Ethnic Self-Identification

The area of race, even ethnicity, is a charged one in public discourse in North America today, and one in which researchers must tread extremely carefully to avoid unintentionally offending the sensibilities of a public that is increasingly quick to take offense. This condition is particularly pronounced in academia, and perhaps because of this, there is distressingly little available research on issues of comparative ethnic identification. Rather, the concept of ethnic identity seems to be mostly viewed in isolation among discrete immigrant groups, rather than answering questions related to individual choices of ethnic self-identification.

Fortunately, Taiwan is not yet afflicted by this cultural condition, and there are a number of studies examining questions of ethnicity in the country, especially as to how it is related to the conception of national identity.⁵ According to Wu (2008) the 1990s saw ethnic relations in Taiwan coalesce into a binary framework of confrontation as what he terms the

5 Unfortunately, much of this research tends to extend into the political realm, making it difficult to find work that is not conducted in service of a political agenda.

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“burgeoning Taiwanese identity” began to take shape and challenge the long-prevailing Chinese identity enforced by decades of authoritarian rule. This led to a polarization of ethnic consciousness that defines the choices of ethnic identification in the current study.

In most countries, only a small proportion of the population are of sufficiently mixed heritage as to be in the individual position to have a claim on one of a range of possible identities. For example, in the United States, there are a number of individuals with mixed-race parentage, such as having a Caucasian father and an African-American mother, and thus they are in the position in today’s society to embrace that aspect of their racial heritage with which they most identify. Still, US census data for 2014 indicates that only about 45,672,250 people are African-American, or African-American in combination with another race, which accounts for a mere 14.3 percent of the US population, according to the National population and housing census (2014).

In contrast, in Taiwan, mixed-race heritage is not only more widespread, but it is considered by many to be a defining characteristic of this population. Moreover, most previous studies look at ethnicity and ethnic identification within the context of a multicultural, multi-ethnic society such as the United States or Canada. The dynamic is extremely different in a largely homogeneous society (despite self-identification as either Mainlander or Taiwanese, both are, in strict racial terms, considered Han Chinese) such as that in Taiwan, and indeed most East Asian countries. As a result, few of these foreign studies are instructive in reading trends on the island. They are, however, extremely helpful in composing conceptualization and operationalization schemes (Whaley 2005: 87, Williams and Thornton 1998: 255).

On the issue of ethnic identification, Isajiw (1992) provides an excellent theoretical backgrounder as he identifies four main approaches: the primordialist, epiphenomenon, situational, and subjective approaches. The first of these looks at ethnicity as fixed and genetically determined. The other three arose as reactions to the established sociological and anthropological orthodoxy of looking at ethnicity as a primordial phenomenon. The epiphenomenon approach used a center-periphery model to conceptualize ethnicity, and posits that uneven patterns of economic disparity determine where ethnic groups consolidate and establish their culture. The situational approach, Isajiw points out, is based on rational choice theory in that people choose to identify with certain ethnic groups based on the perceived advantages that will be accrued as a result. This is similar to the instrumentalist approach, which is preferred by Hempel (2004). The subjective approach conceives of ethnicity as almost completely divorced from matters of culture or any concrete measuring as according to the primordialist school, and instead is a function of psychological “us vs. them”

perceptions and mutually accepted realities.

In a South African study examining the relationship between self-image and ethnic identification, Bornman (1999) conceptualized ethnicity as “a mode of social differentiation based primarily on perceptions of kinship, a common cultural focus, and an awareness of historical destiny.” Although there are few parallels between the two nations either historically, socially or in cultural makeup, this is actually an excellent definition for the various aspects making up the concept of “ethnic identity” in Taiwan today.

In a study of academic performance and dropout rates among young Americans of Mexican descent, Bernal et al. (1991) reviewed the available research and theoretical literature in order to determine the ways in which their identification as Mexican Americans affected their psychological adaptation in school, given the cultural, social, and political contexts of their school settings. The authors concluded that the dominant theoretical views concerning underachievement had not reached a theoretical synthesis, nor adequately explored the

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conditions that lead to dropping out. They proposed closing this gap using Social Identity Theory. This theoretical framework would be helpful, they suggested, “for promoting the understanding of ethnic and other social identity changes as mediators of the effects of environmental and individual variables on school achievement.”

While the context of this study differs from the issue of ethnic identification in Taiwan, it still offers enough parallels to include the theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory as a possible means of explaining the relationship.⁶ Originally proposed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner (1982), membership groups could be anything from social class to a sports team, and provide a sense of pride and self-esteem to the individual. In Taiwan, for example, social groups may include ethnic groups such as Hakka or an indigenous group, or it may be expressed as Benshengren (本省人) or Waishengren (外省人). To what extent, for example, do Taiwan residents exhibit behavior consistent with Social Identity Theory? Moreover, is the military enough of a well-respected institution for it to provide an attractive enough sense of group belonging to give soldiers a source of pride and self-esteem, and can this be stronger than their social identity attachment to other groups from which they derive a sense of social identity: a sense of belonging to the social world? It becomes more complex, however, as this theory looks at the identification of individuals with social groups, and the current study deals with two distinct avenues of belonging: belonging to a perceived ethnic identification, and views of the military. It is possible, according to this framework, a citizen who identifies strongly as either Taiwanese or Mainlander would tend to consider such ethnic identification as being secondary to his more immediate identification as a citizen of a nation facing an external threat.

Young people in Taiwan today are under several sources of pressure that influences how they define themselves and their place in society: in a Confucian-influenced society, birth order, gender, and family characteristics are not the least of these (Yu and Su 2006: 1059).

Furthermore, the way they identify ethnically greatly impacts their political views, especially their view of China: those identifying as Taiwanese, for example, may see China as a threat that promises to annex Taiwan and erase their ethnic distinctiveness by absorbing them into the greater Han majority, of which they are genetically a part. Those identifying as Mainlander, meanwhile, may not share this Taiwanese consciousness and generally envision an inevitable unification of Taiwan and China. How does each regard the nation’s armed forces? Ethnic identification is an essential element in the ROC citizen’s emotional response to the mission to defend against China, and therefore a key concept in this study.

2.4(i) Background on the Identity Issue

Identity is a contentious and ever-shifting issue in Taiwan, and as it is central to the thrust of this research, it is worth offering a backgrounder on the issue of identity in Taiwan today, how it is manipulated and portrayed in the media, and how the understanding of it continues to evolve thanks to ongoing work by a number of scholars.

6 According to Social Identity Theory, the concept of social identity is related to the method by which an individual tends to develop a sense of self by using as a foundation his or her membership in a larger group.

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Both the Chinese in China and those who identify as Chinese in Taiwan tend to view the Taiwanese (Minnan speakers) themselves as just another group of Han Chinese people. This is essentially true, from a primordialist perspective: the migration of Chinese people to Taiwan did not begin until the 17th century, when the Dutch colonialists attracted (and in some cases, kidnapped) Chinese farmers from Fujian and Guangzhou provinces to work the plantations they had established.⁷ Thus, the Taiwanese people today are the descendants of these and subsequent waves of immigration during the Qing dynasty, along with a high degree of intermarriage with the indigenous population.

Since the democratization era, much has been written about an “emerging Taiwanese identity”

gaining ground on the island. Moreover, this is often linked to the search for indigenous ancestors, blood, or DNA, as a means to cement one's Taiwanese bona fides. In fact, the desire to find such genealogical evidence represents a rebuff of the Chinese identity that has been imposed upon Taiwan's people since 1949. Put simply: the interesting point is not that the Taiwanese don't see themselves as Chinese today: it's that they don't want to.

In late May, 2016, the newspapers in Taiwan reported on a poll conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation in which 80 percent of respondents reported that they identified as Taiwanese, with a mere 8.1 percent identifying as Chinese (7.6 percent identified as both).

This is in stark contrast to similar polls conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s in which the vast majority reported identifying as Chinese or both. What happened in the short span of a single generation that could change an entire nation's self-perception so radically?

In fact, no such sea change ever took place. Indeed, neither historical roots nor system-level changes are sufficiently able to influence group identity on the scale of what has been measured (Chu 2004: 498). Rather, according to researcher Frank Muyard (2012), what happened in the 1990s was not a rising Taiwanese identity, but rather a newfound freedom to express that sentiment, including in polls. As with many oppressed and/or colonized peoples throughout the world and throughout history, the Taiwanese identity can be conceptualized in opposition to an external “other.” Before the era of democratization, Taiwaneseness stood in opposition to the KMT and that party's authoritarianism, White Terror, and Leninist efforts to control all forms of social expression by subsuming Taiwaneseness into a subset of Chineseness. For evidence of the expression of this phenomenon one need look no further than the political accretion of opposition forces who chose the name Tangwai (黨外), or literally ‘outside the party’.

In the 1990s democratization opened up new avenues for exploring the idea of Taiwaneseness and what it means. Several things happened in the 1990s. First, the DPP established itself as a legitimate and legal alternative to the KMT and standard bearer of Taiwan-centered politics.

The rise of democratic politics meant that the Taiwan identity could no longer be defined as resistance to the System: the Tangwai were now part of the system in the form of the DPP and its allies. Further, the KMT under Lee Tung-hui, who was president throughout the entire decade, co-opted many DPP programs and positions, and thus appeared to be Taiwanizing.

That made it difficult to oppose the KMT as an anti-Taiwanese party (Wang and Liu 2004:

577).

7 While the indigenous populations were already accomplished farmers, they preferred subsistence farming, and were resistant to being made into taxable subjects, yet the Dutch needed a dependent workforce that would produce a surplus—this workforce they imported from China.

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Survey results from the late 1980s and early 1990s show a high number of respondents identifying as Chinese because, according to Muyard (2012), the Taiwanese had long learned that it was safer to lie to the State. As society opened up through democratization and the end of the authoritarian era, people felt more comfortable publically admitting to a sense of Taiwaneseness, and telling the truth in such surveys. Therefore there was no real “emergence”

of a Taiwanese identity in the 1990s, but rather the uncloaking of a theretofore hidden one.

Moreover, once people from Taiwan were finally able to visit China in the 1980s and 1990s, the stark contrast between the two cultures across the Taiwan Strait began to be made clear.

Since the opening of Taiwan to thousands of Chinese tourists by the administration of former President Ma Ying-jeou, this process of differentiation has only accelerated due to close interpersonal contact (Turton 2016).

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