認同與轉變: 中華民國(台灣)軍民關係的認知研究 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語博士學位學程 International Doctoral Program of Asia Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University, Taipei. 博士論文 Doctoral Dissertation. 認同與轉變: 中華民國(台灣)軍民關係的認知研究 Identity and Transformation: Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of China (Taiwan). Student: Dean Karalekas Advisor: David Blundell. 中華民國 105 年 11 月 November 2016.

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(3) 認同與轉變: 中華民國(台灣)軍民關係的認知研究 Identity and Transformation: Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of China (Taiwan). 研究生：康迪恩 Student: Dean Karalekas 指導教授：卜道 Advisor: David Blundell. 國立政治大學亞太研究博士學位學程博士論文 A Dissertation Submitted as a Partial Requirement to International Doctoral Program in Asia Pacific Studies National Chengchi University, Taipei. 中華民國 105 年 11 月 November 2016. i.

(4) Acknowledgement The completion of this doctoral dissertation would not have been possible without the help and support of so many people. It has been said that the dissertation is a long journey, and this journey has indeed been a long and difficult one, and also immensely enjoyable, not just for conducting the research but the friendships that were formed and the adventures that were experienced, resulting from it. First and foremost, I must express my extreme gratitude to Dr. David Blundell, who has been not only an advisor during this process, but a friend and mentor as well. Dr. Blundell is generous with his knowledge, his contacts, and his depth of experience, and continues to serve as an icon worthy of emulation: should I ever become a professor, he is the kind of professor I hope to be. I give my deepest appreciation to the other members of my dissertation committee, namely Dr. Kuan Ping-yin, Dr. Csaba Moldicz, Col. James Yuan, and Dr. Liu Fu-kuo. Without their patience and assistance this dissertation could not have been accomplished. Dr. Liu was especially instrumental in sharing his depth of expertise and providing an environment in which this research could flourish. I must also thank Dr. Evan Berman, whose vision for the creation and future of the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) and whose tireless work to make it a world-class program, served as an inspiration. I hope, as he did, to leave IDAS a better place than when I joined it. I would also be remiss if I didn’t thank my beloved colleagues and classmates at National Chengchi University (NCCU), foremost among them being Niki Alsford, Philippe Cachia, Moises Lopes de Souza, and Greg Coutaz, as well as the late John Schmeidel, without whose friendship and camaraderie this journey would not have been worthwhile. Thanks must also be made to my friends and family who, after an appropriate length of time, mercifully stopped asking when this dissertation would finally be completed. Finally, my deepest thanks go to Myra Lu, without whose love, patience, encouragement, and translation skills, this document could never have been produced. I am lucky indeed to have her.. ii.

(5) Abstract As the polity continues to evolve in Taiwan, so too does the relationship between the Republic of China (ROC) military and society. Democratization, the growth of civil society, economic and social liberalization, and greater equality in terms of gender and sexual orientation have marked a Taiwan society that is becoming liberal, largely in the same pattern that has taken place in much of the West. As society becomes more open and free, there has been a tendency for government and policymakers to push the military—an important social institution—in that direction as well. The problem arises, however, when Western examples are followed without a proper assessment of whether they are appropriate for local conditions. An example is the push to transition the ROC military to an All-Volunteer Force: this worked in the West because it happened organically and based on exhaustive sociological research conducted prior to implementation. But is it the right thing for Taiwan? In order to assess the applicability of the Western example, this research uses as its theoretical construct the Postmodern Military Model, which is a theoretical construct used to describe how civil-military relations transform driven by changes in perceived threat. As developed by US military sociologists Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, the PMMM describes the transformations that have taken place in the US military and other armed forces in the world, and aids in understanding the state of civil-military relations. This research assesses the ROC military according to the 11 dimensions of the PMMM to determine the current state of civil-military relations, while also providing an assessment of the model’s applicability to the unique context of Taiwan. This study employs quantitative methods, using a survey of ROC citizens providing primary data, supplemented by documentary evidence, to determine the current state of civil-military relations using as a framework the 11 dimensions of the PMMM. Analysis of the findings indicate that the ROC military does not neatly fit the pattern of the PMMM, but in a way that nonetheless sheds light on the state of civil-military relations in Taiwan. A closer look at these dimensions reveals how the PMMM, while not an appropriate roadmap for policymakers, is nevertheless an excellent tool for understanding the current state of ROC civil-military relations, and can yet contribute to the formation of better policy. Keywords: Taiwan Identity, Military sociology, Civil-Military Relations, Postmodern Military Model, Self-Identification, Military Transformation. iii.

(6) Table of Contents Tables and Figures ............................................................................................................. viii Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Research Area, Research Interest, and Research Topic ................................................. 1 1.2 The Armed Forces of the Republic of China (ROC) ..................................................... 1 1.3 Structure...................................................................................................................... 3 1.4 Relevance of the Current Research .............................................................................. 4 1.5 Summary of Research .................................................................................................. 4 1.6 Practical and Theoretical Value of the Current Research .............................................. 5 Chapter 2: Literature Review................................................................................................. 7 2.1 Review of Literature .................................................................................................... 7 2.2 Moskos’s Postmodern Military Model ......................................................................... 7 2.3 PMMM Dimensions .................................................................................................. 10 2.3(i)Perceived Threat ................................................................................................. 10 2.3(ii) Force Structure ................................................................................................. 12 2.3(iii) Major Mission Definition ................................................................................. 13 2.3(iv) Dominant Military Professional........................................................................ 14 2.3(v) Public Attitude Toward the Military................................................................... 15 2.3(vi) Media Relations ............................................................................................... 16 2.3(vii) Civilian Employees ......................................................................................... 18 2.3(viii) Women’s Role in the Military......................................................................... 19 2.3(ix) Spouses and the Military Community ............................................................... 21 2.3(x) Homosexuals in the Military ............................................................................. 21 2.3(xi) Conscientious Objection................................................................................... 22 2.4 Ethnic Self-Identification ........................................................................................... 23 Chapter 3: Research Methodology....................................................................................... 28 3.1 Dependent Variables .................................................................................................. 28 3.1(i) Perceived Threat ................................................................................................ 28 3.1(ii) Major Mission Definition .................................................................................. 29 3.1(iii) Public Attitude ................................................................................................. 29 3.1(iv) Media Relations ............................................................................................... 29 3.1(v) Women's Role, Homosexuals in the Military ..................................................... 30 3.1(vi) Conscientious Objection................................................................................... 30 3.1(vii) Force Structure................................................................................................ 30 3.2 Independent Variables ................................................................................................ 31. iv.

(7) 3.3 Research Questions ................................................................................................... 32 3.4 Population ................................................................................................................. 35 3.5 Research Design and Ethical Considerations.............................................................. 35 3.6 Definition and Conceptualization ............................................................................... 36 3.6(i) Extraneous Dimensions ...................................................................................... 38 3.7 Operationalization ..................................................................................................... 39 3.8 Research Strategy ...................................................................................................... 40 3.9 Validity ...................................................................................................................... 40 Chapter 4: Findings ............................................................................................................. 42 4.1 Results....................................................................................................................... 43 4.1(i) Sample Composition .......................................................................................... 43 4.2 Descriptive Analysis of Independent Variables ........................................................... 47 4.2(i) Self-Identification .............................................................................................. 47 4.2(ii) Identification (Taiwanese vs. Chinese) and Demographics ................................ 49 4.2(iii) Position on Unification/Independence .............................................................. 52 4.2(iv) Political Tendencies ......................................................................................... 54 4.3 Correlations Analysis of Dependent Variables ............................................................ 57 4.3(i) The China Threat ............................................................................................... 57 4.3(ii) Cross-strait worries ........................................................................................... 58 4.3(iii) Problems Faced by the Military........................................................................ 60 4.3(iv) Major Mission Definition ................................................................................. 66 4.3(v) Military Reflecting Societal Values ................................................................... 71 4.3(vi) Willingness to Fight ......................................................................................... 75 4.3(vii) Faith in the Military ........................................................................................ 76 4.3(viii) Military Investigations ................................................................................... 77 4.3(ix) Media Coverage of the Military........................................................................ 78 4.3(x) Females/Homosexuals in Uniform..................................................................... 79 4.3(xi) Conscription..................................................................................................... 81 4.3(xii) Conscientious Objection ................................................................................. 89 4.3(xiii) Sending One’s Own Children to the Military .................................................. 90 Chapter 5: Analysis ............................................................................................................. 93 5.1 Placement of the ROC Military.................................................................................. 93 5.2 PMMM in an ROC Context ....................................................................................... 93 5.3 Threat Perception in Taiwan ...................................................................................... 95 5.3(i) Threat Perception Among Mainlanders............................................................... 97 5.3(ii) Culture War....................................................................................................... 99. v.

(8) 5.3(iii) Research Findings .......................................................................................... 100 5.4 Force Structure in the ROC...................................................................................... 104 5.4(i) Research Findings ............................................................................................ 106 5.5 Mission Definition in the ROC ................................................................................ 108 5.5(i) Research Findings ............................................................................................ 112 5.6 Dominant Military Professional in the ROC ............................................................ 115 5.6(i) Research Findings ............................................................................................ 117 5.7 Public Attitude Toward the ROC Military ................................................................ 118 5.7(i) Research Findings ............................................................................................ 121 5.8 Media Relations and the ROC Military .................................................................... 123 5.8(i) Research Findings ............................................................................................ 125 5.9 Civilian Employees and the ROC Military ............................................................... 126 5.10 Women and the Military ........................................................................................ 127 5.10(i) Feminist Perspective ...................................................................................... 127 5.10(ii) Previous Research ......................................................................................... 128 5.10(iii) Role of Women in Chinese Culture .............................................................. 131 5.10(iv) Gender Equality in Taiwan Society............................................................... 132 5.10(v) Women in the Workforce ............................................................................... 134 5.10(vi) The Women’s Movement in Taiwan.............................................................. 137 5.10(vii) Women in the ROC Military........................................................................ 138 5.10(viii) Research Findings ...................................................................................... 140 5.11 Spouses and the Military Community .................................................................... 141 5.11(i) Military Spouses in Taiwan ............................................................................ 143 5.12 Homosexuals in the ROC Military ......................................................................... 146 5.12(i) Research Findings .......................................................................................... 148 5.13 Conscientious Objection ........................................................................................ 149 5.13(i) Conscientious Objection in Taiwan ................................................................ 150 5.13(ii) Research Findings ......................................................................................... 152 6: Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 153 6.1 Analysis of Results .................................................................................................. 153 6.2 The American Example ........................................................................................... 156 6.2(i) Political Imperative .......................................................................................... 156 6.2(ii) Demographics ................................................................................................. 157 6.2(iii) Cost ............................................................................................................... 157 6.2(iv) Moral Considerations ..................................................................................... 157 6.2(v) Opposition to the Vietnam War ........................................................................ 158. vi.

(9) 6.2(vi) The US Army had a Desire for Change........................................................... 159 6.3 A Culturalist Perspective .......................................................................................... 159 6.3(i) The Identity Conundrum .................................................................................. 160 6.4 Organizational Cultural Change ............................................................................... 162 6.5 Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future Research ....................... 164 6.6 Policy Recommendations ........................................................................................ 165 6.6(i) Focus on the Land ............................................................................................ 165 6.6(ii) Conscription ................................................................................................... 165 6.6(iii) Training ......................................................................................................... 166 6.6(iv) Civilian Employees ........................................................................................ 168 6.6(v) Transparency ................................................................................................... 168 6.6(vi) Cadets Youth Program .................................................................................... 169 6.6(vii) Ethnic Indigenous Regiments ........................................................................ 169 6.7 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 170 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 172. vii.

(10) Tables and Figures Tables Table 1: Dimensions of the Postmodern Military Model Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Table 3: Gender Table 4: Age Table 5: Father’s Ethnic Background Table 6: Mother’s Ethnic Background Table 7: Educational Level Table 8: Religious Belief Table 9: Ethnic Self-Identification Table 10: Parents’ Ethnic Background Table 11: Correlations Between Demographic Variables Table 12: Correlations between self-identification and religion Table 13: Correlations Between Self-Identification and Non-Religious And Taoists Table 14: Position On Unification/Independence Table 15: Predictors of Opinion on Unification/Independence Table 16: Unification/Independence: Self-Identification as Predictor Table 17: Unification/Independence: All Predictors Table 18: Political Party Preference Table 19: Blue and Green Groups Table 20: Political Party Preference: Control Variables Table 21: Political Party Preference: Identity Logit Regression Table 22: Perceived Threat Table 23: Main Threat: Dichotomous Coding Table 24: Main Threat: Logit Regression With All Predictors Table 25: Cross-Strait Worry Table 26: Cross-Strait Worry: Control Variables, Identity as Predictors Table 27: Cross-Strait Worry: One-By-One Correlations Table 28: Problems Facing Military Table 29: Problems Facing Military: By Gender Table 30: Problems Facing Military: By Parents’ Ethnic Background. viii.

(11) Table 31: Problems Facing Military: By Ethnic Self-Identification Table 32: Problems Facing Military: By Political Preference Table 33: Main Mission Definition Table 34: Main Mission Definition: By Gender Table 35: Main Mission Definition: By Parents’ Ethnic Background Table 36: Main Mission Definition: By Ethnic Self-Identification Table 37: Main Mission Definition: By Political Preference Table 38: Military Reflecting Society: Responses Table 39: Military Reflecting Society: Dichotomous Table 40: Military Reflecting Society: Logit Regression Table 41: Military Reflecting Society: Predictors Table 42: Military Reflecting Society: Correlations Table 43: Willingness to Fight Table 44: Willingness to Fight: Coefficients Table 45: Faith in the Military to Defend Taiwan Table 46: Faith in the Military to Defend Taiwan: Coefficients Table 47: Perception of Fairness and Impartiality Table 48: Perception of Fairness and Impartiality: Coefficients Table 49: Perception of Media Discrimination Table 50: Perception of Media Discrimination: Coefficients Table 51: Perception of Women in the Military Table 52: Perception of Women in the Military: Coefficients Table 53: Perception of Homosexuals in the Military Table 54: Openness to Homosexuals Table 55: Openness to Homosexuals: Regression With All Predictors Table 56: Attitude Toward Conscription Table 57: Attitude Toward Conscription: Dichotomous Table 58: Attitude Toward Conscription: Predictors Table 59: Attitude Toward Conscription: Correlations Table 60: Attitude Toward Conscription: Correlations with Attitudes Toward The Military Table 61: Support for Conscription: Reasons Table 62: Support for Conscription: Logit Regression Table 63: Support for Conscription: Identity Correlations Table 64: Support for Conscription: Military Attitudes Correlations Table 65: Perceptions of Conscientious Objection ix.

(12) Table 66: Perceptions of Conscientious Objection: Coefficients Table 67: Sending Own Children to Military Table 68: Sending Own Children to Military: Likert Reordering Table 69: Sending Own Children to Military: Coefficients Table 70: Summary: Taiwan And PMMM Table 71: Sex Ratio in Taiwan (1972-2001) Table 72: Dynamics of Family Relationship Structures Graphs Graph A: Taiwan Population Pyramid Graph B: Parental Ethnic Background vs. Perceived Identity Graph C: Central Government Defense Expenditures 1964-2014 Graph D: Female Labor Market Participation Rates in Taiwan, in the OECD Countries Graph E: Female Share of Owners in SMEs. Figures Figure 1: Model Summary Figure 2: Model Summary. x.

(13) Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Research Area, Research Interest, and Research Topic The research area is based on military-society relations. Within that broad framework, the author’s particular interest is military sociology of the ROC armed forces. While there is a raft of potential for research into ROC military sociology, the author is primarily focused on the research topic of how self-identification impacts ROC citizens’ perceptions of the ROC military. 1.2 The Armed Forces of the Republic of China (ROC) The Armed Forces of the Republic of China (ROC) refers to the country’s Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Military Police Force. Originally called the National Revolutionary Army at its inception in 1925 in China, it was renamed the Republic of China Armed Forces with the 1947 promulgation of the ROC Constitution. Since 1949, the force’s primary goal was the ROC government’s objective of retaking the mainland (China) from the Communists. Known as Project National Glory, this imperative was front and center until the 1970s, and hence the deciding factor in determining force structure. As the military balance in the Taiwan Strait began to shift from one favoring the ROC to one favoring the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the focus of the ROC military began to shift to a defensive posture, defending the islands of Penghu, Quemoy, Matsu, and Taiwan (Formosa) from invasion by China’s People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA remains the predominant—indeed, the only—threat to the ROC today. While still the National Revolutionary Army, it was essentially the military arm of the Kuomintang (KMT). Even after becoming the ROC Armed Forces in 1947, and relocating to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC remained a de-facto one-party state ruled by the KMT, and the military remained essentially the KMT Army, with political indoctrination to ensure the loyalty of its members, and political officers and commissioners installed in each company’s unit to monitor that loyalty. 1 Due to cutbacks and a redefinition of its role, the political warfare department does not wield the power it once did, and political officers can no longer take over command of the unit in the name of ensuring loyalty to the government as they once could. As a result of this history, the military has long been regarded by most Minnan-speaking Taiwanese (those whose ancestors moved to the island from the 17th century, as opposed to the so-called Mainlanders who arrived from mainland China in following the 1949 KMT defeat at the hands of the Communists) as being very much the “KMT army.” The extent to which this perception persists is very much of interest when determining the civil-military relationship in Taiwan. Also because of this history, however, the ROC military has had far fewer of the problems associated with military interventions in politics, as has historically 1. This practice was employed initially by Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo as a means of ensuring loyalty to the KMT at a time when Communist agents and sympathizers routinely infiltrated the ranks of the armed forces, and entire frontline units have been known to have defected to the PRC.. 1.

(14) been the case in such democratized Asian states as Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, and Japan. Unlike these nations, there has never been an attempted military coup d’état in the ROC on Taiwan—a testament to the Chiang regime’s power and the tight control of its military. Thus, on the one hand, conditions exist for low popular regard for the military, especially as regards a military career, and yet the principle of civilian control over the military—a doctrine in military and political science—is perhaps stronger in Taiwan than in many comparable Asian states. In the 1970s, when first the United Nations, and later in the decade the United States, derecognized the ROC in favor of the PRC, the leadership in Taipei deemed—correctly—that anti-Communism would no longer be as strong a force for cementing alliances with the West as it had been up to that point, and so Chiang Ching-kuo began slowly to loosen the reins of the dictatorship which had theretofore been largely successful in repelling domestic calls for social liberalization and eventually democracy. In 1987, the 38 long years of Martial Law came to an end, and with it the White Terror period. Thus Taiwan became one of the nations that threw off the shackles of authoritarianism in the Third Wave of democratization that swept the globe. This democratization, along with the nation’s impressive economic growth—known as the Taiwan Miracle—served to create the conditions wherein rapid changes to the social structure and society’s values would take place. In the wake of the lifting of Martial Law, Taiwan saw enormous changes in almost all aspects, including the growth of a civil society, the widespread acceptance of Western liberal values, a thriving political environment wherein leaders vie for votes to represent their constituencies, and most recently, a deep belief among young people in social justice to the point where they are willing to take to the streets to protest unconstitutional actions on the part of government representatives (see Blundell 2012). Compared to the social landscape just three decades ago, it is a completely different Taiwan. Yet despite these fundamental changes, the security situation across the Taiwan Strait remains essentially unchanged. The PRC is still intent on annexing Taiwan and has yet to renounce the use of force as a means to that end. PLA missiles of the Second Artillery Force stand arrayed along China’s southern coast, with an estimated 1,600 targeting Taiwan at any one time. The faceoff across the strait is a product of the Cold War international order, and while the Cold War itself has long since ended, the situation in the Taiwan Strait remains very much the same, with the threat from China ever-present. The weapons used by Beijing to coerce Taipei into rapprochement have changed as China’s economic and military might have grown in recent decades. Whereas once, the PLA was essentially a large, technically unsophisticated standing army geared toward defense of China’s vast territory, the PRC’s rapid economic growth has enabled the purchase and theft through espionage of advanced weapons systems and technologies which have seen the PLA become a high-tech fighting force, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) move out of a focus on coastal defense to adopt not-so-far-fetched ambitions of one day fielding a blue-water navy. Moreover, following the doctrine of Unrestricted Warfare first enunciated by PLA colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, China has succeeded in creating the conditions whereby its economic and supply-chain integration with the economy of Taiwan can be used as a weapon to coerce capitulation. In addition to the economic sphere, Chinese attempts to effect rapprochement on Beijing’s terms take the form of manipulation in a number of fields, including ethno-cultural (promoting the idea that the Taiwanese are the descendants of Yan and Yellow Emperor), sophisticated electronics (PLA hackers are constantly launching cyber-attacks on the Taiwan government and corporate websites and servers, often as a means to test out new techniques before using them on targets in the United States), and covert 2.

(15) espionage (Chinese intelligence operatives have managed to turn many current and former military members, as well as civilians), among others. Moreover, the situation has become increasingly complicated as the ROC military’s erstwhile patron, the KMT, which was once seen as the anti-Communist party, has in recent years become the party most committed to eventual unification with Communist China. In recent years, under a KMT administration, the door has been opened to thousands of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan, direct flights have begun plying the airways between the two countries, and several deals have been signed.2 So there exists a situation in which Taiwan society has moved forward, both economically as well as politically, from dictatorship, through democratization, and into a truly open and free society dedicated to fairness and equality, and yet the security situation remains unchanged, with the threat of invasion remaining ever-present. As a result, the military tasked with confronting this threat has remained one of the largest social organs on the island resistant to change. Much has been made of the military culture in the ROC armed forces, how it is risk-averse and resistant to change. Yet change it must, if it is truly going to represent, as well as once again play an integral part in, the society it defends. ROC leaders understand that such change is necessary, and in an effort to remake the military into a social institution more in line with modern Taiwan society, an effort was launched in 2008 to transition to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Unfortunately, this effort failed, and during the eight years of the President Ma Ying-jeou administration, recruitment targets and deadlines for completion have consistently gone unmet, with the latest delay of AVF transition pushed off until beyond 2017 (McCauley 2016: 6). This research takes the view that, while the AVF transition is the wrong goal, the instinct for change and modernization is essentially correct. Thus the problem to be solved is how to establish a blueprint for a re-branded ROC military that continues to form a credible defense against China yet reflects the modern-day realities of contemporary Taiwan. In order to solve this problem, an assessment first must be made of the current state of the ROC military. Fortunately, military sociologists have developed tools for just such an assessment. 1.3 Structure The postmodern military model identifies three distinct stages in military transformation: the modern stage, the late modern stage, and the postmodern stage. Each stage is described and identified using 11 dimensions (see Table 1). In the dimension of threat perception, for example, a modern (pre-cold war / 1900-1945) military faces the threat of invasion by the standing army of an enemy state. A late modern (cold war / 1945-1990) military faces the threat of nuclear war. A postmodern (post-cold war / since 1990) military faces challenges such as terrorism, ethnic conflict, and other sub-national threats. In each of the 11 dimensions, the military of each stage is measurably different from the previous stage. The final dissertation consists of six chapters, including this introduction. Chapter two consists of the literature review with a focus on the main theoretical perspectives of the dissertation—in this case, the postmodern military model, as well as work on the question of 2. These include the controversial Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services and the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which has led to a drop in trade and a slide in Taiwan’s trade surplus with China (Turton 2016b).. 3.

(16) identity in Taiwan. In addition to the literature review chapter, a literature review of each topic is presented in the relevant sections as well, divided to cover the eleven dimensions of the PMMM. The third chapter covers the research methodology, offering a description of the survey instrument employed to obtain primary data in this investigation. Chapter four presents the findings of that research. Chapter five provides an analysis of the research findings and how it is relevant to an understanding of the ROC military employing the PMMM. It is divided into sections, with each section consisting of an assessment of the ROC military using one of the eleven dimensions of the model. Each of these thematic sections contains a look at the dimension itself as described by Moskos et al., a review of the dimension in the Taiwan context, a literature review relevant to that factor, and then an analysis of the findings of the current research as to how it adds to our understanding of this dimension of the military/society relationship in Taiwan. Finally, chapter six offers a discussion of the results and their implications for government policy, as well as an examination of the usefulness of this theoretical framework in the cross-strait scenario. It provides a roundup of the major findings vis-à-vis the theoretical application of the postmodern military model, looks at limitations of the research, suggests areas of further study, and concludes with suggestions for policy direction. 1.4 Relevance of the Current Research Very often in Taiwan, when a new government initiative or institutional body needs to be created, there is a tendency to look abroad for a template that can be applied. Due to its close historical relationship to Taiwan, especially during the post war era, the United States often serves as the source of that template, such as the ROC National Communications Commission.3 While this example is a relatively successful example of such transplantation, the situation regarding the military is quite different. The PMMM is an ideal tool with which to measure those differences and hence determine the applicability of the US example. As this research shows, there are significant differences in culture, circumstances, geopolitical currents and other divergent factors that conspire to make the American example one that is not directly applicable to implementation in Taiwan. Having said that, the time is also ripe for a change. Yet, the ROC military brass does not necessarily share this view. Indeed, one of the criticisms that has been levied against ROC military leaders is that they are highly cautious, conservative, and risk-averse (Tucker 2005: 157). Nevertheless, change there must be, as a recent case involving the death of a conscript due to harsh punishment at the hands of his superior officers demonstrates. One must ask the question, what is the place of the military in Taiwan society? That is an essential question that this dissertation will endeavor to clarify. 1.5 Summary of Research In order to understand the place of the ROC military in Taiwan society, this research project is aimed at studying the impact of self-identification on a variety of perceptions of the ROC 3. The ROC National Communications Commission was formed in 2006, and was directly patterned on the US Federal Communications Commission.. 4.

(17) military, according to the eleven dimensions of the PMMM, and to what degree the beliefs of Taiwan citizens about the ROC armed forces are colored by the way they identify ethnically, as either Chinese or Taiwanese (中國人 or 台灣人). The question of identity, and the various ways that is expressed, is central to any understanding of Taiwan society, and thus aspects of identity such as ethnic self-identification, as well as the associated issues of political party identification and vision of the future of Taiwan (especially as regards the independence vs. unification issue), are of paramount importance in any discussion of Taiwan society. They are therefore of no less importance in determining the state of civil-military relations in the country. Ultimately, this research is intended to provide policymakers within the ROC government and military with an understanding of the current military/society relationship, so that they may proceed with their efforts to create a more accountable military armed with knowledge and understanding. This is an especially urgent research problem given the ROC government’s policy goal of shifting to a ‘professional military’. Should that goal be pursued to completion, then the task of enticing the nation’s best and brightest high-school graduates to choose a career in the armed forces will become all the more difficult if the current low levels of morale continue to exist in the ranks. Before policymakers and officers can expect to be able to address the AVF issue, they must be made aware of the root causes the schism that exists between military and society. This is especially important at a time when the nation is looking towards instituting an all-volunteer force. The practical outcomes of research such as this will be important in that endeavor. Moreover, the outcomes of this research may also help theorists gain a better understanding of the dynamics of the famously elusive Taiwanese identity. 1.6 Practical and Theoretical Value of the Current Research This study is designed to have direct practical value to ROC military officers and government policymakers, especially those charged with charting the ideological course of the ROC armed forces. As it stands now, military culture in this country is extremely conservative and risk-averse, troop morale is low, and the public distrusts the neutrality of the armed forces (Swaine and Mulvenon 2001: 75). The training regimen and prevalent ideology within the Army may be a contributor to this phenomenon, as it potentially clashes with the ethnic loyalties of its members. Changing the ideological imprint of a large organization is a difficult prospect at best, and at worst an impossible undertaking. Moreover, the plan suffers from a lack of public interest, exacerbated by memories of the island’s militarized past, which conspire to stand in the way of effective military reform and development (see Setzekorn 2014). However, if sufficient political capital can be harnessed—building upon initial efforts to transfer over to a professional military—then it may become a unique opportunity to implement scientifically valid processes, right at the beginning, thus laying a foundation upon which the new military structure can build a healthy, effective fighting force that is in lockstep with the society it protects. Now is the time to undertake a thorough examination of conditions in the ROC military and society, determine the best course of action, and follow it. In addition to being of direct practical value, this study will make theoretical and conceptual contributions as well. Understanding the link between ethnic identification and perceptions of. 5.

(18) a large social institution such as the military has value beyond just a military setting, as well as in countries other than Taiwan. The dynamics in play in the phenomenon to be studied are not unlike those in several other countries around the world: specifically, ethnic identification in a non-homogeneous society. Moreover, the study’s conclusions include the observation that while Taiwan’s military scores in the higher level in some of the PMMM dimensions, it scores in the lower level in many others. Far from disqualifying the model as an analytical tool, it enhances its usefulness, provided the model is not employed as a predictive tool. The way the model has been employed to measure Taiwan’s military-society relationship may be used in other countries as well that do not themselves follow the Western pattern of development, but rather may be closer to what Taiwan has experienced.. 6.

(19) Chapter 2: Literature Review 2.1 Review of Literature A review of the literature on the main quantitative aspects of this dissertation provides support not only for the feasibility of the project but it reveals gaps that will be eliminated or reduced by this research. An examination of the research question, conceptual framework, and key study concepts, along with an integrated literature review, illustrate the usefulness and viability of this research project. The relevant literature published in English as well as that published in Chinese is reviewed in each section in order to better present the PMMM dimension that is the topic of that section and give a more complete account of how that topic contributes to an overall understanding of civil-military relations in the ROC. This dissertation presents a review of the literature in a way that is integrated, meaning that the literature review is provided in the sections of chapter five, which have been structured to follow the PMMM’s eleven dimensions. In this way, a more cohesive and coherent examination of each dimension may be presented to the reader. Literature of a more general nature and that concerning the key theoretical perspectives is presented in the paragraphs below. 2.2 Moskos’s Postmodern Military Model The postmodern military model (PMMM), promulgated by Moskos, Williams, and Segal, posits that militaries faced with a shift from the threat perception of enemy invasion or nuclear attack to primarily non-traditional threats such as terrorism and ethnic violence undergo changes to their force structure, personnel requirements, and their relationship to the wider society. This work is built upon the foundation established by Morris Janowitz, who in Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1960) famously used the techniques of social science to examine the relationship between the military establishment and civil society in the United States. Janowitz first commented on trends such as the trend toward a managerial-type officer and increasing civilianization that Moskos would build upon and include in the PMMM. The model was originally developed as a means of examining the changes taking place in the US military by establishing a framework for military transformation, from the mass standing army dedicated to war fighting that was marked by a different ethos than the civilian society which it was charged with protecting, to a more multi-purpose force marked by the professional soldier, more civilian interpenetration, and responding to a very different threat profile. The model is one of many competing paradigms for perceiving civil-military relations, including the Concordance Theory put forward by Rebecca L. Schiff, which posits that, contrary to views that the military and civilian spheres must necessarily be physically and ideologically separate from one another, they must forge a cooperative arrangement that diminishes the likelihood of domestic military intervention. Moreover, the civilian-military culture gap thesis, which gained currency at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s / early 1990s, looks at the transformation of the mission, composition, and character of the military, with specific regard to the existence of a cultural gap (i.e. the different values of civilians compared to soldiers) and a connectivity gap (i.e. there being little understanding between. 7.

(20) members in each of these two spheres), and how these differences could become a source of danger in society. While these and other theoretical constructs contribute to the understanding of civil military relations, none is as comprehensive as that of Moskos, and thus the PMMM was adopted for use in the present study. Moreover, the PMMM has been employed not just to describe conditions in America, as a means of studying the shifts that have been experienced by a number of militaries in various countries. An example is the shift that occurred in the Western nations in the post-Cold War era, becoming what Moskos et al. (2000) term “postmodern” militaries. Many militaries have undergone such a shift, primarily those of the Western European and North American nations, as they and their associated societies transitioned into the postmodern era. Thus in addition to being used as a descriptive tool to describe military transformation in these countries, it may also be applicable as a predictive tool to assess the state of civil-military relations in these and other countries. The questions of interest in the current study are how Taiwan’s military scores according to this theoretical framework, and indeed whether or not it is an appropriate predictive tool in Taiwan’s case. Moskos is one of the world’s foremost military sociologists and his theories have been essential in our understanding of civil-military relations, so it is important for planners and policymakers in Taiwan to take such scholarship into account as they see their society evolving toward postmodernism and attempt to push their military to follow. It is the author’s contention that efforts—in particular the desired transition to an all-volunteer force—are in essence attempts to follow a Western pattern of development that have been embarked upon without appropriate research, and so it stands to reason that the very theory that describes so well this pattern be used to assess the ROC military’s readiness for such a change. This dissertation poses several questions, including whether the postmodern military model is even applicable to the ROC Armed Forces; whether the transition to an all-volunteer force is appropriate; and what factors have contributed to civil-military relations in Taiwan. Moreover, while the postmodern military model is restricted to a consideration of a change of perceived threat as the core explanatory variable, the following research will supplement that analysis with an examination of the changes of political system, social values, and ethnic identification, and how these factors contribute to civil-military relations in the ROC. This dissertation is ground breaking in that, to date, very few Asian militaries have been examined using this analytical tool.. 8.

(21) Table 1: Dimensions of the Postmodern Military Model Dimension. Modern. Late Modern. Postmodern. (1900-1945). (1945 - 1990). (1990 -). Threat Perception. Enemy Invasion. Nuclear War. Subnational. Force Structure. Mass Army (Conscription). Large Professional. Small Professional. Mission Definition. Homeland Defense. Alliance Support. MOOTW. Mil. Professional. Combat Leader. Manager / Technician. Soldier-statesman / Scholar. Public Attitude. Supportive. Ambivalent. Indifferent. Media Relations. Incorporated. Manipulated. Courted. Civilian employees. Minor. Medium. Major. Women’s Role. Excluded or separate. Partial integration. Full integration. Spouses. Integral. Partial involvement. Removed. Homosexuals. Punished. Discharged. Accepted. Conscientious Objection. Limited. Permitted. Civilian Service. In determining how the ROC military fits into the definition of a modern, late-modern or postmodern military according to the theoretical construct developed by Moskos et al. (2000), an assessment must be made of the 11 distinct dimensions of the model (see Table 1). The model has been applied to a study of the ROC military before, in a dissertation by Chia-sheng. 9.

(22) Chen (2009), who used it as a framework to explain the organizational changes witnessed by the ROC military since 1949 and illustrate how this transformation was associated with Taiwan’s democratization, economic growth, and foreign military assistance. Chen concluded that the ROC military exhibited the characteristics of a late-modern military. In detailing the transformation of the ROC military, Chen identified four discrete stages of Taiwan’s political-military development. First is the joint defense stage (1949-1978), dominated by the US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty. Following this, the self-defense stage (1979-1986) saw a shift of responsibility for Taiwan’s defense fall squarely on the ROC’s shoulders, with little to no assistance from the international community. Next is the democratization stage (1987-1996), marked by changes in military organization in response to wider social shifts. Finally, the democracy stage (1997 to present) saw a series of changes to ROC military culture and organization, influenced by the transfer of political power in 2000 and other democratic and social forces. These distinct stages, or eras, are a useful hermeneutic tool and will be referenced in this study. 2.3 PMMM Dimensions There are several dimensions for which public perception is extremely helpful in making a determination as to their place on the PMMM spectrum. Moreover, most assessments that have come before have not incorporated survey data on public attitudes, rather providing an assessment based on other measures—such as military members’ attitudes, for example, or an analysis of laws and regulations. This approach, while adequate, would only benefit from incorporating public perceptions, and this is the best way to develop an appreciation for the state of civil military relations. 2.3(i)Perceived Threat The relationship between a nation’s military and the wider society is greatly influenced by the perceived threat. Not only does the threat of war—from what likely enemy or enemies, what sort of war, how imminent is the threat, and other similar factors defining said threat—contribute greatly to the structure and operation of the military tasked to defend against it, but it is ever-present in the minds of the nation’s civilian population as well. As such, it is a defining factor in society-military relations, and the first listed by Moskos et al. (2000) in enunciating the postmodern military model (PMMM). In the modern military—that which existed primarily in the pre-Cold War period, from roughly 1900 to the end of the Second World War in 1945—the threat that was most commonly perceived was invasion. Indeed, since man first raised sticks and rocks to take that which was his neighbor’s, the threat of invasion of one’s territory (or later, that of a political ally) has been the main concern of statesmen and military commanders seeking strategies for defense. Naturally, this necessitated (both for the defenders as well as the aggressors) large standing armies for much of this period, influenced as time progressed by advances in weaponry and tactics. Societies, still largely agrarian, lived in constant proximity to the threat of foreign armies marching in, with the risk that their farmland would become battlefields. This calculus changed greatly in the Cold War as the nature of the perceived threat evolved from one of invasion to the specter of nuclear war. The early twentieth century witnessed 10.

(23) mankind’s great technological leaps forward and advances in industrial-scale production turned to the practice of war, making it possible for the old paradigm of armed invasion to be conducted on a scale never before imagined, in terms not only of speed and efficiency, but also of body counts. Not only did the savagery of the Great War, and after it the Second World War, usher in new aspirations for nationhood (in the form of the European Union and other transnational regional groupings predicated on a new conception of the values of national sovereignty), they spurred scientific and technological development in the manufacture of weapons that would change the threat perception of nations forever: they led to the development of nuclear weapons. At first, atomic weapons were little more than a terrifyingly effective bomb, with admittedly previously unseen side effects in the form of radiation and fallout. Once both sides in the bipolar world order that coalesced after WWII had acquired not only the weapons but systems capable of delivering them to enemy territory across great distances, the primary threat to nations, their militaries and their societies became that of a nuclear attack. Peace—or at the very least, the absence of open hostilities—during this era was predicated on a precarious balance perhaps best described by the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD); nuclear weapons are so deadly and so terrifying, and there are so many of them ready for deployments against the United States and her allies as well as against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that any first strike would be quickly followed up by a conflagration capable of effectively destroying both sides. Societies on either side of the iron curtain were acutely aware of the deadly potentialities of nuclear war—made so by their respective governments not only as a means to ensure that protective measures could be performed, but more importantly as a means of building nationalist-based support for the political and military regime, and against the much-feared enemy. This dynamic defined perceived threat during the late modern military, lasting from roughly 1945 to 1990. This tenuous balance, predicated on MAD, saw the world survive to the end of the cold war, pegged at approximately 1990, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. After a short period during which the Western nations enjoyed a peace dividend marked by lower defense spending and the spread of democratic institutions abroad with an almost missionary zeal, a new threat perception emerged, and one that was so terrifying and chaotic that many longed for the simpler days of the Cold War threat of nuclear annihilation. This new and current threat perception is, of course, terrorism and other sub-national threats. This threat, while present, was largely poorly perceived by society in general until the attacks on September 11, 2001. As much as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, this event was a game-changer in terms of threat perception by Americans, and to a lesser degree by nations around the globe. In addition to terrorism, other aspects of sub national threats include ethnic conflicts, such as the Balkanization of the former Yugoslavia early in the postmodern era, or the attempted genocides and ethnic cleansing perpetrated on ethnic groups in Rwanda, for example, and the Central African Republic, giving lie to the international community's post-WWII vow of “never again.” No longer is the threat of nuclear annihilation society’s boogeyman, unless it pertains to the possible use of a dirty-bomb by an otherwise technologically unsophisticated terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, or one of the domestic so-called lone-wolf terrorists inspired and sometimes supported by groups such as these. Moreover, with the threat perception being dominated by terrorism, it takes the impetus for the buildup to a war out of the hands of high politics and delivers it into the hands of jihadists and—as perceived by citizens in the West—madmen. War no longer is primarily an extension of politics, to 11.

(24) paraphrase von Clausewitz, but the whim of a madman. Thus, the lack of any guiding logic behind the decision to wage war creates an even deeper sense of loss of control on the part of the citizen, and an ever-greater respect for the soldier to put himself in harm’s way in a war in which the other side famously takes no prisoners, unless it is for a subsequent videotaped beheading, and is not bound by the Geneva Conventions. 2.3(ii) Force Structure Force structure is an important aspect of determining whether a military falls into the category of postmodern. It is concerned with the allocation of officers and men and the relationship between military units; it is influenced by the threat perception and designed to meet the established mission requirements. When threat perception is dominated by the threat of invasion, as during the modern era (roughly 1900-1945), a military is concerned primarily with the size of its standing army. This usually means the conscription of all or most of a nation’s able-bodied young men for a period of national service. The practice of conscription is by no means a product of the modern-era army, but rather one that goes back, in Western tradition, to the Babylonian Empire and, in the East, to the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC). Indeed, even the pre-Qin era saw forced conscription in areas where peasants were recruited to fill out the ranks. In addition to serving a year in the military police, or "Zheng Zu 正卒", to defend the Qin capital Xianyang, young conscripts (those aged 23 and up were eligible for the draft) were also required to serve for a year defending the frontier as a garrison troop, or "Shu Zu 戍卒". This is in addition to the month-long duty "Geng Zu 更卒 ", defending one’s home county (睡虎地秦墓竹簡). By the age of the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE), this system largely continued as described above, with another parallel system evolving, in which all men aged between 15 years and 56 years were subject to a system of corvée, or unpaid labor, one month per year. This system was discontinued in the Three Kingdoms Period (CE 220–280) in favor of private regional militias (shibingzhi 世兵制"), or hereditary conscription, wherein local governors could raise an army through recruitment of professional soldiers and prisoners of war. While there remained some press-ganging, peasants were largely freed of the obligation to take up arms. The Sui dynasty (581–618 AD) and Tang dynasty (AD 618-906) employed a practice called the FuBing militia system (府兵制), in which men between the ages of 21 and 60 would serve as a soldier (for a period of time determined by their distance from the capital) and, while not serving, they would work parcels of land which they had been assigned. It was during the Tang dynasty that an official, Duke Wenzhen of Yan (燕文貞公), initiated an end to conscription due to the rampant abuses perpetrated upon the soldiers and their families, and the widespread desertion that occurred as a result. He favored a system of recruitment of a professional armed forces, paid higher salaries, and employing such managed to fill out the ranks. In one form or another, conscription was practiced by the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties, as well as the Modern-era Republican army, which was founded in 1925 as the National Revolutionary Army and was essentially the military wing of the Kuomintang 12.

(25) (KMT). From 1927 to 1937, the ROC Armed Forces went through a period of modernization made possible due to assistance from foreign—mostly German—military advisors, including Max Bauer, Hans von Seeckt, and Alexander von Falkenhausen, who helped to reorganize ROC forces along the German model. These German advisors recommended that the large standing army4 be replaced with a more professional type of soldier. For one thing, German military thinkers of the day were averse to the use of the very sort of large, conscription-based land forces that were heavily favored by Chinese military planners, and the advisors failed to implement this change. It would not be until 2008 that the ROC military would again seriously consider transforming from a draft-based force to one built upon professional soldiering. Thus, up to and during the modern era (1900-1945), the ROC military followed the model described by Moskos et al. and concerned itself mainly with fronting a large standing army. Even such conscript armies, it should be noted, rely on a core group of professional soldiers in the officer class, but most importantly in the class of non-commissioned officers (usually sergeants and above) to provide guidance, cohesion and stability. Moreover, even conscript armies require some professional soldiers in certain trades that required technical proficiency. During the Cold War, late-modern (1945-1990) militaries generally shifted their force structure somewhat—armed forces were still large in terms of troop numbers, but they were increasingly professional. With the shift in threat perception from invasion to nuclear attack, and with the advancements made in weapons systems and military strategy during and after World War II, nations required more from their soldiers than simply being proficient with a gun. During this period, many nations made the shift to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), recruiting a higher-caliber, better-motivated serviceman, especially in trades that required technical specialization. By the Postmodern era (1990-), most of those nations that had managed to avoid making the AVF transition found it amenable to do so, with the end of the Cold War and a redefinition of the threat perception. The new threat of sub-national, largely ethnic-based, violence and the rise of Islamic terrorism demanded a new force structure. The requirement for professionalism in the armed services was even more pronounced, only sizes became smaller. To engage in peacekeeping deployments under the UN umbrella, and to fight jihadists in the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan, what were needed were greater numbers of the very type of special-forces soldiers that were the exception rather than the rule during the Cold War. The postmodern soldier is often deployed on missions requiring his interaction with people of different cultures and values, who speak another language and may be embroiled in a struggle involving religious or ethnic conflicts. This requires not only a higher standard in recruitment, but a higher level of training in order to handle such challenges (Costa 2016: 226). 2.3(iii) Major Mission Definition The major mission definition is a critical aspect of any determination of whether a particular nation’s military has reached the postmodern stage. As a reflection of, and reaction to, the perceived threat, as well as a major contributing factor in decisions related to force structure,. 4. This large standing army was made up largely of unskilled, illiterate commoners, many of whom were press-ganged from among the armies of defeated warlords.. 13.

(26) a military’s main mission definition is intrinsically tied in with the military’s sense of itself, and therefore with its place in the larger society. In the modern era (roughly 1900-1945)—and indeed, for much of history leading up to that era—the major mission definition of a military was one of homeland defense. This reflects the threat being primarily one of invasion and the force structure being a large standing army fed by conscription. In the late modern (cold war / 1945-1990) military, the major mission definition changed to reflect the realities of that age, and became one of alliance support. As described by Moskos et al., the postmodern (post-cold war / since 1990) military is marked by a subsequent shift from a mission definition based on alliance-support to one based on a host of new types of mission theretofore largely unseen. These include peacekeeping operations, international Humanitarian assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and other non-combat specific taskings grouped under the category of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). 2.3(iv) Dominant Military Professional The postmodern military is marked by shifts in perceived threat, from one predicated on nuclear attack to a host of threats at the sub-national level including terrorist attacks and ethnic violence. This naturally necessitates a re-evaluation of the major mission definition and hence a redrawing of the nation’s force structure in order to accomplish that mission. It stands to reason therefore that the dominant military professional will likewise undergo a shift in order to exercise the most effective leadership in the new military/threat environment. Moskos et al. identified how the focus of the dominant military professional changed from the modern (pre-cold war / 1900-1945) period from one of a combat leader proficient in the art of war and in exercising effective leadership under combat conditions, to a more managerial role in the late modern (cold war / 1945-1990) military, and thence to a skill set heavy on diplomacy and scholarship in the postmodern (post-cold war / since 1990) era. It stands to reason that, for much of human history, the best military leaders have been those most capable of fighting and winning wars, with little focus on—indeed, with little need for—the skills of the technician or the diplomat. From Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus to Vice Admiral Horatio Lord Nelson; from Xiang Yu to Sun Tzu; military leaders of the pre-modern period were renowned for their leadership, tactics, and warfighting prowess, and earned promotion and glory on that basis. This continued into the modern period, coming to an end only with the Cold War. This new threat, and hence the new means of fighting the threat of nuclear war, demanded new skills: relatively few conventional wars were waged compared to in previous eras, at least by the global superpowers holding large stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and so as a means of earning promotion, glory on the battlefield gave way to technological and administrative proficiency, befitting the new era of technological weaponry that had become the decisive factor in defeating the enemy. This shift is perhaps best described by Janowitz (1960). In the postmodern military, the skills that lead to success and promotion, as identified by Moskos et al., are those of the soldier-scholar and the soldier-statesman. This is especially important in the realm of civil-military relations, where military leaders must handle such challenges as dealing with a free and independent media, or navigating the intricacies of international relations.. 14.

(27) 2.3(v) Public Attitude Toward the Military At the very heart of the issue of civil-military relations is the public attitude toward the military. Regardless of whether there is civilian leadership of the armed forces, or a significant public-relations effort being made to humanize the army and those serving in it, the bottom line comes back to just how the members of the public perceive of the military, and what are their feelings toward it. This is an important variable in the work of Moskos et al. as they sought to examine and define the postmodern military concept, and it is arguably one over which military and political leaders have the least control. Indeed, it is the sum and the result of the other factors combined, and hence one that requires close study. As a nation’s military shifts from the modern to the late-modern, and thence to the postmodern, model of armed forces, the national public’s attitude towards the military likewise changes. In the modern (pre-cold war / 1900-1945) military, the public is supportive of the military. The dominant perceived threat—one of enemy invasion—is felt keenly by the population at large, and hence there is often a sense of admiration and respect for those warriors who put themselves in harm’s way to protect the nation. Moreover, there is often a policy of universal conscription in effect during this phase, and therefore a greater portion of the population familiar—and therefore sympathetic—with the realities of military life and service. By the late modern (cold war / 1945-1990) period, the public becomes more ambivalent about the military. Support remains, but it is not as strong, with anti-military sentiments appearing in some parts of society, such as academia and among the intelligentsia. By the postmodern (post-cold war / since 1990) era, the public attitude towards the military is largely one of indifference. By this phase, many Western nations had completed their transition to the all-volunteer force, and the military life is distinct and separate from society at large, with the realities of that lifestyle largely alien to much of the population. This lack of familiarity helps create a gulf between military and society, with much less overlap than in previous generations. A good indicator of how the public views the military can be seen in portrayals of military personnel in popular media. During the modern era and immediately afterward, military personnel are largely treated as heroes in movies and television programs: though not exclusively so, this was a trend. American movies—especially science-fiction movies—of the 1950s and early 1960s largely treated soldiers as the saviors and problem solvers while depicting scientists as, if not the antagonists, the inadvertent catalysts for death and destruction through the technology that they unleash. High-profile examples include The Thing from Another World (1951), and the superb Forbidden Planet (1956). These and like films met the public’s desire to see ordinary people, and in many cases ordinary soldiers (much as their sons, fathers, and brothers had been in WWII) defeat the figure of the mad scientist—itself a caricature that fed into the public’s distrust of intellectuals and scientists who had been responsible for unleashing, respectively, Communism and nuclear bombs upon the world. Moreover, the monsters in many films of the era were the explicit by-product of nuclear radiation, most famously in the form of the immensely popular Godzilla movies. Much has been written about the famous movie monster’s popularly as a reflection of Japan’s anxiety’s about the destructiveness of nuclear technology. It is interesting to note that as the modern military model gave way to the late-modern, and the dominant military professional shifted from one of combat leader to technician, this shift is evident in popular media, especially in films that portray the military in a generally positive 15.

(28) light. 1986’s Top Gun, for example, had as its heroes pilots, or Naval Aviators, as opposed to the platoon commander or junior officer. Unlike Top Gun, which received support from the US Navy in exchange for input in how the Navy was depicted, most American films of the era were critical of the military; a reflection of the public’s lingering shame over both the war in Vietnam and how its veterans were treated upon their return. By the postmodern period, the depiction of military personnel has largely degenerated into, as Moskos terms it, buffoonish characters, and in many cases outright antagonists. Moskos mentions Broken Arrow (1996) and The Rock (1996) as famous examples of popular films in which military officers act, essentially, like terrorists. In both cases, it is the lone hero who saves the day. Today, it is rare that a film with a military component is made in which the military itself, or the government, are not the antagonists. A good illustration of this sift is in the big-screen franchise that is an adaptation of the Mission: Impossible television series from the 1960s and early 1970s. In that program, the heroes are government agents (though never explicitly stated, likely CIA) who use sleight of hand, elaborate deception, and grifting techniques to advance America’s interests in the world (and at home) by foiling the plots of Communist regimes, South-American dictatorships, and organized crime syndicates. The assignments, famously delivered clandestinely via tiny, self-destructing tapes hidden around Los Angeles, were never questioned, nor the rightness of the heroes’ actions. In contrast, the big-budget films produced by and starring Tom Cruise almost uniformly have as their villains members of the same government organization for which the heroes work. The Bourne films—adaptations of the Robert Ludlum series—are no different, with the CIA being the ultimate baddies. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find a military-themed movie made by Hollywood that isn’t either critical of the military as an institution or having the villain somewhere higher up in the chain of command. Otherwise, such films would be deemed overly jingoistic and therefore anathema to the sensibilities of much of the nation’s media elites. 2.3(vi) Media Relations The media can be viewed as the communal space through which members of a society interact: it provides the population with a window on the world, and a recounting—and increasingly, analysis—of events taking place within the nation itself. This continues to be true even in the Internet age, especially if one considers social media (as well as bloggers and other non-traditional news sources) as a mere technological advance of the same social institution. Thus the media’s relationship with and position towards the military is an extremely important factor in assessing a nation’s civil-military relations. Due to forces of change within the military, as well as within the media organizations themselves, this relationship has undergone a radical shift in the past century. The modern (pre-cold war / 1900-1945) military enjoyed a cordial relationship with the media: they collaborated to achieve the same goals much of the time. Moskos et al. describe how the American media was essentially incorporated into the US military: citing the need for operational security, the military would routinely censor news reports, and for its part, the media accepted this state of affairs, with members of the press corps being commissioned military members and sometimes wearing uniforms. This was a time before the advent of globalization and the type of multinational media corporations that are the norm today: a. 16.