The American Example

How can policymakers make use of this information? For a start, it is worth re-examining the impulse to shift to an AVF. In large part, it stems from a desire to use what has worked in other countries, particularly America, from which the ROC derives many institutional and policy models. In the current situation, there has been an effort to apply the American example of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) transition to the Republic of China military. A closer look at the experience of the United States military and the conditions therein immediately prior to and during the transition reveals several differences that, at best, make the application of the American model problematic and, at worst, conspire to sabotage the entire effort. The following is a look at some of those factors as enunciated by a study conducted by the Rand Corp. and an analysis of how each is applicable to conditions in Taiwan.

6.2(i) Political Imperative

Campaigning for President in 1968, Richard Nixon made the transition to AVF a platform of his election campaign—an issue that saw significant opposition within the military. In many ways, this parallels the experience in Taiwan, where Ma Ying-jeou, campaigning for president 40 years later, made a similar campaign promise in his own bid for president—the idea likewise facing opposition from the ROC military. Both men won office, but this is where the similarity ends. In Taiwan, an attempt was immediately made to implement the plan. Initial attempts failed due largely to a lack of adequate funding from the government, and the deadline for implementation was delayed first to 2014, and then again to 2016. The reasons for the failure of the transition thus far shall be examined in more detail, but they stem from two main causes: the failure to draw up and follow a detailed plan for the transition, and the failure of government to provide the promised support, especially in the form of adequate funding.

In contrast, in the United States, Nixon did not immediately engage in implementing the transition, and instead first commissioned a report to study its feasibility and methods of implementation. This became known as the Gates Commission Report. This report provided a detailed blueprint on how to implement the transition, and it should be noted that it was steeped in the occupation model on the Institutional/Occupational spectrum. It is worth remembering that conscription is not an American norm or tradition, historically speaking.

Indeed, in its approximately 230 years of history, the United States employed conscription for a mere 35 years – most of which was in the decades prior to the AVF transition.

157 6.2(ii) Demographics

By the time of the Nixon administration, the population of draft-age young men in the United States was far larger than the manpower requirements of the military at that time. This served as an incentive to shifting the focus to a leaner, more professional volunteer military. In contrast, demographics are not in Taiwan’s favor. According to the information website Index Mundi (providing numbers for year 2016), the birth rate is 8.4 births/1,000 population, with a total fertility rate of 1.12. This is a very low fertility scenario with grave implications for Taiwan’s population growth, especially given the culture’s traditional aversion to immigration intake (with a net migration rate of 0.9 migrant(s)/1,000 population). With a median age of 40.2 and a population growth rate of just 0.2%, this paints the picture of a graying population with all the associated problems that that entails.

As a result, the exact opposite demographic conditions are at play in Taiwan than were at the time of the US transition, with too few eligible young men to meet the needs of military staffing. Likewise, the nation’s universities are also finding that demographics are responsible for a drop in matriculation rates, and hence tuition revenues. As a result, they are turning to accepting large numbers of exchange students from China to fill the gap—clearly an option that is not available to the military.

6.2(iii) Cost

The United States had the budget to hire enough volunteers, and to offer salaries and benefits that were comparable to what applicants could make working in the civilian sector. In contrast, Taiwan’s effort to transition to a professional military is suffering from budget shortfalls. Another of the campaign promises made by Ma Ying-jeou was to commit to defense spending of no less than 3% of GDP. According to the CIA World Factbook, however, ROC military expenditures were 2.2% of GDP in 2012, and the government further reduced the budget (from USD10.6 billion to USD10.5 billion) in 2013.

From a fiscal standpoint, the AVF initiative is in dire straits. As reported in the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, the 2011 personnel budget of the ROC military was only able to support the hiring of 5,000 new volunteers, which is less than half the original target of 11,000. Moreover, the defense ministry’s projected budget for 2014, at USD10.4 billion, was only a USD155 million increase from 2011, meaning they could only hire 9,000 more volunteer soldiers, or about 20 percent of the recruitment goals for 2014—the year in which the transition was originally to have been completed.

6.2(iv) Moral Considerations

Both sides of the political aisle called for an end to the draft in America, with those on the left decrying the overrepresentation of blacks and other underprivileged members of American society in the ranks of the conscript US army, while libertarians and the right opposed the very notion of the state forcing young men to do its fighting without their consent.

Taiwan has no clear-cut analogy to these positions. While there is the Chinese tradition of conscription dating back to the Warring States period, conscription of Taiwan’s young men

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into the ROC army has been in place since 1949. The moral component is a difficult one to convey, and it is imperative that different viewpoints seeing the issue very differently be measured before making radical shifts in policy. From the perspective of the ROC elite—the mainlanders who came to Taiwan in 1949 with the KMT party, the government, the ROC military, and the various institutions (including National Chengchi University itself) and individuals who feared death at the hands of Mao’s Communists—is there a moral conundrum at all? After all, they view the Taiwanese people as fellow Chinese, and as such it is perfectly natural to expect that they should serve in the army of the Republic of China. On the other hand, there are many in Taiwan who do not consider themselves Chinese at all, preferring to self-identify as Taiwanese: their view of conscription in the army of the ROC (or worse, of the KMT, should the military not be able to shed that image) is different. As evidenced by this research, very few respondents indicated an inclination toward promoting a military career to their sons and daughters.

6.2(v) Opposition to the Vietnam War

While popular opposition to the war in Vietnam was undoubtedly one of the motivating factors behind the US administration’s desire to end conscription, this too has no direct parallel in Taiwan. While arguably no active state of war exists between Taiwan and China, the latter constitutes a serious threat to the security of the island, and has made its intention of annexing the island, by force if necessary, very clear. Naturally, this differs greatly from the Vietnam situation America found itself in, with Taiwan here being the party open to a potential invasion, and therefore in need of defending. Thus many find it odd that this moment should be chosen for an effort to end conscription on the island. However, given the nature of Taiwan politics and the complex cross-strait relationship, there is little wonder that this project should be proposed by the administration of Ma Ying-jeou, who has been trying since being elected ROC president to smooth relations with Beijing and oversee a rapprochement between the two countries. Ma’s policies show a trend toward an avoidance of riling Beijing, and strong efforts to put the Taiwan/China relationship above all others. Thus, it is little wonder that this administration would take steps to downgrade the overt lethality and capacity of the ROC military, as it stands in the way of other cross-strait policies driven by “soft-power.” Moreover, the KMT party itself has a recent history of neglect of the military, as evidenced by its actions of using its control of the Legislative Yuan to boycott any weapons purchases during the entire eight-year tenure of President Chen Shui-bian—eight years during which the PLA gained a sizeable advantage over the ROC military.

To the Western observer, this might seem counterintuitive – why would a political party act in a way that is detrimental to the nation? However, it must be remembered that the KMT is the Chinese Nationalist Party—it was founded in China, and even today, its more old-guard members still consider the party as the holder of the Mantle of Heaven; a divine right to rule over China. Taiwan is therefore not its main focus, except insofar as it brings the party closer to China.

159 6.2(vi) The US Army had a Desire for Change

This point is related to the previous one, with the war in Vietnam being responsible for a large number of discipline problems among draftees who, quite understandably, did not want to be there. It was thought by Army generals that a more capable army made up of professional soldiers would not suffer from these problems, and so the time had come for a change. While it is likewise time for a change in Taiwan as well, the radically differing challenges and conditions between the two countries and eras mean that the changes adopted must also be different. How then shall policymakers and social leaders chart an appropriate course for the future development of the ROC military? One thing is certain: it must take local realities and conditions into account.

Any impulse to impose a Western form on the ROC military (such as the effort to transition to an AVF) must therefore be resisted, and instead a unique structure tailored to Taiwan’s realities must be adopted. Again, the PMMM can assist in this effort, though not as a blueprint: rather as an analytical tool. What would be an appropriate disposition for the military of a postmodern society faced with an early-modern threat profile? This is the challenge facing Taiwan planners, and it is a challenge that will not be solved by simply importing institutional structures from the West. To answer that question, one must adopt a culturalist perspective.