Policy Recommendations

There are a number of areas in which such efforts can be focused. This section proposes some suggestions for future areas of military policy that are not solid policy recommendations per se so much as they are ideas for programs and projects that would help to usher in a new organizational culture within the ROC military in ways that will help alleviate some of the problems (i.e. media relations, public perception) that, as identified in the current research, beset today’s military. As discussed earlier, it is inadvisable to implement policy without first conducting research into how best to do so; how similar policies have been implemented in other militaries; and how best to adapt the experience of others to suit the unique cultural conditions in Taiwan. Thus, while these represent potential policy goals, each also represents the potential for further research.

6.6(i) Focus on the Land

The ethic and character of the ROC military is very much focused on the ideals expounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Three Principles of the People. While these are laudable ethical underpinnings for an organization with its roots in China, they are, as previously mentioned, anachronistic in today’s Taiwan, and do not represent the values of modern young people.

While there is very little agreement among the nation’s ethnic groups and political philosophies, there is one thing that unites Taiwan people of all stripes, be they Hoklo or Hakka, Mainlander or Taiwanese, indigenous person or modern urbanite: the land. It is the land of Taiwan that represents home and hearth, and thus the focus of any cultural shift within the organization that is the ROC military should be one that focuses on the military’s purpose of defending this land. Therefore this topic is mentioned first as it is a motif that must inform all future decisions on projects and policies as the military moves into the 21st century. This would alleviate some of the ideological gap that exists between the traditional military culture and the realities of the people of Taiwan, in that the former is rooted in the Chinese identity, and of the ROC military being in Taiwan, but not of Taiwan. For decades now the goal of retaking the mainland has been abandoned, and yet the identity associated with that link has persisted. Instead a new identity must be adopted, and that must focus on the land of Taiwan.

6.6(ii) Conscription

First and foremost, plans to transition the ROC military to an All Volunteer Force should be abandoned. For the reasons enumerated earlier in this chapter, the situation in Taiwan does not parallel even distantly the conditions in the United States when that country underwent its own AVF transition. The persistent threat of annexation by China makes this an unrealistic, as

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well as a potentially dangerous, goal. Not only is there insufficient budget to make a military career competitive with what a young graduate can make in the civilian sector—meaning that manpower goals will never be met—but ending conscription would shift the military experience away from the majority of society, making the military a much less vital institution in Taiwan—it would place the armed forces on the fringes of society, and outside of the everyday experience of Taiwan’s people. The opposite is needed.

Conscription is important in keeping up manpower numbers. But it is important for other reasons as well, if properly utilized. Conscripts properly trained not only in military discipline and the duties of a soldier, but in how to mount guerilla campaigns, would in a matter of years create a large potential force of reservists with the knowledge and skills to mount a counter-offensive in the event of a PLA occupation of the island. Reservists are an integral component of a properly equipped and ready military force, and the ROC military currently has in excess of 140,000 reservists on the books, though they are being less than optimally leveraged. Currently, reservists must undergo training and administrative duties that amount to less than a week within a two-year period—far too short a time to ensure training and skills are up-to-date. Moreover, a reported 21 percent of reservists avoided even that minimal commitment in 2016, using loopholes in the rules (McCauley 2016: 6). The time commitment demanded of reservists must be increased significantly, and their training be kept up to date to ensure a ready force can be called out in the event of a conflict, and moreover to ensure the necessary skills exist among a vast proportion of the country’s males to form a resistance in the event of a Chinese occupation of Taiwan. A model from which ROC planner may draw inspiration is the example of Switzerland, whose rigorous and demanding mandatory military training, and follow-up reserve requirements, for all males is well known as the backbone of the nation’s defense strategy.

In addition to making the country better prepared for an attack, conscription is a socialization mechanism whereby Taiwanese from all walks of life will live, eat, and train together to work as an effective unit. Soldiers serving their mandated service time, which should be expanded to between 12 and 18 months in order to provide an effective amount of training and experience, will come into contact with peers from all strata of Taiwan society. Taiwan has been called a multicultural society, and properly utilized, conscription would see Hakka, Hoklo, indigenous people, Benshengren and Waishengren, all training together, helping to form a greater social unity for the nation. These friendships, moreover, carry over into post-military life, and have a great impact in fostering a more tolerant and unified society.

Much has been written on the experience of Singapore: an ethnically diverse city-state where conscription has been credited with contributing to the building of a cohesive nation (Nair 1995: 93). This example, more than the American one, is worthy of emulation. At the very least, more research is urged on how the Singapore example might be harnessed in a Taiwan context.

6.6(iii) Training

Any effort to define the identity of an institution begins with education and training. The values espoused in military training courses must be those that are in line with the values of Taiwan’s society today, not 30 years ago. It must be made clear to the soldiers serving in uniform that they are the primary line of defense protecting the values that they themselves hold to be of importance: democracy, liberty, the freedom to choose one’s own path—just as the people of a nation must be free to choose a path for their nation. Continued focus on

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abstract and anachronistic concepts do little to make the military identity relevant in today’s world.

Moreover, in terms of practical training, conscripts must feel that there is value in the work they are doing while in uniform. A common complaint among conscripts is that they spend their days performing menial tasks such as sweeping and yard work that have nothing to do with defending the nation (Lin 2015). The current short service time and other training inefficiencies inevitably result in accidents, that are both deadly and internationally embarrassing, not to mention having the potential to inadvertently trigger a shooting war given the state of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. One example is the admission by the ROC military on 1 July, 2016, that a Navy NCO had accidentally fired a live supersonic Hsiung-feng II anti-ship missile from a corvette at Zuoying Navy Base, killing the captain of a fishing trawler near Penghu and stirring a diplomatic—though fortunately not military—backlash from China. More recently, on 16 August, 2016, three ROC soldiers died when a CM-11 armored vehicle was driven off a three-meter-high bridge into Wangsha Stream in Pingtung county. A preliminary investigation cited a track jam as the cause of the accident, but more thorough training on how to deal with such unexpected occurrences would doubtless have saved lives.

If conscripts are engaged to serve for a period of 12 to 18 months, then this short time must be used effectively to provide the kind of training required not only of standing soldiers, but of reservists and of potential leaders. If the Western experience in the Middle East has taught military planners any lessons, it is that special forces operators are the future. While it is unrealistic to expect every rank-and-file serviceman to develop SpecOps skills during their conscription period, training in the aforementioned guerilla techniques would be a good first step. Given the geopolitical realities in the Taiwan Strait, the only reason to oppose such a project would be the fear that such techniques could be turned against the home government.

While this may have been a concern during the days of the Chiang regime, when the Taiwanese population was regarded as a potential threat, this no longer represents reality in today’s Taiwan.

The training must be enjoyable, but it must be tasking, both physically and mentally. These concepts are not mutually exclusive: indeed, the only way to develop a sense of camaraderie among soldiers (which is the first step to developing positive morale) is to provide the opportunity for shared achievement. All too often, however, conscripts are parked in make-work jobs as they wait out their time until they can leave the military. Too often, soldiers are regarded by their managers as a cheap source of labor, rather than fighting men and women deserving of respect. At the time of writing, the conscription period has in some cases been reduced to a mere four months. Moreover, since the Hung Chung-chiu scandal, the military has—in good faith, it must be mentioned—stationed ambulances and medical aid personnel nearby training areas where conscripts do pushups, run laps, and perform other physical training activities. These efforts, while serving as a band-aid (both in real terms as well as public perception is concerned) against future occurrences of the unfortunate incident, serve only to highlight to conscripts that they are not being challenged, and that their efforts are not yielding any personal or group victories. Moreover, the short conscription period translates into a tacit acknowledgement by military leaders that conscription itself is a waste of time, and the reduced level of physical demands on the recruits come across as treating them like delicate, fragile things, and not as warriors. This is not the way to create the opportunity for accomplishment, camaraderie, and pride.

168 6.6(iv) Civilian Employees

The cynical use of conscripts for manual labor during their short conscription time means that the use of civilian employees must therefore be increased. They can be hired to perform the menial tasks now demoralizing soldiers so that conscripts can be freed up to focus on training.

As already stated, there is too much of a tendency in the ROC military to view the issue of civilian-military interoperability as one which takes place at exclusively the upper echelons—the ministerial level, and among flag positions. What is equally important as the number of civilian PhDs that are hired are the number of menial jobs contracted out to allow soldiers to train. Moreover, the mindset that regards soldiers as cheap labor must be changed.

In addition to menial and managerial posts, civilian employees must also be hired for technical positions as well. The nature of modern warfare necessitates expertise with complex weapons systems, training to become proficient with which many conscripts do not have the time. Thus until the military becomes an attractive career path for technically proficient job seekers, many technician and technologist jobs will best be performed by civilian contractors.

6.6(v) Transparency

It goes without saying that many aspects of military operations are security-sensitive and must be shielded from prying eyes, but incidents such as trainee deaths, which occur all too frequently, must not be covered up as this only compounds the negative perception when they are inevitably discovered. Such transparency must extend to the media, and can help to forge a new, better relationship with the nation’s media outlets. For their part, the media too must stop using military scandals as sources for sensationalistic reporting, to focus instead on the facts and the social implication of such events.

One possible route to achieving this could be through the use of embedded journalists in military units. The ROC military has proven itself very adept at reducing transparency and improving public relations through such methods as making bases and facilities open to the public on certain days, and on inviting the media to witness training exercises such as the annual Han Kuang Exercise. But in order to demystify the organization and create a better relationship with the public, it is equally important that the media and the public see the everyday lives of ordinary soldiers, airmen, and sailors, not just during high-profile drills.

How do they live? Where do they sleep? What are their duties? The daily life of servicemen is extremely interesting to members of the public, as evidenced by numerous documentaries made all around the world, such as the BBC’s “Sailor” about daily life on the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, and the American equivalent, “Carrier,” a 10-part series filmed aboard the USS Nimitz. Both documentaries share many commonalities, the most important of which is their frankness: they depict the excitement of a life in the military, but they also depict the boredom, the interpersonal conflicts, and they are not afraid to show sailors making mistakes and being punished by their superiors. Another excellent example is the 2010 documentary

“Every Singaporean Son,” which follows 15 young men from different backgrounds as they endure basic training, and in doing so experience a rite of passage that contributes to cementing their identity as Singaporean. Providing free access to TV crews and filmmakers would go a long way to bringing the ROC military and the public closer together, and reducing the often adversarial nature of military-public-media interactions.

169 6.6(vi) Cadets Youth Program

Another project that could be implemented in Taiwan is the institution of a youth league, which in structure would not be too dissimilar from the China Youth Corps, though without that organization’s anti-Communist and colonial-era connotations. Rather, Taiwan could adopt a system similar to the one employed in Canada, whose Royal Canadian Sea Cadets, Air Cadets, and Army Cadets offer the opportunity for adolescents from around the country to work with their peers in learning environment-specific military skills and activities that benefit both the participants as well as the military itself. Sea Cadets, for example, learn about navigation; seamanship; sailing; and ropework, and they have the opportunities to compete in regattas around the world against similar teams from other countries. Air Cadets, meanwhile, learn the skills of junior airmen and have the opportunity to fly training drones and even gliders, while Army Cadets learn orienteering; living off the land; first-aid;

wilderness survival; target shooting; and other soldierly skills, all while still in high school.

Most importantly, these groups focus on fun, sportsmanship, and building self-esteem and teamwork, with only a touch of military discipline. Not only would such a program be a boon to recruiting young people into lifelong military careers, but it would be indispensible as a means of fostering a healthier relationship between the military and society in general.

Moreover, instructors in the Cadets system, as well as former Cadets themselves, represent the future leaders of the Taiwan military, and would bring with them a healthier respect for the military institution and its positive role in society—a far cry from the conscripts of today who count their daily mantou (bread ration) until they are finally released from service. In addition to being of benefit to the military, and to the country (as surely international connections would be made through the aforementioned regattas and other friendly competitions), such an organization would be beneficial to the young people themselves, who are at an age when they seek belonging in a group outside of family, and thus are often attracted to joining gangs and other dangerous pursuits. This organization would offer a positive alternative.

6.6(vii) Ethnic Indigenous Regiments

For countless generations, the indigenous ethnic groups of Taiwan have had to contend with various colonizers who sought to assimilate them and force them to give up their customs, traditions and traditional lifestyles in order to adopt the identity of the majority. This represents a lost opportunity to the Taiwan military, which should instead authorize the formation and training of indigenous regiments that would not only benefit from training in modern military tactics, but employ the traditional skills of indigenous heritage, such as hunting, tracking, and living off the land. This comes back to the previous notes on refocusing the ethic of the military to one that focuses on the land, and there are arguably no groups in Taiwan who know the land better than the nation’s indigenous groups. While such regiments would greatly benefit the military in general, as those skills are shared and as the public comes to view the military as an organization that respects the diversity of peoples in Taiwan: but it would also benefit the indigenous groups themselves, many of whose traditions and skills are in danger of disappearing for lack of opportunity to pass them on. The creation

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of indigenous units and regiments would go a long way toward demonstrating value in those traditional skills, and helping the peoples themselves to rebuild their links with their heritage.

It should be noted that such regiments are not unprecedented, with Cherokee and Choctaw battalions in the United States, and such famously fierce units as the Gurkhas making up regiments in the British Army. In Taiwan, indigenous native soldiers led by indigenous officers could be organized according to indigenous guidelines of ethics, or across them.

Highly trained and accomplished NCOs of such units could furthermore be tasked to teach skills such as tracking, primitive hunting, wilderness survival, and escape-and-evasion techniques to regular army platoons as well. This would not only serve as a transmission of invaluable skills and knowledge, but help foster a greater understanding and respect for the nation’s indigenous people among the Han Chinese majority. As has been observed earlier in this document, one of the training objectives of the Taiwan military should be to imbue its soldiers, and especially reservists, with guerilla fighting skills and tactics, and methods of fighting asymmetrically should Chinese troops occupy the island. There would be no better teacher of such skills and such knowledge than the peoples whose ancestors have lived on this land for thousands of years. Moreover: this would go a long way toward dispelling the myth that the military remains the KMT army.