and policy for Africa, through the de-politicization of diplomacy and the Chinese approach of countries formerly neglected due to their alliance with the USSR. In 1982, the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Zi-yang, paid a visit to eleven African countries, and announced that the Chinese economic cooperation with Africa would be guided by four basic principles12, intended to show African countries, that the relationship between the PRC and Africa would be based on reciprocal basis, and not solely through economic assistance. Thanks to the PRC’s domestic situation, and its pursuit of economic development, there was a decrease in economic assistance and Chinese aid to Africa during this period (Li, n.d;

Brautigam, 2010). Moreover, with the proximity of the end of the Cold War and the subsequent Sino-Soviet rapprochement, Africa eventually lost importance strategic in the dispute between China, USA and USSR for areas of influence.

In the 1990s, however, Beijing’s attitude towards Africa suffered a new shift.

Politically, upon the Tiananmen Square incident, highly condemned internationally, Beijing sought African political support in order to minimize the impacts of sanctions imposed by the West. In addition to the support provided by several African countries, there was an understanding among Africans and Chinese that Western criticism was an attempt to destabilize the country’s growth. Moreover, Chinese leaders realized that African states could be reliable friends in international affairs. It is during this period that the then Chinese President Yang Shang-kun, during his visit to the continent, proposed six principles in order to strengthen the Sino-Africa relationship13. Furthermore, starting from

12 The four principles announced were: equality and mutual benefit; emphasis on practical results; diversity in form; and common development.

13 Support of African countries endeavors in maintaining state sovereignty, opposing foreign interference and developing the national economy; respect the African countries’ right to choose their own political system and development model in accordance with their own national features; it supports African states in their

13 Support of African countries endeavors in maintaining state sovereignty, opposing foreign interference and developing the national economy; respect the African countries’ right to choose their own political system and development model in accordance with their own national features; it supports African states in their